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30 January 2024

Excellency,

The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2723 (2024) today regarding the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The detailed observations of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding this Resolution have already been conveyed verbally and in writing (see annex) to the Presidency of the Security Council.

Upon instructions from my Government, I would like to underline, once again, the views of the Turkish Cypriot side *vis-à-vis* the issue of consent as well as the modalities of the operations of UNFICYP within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As you are well aware, in line with Resolution 2436 (2018), which is also referred to in the present Resolution, one of the governing principles of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world is the requirement that the consent of all parties to the dispute is sought and obtained. In a similar vein, it is also clearly stated in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), “...*that consent of the local parties and impartiality [...] should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping.*” Thus, UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties. Otherwise, UNFICYP not only puts into question its impartiality, but also “*risks becoming a party to the conflict*”, as stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines. Indeed, the principle of consent is also fundamental to the UN Secretary-General’s good offices mission which treats the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides on the island on an equal footing. Furthermore, since political processes are directly interlinked with peacekeeping operations, refraining from seeking the consent of one of the sides in relation to UNFICYP would also constitute a serious shortcoming in this regard.

In view of the above, it should be recalled that there are two sovereign States, two jurisdictions and two territories on the island of Cyprus, and that in the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus where its Government is the sole competent authority, UNFICYP can only operate with its permission and consent. As will be recalled, the necessity to seek and obtain the consent of each side is also manifested by the separate and simultaneous referenda held on both sides of the island in April 2004 on the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan on Cyprus (a.k.a. the Annan Plan). It is long overdue that the relevant references in the resolutions on UNFICYP are brought in line with this reality.

H.E. Mr. Nicolas de Rivière
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of France
to the United Nations
President of the Security Council
for the month of January 2024
New York.

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Needless to say, the consent for the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP sought and obtained prior to the adoption of the Resolution 2723 (2024) from the Greek Cypriot side, which purports to be the long-defunct "Government of Cyprus", only covers the operations of UNFICYP in South Cyprus. In view of this fact, I feel obliged to state that while UNFICYP personnel have operated to this date within the territory of the TRNC as a gesture of the good-will of the Turkish Cypriot side and with the permission of our Government, there is no doubt that our current relationship with UNFICYP is not sustainable and cannot continue "business as usual". In view of the foregoing, UNFICYP's continued lack of sincere engagement with our authorities with a view to developing the modalities of its operations in the TRNC within a reasonable time frame will leave us with no option but to reconsider our approach towards this issue.

I would be grateful if this letter as well as its annex, enclosed herewith, could be circulated to the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Mehmet Dâna
Representative

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TURKISH CYPRIOT VIEWPOINT

On the Extension of the Mandate of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council (January 2024)

PP1, PP4, OP1: During and after the informal 5+UN meeting and all of his subsequent UNFICYP and Good Offices Mission reports, the UN Secretary-General has been refraining from making reference to any particular settlement framework in Cyprus with a view to not jeopardizing the deliberations aimed at determining whether there exists a common ground between the two sides. We expected that the Council would show the same sensitivity in this regard. However, the Council once again insisted on making references to the repeatedly failed and thus exhausted framework of the past as well as the “existing body of work” which is no longer relevant. Therefore, references to the “bi-zonal, bi-communal framework” need to be deleted as; this model has been tried and categorically failed numerous times during more than 50 years of negotiations and totally collapsed in Crans-Montana in 2017, there is no consensus between the two sides on this framework, the responsibility for finding a solution lies first and foremost with the two sides (PP2) and the two sides in Cyprus should be able to freely negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement (OP2). In the light of these realities, the two sides should be given sufficient space to engage in negotiations on a new basis with a view to establishing a cooperative relationship between the two existing States, upon the formal acknowledgement of their inherent rights, namely sovereign equality and equal international status. Accordingly, reference made to the outdated and obsolete Security Council Resolution 1251 (1999) should also be deleted.

PP3, PP5, OP3: The Turkish Cypriot side has supported from the very first day the proposal of the Secretary-General to appoint a Personal Envoy to explore whether or not common ground exists between the two sides in Cyprus. Therefore, we welcome the appointment of María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General and express our readiness to engage with her sincerely on the basis of her agreed mandate during her six-month tenure. However, contradictory references in the Resolution create an implication as if the Security Council is expecting the Personal Envoy to engage in an activity in line with the exhausted formula, thus placing a pre-condition for her mandate. Therefore, all references linking her mandate with the exhausted parameters should be removed in order allow her enough space to freely exercise her duties.

PP6, OP13, OP14

The call of the Council to de-escalate tensions in and around the buffer zone should have been directly made to the Greek Cypriot side who bears the sole responsibility for the provocative actions that have raised tension in and around the buffer zone.

In this regard, it should be underlined that despite the calls made by the Security Council and the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriot side continues its major military isolations in and along the buffer zone, such as installation of concrete firing positions (S/2024/12, para 20) the number of which has increased to 327 in the latest reporting period and the 14 km long unauthorized concertina wire fence placed by the Greek Cypriot side (the majority of which falls within the buffer zone) (S/2024/12, para 17). Hence, we reject in

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toto each and every claim of “*move forward violations across the northern ceasefire line*”. The fact that there is no direct reference even to major Greek Cypriot violations in and along the buffer zone such as the above-mentioned placement of 327 military bunkers and 14 km long concertina wire is yet another proof of the double standards employed in the draft resolution.

While we note that the Council continues the practice of indirect references to these gross violations by referring to the relevant paragraphs of the Secretary-General’s UNFICYP reports, considering the scale of these violations, they should have been clearly mentioned in the resolution. As can be seen from the actions taken in this regard by the Greek Cypriot side during the reporting period, refraining from directly referring to these gross violations served no purpose but to embolden the perpetrator for further and bolder violations in and along the buffer zone. In the interest of objective reporting as well as reducing the tension along the buffer zone, the resolution should have clearly called on the Greek Cypriot side for the immediate removal of these military installations.

In the same paragraphs, although there are references to unauthorized construction in the buffer zone, there is once again no mention of the unauthorized university as well as the constructions associated with it in Pile/Pyla. The said university, the constructions associated with it as well as its operation continues to operate without any authorization by UNFICYP as stated again in the said report. There is also no reference in the draft resolution to the completion of the construction of an open air cinema at the southeast of Derinya crossing point (border) in the buffer zone, where the Greek Cypriot side created a *fait accompli* and once again violated the status of the buffer zone.

PP7, OP4 OP15 and OP18: First and foremost, it should be underlined that fenced-off area of Maraş (Varosha) and Akyar (Strovilia) are within the borders of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and thus fall outside the scope of UNFICYP’s authority. Therefore, the references and calls in these paragraphs are unwarranted. It should be noted that the steps taken by the TRNC in the fenced-off area of Maraş are in line with international law and protect property rights. It is disappointing that the Council once again overlooked these realities and opted to echo the fabrications of the Greek Cypriot leadership disseminated to misguide the international community.

In July 2021, TRNC Government lifted the military zone status of a pilot area which corresponds to %3.4 of the fenced-off area Maraş. The purpose of this decision was to enable the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) to process property claims, as this was previously not possible due to the military status of the area. Majority of the Greek Cypriots welcomed and supported this decision and indeed the number of applications to the IPC regarding this pilot area in particular and the fenced-off area of Maraş in general have considerably increased thereafter.

IPC was established by the TRNC in 2005 and is recognized as an effective domestic remedy by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) with the authority to deal with applications and deliver decisions on the property claims by providing remedies in the form of restitution, compensation and/or exchange. For the pilot area in question, the IPC is now able to process and decide on the applications in the form of one of the remedies in place.

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namely, compensation, exchange and in particular restitution. Therefore, all the steps that have been taken in the fenced-off area of Maraş by TRNC are in line with international law and respect the property rights. TRNC views its decisions in relation to the fenced-off area of Maraş as a humanitarian act which will be economically beneficial to both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples. Thus, we strongly reject the misguided and factually wrong references to the fenced-off area of Maraş in the resolution and believe that they should have been deleted altogether.

Furthermore, the fact that the Secretary-General clearly underlined in his latest Report on UNFICYP (S/2024/12, para 14) that “*UNFICYP did not observe any significant change*” in the above-mentioned area, is yet another proof that the references made in this regard are baseless, arbitrary and unwarranted, and is yet another proof that the Council has chosen to reflect the fabrications of the Greek Cypriot propaganda machinery in relation to the matter rather than the realities on the ground.

PP10: Regarding the issue of irregular migration, we give great importance to this global challenge and recently proposed to form an effective mechanism with the participation of the two sides on this matter that requires island-wide cooperation. Unfortunately, rather than allowing the establishment of an effective mechanism to tackle this humanitarian issue in a meaningful manner, the Greek Cypriot side prefers to utilize it as a political propaganda tool by falsely blaming our authorities and Türkiye at every possible forum. Rather than making a general call regarding the need to adhere to applicable international law, we expected the Security Council to highlight the urgent need for the two sides on the island to cooperate on this all-too-important issue and to make a strong call in this direction.

PP11: While the Council took note of the widening socio-economic disparity between the two sides in Cyprus, *alas*, without using the correct terminology, it is disappointing that the real reason for the widening socio-economic disparity between the two sides, namely the decades-old unjust and inhuman isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people, has not been mentioned. Furthermore, in the resolution, no remedy was suggested to overcome this disparity. Needless to say, immediate, concrete and sustained action is required to alleviate this unjust situation. As also underlined in the resolution, this disparity results in the deterioration of trust between the two sides, and thus constitutes a major impediment before the prospects of a fair and sustainable agreement in Cyprus. Unfortunately, the wording in the Security Council resolution fails to reflect the urgency and the gravity of this humanitarian issue.

Lifting the unnecessary restrictions on the Turkish Cypriots in all aspects of life would not only end this gross human rights violation that has been going on for decades, but also create an environment conducive to efforts towards a freely negotiated and mutually acceptable agreement. Additionally, it would ensure the sustainability of a future agreement in Cyprus by establishing socio-economic equilibrium between the two sides. Therefore, the Council should not only acknowledge the existence of this widening socio-economic disparity but also seek ways to effectively address its root cause.

In this regard, the issue of the unjust isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people has been omitted yet again in the present Resolution. Almost twenty years have elapsed since

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the Report of the then UN Secretary-General to the Security Council dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), where it was clearly stated that “*there exists no rationale for pressuring and isolating the Turkish Cypriots*”. The imbalance created by the perpetuation of the isolation exacerbates the deep crisis of confidence between the two peoples and the two sides in Cyprus.

PP12 PP14 & OP7 (a,b,c): The Greek Cypriot side has been refraining from cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot side for a long time. However, cooperation, including civilian and policing matters, are necessary for addressing island-wide matters and building trust between the two sides on the island, paving the way for a negotiated agreement. Therefore, the calls in the relevant paragraphs should not have been limited to contact and communication, but also to effective cooperation between the two sides, with a view to encouraging the Greek Cypriot side towards this end.

Furthermore, it must be underlined that the only way to prompt such direct cooperation between the two sides is for the international actors to engage with the Turkish Cypriot side in a similar fashion, setting up an example for the Greek Cypriot side in this regard. Accordingly, while the latest UNFICYP Report of the Secretary-General (S/2024/12 para 75) underlines the fact that the so-called “*concerns about recognition should not in themselves constitute an obstacle to increased cooperation.*”, it is difficult to understand why the same reasoning cannot be true in establishing relations between the Turkish Cypriot people and the international community.

PP15 and PP17: As regards references to the so-called “*Government of Cyprus*”, it should be recalled that the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot partner in 1963. Since then, there has not been a joint administration capable of representing the whole of Cyprus, either legally or factually. Each side has since ruled itself, while the Greek Cypriot side has continued to claim that it is the “*Government of Cyprus*”. The separate and simultaneous referenda held on 24 April 2004 on the Comprehensive Settlement Plan (a.k.a. the Annan Plan) of the then UN Secretary-General has highlighted, once again, the fact that the island of Cyprus comprises two distinct peoples and administrations. Hence, this reference is unacceptable. The reference to the “*Government of Cyprus*” in and of itself is a sufficient reason for us to reject the resolution *in toto*.

It should be recalled that in line with the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report, 2000), as well as Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018), the consent and approval of all concerned parties constitute a bedrock principle of all peacekeeping operations and is necessary for their success. This principle undoubtedly applies to the operations of UNFICYP as well, which has to cooperate with the two sides in Cyprus. The reference in PP15 only to the agreement of the Greek Cypriot administration under its purported title as the so-called “*Government of Cyprus*” regarding the extension of the presence of UNFICYP clearly contradicts the aforementioned principle. In the absence of consent of both sides in Cyprus, UNFICYP *is not a party to the conflict*” as stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.

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The Turkish Cypriot side has repeatedly put on record the need to establish a formal agreement/framework which outlines the modalities of the relationship between UNFICYP and our authorities. This could be in the form of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or another mutually acceptable format. There is no doubt that our current relationship with UNFICYP is not sustainable and cannot continue “business as usual”. We once again underline the urgent need to conclude an agreement on this issue with UNFICYP without further delay.

OP2: We note that the Council once again underlined the fact that a settlement should be freely negotiated and mutually acceptable. However, it continues to make reference in the same paragraph to “*further rounds of informal talks*” which has become completely irrelevant and obsolete particularly following the appointment of a Personal Envoy by the Secretary-General.

OP5: Construction of a road between Yiğitler and Pile has been on the agenda of the TRNC for the past 25 years, where the Turkish Cypriot side has communicated the need for this humanitarian project on numerous occasions to UNFICYP, to no avail. While the Greek Cypriot residents of the village can enter and exit the Greek Cypriot Administration without hindrance and are afforded the undue advantage of not being subject to any kind of control or restrictive measures during their travel, the Turkish Cypriot residents of the village use Beyarmudu crossing point, which is under the control of the Sovereign British Base Areas (SBA) authorities, when entering and exiting from the Pile village, meaning that they are subject to controls by SBA every time they enter and exit their own village. The Yiğitler-Pile road project does not entail any territorial or military motives, nor does it aim to alter the status quo of the buffer zone. Its sole purpose is to ease the lives of Turkish Cypriot residents of Pile. It is important to note that in 1996 the Greek Cypriot side monopolized the Pile section of the road in question and constructed the Larnaca – Dhekelia – Ayia Napa road, which even passes through land with Turkish title-deeds, as well as the Pile – Oroklini road which also passes through the buffer zone. None of these road constructions were physically stopped by UNFICYP.

In view of the foregoing, the main reason which led to the unfortunate event in August, during which people on both sides (Turkish Cypriot side and UNFICYP) suffered some minor injuries, is the unprecedented decision of UNFICYP to physically intervene in a humanitarian project. The wording in the Resolution is clearly aimed at diverting the attention from this fact by unfairly trying to put the blame on the Turkish Cypriot side. Indeed, the Council had already unfairly used the word “*condemnation*” in a statement issued in August. Its insistence to reiterate it after more than five months is totally unwarranted and unacceptable and is yet another indication that the sole aim is to divert the attention from the fact that UNFICYP bears the sole responsibility for what happened on that day.

The language of the Resolution on this issue also does not respect the wording of the understanding reached between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot side. The reference made to “*Pyla/Pile plateau*” (which should have been replaced with “*the area of Pyla/Pile*”

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in line with the agreed wording of the understanding) in the resolution clearly distorts as well as misrepresents the understanding.

In addition, referring to the so-called “emergence of new issues” as the main reason for the current stalemate in Pile is also a clear distortion of facts. The main reason for the problems we had in the implementation of the understanding is again the mishandling of the matter by UNFICYP which concluded two separate and clearly contradicting understandings with the two sides. There should be no surprise that these contradictions surfaced during the implementation phase. Thus, it is the mishandling of the matter by UNFICYP and not the “*emergence of new issues*” that led to the current deadlock.

In view of the foregoing, the word “condemnation” used by the Council in relation to the unfortunate events that took place in Pile on 18 August 2023 is totally unacceptable.

OP6: There should be no controversy in registering the fact that the natural resources in and around the island belong to both Turkish Cypriot people and Greek Cypriot people. Given the insistence of the Greek Cypriot side to take unilateral steps which constitute the real source of escalation and instability, reducing the tension will only be possible through dialogue and cooperation between the two sides on the island.

In his latest report on his Good Offices Mission (S/2024/13, para 48), the Secretary-General underlined his concern regarding the tensions in and around Cyprus and he once again urged “*the parties to make sincere efforts towards exploring options for sustainable energy cooperation in and around the island that may benefit all parties, and refrain from taking action that could increase tensions. I wish to reiterate that natural resources in and around Cyprus should benefit both communities and constitute a strong incentive for the parties to pursue mutually acceptable and durable solutions to disagreements related to natural resources.*”

To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side has made constructive proposals to the Greek Cypriot side in 2011, 2012 and 2019. Moreover, on 1 July 2022, the Turkish Cypriot side made an alternative proposal as a fresh attempt to enable cooperation on hydrocarbons, which also included, *inter alia*, specific proposals for cooperation on other energy related issues. Hence, if the Council intends to diffuse tensions arising from this issue, it should underline in its resolutions the need for diplomacy and cooperation between the two sides.

OP7 (a): The call to “*provide the necessary support and overall guidance to free the Technical Committees from political obstructions in their work and enable them to function effectively,*” should have been made to the Greek Cypriot leadership alone, as it is the lack of political will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side which has slowed down, or even unilaterally halted the work of some of these committees.

OP7 (c): The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has revised its schoolbooks in the past, promoting a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding. However, the Greek Cypriot side refuses to remove discriminatory language against the Turkish Cypriot people from its textbooks. The Greek Cypriot administration even has the audacity to attempt every year to send to the Greek Cypriot schools in Karpaz, a town in the TRNC, text books

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containing derogatory and racist remarks about the Turkish Cypriot people and Turkish people. The resolution also falls short of referring to the lack of a primary school for Turkish Cypriots in South Cyprus in spite of the repeated written and verbal assurances given by the Greek Cypriot side to UNFICYP, which were reflected in previous UNSG reports.

OP9: The Turkish Cypriot side is ready for direct cooperation between the two sides on every issue, including the establishment of a direct military-level contact mechanism. Nevertheless, like similar cooperation mechanisms established in the island, such as Technical Committees and Committee on Missing Persons, such a mechanism can naturally only be between the two sides in Cyprus. Therefore, the relevant wording in OP7, which makes reference in this regard to “*the relevant involved parties*” is factually wrong. Furthermore, cooperation cannot be limited solely to military aspects and should concurrently include other civilian island-wide matters that require cooperation.

OP10: Cognizant of the importance of cooperation for building trust between the two sides in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot side has made further proposals on 1 and 8 July 2022 with a view to establishing cooperation mechanisms in areas such as hydrocarbons, electricity grids, solar power generation, freshwater resources, as well as demining and irregular migration. We are ready to work with the Greek Cypriot side in good faith on ideas that will enhance the daily lives of all Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as long as they are mutually agreed and beneficial for the two sides, respect their equality and do not involve or imply the extension of one side’s authority over the other.

Furthermore, in his meeting with the UN Secretary-General in September during the opening week of the 78th UN General Assembly, President H.E. Mr. Ersin Tatar proposed a Cooperation Dialogue Process to be initiated with a trilateral meeting to be held at the level of the leaders and with the participation of the Secretary-General to discuss these comprehensive cooperation proposals with the Greek Cypriot side.

It is unfortunate that once again the Council fails to make reference to these mutually beneficial cooperation proposals that would help create built trust and interdependence between the two sides as well as an environment conducive to a positive political climate.

OP10: The Secretary-General clearly states in his Report that “Notwithstanding the Security Council’s repeated calls, and my own, efforts in Cyprus to achieve greater economic and social parity between the two sides and to broaden and deepen economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation remain limited.” (S/2024/12, Para 74). He also underlines that “*...long queues are still common at the Agios Dometios/Metehan crossing point in Nicosia where approximately half of the island’s crossings occur*” and that “*one suggestion supported by the Technical Committee on Economic and Commercial Matters is for a dedicated commercial crossing east of Nicosia*” (S/2024/12, para. 45).

Opening of such a commercial crossing point would not only help increase the level of trade between the two sides but would also increase interaction by easing the said persistent long queues at the Metehan/Agios Dometios crossing points by diverting all commercial vehicles to this new crossing point.

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Despite the repeated promises of the Greek Cypriot side made for over a year to resolve this issue at the said crossing point, the fact that there is no progress so far can only indicate the lack of political will in this regard on the part of the Greek Cypriot administration, whose actual aim is to stifle the economic activities of the Greek Cypriot people in the TRNC.

Furthermore, any dialogue towards building trust and reducing tension in Cyprus can only take place between the two sides on the island, therefore, the reference to the “*parties*” in this paragraph regarding a possible dialogue on the use of surveillance technology should have been replaced with “*two sides*”.

OP11: With a view to supporting the work of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), the Turkish Cypriot side has established an Archive Committee in 2016, which comprises military and police authorities, experts from the Ministry of Health and National Archives as well as other relevant units of the Government, to examine the relevant archives for the information requested by the CMP regarding the location of missing persons. In this connection, access was given to the Office of the Turkish Cypriot Member of the CMP to check the aerial photos dating 1974. The Turkish Cypriot side has also established an investigation unit under the TRNC Presidency to examine all relevant archives in order to gather information requested by the CMP regarding the potential locations of missing persons, as well as the Missing Persons Unit (MPU) which conducts criminal investigation into the cases of the identified Greek Cypriot missing persons under the supervision of the constitutionally independent TRNC Attorney-General’s Office. Furthermore, upon finding evidence on potential burial places, the Turkish Cypriot side accommodates access requests of the CMP to any area throughout the TRNC, be it by interrupting the construction of a major road or giving access to those military areas CMP asks for according to its work plan.

As of end of November 2023, the CMP has carried out a total of 1490 excavations in the civilian areas; 1193 of these excavations were carried out within the borders of the TRNC, whereas only 292 excavations took place in the Greek Cypriot side. The established practice has been that CMP is granted access to exhume in military areas according to an agreed work plan. So far, 88 excavations were carried out in the military areas located in the TRNC and additional 3 excavations were carried out in the buffer zone with the consent of the military authorities of the TRNC.

Both the TRNC and Türkiye continue to support CMP financially. It should be noted in this regard that the amount provided by the EU, which constitutes a significant portion of the funding provided to the CMP, comes from the funds allocated by the EU for the development of the Turkish Cypriot people. Yet, none of these contributions and examples of cooperation with the CMP are reflected in the resolution.

OP14, OP15: The reference made to “UNFICYP’s activities across the island” and the claim made in the following paragraph that “UNFICYP’s mandated authority extends throughout Cyprus” are misleading and do not reflect the realities on the island. The consent given by the so-called “Government of Cyprus” for the operations of UNFICYP

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on the island, as well as the arrangement concluded between the Greek Cypriot side and UNFICYP, cover only the South.

OP19: The positions of the two sides on the island regarding the issue of demining are very different as stated in the Secretary-General's latest UNFICYP Report "*While the Turkish Cypriot security forces expressed potential interest in the subject if it were to involve reciprocity from the other side, the National Guard did not wish to discuss the matter.*" (S/2024/12, Para 24). While there is a reference to the said paragraph in the resolution, the continued practice of making a call to both sides, particularly without clearly registering the different positions of the two sides on the matter, is not fair on the Turkish Cypriot side, which has already given its positive response to the calls for cooperation and recently made a new cooperation proposal on the issue.

OP20: The Turkish Cypriot side takes note of the need to renew regularly all peacekeeping operations including UNFICYP and is of the view that a comprehensive review of UNFICYP, including its mandate, in light of the changing circumstances on the island, is long overdue.

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