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January 30, 2026

U.S. Department of Justice/NSD
FARA Registration Unit
175 N Street, NE – 3CON
Room 1.300
Washington, D.C. 20530

Re: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Registration No. 2619
Filing of Copy of Document Disseminated January 30, 2026.

Dear Madam/Sir:

Enclosed for filing please find the following disseminated document:

- 1. Dissemination Date: January 30, 2026.** A two (2) page letter and its twelve (12) page annex dated January 30, 2026 from H.E. Mr. Murat Soysal, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in New York to H.E. Mr. Abukar Dahir Osman, President of the Security Council for the month of January 2026, for its circulation to all members of the of the Security Council as an official UN document.

Sincerely yours,

Murat Soysal
Representative



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30 January 2026

Excellency,

The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2815 (2026) today regarding the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The detailed observations of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding this resolution have already been conveyed verbally and in writing (see annex) to the Presidency of the Security Council. Regrettably, our request to deliver a statement at the resolution adoption meeting of the Security Council was not facilitated, despite the fact that the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP directly affects the Turkish Cypriot people and notwithstanding that our constructive suggestions regarding the resolution were not duly considered.

Upon instructions from my Government, I would like to underline, once again, the views of the Turkish Cypriot side *vis-à-vis* the issue of consent as well as the modalities of the operations of UNFICYP within the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). As you are well aware, in line with resolution 2436 (2018), which is also referred to in the present resolution, one of the governing principles of UN peacekeeping operations throughout the world is the requirement that the consent of all parties to the dispute is sought and obtained. In a similar vein, it is also clearly stated in the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) “...that consent of the local parties and impartiality [...] should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping.” Thus, UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both parties. Otherwise, UNFICYP not only puts into question its impartiality, but also “risks becoming a party to the conflict”, as stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines. Indeed, the principle of consent is also fundamental to the UN Secretary-General’s good offices mission, which treats the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides on the island on an equal footing. Furthermore, since political processes are directly interlinked with peacekeeping operations, refraining from seeking the consent of one of the sides in relation to UNFICYP would also constitute a serious shortcoming in this regard.

In view of the above, it should be recalled that there are two sovereign States, two jurisdictions and two territories on the island of Cyprus, and that in the territory of the TRNC, where its Government is the sole competent authority, UNFICYP can only operate with its permission and consent. As will be recalled, the necessity to seek and obtain the consent of each side is also manifested by the separate and simultaneous referenda held on both sides of the island in April 2004 on the UN Comprehensive Settlement Plan on Cyprus (a.k.a. the Annan Plan). It is long overdue that the relevant references in the resolutions on UNFICYP are brought in line with this reality.

H.E. Mr. Abukar Dahir Osman
Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Somalia to the United Nations
President of the Security Council for the month of January 2026
New York.

Needless to say, consent for the extension of the mandate of UNFICYP sought and obtained prior to the adoption of resolution 2815 (2026) from the Greek Cypriot side, which purports to be the long-defunct "Government of Cyprus", only covers the operations of UNFICYP in South Cyprus. In view of this fact, I feel obliged to state that while UNFICYP personnel have operated to this date within the territory of the TRNC as a gesture of the good-will of the Turkish Cypriot side and with the permission of our Government, there is no doubt that our current relationship with UNFICYP is not sustainable and cannot continue "business as usual". In view of the foregoing, UNFICYP's continued lack of sincere engagement with our authorities with a view to developing the modalities of its operations in the TRNC within a reasonable time frame will leave us with no option but to reconsider our approach towards this issue.

I would be grateful if this letter as well as its annex, enclosed herewith, could be circulated to the members of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Murat Soysal
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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TURKISH CYPRIOT VIEWPOINT

On the Extension of the Mandate of UNFICYP by the UN Security Council (January 2026)

PP1, PP5, OP1: Both during and after the informal broader format (5+UN) meetings held on 17-18 March in Geneva and 16-17 July in New York, the UN Secretary-General refrained from making reference to any particular settlement framework in Cyprus with a view to not jeopardizing the deliberations of the two sides regarding the way forward. In addition, although the two leaders emphasized that the goal would be to find a solution within the framework of political equality at their meeting on 11 December, there was no emphasis on the model of the solution, and this fact was clarified by the Turkish Cypriot leader at his press conference that same day. We expected that the Council would show sensitivity in this regard; however, the Council has once again insisted on making references to the repeatedly failed and thus exhausted framework of the past as well as the “*existing body of work*”, which is no longer relevant. References to the “*bicommunal, bizonal federation*” framework need to be deleted as; this model has been tried and categorically failed numerous times during more than 50 years of negotiations and totally collapsed in Crans-Montana in 2017, there is no consensus between the two sides on this framework, the responsibility for finding a solution lies first and foremost with the two sides (PP2) and the two sides in Cyprus should be able to freely negotiate a mutually acceptable settlement (OP3). In the light of these realities, the two sides should be given sufficient space to engage in negotiations on a new basis with a view to establishing a cooperative relationship between the two existing States, upon the formal acknowledgement of their inherent rights, namely sovereign equality and equal international status. Accordingly, the reference made to the outdated and obsolete Security Council resolutions 716 (1991) and 1251 (1999) should also be deleted.

PP5: In earlier drafts of the resolution, the presidential elections that were conducted in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) on 19 October and resulted in the election of our new President, H.E. Mr. Tufan Erhürman, were referenced using the wording “*following the election of the new Turkish Cypriot leader*”; however, this wording was later removed from the resolution due to the insistence of certain Council members to not refer to “elections” being held in our country. This is not only extremely disappointing but disregards the sovereign will of the Turkish Cypriot people, insults our democratic process, and discriminates against the Turkish Cypriot leader, who is considered by the Secretary-General to be on equal footing with the Greek Cypriot leader. Our presidential elections are conducted in accordance with Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a United Nations document, and both the Secretary-General’s report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2026/9) and his report on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/2026/8) refer to the “election” of the new Turkish Cypriot leader. The same wording was also used in his reports following the previous presidential elections held in the TRNC in 2021. This omission is a concrete example of the Council’s disregard of the facts and lack of alignment with the Secretary-General when it comes to the issue of Cyprus. We are of the opinion that the Council cannot claim to “fully support”

the Secretary-General's ongoing engagement with the sides (OP3) while disregarding the language used in his reports.

PP5, OP1: The exhausted and now-defunct agreement model of “bizonal bicomunal federation model” still continues to be referenced in the resolution, even though the Greek Cypriot side has categorically rejected a solution on this basis on numerous occasions, including the Annan Plan in 2004 and the Cyprus Conference held in Crans-Montana in 2017. More than fifty years of negotiations carried out on a federal settlement framework have decisively failed due to the refusal of the Greek Cypriot side to share power and prosperity with the Turkish Cypriot people. Decades of failed negotiations clearly demonstrate that the reluctance of the international community to acknowledge the inherent rights of the Turkish Cypriot people – namely, their sovereign equality and the equal international status of their State – takes away any incentive for compromise from the Greek Cypriot side, thus rendering the prospect of a freely-negotiated and mutually-acceptable agreement in Cyprus impossible. Instead of clinging to outdated parameters, the Council should emphasize the need for the parties to negotiate freely and encourage them to reach a mutually agreed settlement model.

PP7, PP11, OP13, OP14: The call of the Council to “*de-escalate tensions in and around the buffer zone*” should have been directly made to the Greek Cypriot side, who bears the sole responsibility for the provocative actions that have raised tensions in and around the buffer zone. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the Greek Cypriot side continues its major military violations in and along the buffer zone, such as the installation of prefabricated concrete firing positions (S/2026/8, para. 14), the number of which has increased to 340 in the latest reporting period, with 13 being situated deep inside the buffer zone. The fact that there is no direct reference even to major Greek Cypriot violations in and along the buffer zone, such as the said firing positions, is yet more proof of the double standards employed in the resolution.

Similarly, the resolution's indirect extremely watered-down reference (PP11) to the aggressive behavior displayed towards personnel of UNFICYP and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees by Greek Cypriot police officers during their forcible pushbacks of asylum-seekers into the buffer zone, contrasted with the direct reference to the incident that took place in Pile in August 2023 - included due to pressure from the Greek Cypriot side - clearly highlights the unequal treatment of the two sides.

While we note that the Council continues the practice of indirect references to these gross violations by referring to the relevant paragraphs of the Secretary-General's UNFICYP reports (OP13), considering the scale of these violations, they should have been clearly mentioned in the resolution. As can be seen from the actions taken in this regard by the Greek Cypriot side during the reporting period, refraining from directly referring to these gross violations served no purpose but to embolden the perpetrator to engage in further and bolder violations in and along the buffer zone. In the interest of objective reporting as well as reducing tensions along the buffer zone, the resolution should have clearly called on the Greek Cypriot side for the immediate removal of these military installations.

In the same paragraphs, although there are references to unauthorized construction in the buffer zone, there is once again no direct reference to the unauthorized university in Pile/Pyla (The University of Central Lancashire) or the constructions associated with it. The said university, its operation and the constructions associated with it continue to be unauthorized by UNFICYP, as stated in the Secretary-General's report (S/2026/8, para. 22). There is also no reference in the resolution to the completion of the construction of an open air cinema at the southeast of Derinya border crossing point in the buffer zone, where the Greek Cypriot side created a *fait accompli* and once again violated the status of the buffer zone.

Furthermore, the resolution, despite directly referencing the issue for the first time, still falls short of condemning and calling for the cessation of the continued disguising of military positions within civilian structures by the Greek Cypriot side, a major permanent military violation which has been reported on by the Secretary-General multiple times (S/2025/447, paras. 19 and 57; S/2025/6, paras. 18 and 63; S/2024/527, paras. 20 and 61; S/2024/12, paras. 19 and 71). He underlined in his most recent UNFICYP report that “*Not only are such installations military violations, but they also dangerously obscure the distinction between civilian and military facilities*”, that the Greek Cypriot authorities’ “*policy of deliberately blurring the distinction between military and civilian by disguising military positions within civilian structures raises serious concerns*” and that “*Invoking the imbalance of forces on the island cannot justify such violations*” (S/2026/8, paras. 16 and 46). The disguising of military positions within civilian structures by the Greek Cypriot side cannot be considered only as military violations; they also pose serious ethical questions as they raise “serious humanitarian concerns”, as previously underlined by the Secretary-General (S/2025/447, para. 57).

PP8, OP4, OP15, OP18: First and foremost, it should be underlined that the fenced-off area of Maraş (Varosha) and Akyar (Strovilia) are both part of the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, where our Government has sole jurisdiction and authority, and thus fall outside the scope of UNFICYP's authority. Therefore, the references and calls in these paragraphs are unwarranted. It should be noted that all the steps that have been taken in the fenced-off area of Maraş by the TRNC are in line with international law and are without prejudice to property rights. It is disappointing that the Council has once again overlooked these realities and opted to echo the fabrications of the Greek Cypriot leadership, which have been disseminated to misguide the international community.

Unlike the Greek Cypriot administration, which effectively prevents any sort of remedy for the Turkish Cypriot people who had to abandon their properties in South Cyprus, our Government recognizes and respects the right to property, including that of the Greek Cypriot people who left properties in North Cyprus. Accordingly, the Immovable Property Commission (IPC) was established by the TRNC in 2005 and is recognized as an effective domestic remedy for the settlement of property claims by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The IPC has the authority to handle applications and deliver decisions on the property claims by providing remedies in the form of restitution, compensation and/or exchange.

In July 2021, the TRNC Council of Ministers lifted the military zone status of a pilot area, which corresponds to %3.4 of the fenced-off area of Maraş, with a view to enabling the IPC to also grant restitution as a remedy for the properties located in that area, in addition to the already available remedies of compensation and/or exchange. In this vein, it is important to note that currently over 500 applications have been lodged at the IPC concerning the fenced-off area of Maraş, including applications concerning properties within the pilot area. This serves to show that, contrary to the Greek Cypriot side's propaganda, the steps undertaken by our authorities have been received favorably among the Greek Cypriot population. The TRNC views its decisions in relation to the fenced-off area of Maraş as a humanitarian act which will be economically beneficial to both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples. Thus, we strongly reject the misguided and factually wrong references to the fenced-off area of Maraş in the resolution and believe that they should have been deleted altogether.

Furthermore, the fact that the Secretary-General clearly underlined, once again, in his latest report on the UN Operation in Cyprus (S/2026/8, para. 10) that “*UNFICYP did not observe any significant change*” in the above-mentioned pilot area clearly shows that the references made in this regard in the resolution are baseless, arbitrary and unwarranted. These paragraphs serve as yet further proof that the Council has chosen to reflect the fabrications of the Greek Cypriot propaganda machinery in relation to the matter rather than the realities on the ground.

PP11: We are keenly aware of the challenges brought about by irregular migration and place great importance on this global issue. As such, the Turkish Cypriot side proposed to form an effective mechanism with the participation of the two sides on this matter, which requires island-wide cooperation. Unfortunately, rather than allowing the establishment of an effective mechanism to tackle this humanitarian issue in a meaningful manner, the Greek Cypriot side prefers to utilize it as a political propaganda tool by falsely blaming our authorities and Türkiye at every possible forum.

At the same time, Greek Cypriot police officers have displayed aggressive behavior towards the personnel of UNFICYP and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees during their forcible pushbacks of asylum-seekers into the buffer zone, a matter which was reported on extensively in the Secretary-General's January 2025 report on the UN Operation in Cyprus (S/2025/6) and followed by the Secretary-General's call for the Greek Cypriot administration to “*undertake its investigations into the previously reported actions*” in his July 2025 report (S/2025/447).

Within this context, rather than making a general call regarding the need to adhere to applicable international law, the Council must make a strong call for the two sides on the island to cooperate on this all-too-important issue. At the same time, the Council should not shy away from holding the Greek Cypriot side accountable for its inhumane policies regarding refugees in need of humanitarian assistance (some of whom, in the past, were left stranded in the buffer zone for many months) as well as call on the Greek Cypriot side to undertake the aforementioned investigations and hold the perpetrators to account.

PP12: While the Council takes note of the widening socio-economic disparity between the two sides in Cyprus, *alas*, without using the correct terminology, and urges further efforts to address this through meaningful contacts, it is disappointing that the real reason for the widening socio-economic disparity between the two sides, namely the decades-old unjust and inhumane isolation imposed on the Turkish Cypriot people has, yet again, not been mentioned. Furthermore, the resolution fell short of suggesting a concrete remedy to overcome this disparity. Needless to say, immediate, concrete and sustained action is required to alleviate this unjust situation. As also underlined in the resolution, this disparity risks leading to further estrangement on the island and potentially affecting prospects for a settlement, and thus constitutes a major impediment before the prospects of a fair and sustainable agreement in Cyprus. Unfortunately, the wording in the Security Council resolution, once again, fails to reflect the urgency and the gravity of the situation resulting from the unlawful and unjust isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people.

Lifting the unnecessary restrictions on the Turkish Cypriot people in all aspects of life would not only end this gross human rights violation that has been going on for decades, but also create an environment conducive to efforts towards a freely-negotiated and mutually-acceptable agreement. Additionally, it would ensure the sustainability of a future agreement in Cyprus by establishing socio-economic equilibrium between the two sides. In view of the foregoing, the Council should lead the international community by taking concrete and effective steps for the removal of the root cause of this widening socio-economic disparity, i.e. the unjust and unlawful isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people.

More than twenty years have elapsed since the report of the then UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus dated 28 May 2004 (S/2004/437), where he clearly stated that “*The Turkish Cypriot vote has undone any rationale for pressuring and isolating them. I would hope that the members of the Council can give a strong lead to all States to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies, to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots and impeding their development.*” The imbalance created by the perpetuation of the isolation exacerbates the deep crisis of confidence between the two peoples and the two sides in Cyprus.

PP14, OP9: The Turkish Cypriot side is ready for direct cooperation between the two sides on every issue, including the establishment of a direct military-level contact mechanism, as has been recently proposed by our new President, H.E. Mr. Tufan Erhürman in his 10-point proposal. Nevertheless, like similar cooperation mechanisms established on the island, such as Technical Committees and the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), such a mechanism can naturally only be established between the two sides in Cyprus. Therefore, the relevant wording in OP9, which makes reference in this regard to “*the relevant involved parties*” is factually wrong. Furthermore, cooperation cannot be limited solely to military aspects and should concurrently include other civilian island-wide matters that require cooperation.

PP15, OP7 (a, b, c): The Greek Cypriot side has been refraining from cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot side for a long time. However, cooperation, including on civilian and policing matters, are necessary for addressing island-wide matters and building trust

between the two sides on the island, paving the way for a negotiated agreement. Therefore, the calls in the relevant paragraphs should not have been limited to contact and communication, but also to effective cooperation between the two sides, with a view to encouraging the Greek Cypriot side towards this end.

Furthermore, it must be underlined that the only way to prompt such direct cooperation between the two sides is for international actors to engage with the Turkish Cypriot side in a similar fashion, thereby setting an example for the Greek Cypriot side. Accordingly, while the latest UNFICYP Report of the Secretary-General (S/2026/8 para. 52) once again underlines the fact that so-called “*concerns about recognition should not in themselves constitute an obstacle to increased cooperation*”, it is difficult to understand why the same reasoning cannot be true in establishing relations between the Turkish Cypriot people and the international community.

PP16, PP18: As regards references to the so-called “*Government of Cyprus*”, it should be recalled that the 1960 Republic of Cyprus was destroyed by the Greek Cypriot partner in 1963. Since then, there has not been a joint administration capable of representing the whole of Cyprus, either legally or factually. Each side has since ruled itself, while the Greek Cypriot side has continued to claim that it is the “*Government of Cyprus*”. The separate and simultaneous referenda held on 24 April 2004 on the Comprehensive Settlement Plan (a.k.a. the Annan Plan) of the then UN Secretary-General highlighted, once again, the fact that the island of Cyprus comprises two distinct peoples and administrations. Hence, this reference is unacceptable. The reference to the “*Government of Cyprus*” in and of itself is a sufficient reason for us to reject the resolution *in toto*.

It should be recalled that in line with the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report, 2000) as well as Security Council Resolution 2436 (2018), the consent and approval of all concerned parties constitutes a bedrock principle of all peacekeeping operations and is necessary for their success. This principle undoubtedly applies to the operations of UNFICYP as well, which has to cooperate with the two sides in Cyprus. The reference in PP16 only to the agreement of the Greek Cypriot administration under its purported title as the so-called “*Government of Cyprus*” regarding the extension of the presence of UNFICYP clearly contradicts the aforementioned principle. In the absence of the consent of both sides in Cyprus, UNFICYP “*risks becoming a party to the conflict*” as stated in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines.

The Turkish Cypriot side has repeatedly put on record the need to establish a formal agreement/framework which outlines the modalities of the relationship between UNFICYP and our authorities. This could be in the form of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or another mutually acceptable format. There is no doubt that our current relationship with UNFICYP is not sustainable and cannot continue “business as usual”. We once again underline the urgent need to conclude an agreement on this issue with UNFICYP without further delay.

OP3: We note that the Council once again underlined the fact that a settlement should be freely negotiated and mutually acceptable.

OP5: Construction of a road between Yiğitler and Pile has been on the agenda of the TRNC for more than 25 years; the Turkish Cypriot side has communicated the need for this humanitarian project on numerous occasions to UNFICYP to no avail. While the Greek Cypriot residents of the village can enter and exit the Greek Cypriot side without hindrance and are afforded the undue advantage of not being subject to any kind of control or restrictive measures during their travel, the Turkish Cypriot residents of the village use Beyarmudu crossing point, which is under the control of the Sovereign British Base Areas (SBA) authorities, when entering and exiting the village of Pile, meaning that they are subject to controls by the SBA every time they enter and exit their own village. The Yiğitler-Pile road project does not entail any territorial or military motives, nor does it aim to alter the status quo of the buffer zone. Its sole purpose is to ease the lives of Turkish Cypriot residents of Pile. It is important to note that in 1996 the Greek Cypriot side monopolized the Pile section of the road in question and constructed the Larnaka-Dikelya-Aya Napa road, which even passes through land with Turkish Cypriot title-deeds, as well as the Pile-Oroklini road, which also passes through the buffer zone. None of these road constructions were physically stopped by UNFICYP.

In the Secretary-General's report on the UN Operation in Cyprus in January 2024 (S/2024/12, para. 27) the construction of the Astromerit-Evrihu road was recorded as a violation of the buffer zone by the Greek Cypriot side. However, in the following report (S/2024/527, para. 27) it was claimed that the Greek Cypriot side had produced historical evidence indicating that the highway's route did not infringe upon the buffer zone. In the same report, it was also claimed that, although the highway had supposedly not altered the military status quo of the buffer zone or significantly eroded its integrity, UNFICYP continued to regard the construction as a violation. But since the January 2025 report (S/2025/6), there has been no further mention of this violation in the reports. References to the Astromerit-Evrihu road have been removed from the reports on the grounds of an outdated map submitted by the Greek Cypriot side to UNFICYP, allegedly proving that the construction does not violate the buffer zone. UNFICYP has also rejected, without justification, our proposal to share the said maps with the Turkish Cypriot side. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side's purely humanitarian road project, namely the Yiğitler-Pile road project, has been physically stopped by UNFICYP.

The main reason behind the unfortunate events of August 2023, during which people on both sides (the Turkish Cypriot side and UNFICYP) suffered some minor injuries, is the unprecedented decision of UNFICYP to physically intervene in a purely humanitarian project. In order for the paragraph to be constructive and forward-looking, the reference to August 2023 should have been removed; this reference only serves to unjustly point the finger to the Turkish Cypriot side for an incident that occurred a long time ago due to the mishandling of the previous Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UNFICYP, Mr. Colin Stewart. Maintaining references to the past also risks constraining the ability of the new SRSG, Mr. Khassim Diagne, to freely resolve the Pile issue based on the current realities on the ground. Furthermore, there is already sufficient wording in the paragraph (*the need to avoid any unilateral actions by either party*) to serve as a warning to both sides not to engage in actions that would raise tensions in the area.

The language of the resolution on this issue also does not respect the wording of the agreement reached between UNFICYP and the Turkish Cypriot side. Firstly, the reference made to the “*Pyla/Pile plateau*” is factually incorrect and should have been replaced with “*the area of Pyla/Pile*”. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the main reason for the problems faced in Pile was the mishandling of the matter by UNFICYP, specifically by the previous SRSG, who concluded two separate and clearly contradicting agreements with the two sides. In this connection, it must be emphasized that there is no mutual understanding regarding Pile, and it is both factually wrong and misleading to claim that there is one. While the phrase “*implement the Pyla/Pile understanding*” which was used in the previous resolution has been replaced with “*on a way forward*” in the current resolution, the reference to paragraph 11 of the Secretary-General’s report (S/2024/12), which falsely claims that such an understanding was reached, has not been removed, creating a major inconsistency as well as a factual mistake. Similarly, the phrase “*implementation remains paused*” should have also been removed, as there is no mutual “understanding” to implement.

It is particularly disturbing that all of the Turkish Cypriot side’s aforementioned concerns regarding this paragraph were dismissed out of hand by the Council members despite our clear communication of the facts. The Council has proven once again that as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned, it is part of the problem, not the solution, and has an overtly biased approach towards the Turkish Cypriot side. We expect the Council to make a clear call for the completion of the purely humanitarian Yiğitler-Pile road and to stop misrepresenting the issue by making unacceptable references in the resolution.

OP6: There should be no controversy in registering the fact that the natural resources in and around the island belong to both Turkish Cypriot people and Greek Cypriot people. Given the insistence of the Greek Cypriot side to take unilateral steps which constitute the real source of escalation and instability, reducing the tension will only be possible through dialogue and cooperation between the two sides on the island.

To this end, the Turkish Cypriot side has made constructive proposals to the Greek Cypriot side in 2011, 2012 and 2019. Moreover, on 1 July 2022, the Turkish Cypriot side made an updated proposal as a fresh attempt to enable cooperation on hydrocarbons, which also included, *inter alia*, specific proposals for cooperation on other energy related issues. Hence, if the Council intends to diffuse tensions arising from this issue, it should underline in its resolutions the need for diplomacy and cooperation between the two sides.

OP7 (a): The call to “*provide the necessary support and overall guidance to the work of the Technical Committees, ensuring they are free from political obstructions and able to function effectively in coordination and cooperation on matters which have been island-wide implications, including taking forward the trust-building initiatives agreed in 2025 which have been assigned to them...*” should have been made to the Greek Cypriot leadership alone, as the Turkish Cypriot side has shown and continues to show its will to take further steps on trust building initiatives. It is the lack of political will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side which has slowed down or even unilaterally halted the work of some of these committees.

OP7 (c): We welcome the noting of the Council's concern regarding the fact that the Technical Committee on Education did not meet during the reporting period, especially given the Greek Cypriot side's ongoing efforts to use education as a political tool. The TRNC revised its history textbooks in 2004 in accordance with Council of Europe principles to remove inappropriate references, ensuring that they contain no elements of racial hatred or intolerance and that they promote a culture of tolerance and mutual understanding. However, the Greek Cypriot side still refuses to remove discriminatory language against the Turkish Cypriot people from its textbooks. The Greek Cypriot administration even has the audacity to attempt every year to send to the Greek Cypriot schools in Karpaz (a town in the TRNC) textbooks containing derogatory and racist remarks about the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish people.

Unfortunately, the resolution still falls short of calling out the lack of a primary school for Turkish Cypriot students in South Cyprus in spite of the repeated written and verbal assurances given by the Greek Cypriot side to UNFICYP on this matter, which were reflected in previous UNSG reports.

OP10: As known, at the informal broader format (5+UN) meetings held on 17-18 March in Geneva and 16-17 July in New York, the two sides agreed on ten areas of cooperation, which are referred to by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Ms. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar, as "initiatives to build trust". In addition to these ten initiatives, our new President, H.E. Mr. Tufan Erhürman, presented a 10-point proposal to the Greek Cypriot side, outlined in the Annex of the Secretary-General's report on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (S/2026/9), with the goal of working towards creating a climate conducive to a solution.

Cognizant of the importance of cooperation for building trust between the two sides in Cyprus as well as creating an environment conducive to a positive political climate, we are ready to work with the Greek Cypriot side in good faith on ideas that will enhance the daily lives of all Turkish Cypriot people and Greek Cypriot people as long as they are mutually agreed and beneficial for the two sides, respect their equality and do not involve or imply the extension of one side's authority over the other. Within this context, we expected the Council to make a stronger call to the sides to achieve progress on all of the agreed-upon initiatives to build trust.

OP10: The Secretary-General clearly states in his most recent reports that "*previous calls for the sides to step up efforts to achieve greater economic and social parity and to broaden and deepen economic, cultural and other forms of cooperation remain limited*" (S/2026/8, para. 51) and that "*...persistent delays have been caused by a lack of sufficient lanes and personnel for document checks*" at the Metehan border crossing point in Nicosia (S/2026/9, para. 19). In this context, it should be noted that the "*long delays at the main vehicular crossing point at Agios Dometios/Metehan in Nicosia, owing to lane closures and upgrades to technical systems*" (S/2026/8, para. 30), are directly caused by the administrative barriers created by Greek Cypriot side. It is well known that while the Turkish Cypriot side operates three booths at Metehan, the Greek Cypriot side continues to operate only two booths, thereby impeding the flow of crossings. Recently, the Turkish Cypriot side shared an

updated proposal after the meeting of the two leaders on 20 November 2025, in which it suggested increasing the number of booths at the Metehan border crossing point to three as well as ensuring that each booth is continuously staffed.

Regrettably, despite the opening of 4 new crossing points being one of the agreed-upon initiatives to build trust, the Greek Cypriot side is yet to consent to the opening of any new mutually-beneficial border crossing points. It is very disappointing that there has been no change in the Greek Cypriot side stance to block the opening of new border crossing points elsewhere unless their demands on the creation of South-to-South transit corridors in Erenköy and Kiracıköy are accepted, despite the fact that such transit corridors do not conform to the established definition of a crossing point and are not in line with the Secretary-General's statement that border crossing points "*should facilitate the movement of people and goods*" (S/2026/8, para. 51). On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriot side has reiterated its constructive proposal to open new border crossing points in Haspolat and/or Akıncılar to ease traffic congestion in Metehan, benefiting both sides. The opening of new mutually-beneficial border crossing points would not only help increase the level of trade between the two sides, but also increase interaction by easing the aforementioned persistent long queues.

Unfortunately, the ill-intentioned approach of the Greek Cypriot side to undermine intra-island trade is not limited to its objection to the opening of new crossing points. Having mentioned trade across the Green Line in OP10, it must be recalled that this approach leaves the fate of the socio-economic well-being of the Turkish Cypriot people at the mercy of the Greek Cypriot administration, as intra-island trade can never replace the potential benefits of direct trade and the establishment of unhindered contacts with the rest of the world for the Turkish Cypriot people. In fact, intra-island trade, which is limited by an EU regulation, is not even delivering what it should, due to the Greek Cypriot administration's persistent arbitrary and politically motivated practices. We therefore expect the Security Council to refrain from suggesting unrealistic and inadequate remedies to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots, such as intra-island trade.

OP11: With a view to supporting the work of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP), the Turkish Cypriot side has established an Archive Committee in 2016, which comprises military and police authorities, experts from the Ministry of Health and National Archives as well as other relevant units of the Government, to examine the relevant archives for the information requested by the CMP regarding the location of missing persons. In this connection, access was given to the Office of the Turkish Cypriot Member of the CMP to check the aerial photos dating 1974. The Turkish Cypriot side has also established an investigation unit under the TRNC Presidency to examine all relevant archives in order to gather information requested by the CMP regarding the potential locations of missing persons, as well as the Missing Persons Unit (MPU) which conducts criminal investigations into the cases of the identified Greek Cypriot missing persons under the supervision of the constitutionally independent TRNC Attorney-General's Office. Furthermore, upon finding evidence on potential burial places, the Turkish Cypriot side accommodates access requests of the CMP to any area throughout the TRNC, be it by interrupting the construction of a

major road or giving access to those military areas the CMP asks for according to its work plan.

As of November 2025, the CMP has carried out a total of 1,595 excavations in civilian areas; 1,278 of these excavations were carried out within the borders of the TRNC, whereas only 317 excavations took place in the Greek Cypriot side. According to the statistics provided by the Office of the Turkish Cypriot Member, as of 30 November 2025 the CMP has exhumed 1,713 remains (216 of which were not relevant for the work of the CMP) and identified a total of 1,058 missing persons, 296 of whom are Turkish Cypriot missing persons and 762 of whom are Greek Cypriot missing persons. In this context, it is also important to recall that all of the Turkish Cypriot missing persons are civilians, whereas the majority of Greek Cypriot missing persons are armed combatants.

The established practice has been that the CMP is granted access to excavate in military areas according to an agreed work plan. To date, 115 excavations have been carried out in the military areas located in the TRNC (with additional 3 excavations carried out in the buffer zone with the consent of the military authorities of the TRNC), whereas only 2 excavations have been carried out in the military areas located in the Greek Cypriot administration. Since the last extension of UNFICYP's mandate in 2025, the CMP has excavated 100 suspected burial sites in the TRNC, 19 of which were in military areas. On the other hand, the CMP has excavated 26 suspected burial sites in the Greek Cypriot side, none of which were located in military areas.

Regrettably, the proactive stance of the Turkish Cypriot authorities is not reciprocated by the Greek Cypriot side in terms of providing information on possible burial sites and effective investigations into the cases of the Turkish Cypriot missing people. As of today, the Greek Cypriot Member of the CMP, who is expected to have access to the archives of the Greek Cypriot Police Force and Greek Cypriot National Guard, has unfortunately failed to provide the other CMP members with any information from the aforementioned archives.

Both the TRNC and Türkiye also continue to support the CMP financially. It should be noted in this regard that the amount provided by the EU, which constitutes a significant portion of the funding provided to the CMP, comes from the funds allocated by the EU for the development of the Turkish Cypriot people. Yet, none of these contributions and examples of cooperation with the CMP are reflected in the resolution. On the other hand, a new matter of concern has emerged related to the CMP vis-à-vis the EU which must be underscored. The recent attempt of Greek Cypriot European Parliament member Mr. Michalis Hadjipantela to politicize the issue of missing persons in Cyprus by introducing the motion for a resolution calling upon the Parliament to “*consider the allocation of resources to finance the establishment in its premises of a memorial dedicated to the victims of the 1974 Turkish invasion of the Republic of Cyprus, including missing persons*” not only fails to acknowledge the fact that Turkish Cypriot missing persons date back to 1963, but also undermines the invaluable work of the CMP.

OP14, OP15: The reference made to “*UNFICYP's activities across the island*” and the claim made in the following paragraph that “*UNFICYP's mandated authority extends*

throughout Cyprus" are misleading and do not reflect the realities on the island. The consent given by the so-called "Government of Cyprus" for the operations of UNFICYP on the island, as well as the arrangement concluded between the Greek Cypriot side and UNFICYP, cover only the South. At this point, it should once again be recalled that UNFICYP's facilities in our country are not based on any agreement or any other mutually acceptable format and lack a legal foundation, and that UNFICYP's activities in our country are carried out solely within the framework of the goodwill of the Turkish Cypriot side.

OP19: The positions of the two sides on the island regarding the issue of demining are very different as also stated by the Secretary-General who underlined that "*While the Turkish Cypriot security forces expressed potential interest in the subject if it were to involve reciprocity from the other side, the National Guard did not wish to discuss the matter*" (S/2024/12, para. 24). While there is a reference to the said paragraph in the resolution, the continued practice of making a call to both sides, particularly without clearly registering the different positions of the two sides on the matter, is not fair on the Turkish Cypriot side, which has already given its positive response to the calls for cooperation and recently made a new cooperation proposal on the issue.

Most recently, the issue of de-mining was also among the six cooperation initiatives agreed between the two leaders at the informal broader format (5+UN) meeting held on 17-18 March in Geneva. However, to this day, no meaningful progress could be achieved on this humanitarian issue due to the unwillingness of the Greek Cypriot side to move toward a positive outcome. While the Turkish Cypriot side remains committed to a mine-free Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot leadership has reneged from its commitment towards a mine-free Cyprus and upon returning to the island, citing decades old so-called security concerns, stated that some of the minefields in the South should not be cleared. The Secretary-General's statement regarding the Greek Cypriot side's policy of blurring the distinction between military and civilian buildings, which underlines that "*invoking the imbalance of forces on the island cannot justify such violations*" (S/2026/8, para. 46), should also be recalled within this context and should likewise be applied when it comes to the stance of the Greek Cypriot side on demining.

OP20: The Turkish Cypriot side takes note of the need to renew regularly all peacekeeping operations including UNFICYP and is of the view that a comprehensive review of UNFICYP, including its mandate, in light of the changing circumstances on the island, is long overdue.

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