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**民主進步黨**  
Democratic Progressive Party, Taiwan

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# The Latest My-Formosa Tracking Poll Analysis (October 2023)

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The Latest My-Formosa Tracking Poll Analysis (October 2023) from My-Formosa's President Wu Tzu-chia (吳子嘉) and Research Associate Dai Li-an (戴立安)

| Source (Chinese): [http://my-formosa.com/DOC\\_200563.htm](http://my-formosa.com/DOC_200563.htm)


| Video Link (Chinese): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpHul2fX\\_vs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YpHul2fX_vs)

## [Discussion about Presidential Tracking Poll]

The latest poll from my-Formosa shows monthly national policy surveys compared to the more frequent tracking polls conducted every three days. Lai Ching-te's support hit a low in October, similar to the period after the local elections last year. This dip may be attributed to scandals involving Chao Tien-Lin and Cheng Wen-Tsan during the polling period in October. Both Hou and Ko's poll numbers are on the rise.




Voters are divided into three groups: G1-G3 (blue-leaning, from strong to moderate support), G4-G6 (swing voters, with G4 optimistic about both parties, G5 neutral, and G6 disliking both), and G7-G9 (green-leaning, from moderate to strong support). With three candidates, Hou You-yi has 80% support among strong blue supporters (G1), Ko Wen-je has nearly 60% in the moderate blue (G3) and over 50% among those disliking both parties (G6), and Lai Ching-te has solid support among green-leaning voters (G7-G9).




With four candidates, including Terry Gou (who has overall support of about 5%-6%), Gou's impact is minimal as his entry does not significantly draw votes from the other candidates, except for a slight increase among G6, who dislike both blue and green. Gou's entry seems to lower Ko's numbers slightly but has


no significant effect on Hou or Lai.



The latest poll (66th wave, Nov 1-3, 2023) shows Lai Ching-te holding his base, with a larger gap developing between Hou You-yi and Ko Wen-je, although the situation remains fluid and subject to change with evolving issues. Two specific points are highlighted: Poll 54 (Oct 16-18) following the Blue-White pre-meeting meeting (Oct 14, TPP's 黃珊珊 and KMT's 金溥聰) showed initial optimism for both, but as talks progressed, their poll numbers intertwined, squeezing each other's support until an emotional backlash at Poll 63 (Oct 27-31). Voters blamed Ko for the Blue-White failure. However, a reversal is still possible.



Regarding the question about "political party rotation," 33.3% wish for the DPP to continue, 22.0% for a change to the KMT, 11.2% for the TPP, and 3.2% for an independent. The survey indicates that those wanting the DPP to continue and those wanting a change (including KMT, TPP, or independent) are about even. It is also noted that support for the TPP is lower than for Ko individually, suggesting greater trust in him personally than in his party.



### [Other Discussion]

- Ko Wen-je still advocates for comprehensive polls (全民調) and suggests a 3% margin of error for Hou You-yi across five polling companies with 3000 samples each. Dai Li-an notes the difficulty in finding sufficient qualified companies for such a task. Assuming a sample size of 1000, a statistical margin of error of  $\pm 3\%$  (total of 6%) is expected, with significant differences only beyond 6%. Therefore, if Ko's original intention is to yield to the KMT, he should concede by 6% to make a genuine concession.
- Dai Li-an attributes Ko Wen-je's poll collapse to the "Xu Chunying" issue and the wait-and-see attitude of young and swing voters.
- Someone argued that my-Formosa's polls show drastic changes not seen in other polls. Dai Li-an responded that poll comparisons should consider overlapping timings, especially as changes rapidly approach elections. Wu Tzu-chia adds that My-Formosa is the only Taiwanese polling company that fully discloses its data online.
- Wu Tzu-chia dismisses the existence of "Ko fans," noting his support base among moderate blue voters. Wu said that's why his focus is on mainland spouses. Local mayors and leaders started to worry about Ko's ambitions to hollow out the KMT, which caused their endorsements for Hou You-yi.
- Wu also suggests that Ko's narrative changes are a strategy to ally with Eric Chu (for the Premier position) and betray Hou You-yi. This, he says, is

conspiracy rather than methodology for the corporation. Wu further claims that the discussion has shifted from a Blue-White alliance to assigning historical blame, with both sides strategizing against each other instead of cooperating. And certainly, the KMT intends to cast Ko Wen-je as historical blame.

- Dai Li-an points out that if Terry Gou persists in the election with his current support of 5-6%, he could potentially secure 800,000 votes. However, he will likely suffer from the strategic voting effect (棄保效應), which could halve his support.
- Wu Tzu-chia believes that cooperation between Gou and Ko Wen-je is impossible. Gou is currently under significant pressure from the CCP, and given the limited significance of his candidacy, he may ultimately withdraw from the election. Furthermore, Ko has no desire to collaborate with Gou; Ko's rhetoric has always been about "both sides of the Taiwan Strait being one family," and he claims to be the presidential candidate best equipped to negotiate with Beijing. This stance on the issue of mainland spouses also signals goodwill towards Beijing, implying that Ko would not risk offending Xi Jinping by allying with Gou. Wu also states that if Ko cannot cooperate with the KMT, leading to a dispersion of KMT votes, he would also offend Beijing, which supports the KMT.
- Wu argues that Han Kuo-yu, as KMT's vice candidate, would not aid Hou You-yi's campaign due to his appeal to strong blue voters and the stain of his recall. A partnership with Ko Wen-je, who attracts moderate blue and swing voters, is seen as the most complementary strategy for the KMT, especially with Ko as the lead candidate.

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