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**民主進步黨**

Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan

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## **China Influence Tracker (XI)**

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# PROTECT SEA CABLES

## THE SEVEN SEA CABLE LAWS

- 1 Sea Cables, comprehensive protection of pipes and power lines
- 2 Criminal devices will be immediately confiscated
- 3 Ships must turn on identification systems
- 4 Ships that obstruct safety must be withdrawn within a certain timeframe or they will be seized

Ensuring people's livelihood X Enhancing national security

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*September 30th, 2025*

In collaboration with the DPP China Affairs Department, the latest DPP U.S. Mission report provides key updates on the evolving cross-strait situation, detailing the escalation of China's military intimidation, gray zone activities, cognitive warfare, and United Front infiltration targeting Taiwan. Enclosed are the recent developments, offering a comprehensive overview of the current threat landscape, Taiwan's countermeasures, and emerging public opinion trends shaping the strategic environment.

### [Key Takeaways]

- **President Lai reiterated the peace-through-strength ethos.** He reiterated that true peace requires deterrence, not concessions—backed by a defense budget rising to **3.32% of GDP**

**in 2025** and a **5% target by 2030**, plus the “Four Pillars of Peace” (defense, economic resilience, democratic alignment, principled dialogue).

- **PRC gray zone pressure is broadening, including sea, air, and infrastructure.** Around the September 3 parade, Chinese government vessels surged near Kinmen; a PRC fishing boat was seized off Penghu; and Taipei moved to harden **undersea cable protection** with new laws and an **NT\$550B resilience budget** (NT\$113.2B for gray zone defense).
- **Humanitarian lines are being tested.** Reports that PLA fighters closed to visual range on a **medical evacuation flight** underscore attempts to assert de facto “law-enforcement” in the Strait, drawing MAC/SEF condemnation for endangering MEDEVAC safety.
- **Legal warfare and force display advances in tandem.** Beijing declared a **Huangyan/Scarborough “national nature reserve”** to buttress jurisdictional claims, while the **carrier Fujian** transited the Strait with expanded PLA air/sea activity—signaling capability growth even if full combat readiness still lies ahead.
- **The CCP and the KMT politicized sub-national exchanges.** Taipei postponed the **Taipei–Shanghai Forum** after concerns about the MOU and the legal scope; MAC says it facilitated paperwork and warned against becoming PRC propaganda, while Beijing and opposition figures accused the government of “blocking exchanges.”
- **Diplomatic coercion continued.** Beijing smeared Tsai Ing-wen’s private Japan trip as a “sneaky visit,” pressed the “one China principle” at ICAO and beyond, and was blamed for cancellations or pressure surrounding international forums and cultural events.
- **United front & infiltration diversified across domains.** From **ID/citizenship manipulation** and new checks on PRC documentation, to **education/youth fee waivers**, a **Jiangxi “Taiwan Research Center,”** and **religious long-arm control**, PRC efforts targeted identity, campuses, clergy, and culture; MAC flagged **188 cases** of Taiwanese missing/interrogated in China, including **nine followers of the I-Kuan Tao sect**.
- **Information ops escalated via AI deepfakes and content farms.** A YouTube channel pushed fabricated Lai–Hsiao audio;

research tied PRC-linked entities to mass data harvesting and narrative targeting, while PRC outlets amplified “unification” talking points after AIT reaffirmed **“Taiwan has never been part of the PRC.”**

- **Narrative framing keeps expanding (“Universe of Separatism”).** The DPP cataloged **54+** **“XX separatism”** labels spanning defense, diplomacy, law, health, sports, education, and culture—paired with warnings about the PRC’s **“22-point set of ‘guidelines’ to penalize ‘die-hard’ Taiwanese independence separatists”** and new religious controls as legal-political tools of intimidation.

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## **President Lai’s Efforts to Maintain the Status Quo of Peace and Stability in the Taiwan Strait**

On September 8, President Lai Ching-te gave an exclusive interview, asserting that “we may have ideals for peace, but we cannot harbor illusions — only with strength can true peace be secured.” He cautioned against the misperception that accepting the “1992 Consensus,” the One China principle, or participating in a PRC military parade could yield real peace. As for concrete measures, he pledged that next year, in 2026, Taiwan’s defense budget would reach 3.32 % of GDP, and that by 2030 it should rise to 5%, using both arms procurement and domestic defense development to demonstrate resolve. President Lai also emphasized the importance of aligning with democratic partners to deter aggression, advocating a posture of “preparation to prevent war.” He reaffirmed that Taiwan must maintain the status quo and engage China in dialogue on the basis of equal dignity, noting that China’s current strategy not only fails to gain support from the Taiwanese public but also provokes an international backlash. When critics from the opposition labeled the “17 national security strategies” as provocative toward China, President Lai rejected such claims as a reversal of cause and effect, stressing that safeguarding national security and democratic freedom should never be construed as provocation.

On September 10, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) responded to the interview, shifting responsibility onto Taiwan by asserting that if Taiwan returns to the “One China principle” and the “1992 Consensus” and ceases separatist actions,

cross-strait negotiations could resume. In parallel, Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chair Chiu Chui-cheng visited Washington, meeting bipartisan members of the U.S. Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party. Committee Chair John Moolenaar stated that the meeting focused on countering PRC disinformation and united front activities while strengthening security and economic ties. Congressman Nathaniel Moran said that CCP united front operations are intensifying in efforts to undermine freedom and spread false narratives, praising Taiwan's steadfast defense of democracy and regional freedom. The TAO, on the same day, retorted by saying it opposes any form of official U.S.–Taiwan interaction and warned the U.S. against providing a “stage for performing Taiwan independence.”

On September 12, during the Joint Opening Ceremony of the Army Academy, the Naval Technical School, and the Air Force Institute of Technology, President Lai further outlined his “Four Pillars of Peace” initiative: (1) strengthen defense through increased budgets, procurement, and defense industry autonomy; (2) boost economic resilience to reduce dependence on China and promote global expansion; (3) stand shoulder to shoulder with democratic partners to preserve regional peace; and (4) pursue principled dialogue with China. He reiterated that peace cannot be achieved by ceding sovereignty or by mere agreements, but only through strength and cooperation with democratic allies.

On September 20, at the “Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Forum,” President Lai reiterated that peace cannot rely solely on the goodwill of aggressors, but must be built on constant preparation and societal resilience. He announced that the defense budget for the coming year would reach 3.32% of GDP, setting the target for 2030 at 5%, and that NT\$150 billion would be set aside to bolster homeland security resilience. He also announced a new civil defense handbook to guide public readiness. Declaring that “if Taiwan is subject to military invasion, any talk of defeat or surrender is fake news,” President Lai, as Commander-in-Chief, left no doubt about Taiwan's determination to defend its democracy, sovereignty, and continued existence.

## ■ China's Gray Zone Tactics and Military Harassment Against Taiwan

## I. Maritime Gray Zone Operations and Infrastructure Threats

In early September, China leveraged the September 3 military parade to intensify maritime gray zone incursions and possibly threaten undersea cable infrastructure. From September 2 onward, the Kinmen–Matsu–Penghu Branch of Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration detected a noticeable uptick in Chinese government vessels operating nearby, prompting Taiwan to bolster patrols and defensive deployments. On September 6, the Coast Guard Administration intercepted a Chinese fishing vessel operating beyond permitted waters; its 15 crew members were detained, and about one metric ton of catch was discarded. On September 8, in response to escalating reports of undersea cable sabotage, President Lai Ching-te confirmed that national security agencies have placed suspect vessels under special monitoring. The Executive Yuan is drafting “seven laws” to strengthen cable protection, and legislative voices like DPP legislator Wang Ting-yu have urged expanded legal authority and international cooperation.

Domestically, Taiwan moved to shore up resilience. On September 11, the Executive Yuan passed a NT\$550 billion special “resilience” budget, allocating NT\$113.2 billion to guard against China’s gray zone provocations. The funds are earmarked for undersea cable protection, robust communications capability, construction of 12 anti-collision/anti-wave large vessels, and 28 new patrol craft to counter infiltration or harassment.

## II. Aerial Gray Zone Provocations and Humanitarian Threats

Tension also extended into the air. On September 9, the media reported that months earlier, a medical evacuation aircraft operated by Anjie Aviation was intercepted by PLA J-7 and J-10 fighters close enough for visual contact. A retired pilot interpreted the maneuver as China testing Taiwan’s response in the Taiwan Strait under the guise of exercising “law enforcement authority.” The same day, Taiwan’s MAC issued a formal condemnation, stressing that such actions jeopardize flight and humanitarian safety, and demanding an immediate halt. On September 12, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) Secretary-General Lo Wen-chia warned that Taiwan’s outlying island medical evacuation system depends on timely air transport; Chinese military harassment of this mechanism would dangerously undermine basic cross-strait civil safety.

### III. Legal Warfare and Jurisdictional Maneuvers

On September 10, China's State Council officially announced the establishment of a "national-level nature reserve" on "Huangyan Island" (known as the "Minzhu Reef" in Taiwan and "Scarborough Shoal" in other countries), citing strengthened enforcement and ecological protection. The PRC media and scholars defended the move as ecological management, but regional analysts suggest it is part of a legal stratagem to tighten administrative control, in alignment with China's 2021 Coast Guard Law. The TAO asserted that both sides of the strait are part of one China and should jointly defend sovereignty and maritime rights. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded with a stern statement condemning the move as illegal and highlighting China's hegemonic tendencies.

### IV. Military Intimidation and Force Projection

China also tested Taiwan's air and naval boundaries. On September 10, the PLA deployed its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, on sea trials—a voyage speculated to be one of its final tests before full commission. According to Japan's Ministry of Defense, Fujian departed the Yangtze River estuary and sailed southwest, escorted by the destroyers Hangzhou (DDG-136) and Jinan (DDG-152). The formation drew attention from civilian and military observers worldwide.

On September 12, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense reported that between 6 a.m. on September 11 and 6 a.m. on September 12, it detected 22 Chinese military aircraft and 10 warships operating around Taiwan. Of those, 15 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait median line and entered Taiwan's northern and southwestern airspace—corresponding with Fujian's transit. The PLA confirmed Fujian had passed through the strait en route to the South China Sea, claiming the mission was for "science, testing, and training" and not aimed at any specific target. Meanwhile, independent analysts speculate Fujian might be heading to the Sanya naval base in Hainan and may enter service on a symbolic date such as September 18 or October 1.

Taiwan's defense authorities stated they maintained full tracking via joint reconnaissance and would respond appropriately. A defense institute associate researcher cautioned that while Fujian still requires carrier air wing integration and task force training before becoming fully combat-capable, the emergence of a third operational carrier would represent a shift in naval balance and could become a "qualitative change" for Taiwan's defense posture.

## V. Information Warfare and Psychological Operations

China's aggression also ventured into psychological and information warfare. On September 14, a video circulated claiming that Taiwan's vessel Lienjiang had been intercepted by PLA ships broadcasting orders during a chase of a Chinese fishing vessel. Taiwan's coast guard debunked the footage as a manipulated compilation of distinct incidents from different times and places. Meanwhile, the PLA's Eastern Theater Command political department released a military anthem MV titled "Plant the Banner of Victory on Formosa," with lyrics referencing "embracing Penghu Bay," "berthing in Keelung Harbor," and "planting flags on the island" — a blunt attempt at psychological intimidation and united front propaganda.

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### ■ CCP and Opposition Parties' Maneuvering Around the "Taipei–Shanghai Twin-City Forum" and Its Postponement

On September 10, when asked about the timing of the "Twin-City Forum," the TAO stated only that Shanghai and Taipei had maintained communication and that exchanges should be promoted based on the "1992 Consensus" and opposition to Taiwan independence.

On September 18, Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an said he would apply according to regulations and reiterated the principle of mutual respect and dignity. KMT legislator Hsu Chiao-hsin and Taipei city councilor Chan Wei-yuan also urged continued exchanges. In response, Executive Yuan spokesperson Li Hui-chih and MAC Planning Director Lu Chong-ni both stressed that the government supports "healthy, orderly, and city-focused" interactions. MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie further outlined four reminders: (1) all exchanges and MOUs must be based on equality and dignity; (2) the agenda should focus on municipal affairs, avoiding issues like tourism that fall under central government jurisdiction; (3) participation in the CCP's "three 80th anniversary" united front events is not permitted; and (4) any changes in itinerary must be reported.

On September 19, the KMT accused the DPP government of "governing by ideology," pointing out that county and city leaders under past DPP administrations had also traveled to China to promote tourism.

On September 22, Taipei City Hall abruptly announced that the forum would not be held in September, citing the need for more thorough reviews of administrative and technical matters, stressing that “holding it well is more important than holding it early.” Deputy Mayor Lin Yi-hua explained that the MOUs involved multiple central ministries and required greater preparation. KMT figures and the United Daily News criticized the DPP for “blocking exchanges” through technicalities, while KMT legislator Lai Shyh-bao and New Taipei City mayor Hou You-yi called for unobstructed exchanges. In response, MAC Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung emphasized that travel permits had already been issued that morning and denied any obstruction, stressing that officials had reminded Chiang Wan-an to avoid becoming material for CCP propaganda. MAC also issued a statement the same day reiterating that the government had been actively assisting and that media claims of obstruction were inaccurate.

On September 23, KMT chairmanship candidates Hau Lung-bin and Lo Chih-chiang, along with legislator Weng Hsiao-ling, again criticized the DPP for “technical obstruction,” emphasizing that the Twin-City Forum was the last remaining official exchange platform. DPP spokesperson Wu Cheng pointed out that Mayor Chiang was “backtracking” and failing to uphold national sovereignty. MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie responded that if the government intended to block the forum, it would announce so openly, stressing nonetheless that the MAC “has always been assisting.”

On September 24, TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of “going to great lengths to obstruct” and reiterated the “one family across the Strait” narrative. The MAC rejected Beijing’s comments as malicious, reaffirming that the government’s consistent stance is to facilitate exchanges. The Ministry of Labor also clarified that the vocational training MOU did not involve employment brokerage and emphasized that no obstruction had occurred. Meanwhile, KMT Chairman Eric Chu and TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang both criticized the DPP for “blocking exchanges.”

On September 28, officials told the Liberty Times that the original MOU had violated Articles 34 and 35 of the Cross-Strait Act. After revisions, it no longer met Beijing’s demands, and with Chiang Wan-an refusing to endorse the “1992

Consensus,” Beijing decided to delay the forum. This revealed that the CCP’s united front objectives had not been satisfied.

## ■ China’s Diplomatic Suppression and Coercion

**I. Smearing Tsai Ing-wen’s Japan visit as “sneaky”:** On September 10, former President Tsai Ing-wen traveled to Japan on a private visit. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs harshly criticized the trip as a “sneaky visit” (竄訪), accusing Tsai of “colluding with foreign forces to seek independence,” and even invoked the rhetoric of Japan’s “historical responsibility.”

**II. Suppressing Taiwan’s participation in international organizations:** Also on September 24, China’s TAO claimed that Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as ICAO must adhere to the “one China principle” and warned the United States not to “send the wrong signals.”

**III. International forums and cultural exchanges disrupted:** On September 10, Taiwan’s Ministry of the Interior announced that the 7th International Police Cooperation Forum had set a new record, with 52 countries and 2,713 participants. However, due to Chinese interference and political factors, 11 foreign guests from 6 countries canceled their participation at the last minute. In Europe, Minister of Culture Li Yuan’s itinerary in Paris also encountered obstruction from Beijing.

**IV. Attacking Lin Chia-lung’s European trip and invoking the “one China principle”:** On September 12, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung’s visit to Europe, demanding that the host countries adhere to the “one China principle.” Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Hsiao Kuang-wei countered that Taiwan, as a member of the international community, has the right to engage with like-minded partners, calling out China’s arbitrary interference as a display of a “hegemonic mindset.”

**V. Kazakhstan art exhibition canceled:** On September 21, Taiwanese artists were scheduled to hold the Taiwan Contemporary Art Exhibition at Kazakhstan’s National Museum. However, the museum abruptly canceled the event and terminated the contract, citing excuses like renovation and construction. Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly condemned Beijing’s coercion, calling it a blatant obstruction of cultural exchange, and expressed deep regret.

**VI. TAO escalates united front rhetoric:** On September 24, the TAO further denounced Lin Chia-lung's European trip as an attempt to "rely on foreign forces to seek independence," grouping it together with Tsai Ing-wen's visit for criticism, thereby escalating its political attacks and united front narrative.

## ■ United Front and Infiltration Operations

### I. Legal and Identity Manipulation

#### 1. Beijing Exploits Identity and Citizenship Issues to Shape Cross-Strait Recognition

On August 27, Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior announced a draft amendment to the Regulations Governing Permission for Restoration of Household Registration for Mainland Residents with Former Taiwan Household Registration. The amendment stipulates that applicants who have engaged in CCP political propaganda, violated cross-strait policies, or endangered national security may be denied permission to apply. In response, the TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian denounced the move as "green terror" and an attempt by the DPP to manipulate the "two-state theory" through household registration cancellations. Taiwan's MAC emphasized that Taiwan's identity is a precious status, and related matters must be handled prudently.

At the same time, some PRC spouses applying for a "loss of original household registration certificate" (required to obtain Taiwanese citizenship) encountered obstruction from local Chinese police, who demanded that applications be filed under the name "Taiwan Province." The SEF raised the issue with the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), but Beijing refused to cooperate. On August 29, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie revealed that around 50 PRC spouses were blocked from obtaining certificates, criticizing Beijing for deliberately sowing instability and harming PRC spouses' rights.

On September 10, the TAO again attacked Taiwan for checking the nationality status of PRC spouses and public servants, while the MAC countered that both sides adopt a single-citizenship policy and that Beijing has previously issued over 7,000 such certificates. Meanwhile, a Taiwanese man, Ying Chih-hung, destroyed his ROC passport in China and declared himself to "love China." He was later found to be a wanted fraud suspect. The MAC revoked his household registration and passport, accusing Beijing of shielding him.

The Taiwan government also further tightened preventative measures, including revising Guidelines for Visiting Hong Kong and Macao to require

prior reporting for public servants and launching a special review on September 14 that confirmed some public officials possessed PRC-issued documents. From 2025, this review will be institutionalized, with priority checks on volunteer soldiers and essential government employees.

## **2. Beijing Leverages Military Parade and War Narrative for United Front Propaganda**

On September 3, the CCP held a military parade in Beijing's Tiananmen Square marking the "80th Anniversary of the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War." CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping declared China follows a "path of peaceful development," while demanding the building of a "world-class military" and resolutely defending "national sovereignty, unification, and territorial integrity," sending a clear threat to Taiwan.

Prior to the parade, TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian, on August 27, accused Taiwan of "downplaying the history of the War of Resistance" and invited Taiwanese figures to attend; PRC Defense Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang, on August 28, claimed the KMT and CCP "fought side by side" against Japan and invited former KMT soldiers. On the day of the parade, former KMT Chair Hung Hsiu-chu attended and remarked she felt "proud to be Chinese," which Beijing highlighted in its propaganda.

On September 2, CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning chaired a symposium framing the war victory as the achievement of "all Chinese compatriots," stressing "one China" and the "1992 Consensus." On September 4, Wang again met Hung and praised her "anti-independence, pro-unification" stance. The PLA Daily also republished The History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, casting the CCP as the "pillar of the national resistance."

Taiwan's MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie, on August 29, emphasized the war was led by the ROC government, with the CCP making "no contribution." On September 3, President Lai Ching-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim paid respects at the National Revolutionary Martyrs' Shrine, stressing that "true peace comes from strength." The MAC reiterated that the CCP cannot conceal historical facts, while the DPP labeled Hung's participation as "treasonous."

On September 10, TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua claimed the CCP annihilated 697,000 Japanese troops, bearing 60% of the resistance on the "enemy's rear front." The MAC rebutted, citing not only Japanese and ROC records showing about 500,000 total Japanese fatalities, but also the almost total lack of

evidence of Communist participation in major battles throughout the war. The MAC emphasized that the resistance was led by the ROC government, and the CCP only used the war as an opportunity to build its own strength. All CCP propaganda about “victory” is intended to confuse audiences, as part of its united front campaign against Taiwan.

## **II. Education, Youth, and Religious United Front**

### **1. Beijing Establishes “Taiwan Research Center” in Jiangxi to Advance Unification**

On August 26, Beijing inaugurated the first provincial-level “Taiwan Research Center” in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, jointly established by the Jiangxi TAO and the Jiangxi Academy of Social Sciences. CCP officials stressed the center must “follow the correct political direction” and ensure research supports the “one China principle,” the “1992 Consensus,” and “national unification.” This demonstrates Beijing’s use of local think tanks and academic institutions as institutionalized tools for United Front work.

### **2. Beijing Exploits Education and Youth Exchanges for Infiltration**

On August 27, TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian announced that from July 2024 through 2027, first-time applicants for the Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents (“Taiwan Compatriot Permit”) would be exempted from fees. Zhu claimed that July applications rose 22% compared to June, with 72% of applicants under the age of 45, and that first-time arrivals increased by 33%. In early September, Taiwan’s Ministry of Education instructed universities not to participate in or forward information about PRC-sponsored “all-expenses-paid” exchange activities, citing reports about Jilin University’s “Winter Camp of Northern Charm,” which involved abnormal unilateral hospitality.

TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua, on September 10, condemned the move as “deliberately heightening confrontation,” while Taiwan’s MAC and Ministry of Education stressed exchanges must comply with the principles of parity, dignity, and Taiwan’s legal framework to avoid becoming United Front tools. MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie warned that offers of “unreasonably generous treatment” are suspect, reminding students that “there is no free lunch.”

### **3. Beijing Expands Religious Control and Long-Arm Jurisdiction**

The CCP has recently issued the Code of Conduct for Online Behavior of Religious Clergy, even extending its provisions to Taiwanese clergy. On September 18, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie stressed that “there is no religious freedom in China, only control and suppression,” warning Taiwanese religious figures not to harbor illusions when visiting China. On September 19, the MAC denounced the regulation as an infringement on religious freedom and a blatant attempt at extraterritorial control.

The MAC also revealed that from January 2024 to August 2025, 188 Taiwanese nationals either went missing or were interrogated in China—about nine cases per month. Cases included detained I-Kuan Tao practitioners, arrested Taiwanese businessmen, and tourists harassed at airports and hotels. On September 25, Liang disclosed that nine Taiwanese I-Kuan Tao believers remain in detention, urging citizens to avoid religious activities in China. SEF Deputy Secretary-General Li Pao-wen, on September 26, stated the SEF has been assisting families, condemning Beijing’s suppression of religious freedom, and warning Taiwanese to remain vigilant about risks in China.

### **III. Cultural and Entertainment Infiltration**

#### **1. Beijing Smears Taiwan Through Cultural Exchange, Accusing “Cultural Independence”**

On September 10, TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua accused the DPP of “pushing cultural Taiwan independence” while simultaneously “exploiting Chinese cultural relics” through exhibitions abroad, citing the National Palace Museum’s loan to the Czech Republic. On September 11, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie rebutted that Taiwan has never pursued “de-Sinicization,” noting that the real cultural destruction came from the CCP’s Cultural Revolution. He stressed that the exhibition in Prague was a standard cultural exchange, no different from Beijing’s Palace Museum exhibitions abroad.

#### **2. Beijing Uses Entertainers as Tools in United Front Operations**

On August 14, the MAC summoned 20 Taiwanese entertainers to explain allegations of “echoing CCP narratives.” MAC Chair Chiu Chui-cheng, on August 26, emphasized the need to safeguard national sovereignty. On August 29, Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture reported that most entertainers responded that their posts were handled by PRC-based agents or without their knowledge of the legal implications, pledging future compliance. Minister Li Yuan publicly urged entertainers not to become United Front tools. The same day, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie confirmed some cooperation but issued only

oral warnings. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian, on August 27, accused the DPP of “intimidating Taiwanese.”

On September 3, some Taiwanese entertainers reposted CCTV’s National Day parade livestream notice. The MAC initially judged that no red lines were crossed, although Deputy Minister Liang, on September 4, noted the posts appeared templated. Media later reported 11 entertainers had not responded, prompting the Ministry of Culture to send another request. With PRC National Day approaching, MAC Deputy Minister Shen Yu-chung, on September 22, reiterated two red lines: entertainers must not denigrate the ROC or endorse armed unification. He criticized Beijing for deliberately exploiting entertainers as propaganda tools, harming cross-strait cultural exchanges.

### **3. Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Dispute Persists**

On September 16, Hunan Province Governor Mao Weiming called for resuming direct flights between Hunan and Taiwan at the 17th Hunan-Taiwan Economic and Trade Fair. Some Taiwanese tourism operators have also urged the lifting of Taiwan’s outbound tour ban to China. On September 18, MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-jie stressed that tourism resumption must be negotiated via the Taiwan Strait Tourism Association (TSTA) and the Cross-Strait Tourism Exchange Association (CSTEA) to ensure safety and quality.

On September 19, the MAC urged Beijing to first restore PRC students studying in Taiwan and respond to TSTA’s communication requests, pointing out that current cross-strait flows are “more Taiwan to China, fewer China to Taiwan.” On September 24, the TAO retorted that its “sincerity remains unchanged” and accused the DPP of politicizing tourism, claiming that the policy of resuming some tour groups to Taiwan had already taken effect. The MAC countered the same day, stating that tourism talks are “technical, not political,” and reiterating the need for proper negotiation. Liang, on September 25, again urged Beijing to demonstrate sincerity by responding to Taiwan’s proposals.

## **IV. Cognitive and Information Operations**

### **1. Beijing Leverages Xiangshan Forum to Counter AIT Statement, Reinforce Unification Narrative**

On September 18, after the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) reiterated that “Taiwan has never been part of the PRC,” Beijing mounted a strong counterattack. TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua restated the claim that “Taiwan has always belonged to China,” demanding the U.S. respect the “one China

principle.” At the Xiangshan Forum in Beijing, Defense Minister Dong Jun declared the PLA would “never allow Taiwan independence” and was ready to defeat foreign interference.

PLA Academy of Military Science Lt. Gen. He Lei invoked the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, arguing that Taiwan’s sovereignty belonged to China. Chinese scholars such as Wu Xinbo (Fudan University) and Zheng Yongnian (CUHK-Shenzhen) advocated for the “peaceful unification” approach, suggesting that U.S. support for it would improve U.S.-China relations. Taiwan’s MAC and Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissed Beijing’s interpretations, emphasizing that Taiwan has never been ruled by the PRC and that those cited wartime declarations had been superseded by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The DPP China Affairs Department stressed Beijing was waging a battle of narratives, but noted that Washington had pushed back by reaffirming the historical reality that Taiwan and the PRC are not subordinate to one another.

## **2. Beijing Deploys AI Deepfakes and Content Farms for Cognitive Warfare**

The YouTube channel "AI Community of Destiny" (AI命運共同體), launched on July 28, has released over 51 political videos disguised as entertainment. Its content consistently reflects CCP narratives, spreading pro-China, anti-Taiwan, and anti-U.S. messages. On September 17, the channel even published a deepfake video of a fabricated conversation between President Lai Ching-te and Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim, attempting to fuel distrust toward the U.S., Taiwan’s military, and Taiwan’s leadership. Taiwan’s national security agencies warned that such AI-driven disinformation undermines democratic trust.

The Vanderbilt University National Security Institute reported that the PRC military-linked company Zhongke Tianji had collected data on over 5,000 Taiwanese social media accounts, creating psychological profiles and utilizing generative AI to disseminate deepfake content during Taiwan’s 2024 presidential election. Separately, a civil think tank research found that Facebook “靠北” pages were run by the Qinhuangdao-based “No Boundaries Group,” using Hong Kong as a front to operate content farms, continuing the disinformation model once used by “Huanshang Net.”

## **█ DPP China Affairs Department Highlights the “Universe of Separatism” and Warns of Risks from the “22 Anti-Separatism Measures”**

## I. Overview and Origins of the “Universe of Separatism”

According to statistics compiled by the DPP China Affairs Department, Chinese authorities have used at least 54 different labels of “谋独” (“plotting separatism”) —a surprisingly large number. These accusations frequently appear in press releases and briefings from the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of State Security, and TAO, as well as in reports from state media such as Xinhua, People’s Daily, and CCTV, or in commentary from PRC-aligned scholars and Hong Kong/Macau outlets. In practice, almost any action taken by Taiwan can be branded as an act of “separatism.”

## II. “Separatism” Accusations Across Different Sectors

**1. Cross-Strait Affairs:** Nearly every mainstream value or stance in Taiwan has been labeled as “separatism.” For instance, former President Tsai Ing-wen’s National Day speech was denounced as “peace separatism,” President Lai Ching-te’s inaugural address was branded “democracy separatism,” U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan was called “anti-China separatism,” and Lai’s “17 National Security Measures” were smeared as “green terror separatism.”

**2. National Defense:** Any defense policy or budget in Taiwan is condemned as “armed separatism,” “military separatism,” or “maritime separatism.” Civic participation in civil defense and the government’s “whole-of-society resilience” program have been attacked as “preparing for war separatism” or “forcing the people into separatism.” Taiwan’s cyber forces have even been placed on the PRC Ministry of State Security’s wanted list under charges of “cyber separatism.”

**3. Diplomacy:** With nearly 20 terms, diplomacy is the sector most targeted. Familiar examples include “U.S.-reliant separatism” and “foreign-dependent separatism.” The PRC has labeled the U.S.-Taiwan 21st Century Trade Initiative as “selling out Taiwan separatism,” Taiwan-Japan political exchanges as “Japan-leaning separatism,” European Parliament resolutions as “Europe-reliant separatism,” and international calls for peace in the Taiwan Strait as “West-dependent separatism.” Taiwan’s aid to Ukraine has even been accused of being “Ukraine-linked separatism.”

**4. Legal Affairs:** President Lai’s cross-strait policy statements have been smeared as “legal independence” or “constitutional separatism.” Taiwan’s constitutional amendment to lower the voting age to 18 was criticized as

“constitutional amendment separatism.” Legislative action on the “Five National Security Laws” was labeled “rule-of-law separatism,” while rulings by Taiwan’s Constitutional Court were branded “interpretive separatism.”

**5. Other Areas (Health, Sports, Education, Culture):** During the COVID-19 pandemic, Taiwan was accused of “pandemic separatism.” After controversies at the Universiade, PRC officials claimed Taiwan engaged in “sports separatism.” The Ministry of Education’s “Understanding China” curriculum was denounced as “textbook separatism,” and the Golden Bell Awards-nominated TV series Listen Up the Sound of the Waves was condemned as “cultural separatism.”

### **III. Treat Assessment: The Absurd Expansion of the “Separatism Universe”**

The PRC’s “separatism” accusations have become pervasive—“the mountains plot separatism, the seas plot separatism”—expanding across all domains. This reflects the irrationality and absurdity of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. Such rhetoric neither fosters positive cross-strait relations nor builds trust; instead, it further alienates the PRC from the people of Taiwan and the international community.

### **IV. Risk Advisory: The “22 Anti-Separatism Measures” and Religious Control**

The PRC has recently introduced the “22 Anti-Separatism Measures”, which threaten Taiwan’s people with “lifetime pursuit” and even the “death penalty.” In addition, Beijing’s new Regulations on the Online Conduct of Religious Clergy seek to extend jurisdiction over Taiwanese religious personnel, prohibiting them from “opposing CCP leadership or undermining national unity.” These authoritarian measures highlight the severe security risks facing Taiwanese under Beijing’s expanding “legal warfare” and United Front strategies.

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# 民主進步黨

Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan

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## A Guide to President Lai's 2025 National Day Address

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*October 10th, 2025*

On October 10, President Lai Ching-te delivered his National Day address titled “A New Taiwan Rises in a Time of Change,” emphasizing that the nation will respond to a rapidly changing and uncertain world as a stable Taiwan —steady in direction, resilient in spirit, and forward-looking in vision. His remarks

underscored Taiwan's strategic confidence and collective strength from all its citizens in facing new global challenges.

The speech centered on five major themes, each underscoring Taiwan's determination to remain secure, prosperous, and responsible in an era of change.

## 1. Defining Taiwan's Existence through Democracy and Resilience

President Lai began by marking this year as a historic milestone: for the first time, **the number of days Taiwan has spent free from martial law has surpassed those under its stifling rule**, signifying that the nation has parted entirely from authoritarianism and entered a democratic future full of hope.

Amid Beijing's attempts to distort the history of the War of Resistance, World War II, and Taiwan's postwar identity through its "three 80-year" narratives, President Lai reaffirmed that the purpose of the state is to realize the people's free development—not to serve the ambitions of authoritarian rulers.

He noted that while the world faces mounting uncertainty—from the war in Ukraine and unrest in the Middle East to China's military expansion, U.S. policy adjustments, and global supply chain restructuring—**Taiwan has remained strong and steadfast**.

The Asian Development Bank recently raised Taiwan's growth forecast to **5.1%**, the highest among the Four Asian Tigers; its **stock market capitalization surpassed US\$3 trillion**, and **foreign exchange reserves exceeded US\$600 billion** for the first time.

These achievements, President Lai said, reflect not only Taiwan's economic vitality but also the collective effort of its 23 million people, with the nation's high-tech industries—semiconductors, ICT, and electronics—standing as shared national assets that symbolize the unity and creativity of the Taiwanese people.

## 2. Building a Balanced Taiwan That Leaves No One Behind

Turning to domestic priorities, President Lai underscored that economic growth must be inclusive. Under the "Four Major Priorities" and the principle of "leaving no one behind," his administration will ensure that prosperity benefits all sectors and communities—traditional industries, MSMEs, workers, farmers, and fishers alike. Key initiatives include:

- **A NT\$93 billion tariff-impact support plan;**

- Annual investment of over **NT\$10 billion** to help MSMEs implement AI and digital transformation;
- Tailored competitiveness strategies for traditional manufacturing sectors.

President Lai reminded the public that “times of change are also times of opportunity.” He called on all citizens to face global challenges with confidence, action, and unity.

### **3. Securing National Competitiveness through Three Forward-Looking Strategies**

To sustain Taiwan's leadership and economic momentum, President Lai announced three strategic directions:

- **Expand Investment and Deepen Roots in Taiwan** – The **Three Major Programs for Investing in Taiwan** have attracted over **NT\$2.5 trillion** and created more than 160,000 jobs. The Trillion NT Dollar Investment National Development Plan will continue to improve infrastructure, boost local economies, and raise quality of life across the island.
- **Deepen International Economic and Trade Cooperation** – Under the **Enhanced Trade Partnership** framework, Taiwan and the United Kingdom signed three pillar arrangements covering **investment, digital trade, and energy/net-zero** cooperation. Taiwan is also pursuing **reciprocal tariff negotiations with the United States** to strengthen bilateral industrial collaboration and expand global linkages.
- **Build “Guardian Mountains” to Fortify Taiwan’s Industrial Strength** – Through the **Ten New AI Infrastructure Initiatives**, Taiwan will promote R&D in **quantum computing, silicon photonics, and robotics**. The government also seeks to make Taiwan an **Asian hub for asset management**, while the **biotech and precision-health industries**, designated as a *National Project of Hope*, will serve as trillion-NT-dollar pillars of innovation and national growth.

### **4. A Responsible International Actor: Upholding Peace and Strengthening Defense**

President Lai reaffirmed that **democratic Taiwan is a crucial link for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and a responsible member of the international community.**

Taiwan will continue to **uphold the status quo across the Taiwan Strait**, safeguard regional stability, and strengthen national defense through a forthcoming **special defense budget**. The government has set three primary objectives:

- Build the **T-Dome** multi-layered air-defense network;
- Integrate **AI and advanced technologies** to develop a **smart defense system**;
- Strengthen the **defense industry and local supply chains** to make Taiwan a **trusted security partner for allied nations**.

President Lai stressed that **peace must be achieved through strength, not confrontation**, and that true strength comes from the resilience of society as a whole. He also extended a note of goodwill toward Beijing, stating that both sides of the Strait have experienced the pain of war and should therefore **work together to promote stability and peace**.

This message aligns with the **European Union's recent appeal referencing the UN Charter**, calling on China to refrain from the use of force and to jointly preserve international peace.

## **5. Fostering Social Cohesion and Showcasing Taiwan's Resilience**

President Lai closed his address by honoring the unity and compassion of the Taiwanese people.

He thanked the overseas Taiwanese community for their “Chip in with Taiwan” campaign in New York’s Times Square, and praised the “superheroes with shovels” who joined disaster-relief efforts in Hualien.

These actions, he said, represent **the spirit of solidarity, empathy, and perseverance that defines the Taiwanese people**—a collective strength that enables Taiwan to overcome challenges and inspire the world.

Through this shared sense of purpose, Taiwan will continue to demonstrate **democratic resilience and innovative vitality**, contributing both stability and hope to the global community.

## ■ Cross-Strait Outlook: From National Resilience to Regional Peace

Building on his call for peace through strength, President Lai extended his vision to the broader region. He stated that Taiwan's commitment to democracy also underpins peace in the Indo-Pacific, declaring:

*“Democratic Taiwan is a hub for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and a responsible member of the international community. We will uphold the status quo, safeguard peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and promote prosperity throughout the region.”*

In this spirit, he urged Beijing to fulfill the responsibilities of a major power—to cease distorting United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and historical documents related to World War II—and to renounce the use of force or coercion to alter the cross-Strait status quo.

Recalling the devastation and suffering caused by war, he appealed to China of lessons learned from history so that the tragedies of the past are never repeated. This concluding message linked Taiwan's domestic resilience to its international role: a **responsible, predictable, and stable actor** committed to defending freedom, preserving peace, and contributing to the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific community.

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