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China Influence Tracker (XIV)



Military encirclement follows "goodwill" forum

Beijing's "three tickets" for opposition access

KMT legislators summoned to Xiamen

Taiwan blocks RedNote after massive security failure

CHINA INFLUENCE TRACKER
DPP Mission to the U.S.



January 5th, 2026

December Highlights

Military encirclement follows the "goodwill" forum: PLA launched unjust "Justice Mission 2025" exercises on December 29th forming near semi-encirclement with live-fire drills, just 24 hours after Taipei's mayor of KMT attended Shanghai's Twin-City Forum.

Beijing's "three tickets" for opposition access: Reports surfaced that CCP conditioned potential KMT Chair-Xi meeting on blocking defense budget, stalling security legislation, and reaffirming "Chinese unification" goals.

Seven legislators summoned to Xiamen: KMT legislators reportedly invited to receive Beijing's directives on obstructing President Lai's defense and security proposals through January.

Taiwan blocks Xiaohongshu (RedNote) after massive security failure: App failed all 15 cybersecurity indicators, linked to 1,706 fraud cases (NT\$240M losses), refused Taiwan jurisdiction.

THE BIG PICTURE: Beijing launched its largest military exercises against Taiwan in years last week, encircling the island with "Justice Mission 2025" drills that simulated blockades, port seizures, and coordinated attacks. The PLA announced the operation on December 29th, just 24 hours after Taipei's mayor concluded a "goodwill" visit at Shanghai's Twin-City Forum.

But this was no accident. While one hand extended symbolic friendship, the other mobilized live-fire drills around Taiwan and coast guard "law enforcement" patrols near Kinmen. **Meanwhile,** opposition legislators were reportedly instructed to block the special defense budget, and Fujian Province announced infrastructure projects Taiwan never requested.

December exemplified Beijing's modus operandi: layer military pressure with political interference, economic inducements with legislative obstruction, all synchronized to erode sovereignty while maintaining the appearance of cross-strait normalcy.

THE SYNCHRONIZED SQUEEZE: The Twin-City Forum ended December 28th. Military exercises launched December 29th. The pattern isn't subtle.

The PLA's "Justice Mission 2025" simulated blockades across five landing zones with live-fire drills on December 30th. Meanwhile, **throughout the month**, fishing vessels illegally trawled Penghu waters, four Coast Guard ships entered Kinmen's restricted zones requiring interception, and the carrier Fujian transited the Taiwan Strait. **But military pressure was only part of the campaign.**

Last month, Liberty Times reported Beijing set three preconditions for a meeting between Chairman Xi Jinping and KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun: block defense budgets, stall security legislation, and reaffirm unification. **Cheng's immediate criticism** of President Lai's defense proposal as "playing with fire" echoed Beijing's preferred language—a clear start. Meanwhile, seven legislators were reportedly summoned to Xiamen where officials urged them to stall major bills through January. United Front Director Song Tao reportedly told KMT representatives at a November 14th session that resuming party forums hinged on blocking defense budgets.

United front operations also continued at a breakneck pace. Fujian announced infrastructure projects Taiwan doesn't need. The Entrepreneurs Summit featured explicit reunification messaging, and the Twin-City Forum concluded just hours before Joint Sword's launch. Information warfare swung from violent propaganda to promises that unification would elevate Taipei to "second-tier city" status, and exposed recruitment offering €40,000 monthly to undermine defense confidence. Digital threats escalated as Xiaohongshu, linked to 1,706 fraud cases totaling NT\$240 million, **was blocked after refusing compliance.**

TAIWAN'S RESPONSE: Taiwan's military and coast guards activated emergency protocols throughout December's exercises, releasing videos emphasizing readiness and democratic partnerships. The Executive Yuan approved amendments requiring legislators to obtain approval before China travel. The Ministry of Digital Affairs blocked Xiaohongshu after repeated non-compliance since October.

MOFA also refuted Wang Yi's "seven locks" claims, clarifying Taiwan's postwar status was governed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, that UN Resolution 2758 doesn't mention Taiwan, and that the ROC is sovereign. The MAC noted Hong Kong's Democratic Party dissolution and Jimmy Lai's conviction prove "One Country, Two Systems" eliminates dissent, **reinforcing Taiwan's 80%+ public opposition.**

Our battlefield extends beyond the military domain. It's in legislative procedures, on digital platforms, and in information spaces where Beijing operates through influence before invasion. December proved the coercive nature of China's "peaceful reunification": window dressing for encirclement exercises, legislative interference, and sovereignty erosion packaged as "peace".

[READ THE FULL REPORT](#)

In collaboration with the DPP China Affairs Department, the latest DPP U.S. Mission report provides key updates on the evolving cross-strait situation, detailing the escalation of China's military intimidation, gray zone activities, cognitive warfare, and United Front infiltration targeting Taiwan. Enclosed are the recent developments, offering a comprehensive overview of the current threat landscape, Taiwan's countermeasures, and emerging public opinion trends shaping the strategic environment.

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
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Huang Kuo-chang's Washington Deceit



January 14th, 2026

Huang Kuo-chang's Washington Deceit

President Lai Ching-te [announced](#) in November a special defense budget totaling NT\$1.25 trillion (approximately US\$40 billion) to bolster Taiwan's self-defense from 2026 to 2033. Washington [welcomed the proposal](#) as a critical step to strengthen deterrence against growing threats from China. Despite

American support, Taiwan's opposition-controlled Legislative Yuan has blocked the special budget eight times since November, with the TPP, led by Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌), criticizing the proposal as "opaque" and refusing to advance the bill.

Huang traveled to Washington this week to meet with U.S. officials. According to media reports, the meetings emphasized the urgent need for a unified, non-partisan approach to Taiwan's defense. Upon returning to Taiwan, however, Huang held a press conference where he doubled down on opposing the special budget, claiming his meetings vindicated his criticisms.

Huang's Claims

Huang: "Taiwan is a democratic country; it cannot accept its legislature still not knowing the items and content before deliberating the special act. The U.S. side fully understood and agreed with this view."

「台灣是民主國家,沒辦法接受國會在審議特別條例前仍不知品項內容,美方充分理解且同意這看法。」

Huang: "The NT\$1.25 trillion isn't entirely for U.S. arms purchases; a fairly high proportion is not for U.S. procurements."

「1.25兆元不全然是對美軍購,有相當高比例不是。」

Huang: "Money must be spent on the blade's edge (wisely), not squandered, and it must not become a big fat piece of meat in the eyes of certain arms dealers and brokers."

「錢要花在刀口上,不能亂花,更不能成為某一些軍火商、捐客眼中的大肥肉。」

Huang: "The NT\$1.25 trillion arms procurement special bill is severely lacking in information transparency, making the Legislature's oversight virtually void."

「1.25兆軍購特別條例嚴重缺乏資訊透明,『國會』監督形同虛設。」

Huang: "After returning from the U.S., my resolve to oppose the defense bill is only stronger, not weakened at all!"

「美國回來了以後,我反對的決心只有更強烈,沒有軟化!」

In Sum

Huang's assertion that U.S. officials "fully understood and agreed" with his transparency concerns directly contradicts publicly available evidence. AIT's Jan. 14 statement **voiced strong U.S. support for President Lai's**

proposal as a major step to strengthen deterrence. There is no indication that Washington endorsed the opposition's roadblocks.

His characterization of the budget is equally false. The Ministry of National Defense has clarified that over 75% of the special budget is designated for foreign procurement, formulated through close U.S.-Taiwan consultations. His insinuation of corruption ignores that most procurements occur through government-to-government channels under strict scrutiny. His claim that legislative oversight is "void" misrepresents reality – one in which Huang's coalition, despite being repeatedly briefed by MND senior officials, has blocked the bill eight times. **Genuine oversight would amount to giving the special budget the consideration it deserves.**

Most troubling is Huang's assertion that his opposition "hardened" after meeting with U.S. officials. All available evidence points in the opposite direction. U.S. officials have consistently emphasized urgency and political unity on Taiwan's defense. This suggests either a fundamental misunderstanding of U.S. messaging or a deliberate effort to distort American support for political purposes. Taiwan cannot afford politicians who return from meetings with American officials and use those meetings to justify weakening Taiwan's defense posture.

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Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan

China Influence Tracker (XII)



- ▶ PRC establishes "Taiwan Retrocession Day" as national holiday
- ▶ China Coast Guard intrudes Pratas Island on National Day
- ▶ Chongqing police prosecute Puma Shen using 22 anti-separatist measures
- ▶ President Lai: Beijing should stop distorting UN Resolution 2758
- ▶ 79.4% Taiwanese affirm "Taiwan is not part of the PRC"

CHINA INFLUENCE TRACKER

DPP Mission in the US



In collaboration with the DPP China Affairs Department, the latest DPP U.S. Mission report provides key updates on the evolving cross-strait situation, detailing the escalation of China's military intimidation, gray zone activities, cognitive warfare, and United Front infiltration targeting Taiwan. Enclosed are the recent developments, offering a comprehensive overview of the current threat landscape, Taiwan's countermeasures, and emerging public opinion trends shaping the strategic environment.

[October Highlights]

- President Lai's National Day address was well received abroad, but Beijing responded with sharp criticism and gray-zone tactics.
- The PRC officially adopted "Taiwan Retrocession Day," an extension of their "stolen valor" for the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII.
- The CCP interfered in the KMT chairmanship elections to help pro-Beijing hardliner Cheng Li-wun emerge victorious.
- New lawfare measures were implemented, notably the launching of an unprecedented cross-border investigation into Taiwan legislator Puma Shen.

Beijing's Comprehensive Post-National Day Countermeasures toward Taiwan: Heightened Political Division and United Front Infiltration

***Summary:** Following President Lai's National Day address rejecting Beijing's misuse of UN Resolution 2758, the PRC launched a coordinated political, legal, and information offensive—framing Taiwan as historically "returned to China," accusing Lai of provoking tensions, and escalating gray-zone pressure near Dongsha. Beijing also expanded disinformation efforts during the KMT chairmanship race and amplified narratives supporting new Chair Cheng Li-wun, while pairing these moves with cultural united-front outreach and an expanded TAO spokesperson system. Together, these actions reflect a synchronized PRC push to shape Taiwan's political environment and public opinion.*

I. Beijing's Immediate Response to President Lai's National Day Address: Intensifying Political and Legal Warfare

On **October 10**, President Lai Ching-te emphasized in his National Day address that “democratic Taiwan” stands as a beacon of freedom in Asia. He called on Beijing to “demonstrate the responsibility of a major power,” to cease distorting **UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 and World War II declarations**, and to “abandon the use of force or coercion to alter the cross-Strait status quo.” Lai underscored that “peace must be built upon strength,” announcing plans for a **special national defense budget** that will raise defense spending to **over 3% of GDP by 2026 and 5% by 2030**, signaling his administration’s determination to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty and democratic system.

Beijing swiftly launched a coordinated propaganda and diplomatic counteroffensive. The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) denounced Lai for “stubbornly adhering to Taiwan independence, inciting democracy-versus-authoritarianism confrontation, and distorting historical facts,” declaring that “nothing Lai says or does can change the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China.” The PRC Foreign Ministry invoked the **Cairo Declaration** and **Potsdam Proclamation**, asserting that these political statements had already “confirmed Taiwan’s return to China,” and further claimed that **UNGA Resolution 2758** “completely resolved the issue of China’s representation, including Taiwan.” Chinese state media followed up with coordinated commentaries accusing Lai of “seeking independence through military buildup” and “relying on foreign powers to resist reunification.” The campaign aimed to portray Taipei as the destabilizing actor and reframe cross-Strait tensions as a result of “provocation by Taiwan.”

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) issued strong rebuttals the same evening, dismissing Beijing’s rhetoric as “old and unconvincing.” They stressed that **UNGA Resolution 2758** makes no reference to the “Republic of China” or “Taiwan,” nor does it address sovereignty issues. MOFA emphasized that the **Treaty of San Francisco**—which has the force of international law—replaced such political statements as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. The treaty did not cede Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Republic of China (Taiwan) and the PRC stand on equal footing, with neither being subordinate to the other.

Taiwanese Public Opinion Strongly Backs Lai’s Policy Line: A MAC survey released on **October 23** showed overwhelming public support for Lai’s policy stance and deterrence measures.

- **76.7%** of respondents supported the president’s call for Beijing to renounce the use of force and coercion.

- **75.5%** backed the accelerated construction of a “T-Dome” air defense system for self-defense.
- **79.4%** agreed with the statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and Taiwan is not part of the PRC.”
- **86.4%** supported dialogue with China under the principles of **equality and dignity**, and **77.2%** backed routine identity checks to ensure public servants do not hold PRC residency or identity documents.

The MAC emphasized that Beijing’s “One China principle, the so-called ‘1992 Consensus,’ and the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula” collectively aim to eliminate the Republic of China and advance unification, a position firmly rejected by Taiwan’s mainstream public opinion.

Escalation in the Maritime Gray Zone and Psychological Operations:

On October 10, a **China Coast Guard vessel operating without AIS transponder signals** intruded into restricted waters southwest of **Pratas Island (Dongsha)**. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) deployed the **Tainan patrol vessel** to shadow and drive it away. According to CGA data, **nine PRC vessels conducted a total of 30 incursions** into Pratas waters since January, demonstrating Beijing’s intent to normalize its gray-zone tactics. The deliberate timing—on Taiwan’s National Day—carried clear political signaling. Simultaneously, the PRC Defense Ministry mocked Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine program as “a patchwork submarine not fit for combat,” declaring that “armed independence will only lead to self-destruction.” These statements exemplify Beijing’s twin-track approach of **military intimidation and psychological warfare**, using low-level provocations to test Taipei’s resolve and international reaction.

II. Intensified CCP–KMT Political Convergence and United Front Signaling

Throughout October, Beijing engaged in **multi-layered political and information operations** surrounding the **KMT chairmanship election**, combining disinformation campaigns with post-election political outreach. Between October 9 and 12, former Taipei Mayor **Hau Lung-bin** and 2024 KMT vice-presidential candidate **Jaw Shaw-kong** reported waves of AI-generated videos and fake accounts attacking Hau’s campaign, which Taiwan’s National Security Bureau later confirmed as **PRC-origin cognitive operations** involving over 1,000 TikTok clips and 200 YouTube uploads. The

DPP characterized the effort as a classic divide-and-weaken tactic, noting that Beijing appeared to favor pro-China candidates while using online attacks to erode the influence of those perceived as less accommodating toward the PRC.

After **Cheng Li-wun** won the chairmanship on **October 18**, Xi Jinping promptly sent a congratulatory letter praising the KMT for “upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence,” calling on both parties to “unite compatriots and advance national reunification.” Cheng responded by reaffirming that the KMT and the CCP will jointly promote cross-Strait peaceful development based on the common political foundation of “upholding the 1992 Consensus and opposing Taiwan independence,” and that “both sides belong to the Chinese nation (中華民族).” She also quibbled with the KMT’s past “pro-U.S., distant-from-China” stance. Cheng later vowed to promote cross-Strait peace as her top priority and expressed openness to meeting Xi. The TAO soon reaffirmed willingness for high-level exchanges on the basis of the 1992 Consensus. Meanwhile, Chinese platform Bilibili heavily promoted clips of Cheng advocating “peaceful unification” and “shared Chinese identity,” shaping a “praise Cheng, belittle Hau” narrative that framed renewed KMT–CCP cooperation as the path to cross-Strait peace. Just before taking office on November 1, Cheng gave an interview to Deutsche Welle in which she described Vladimir Putin as “democratically elected” and “not a dictator,” and also blamed the war in Ukraine on NATO.

On **October 28**, KMT Vice Chair-designate Hsiao Hsu-tsen led a delegation to Tianjin to meet with TAO Director Song Tao, marking the first high-level cross-party contact since the KMT election. Song hailed the meeting as “a new stage in cross-Strait relations,” while Hsiao called for maintaining communication channels to “promote peace and oppose confrontation.”

However, on **October 31**, Cheng’s Deutsche Welle interview—where she claimed Putin “is not a dictator but an elected leader”—sparked domestic backlash, with critics accusing her of echoing PRC rhetoric and undermining Taiwan’s defense credibility. The following day, former KMT Chair Hung Hsiu-chu advocated signing a “peace agreement” with Beijing, arguing that “the ROC Constitution already embodies a One China framework.” These developments underscored growing internal debate within the KMT and Beijing’s ongoing efforts to cultivate a political interlocutor for its “peaceful reunification” narrative.

III. Cultural United Front and Propaganda Adaptation

On **October 5**, the TAO hosted a “Mid-Autumn Reunion for Cross-Strait Compatriots” in Fuzhou, Fujian Province, where **Director Song Tao** declared

that “people on both sides of the Strait are members of one family” and urged joint efforts to achieve “national reunification and rejuvenation.” The event featured **KMT then-Vice Chair Lien Sheng-wen**, lawmakers, and Taiwan business representatives, exemplifying Beijing’s use of festive cultural symbolism—themes of “family reunion” and “shared heritage”—to mask political messaging and blur sovereignty distinctions.

Scholars in Taiwan noted that the CCP routinely leverages traditional holidays such as the Dragon Boat Festival, Mid-Autumn Festival, and Lunar New Year to conduct soft power operations that frame “anti-independence” rhetoric as “defending the homeland.” Multiple parallel events across Fujian and Jiangsu reinforced the tactic of transforming “cultural affinity” into “political identification.”

IV. Personnel Reshuffle Strengthens Beijing’s Economic and Propaganda Outreach toward Taiwan: The TAO on **October 29** appointed **Peng Qing-en, Director-General of its Department of Economic Affairs**, as a new spokesperson, expanding its lineup to four. Peng, known as a “Taiwan-savvy” economic official, was seen as strengthening the linkage between economic integration and propaganda coordination, signaling that Beijing’s future Taiwan work will increasingly merge economic incentives with political messaging.

■ Beijing’s Historical Narrative Campaign: Legalizing “Unification” through Culture and Propaganda

Summary: *In October, Beijing intensified efforts to reshape Taiwan’s history by pairing cultural events with legal and political messaging. It used PRC National Day, a large “80th Anniversary of Taiwan’s Retrocession” campaign, and new retrocession-themed commemorations—backed by PLA imagery and cultural productions—to assert Taiwan’s “return” as legally and historically grounded. PRC outlets also promoted a “patriots governing Taiwan” framework. Taipei responded by banning official participation in PRC events and reaffirming that Beijing’s narratives have no bearing on ROC historical facts.*

I. Beijing’s 76th National Day Sparks Celebrity Pledges of Loyalty, Taipei Reaffirms “Two Red Lines” to Counter Cultural United Front

On **October 1**, China celebrated the **76th anniversary of the founding of the PRC**. State media outlets, including CCTV News and People's Daily, released simultaneous midnight posts marking the occasion. Soon after, several **Taiwanese entertainers reposted** the content on Weibo, adding captions such as “Long live the motherland” and “Happy 76th anniversary of New China”; some even wrote poetry or greetings to “wish the PRC a happy birthday.”

In response, the MAC issued a statement the same day, noting it was monitoring whether such content involved “undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of China, erasing Taiwan’s distinct identity, or endorsing military threats against Taiwan.” The MAC urged artists to cherish Taiwan’s hard-won freedom and democracy. On **October 2**, the MAC further clarified that while it respects artistic and professional freedom, **two “red lines”** must not be crossed: (1) harming the sovereignty or dignity of ROC Taiwan, and (2) echoing the PRC’s military intimidation or calls for armed unification. Taipei emphasized that Beijing has **long weaponized market-access pressure** to coerce political expression from Taiwanese artists and corporations—a core tactic of its “**cultural united front**” strategy that has deepened cross-Strait estrangement.

II. Beijing Uses the “80th Anniversary of Taiwan’s Retrocession” to Fuse Legal and Cultural Warfare

In mid-to-late October, the CCP launched an extensive campaign themed on the “**80th Anniversary of Taiwan’s Retrocession**”, combining cultural, legal, military, and diplomatic instruments to advance its claim of “historical legitimacy” over Taiwan. Beginning **October 13**, Beijing hosted commemorative exhibitions and forums across several cities—including Nanjing University’s “Exhibition on Taiwan’s Retrocession and the Recovery of the South China Sea Islands,” a calligraphy and painting show at the Beijing Taiwan Hall, a “Peace and Development Forum” in Hong Kong, a “Cross-Strait Integration Forum” in Fuzhou’s Minjiang University, and a “Cross-Strait Art Exhibition” in Beijing. Senior officials such as the TAO, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, and the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots attended, emphasizing that “Taiwan’s return to China has complete international legal justification” and that “both sides share blood ties and a common struggle against foreign aggression.”

The MAC warned that Beijing’s use of cultural events to package political propaganda represents an extension of its “**legal warfare**” strategy. He

announced that public officials at all levels were prohibited from attending such PRC-sponsored activities to prevent Taiwanese participants from becoming united front showcases. The MAC noted that Beijing's approach—"using culture to rewrite history and history to legitimize politics"—serves as a psychological and narrative prelude to its goal of annexation.

On **October 22**, the TAO announced plans for a "Commemoration Conference on the 80th Anniversary of Taiwan's Retrocession." Two days later, the **Standing Committee of the National People's Congress** officially approved the establishment of a "**Taiwan Retrocession Day**," claiming it as "irrefutable proof of China's resumption of sovereignty." The Legislative Affairs Commission said the move demonstrated that "Taiwan is an inseparable part of China" and elevated the CCP's Taiwan narrative to a legal level.

On **October 25**, **CPPCC Chair Wang Huning** presided over the national commemorative conference at the Great Hall of the People, introducing the "Seven Benefits After Reunification" and claiming that unification would improve Taiwan's economy, energy security, diplomacy, and public welfare. Wang reiterated that "peaceful unification and the 1992 Consensus" remain the foundation for dialogue. **TAO Director Song Tao** later described the new holiday as "a powerful move against Taiwan independence and foreign interference," signaling an escalation of Beijing's legal and propaganda offensive under the banner of "retrocession."

That same day, Beijing Daily released new **satellite imagery of Taiwan** captured by the **Jilin-1 satellite**, while CCTV Military Channel broadcast footage of **H-6K bombers and J-10 fighters** conducting drills around Taiwan. The CCP's propaganda outlet Yuyuquantian (玉渊潭天) described the exercises as "thunder in silence," implying that China had "upgraded jurisdiction over Taiwan" and was "accelerating the unification process." The **Chinese ambassador to the U.K.** echoed these messages in an op-ed asserting that "the return of Taiwan to China is an important part of the outcomes of World War II."

Taipei responded swiftly. On **October 22**, the MAC banned public officials from attending PRC events, and the next day, the MAC cautioned that Beijing's inclusion of "Kinmen Economic Integration" in its forthcoming **15th Five-Year Plan** suggested efforts toward "de facto jurisdiction." On **October 24**, the MAC reiterated that Taiwan's Retrocession Day is a **historical event of the Republic of China, unrelated to the PRC**. On **October 25**, President Lai released a video commemorating the Battle of Gunningtou, underscoring that "peace must be built on strength," directly countering Beijing's "peaceful unification" propaganda.

Scholars interpret these moves as Beijing's attempt to **codify and institutionalize the claim that "Taiwan is part of China,"** marking a transition from historical narrative-building to an integrated campaign of legal and psychological warfare—what analysts describe as a new phase of **"unification through law, infiltration through culture, and consolidation through history."**

III. Cultural Productions Reinforce the Unification Narrative: On the cultural front, Beijing's state-run media intensified unification themes through film and television. In late September, CCTV aired the spy drama Silent Honor, depicting PRC agents infiltrating Taiwan and glorifying "loyalty to the motherland." In October, a trailer for the upcoming historical film Penghu Hai Zhan portrayed the Qing conquest of Taiwan, ending with the slogan "Unification of Taiwan is unstoppable." On **October 25**, CCTV released the documentary Regaining the Homeland: Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of Taiwan's Retrocession, claiming declassified U.S. documents "prove" that the **Cairo Declaration** authorized China's recovery of Taiwan. Analysts note that these productions represent the CCP's **"cultural warfare"** strategy—embedding political messaging within entertainment to normalize the belief that "unification is inevitable" and "separation is illegitimate."

IV. "Zhong Taiwen" Articles Promote the "Patriots Governing Taiwan" Concept: Between October 26 and 28, the TAO-affiliated online outlet Zhong Taiwen published a three-part series—"The Origin and Nature of the Taiwan Question," "Cross-Strait Development and the Benefits of Unification," and "National Reunification Is Inevitable." The articles advocated a **"patriots governing Taiwan"** framework, asserting that Taiwan would enjoy "high autonomy after peaceful unification" but that "its only path forward lies in reunification." The MAC condemned the rhetoric as an attempt to replicate the Hong Kong model of **"patriots governing Hong Kong,"** arguing that Beijing is using the banner of "peaceful unification" to mask an agenda of **comprehensive political control**.

Beijing's "Three-Warfares" Against Taiwan: Coordinated Campaigns of Public Opinion, Psychological, and Legal Warfare

Summary: *In October, Beijing intensified its historical-narrative campaign by using the PRC's 76th National Day and the "80th Anniversary of Taiwan's Retrocession" to advance claims of historical and legal sovereignty over*

Taiwan. It staged retrocession-themed exhibitions, forums, and a new “Taiwan Retrocession Day,” while media releases, PLA drill footage, and cultural productions reinforced “unification” messaging. PRC-linked outlets also promoted a “patriots governing Taiwan” model. Taipei responded by banning official participation in PRC events and stressing that “retrocession” is an ROC historical event unrelated to the PRC.

I. Escalating Propaganda Frequency and Expanding Platforms to Dominate the Narrative

Beijing has intensified its propaganda and united-front messaging toward Taiwan. On **October 15**, the TAO announced that it would expand the number of ports where Taiwanese travelers can obtain **single-entry travel permits** upon arrival and increase the frequency of its regular press briefings from twice a month to **weekly**. The move was presented as an effort to make cross-Strait travel “more convenient and secure,” but analysts viewed it as part of a coordinated campaign to project an image of “ongoing dialogue and goodwill.” The **MAC** on **October 16** urged Beijing to adopt substantive policy measures and engage in institutional dialogue rather than rely on publicity stunts.

On **October 22**, the TAO opened an official Facebook account titled “Spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council,” marking the first time a PRC government body has launched an account on a Western social-media platform. The account claimed to “explain cross-Strait policies and showcase the mainland’s achievements,” but was immediately flooded with critical comments from Taiwanese users. The MAC noted the irony of Beijing banning Facebook domestically while exploiting it abroad for propaganda purposes, and warned that private engagement with such accounts, especially those linked to “**reward programs**” for reporting on Taiwan independence supporters, could violate Taiwan’s national security laws. The episode reflected Beijing’s attempt to use **social media infiltration and information synchronization** to simulate “normalized cross-Strait communication.”

II. Embedding “Anti-Independence” and Taiwan-Related Clauses in the 15th Five-Year Plan: Institutionalizing “Unification by Law”

On **October 28**, the CPC released its new 15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030) and long-term vision for 2035. For the first time, the plan explicitly incorporated “opposing Taiwan independence and foreign interference” into China’s national-development framework, calling for Beijing to “firmly grasp

the initiative in cross-Strait relations” and to “improve national-security and foreign-related legal systems.” The document was approved at the **Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee** (October 24–29), which emphasized “comprehensive reform and Chinese-style modernization” while reiterating that “One Country, Two Systems is the best solution for unification.”

The TAO on **October 29** asserted that the new plan “fully reflects the firm will of the Party and the nation to uphold the one-China principle and oppose Taiwan independence.” The MAC noted that this marks a **critical step in Beijing’s effort to formally embed “anti-independence” and “anti-interference” objectives into its national development blueprint.** It parallels the recently introduced **22-point set of “Guidelines for Punishing Taiwan Independence Separatists” (22 Guidelines)** and the establishment of “**Taiwan Retrocession Day,**” together forming a **three-stage framework—planning, legislation, and enforcement—that constructs a “legal unification chain.”** The MAC emphasized that Beijing is advancing its agenda of **legal unification under the guise of institutional governance, effectively using bureaucratic mechanisms to package political objectives.**

III. The “2758 Resolution” White Paper: Reframing the “One-China Principle” through International Legal Warfare

At the international level, Beijing has used legal documentation to expand its narrative warfare. On **September 30**, China’s **Ministry of Foreign Affairs** issued a position paper titled “China’s Position Paper on the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758,” claiming that the resolution “resolved once and for all the question of the representation of the whole of China, including Taiwan, in the U.N.” and condemning the United States and other countries for “distorting” it. The paper was widely seen as part of Beijing’s attempt to **use international-law rhetoric to reinforce the one-China principle and block Taiwan’s international participation.**

The MAC, in an **October 2** statement, firmly rejected Beijing’s assertions. It reaffirmed that the **Republic of China (Taiwan)** has existed continuously since 1912, and that Resolution 2758 neither addressed Taiwan’s sovereignty nor authorized a “succession of regimes.” The MAC refuted Beijing’s three key fallacies: (1) the claim of regime succession is fictitious—the ROC government remains extant in Taiwan; (2) the PRC’s claim of full sovereignty over Taiwan lacks any basis in international law; and (3) Beijing’s exclusion of Taiwan from global participation violates the **U.N. Charter’s principle of universality.** **The statement reiterated that cross-Strait relations are non-**

subordinate, and that U.N. membership is not the determinant of sovereign status.

Building on this campaign, Beijing convened an academic seminar on **October 18**, marking the **80th anniversary of the United Nations Day**, where it released two books titled “Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations: Text, Documents and Materials” and “Collections of Legal Studies on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758.” The event framed challenges to the resolution as “violations of international law.” Taipei’s **MAC** and **Ministry of National Defense** condemned the effort as a fusion of **legal, psychological, and propaganda warfare**, using “academic research” and “legal discourse” to fabricate an image of extraterritorial jurisdiction and to strengthen Beijing’s international narrative coercion.

IV. Launching Cross-Border Legal Prosecutions under the “22 Guidelines”

On **October 28**, the **Chongqing Public Security Bureau** announced a criminal investigation into **Taiwanese legislator Puma Shen**—accusing him of “inciting secession” under the **PRC Criminal Law** and the **“22 Guidelines.”** Shen was charged with founding the **Kuma Academy**, alleged to promote “Taiwan independence activities.” The TAO described the action as a “necessary measure to oppose independence and safeguard national unity,” marking Beijing’s first attempt to **apply PRC law extraterritorially to prosecute a Taiwanese individual.**

The MAC condemned Beijing’s move, asserting that the PRC has **no jurisdiction over Taiwan** and that its domestic laws are **invalid for Taiwan’s citizens.** The **MOFA** characterized the investigation as **transnational repression and long-arm jurisdiction**, warning that Beijing might misuse judicial cooperation or extradition treaties—or even request **Interpol red notices**—to target Taiwanese abroad. Analysts in Taipei noted that Beijing is constructing an **“anti-independence legal system”** centered on the **“Anti-Secession Law”** and national-security statutes, using a veneer of legality to disguise political persecution. Shen responded that this was the **sixth time in a year** he had been targeted by Beijing, underscoring what he described as the CCP’s **authoritarian tendency to “punish rather than debate,” silencing those who raise questions instead of addressing the issues themselves.**

V. Extending the “Punish Independence” Campaign through Bounties and Media Threats

On **October 10**, China’s **Ministry of State Security** published an article titled “The Inescapable Taiwan Independence Cyber Army,” disclosing the personal information of three Taiwanese citizens and one company. It accused them of conducting “anti-China propaganda and sabotage under DPP direction” and invoked the “**Anti-Secession Law**” and the “**22 Guidelines**” to threaten “lifetime accountability under the law.” The tactic, framed as “law-based unification,” amounted to **transnational doxxing and intimidation** aimed at silencing dissent.

On **October 11**, the **Xiamen Municipal Public Security Bureau** issued a wanted notice targeting 18 members of Taiwan’s military psychological operations unit, offering monetary rewards for tips. The TAO accused the unit of producing “fabricated videos and subversive games,” while the CCP-run outlet **Riyue Tiantian** threatened that those involved “could face the death penalty and trial in absentia.” Taiwan’s **Ministry of National Defense** and intelligence agencies denounced the campaign as **authoritarian intimidation and disinformation**, designed to divide public opinion and undermine government authority. In mid-October, the TAO defended the bounty notices as “lawful actions against separatists,” claiming due process would follow. Riyue Tiantian subsequently named five Taiwanese companies as “external supporters of psychological-warfare operations” and demanded they “draw a clear line.”

VI. Diversifying Psychological Warfare: Disinformation, Religion, and Cultural Outreach

Beijing’s psychological operations increasingly combine **false-information campaigns with cultural and religious infiltration**. In late October, a mobile-app campaign emerged around a program called “Homecoming (歸家)”, allegedly created by PRC-based engineers. The app claimed to allow Taiwanese citizens and soldiers to “register to defect with one click,” displaying over 120,000 **supposed registrants** and offering rewards, such as cash, electronics, and “priority housing after unification,” for reporting “pro-independence individuals.” It even featured buttons to “apply for a PRC ID” and “call the PLA.” The **MAC** confirmed that no such app existed on legitimate platforms, calling it a **psychological warfare fabrication** intended to spread panic and portray a “wave of defections” toward unification. Officials said the operation typified **tactics of foreign influence aimed at eroding public morale and confidence in national defense**.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior on **October 24** cited research by the Information Operations Research Group (IORG) showing that since early 2024, the PRC had sponsored at least **116 cross-Strait “religious-exchange” events**, involving about **40 Taiwanese temples and 16,000 participants**. By emphasizing shared ancestry and folk beliefs, particularly **Mazu worship and ancestor veneration**, Beijing has sought to convert **spiritual affinity into political identity**. The ministry warned religious groups to remain vigilant and avoid becoming platforms for united-front propaganda, underscoring that religion has long been a key instrument of Beijing’s **emotional and cultural influence operations**.

■ Taiwan’s Counter-Infiltration and Defensive Measure

***Summary:** In October, Taiwan broadened its counter-infiltration measures across government, elections, law enforcement, and society. Identity checks for civil servants were institutionalized, and new rules require candidates to declare they hold no PRC household registration, passport, or foreign nationality. Rising cases of Taiwanese citizens detained or missing in China prompted continued travel warnings and calls for safety talks through tourism liaison mechanisms. The judiciary issued its first election-interference conviction under the Anti-Infiltration Act, while authorities revoked the residency of a PRC national spreading extremist pro-unification content and tightened reporting rules for civil servants traveling to China. Together, these steps reflect Taipei’s effort to build a layered, whole-of-society defense against PRC infiltration.*

I. Institutionalizing Identity Vetting to Strengthen the National Security Firewall

Beginning in October, Taiwan’s government introduced new institutional measures to guard against PRC infiltration, extending oversight mechanisms from civil servants and educators to electoral candidates. On **October 3**, the **MAC** announced that starting **January 2025**, checks on whether civil servants hold **PRC identification cards or residence permits** will become a **regular, institutionalized practice**. Each government agency must submit semiannual reports by **May 31** and **November 30**. In the 2024 special review, approximately **627,000 individuals** were screened, achieving a **99.79%** completion rate. Authorities found **two cases** involving PRC ID cards and **102 cases** of PRC residence permits—all were revoked or otherwise addressed in accordance with regulations. The MAC on **October 4** refuted

rumors of a “regular verification semiannually,” clarifying that the new rule applies only to **newly appointed or reassigned personnel** and is aimed at preventing CCP infiltration through identity manipulation in sensitive positions.

Separately, the **Ministry of the Interior** on **October 17** announced a draft amendment to **Article 15 of the “Enforcement Rules of the Civil Servants Election and Recall Act,”** requiring electoral candidates to declare that they do not hold PRC household registration, PRC passports, or any foreign nationality. These declarations will be published in official election bulletins. The **MAC** emphasized that the amendment, grounded in the **Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area**, strengthens loyalty screening for candidates and enhances transparency and public oversight. The reform, slated to take effect from the **2026 elections**, extends the government’s counter-infiltration framework from the **administrative to the electoral system, creating a multilayered national security** defense network.

II. Rising Cases of Detention and Disappearance in China Highlight the Need for Travel Risk Controls

On **October 2**, the MAC reported that during the first eight months of 2025, there were **133 cases** of Taiwanese citizens missing, detained, or interrogated in China, more than double the total of **55 cases in 2024**. Between **January 2024 and August 2025**, authorities received **188 reports**: 50 missing persons, 19 interrogations, and 119 cases involving restrictions on personal freedom. As of the end of September, the total had risen to **212**, including **93 fraud cases, 13 religious-activity cases, and one national-security case**. The MAC reiterated that while the government continues to support the resumption of cross-Strait tourism, **public safety remains the priority**. He urged Beijing to use the **established mechanism of contacts between the semi-official “Taiwan Strait Tourism Association”** (from the Taiwan side) and **“Association for Tourism Exchange Across the Taiwan Straits”** (from the Chinese side) to negotiate tourism order and safety. The MAC maintained its **“orange-level” travel alert** for China, Hong Kong, and Macao, urging travelers to exercise caution. The data underscore how **detention and questioning of Taiwanese citizens have become increasingly institutionalized**, while Taipei has responded by publishing statistics and issuing risk alerts to strengthen public vigilance and establish a **“human-flow security shield.”**

III. Legal Enforcement: First Election-Interference Conviction under the “Anti-Infiltration Act”

On **October 16**, the **Taiwan High Court** upheld the conviction of **former TPP legislative candidate Ma Chih-wei** for **accepting PRC funds to influence an election**, sentencing her to **two years and eight months** in prison under the “Anti-Infiltration Act.” It was the first landmark case applying the Act to election interference. The court found that during the **2024 legislative campaign**, Ma received roughly **NT\$1.05 million** (in USD and cryptocurrency) from PRC-linked intermediaries known as “Ice Sister” and “A-Hao,” in exchange for sharing contacts from Taiwan’s national-security and government liaison networks. The ruling noted that Ma, fully aware that China is a **hostile foreign power**, knowingly collaborated with it, becoming a local proxy who could have acted under PRC influence if elected, posing a threat to national sovereignty and democratic integrity. The case revealed how Beijing’s electoral infiltration tactics increasingly involve **financial and digital channels** and demonstrated Taiwan’s **judicial resolve** to use the “**Anti-Infiltration Act**” as a core legal instrument to counter political interference.

IV. Multi-Layered Countermeasures and Construction of a Social Defense Network

On **October 30**, the MAC disclosed that the administrator of the Facebook group “People’s Liberation Army”, a PRC national named **Qian Li**, had her Taiwan household registration revoked for repeatedly posting extremist pro-PRC content, including calls to “eliminate the Republic of China” and “unify Taiwan by force.” MAC explained that Qian’s permanent residency was canceled under the “Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.” Straits Exchange Foundation added that such radical expressions “have crossed the bounds of social tolerance.”

That same day, the MAC announced new **Guidelines for Strengthening the Management Mechanism for Civil Servants and Administrative Faculty Traveling to China, Hong Kong, and Macao**, requiring advance reporting and random audits starting in **2026**. Meanwhile, the Ministry of the Interior revised regulations to require PRC nationals applying for permanent residence in Taiwan to **provide proof that they do not hold—or have renounced—PRC passports**, closing a long-standing loophole. **Former Military Intelligence Bureau Director Liu Te-liang** warned on **November 1** that CCP infiltration efforts now target **government institutions, corporations, think tanks, and local communities**, urging citizens to remain vigilant and avoid being exploited as tools of espionage or united-front operations. Overall, Taipei’s approach combines **institutional safeguards, judicial enforcement, and public**

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**awareness, gradually building a comprehensive whole-of-society
defense network** against PRC infiltration.

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