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Democratic Progressive Party of Taiwan

Taiwan's Defense Budget: Critical Deadline, Partial Progress, & Paths Forward



May 28th, 2026

The legislative battle over Taiwan's special defense budget isn't over. The opposition's May 8th vote capped spending at NT\$780 billion (US\$24.8 billion) and stripped out critical capability programs, but the government has refused to treat that outcome as final. President Lai, Premier Cho, and Defense Minister Koo have moved quickly to keep arms procurement on track against a May 31st HIMARS payment deadline, while laying the groundwork to recover what the opposition cut — and this week, their efforts cleared a critical hurdle.

Where Things Stand

The Legislative Yuan's (LY's) Finance, Foreign and National Defense Committees cleared the Executive Yuan's (EY's) 2026 defense procurement budget in just 40 minutes on Wednesday, reducing the NT\$8.8 billion (US\$280 million) proposed for this fiscal year by NT\$2 million with no freezes attached. DPP Legislator Chen Kuan-ting, co-chair of the Foreign and National Defense Committee, said he hopes the bill can be placed on

the floor calendar as soon as Friday.

The immediate pressure point is May 31st. That's the payment deadline for the HIMARS multiple launch rocket system. Minister Koo indicated that once the EY's budget submission is before the LY, the government can activate Article 84 of the Budget Act to authorize the first payment, and that the overall timeline should still be manageable.

The EY's Gameplan

Wednesday's committee clearance addresses an urgent item on the government's plate, but not the most consequential one. The opposition's May 8th vote left a NT\$470 billion gap in Taiwan's self-defense architecture, and the government has laid out three tracks to close it.

In his second anniversary address last week, President Lai Ching-te made clear the government will not treat the opposition's NT\$780 billion (US\$24.8 billion) version as the final answer, saying the LY's failure to fully pass the original special defense budget act will "inadvertently have a severe impact on the status quo of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait." To close the gap, the government's pursuing **three tracks: an alternative special act, additional budgets, and increases to the annual defense budget**, with the goal of recovering the commercial procurement, commissioned production, international cooperation, and defense industrial base development the opposition stripped out.

Premier Cho Jung-tai issued a directive on May 14th instructing the Ministry of National Defense (MND) to review each excluded item and identify the appropriate budgetary tool to bring it back into Taiwan's defense planning framework. Minister Koo confirmed this week that the MND is conducting that review case by case, with some items likely moving into the annual budget, others handled through additional budgets, and any decision on a new special act made under guidance from the EY.

The items under review represent the backbone of Taiwan's comprehensive defense plan — the Chiang-Kung medium-range anti-ballistic missile, unmanned aerial and surface systems, counter-drone capabilities, AI-assisted intelligence and decision-making modules, the Tactical Assault Kit, the Taiwan Tactical Network, expanded weapons production capacity, and general-purpose munitions. These are capabilities directly tied to asymmetric warfare, integrated air defense, command and

control, wartime sustainment, and defense industrial resilience. Passing roughly 62% of the original budget doesn't mean Taiwan preserved 62% of the intended capability. Once a foundation is removed, the architecture can't hold, and the resulting loss can't be measured in dollars alone.

What's on Deck

The NT\$480 billion (US\$15.3 billion) set aside for a second batch of U.S. arms procurement is contingent on Washington formally approving the relevant sales and issuing Letters of Offer and Acceptance. Minister Koo said on Monday that the MND has not received any indication that U.S. policy has changed, and that the United States has reaffirmed its longstanding commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. The MND remains cautiously optimistic, but the timeline depends on the U.S. arms sales process moving forward, and on whether the KMT-led legislature can avoid another round of obstruction when it does.

What to Watch

Will the opposition clear the first procurement package in time, or will further obstruction put the May 31st HIMARS deadline at risk? When Washington moves forward on the next phase of arms sales, will Taiwan's legislature be positioned to act without delay? And as the government's three-track repair plan moves forward, will the legislature allow it to proceed on the timeline Taiwan's defense requires?

The NT\$780 billion act passed earlier this month was one step forward under difficult political conditions, **but it's unfinished**. Taiwan needs a complete defense architecture, not a politically fragmented procurement package. How the LY handles what comes next will say a great deal about whether they're serious about Taiwan's defense commitments to itself and its partners.

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Cheng Comes to Washington: Setting the Record Straight

The KMT Chairwoman has been distorting
her political record to anyone who will listen.

*She's hoping that no one
checks the facts.*



Rapid Response | Cheng Comes to Washington
DPP Mission in the U.S.



June 7th, 2026

The KMT Chairwoman is in the middle of a two-week tour of the United States, her first as party leader, and at each stop she's worked to recast her record for an American audience. The Cheng who courted Xi Jinping in Beijing in April has given way to a Cheng who casts herself as Taiwan's steadiest defender and Washington's most reliable partner. It's political grandstanding, and it's not true to form. Nowhere is the gap wider than on defense — where the story she's telling Americans is the opposite of the record she's written back home.

Cheng began in San Francisco, where she told scholars at Stanford's Hoover Institution that Taiwan needs an "AI-driven defense strategy" to harness the deterrent power of asymmetric warfare. Days later, at Harvard, she attacked the Ministry of National Defense's (MND's) special defense budget as a "black-box budget" that can't deliver real defensive capabilities, and vowed the KMT would keep opposing it. She's in New York now, with Washington just ahead — and soon her message will reach the one audience that can act on it.

That message has been refined at every stop, but it doesn't survive contact with the record. Here's what you need to know.

The AI strategy she touts is the one she killed.

In San Francisco, Cheng called for an "AI-driven national defense strategy," telling an audience at the Hoover Institution that Taiwan should integrate AI into "military command and decision-making, intelligence analysis, drone systems, and air defense networks" to project asymmetric deterrence. Cheng's "support" for this strategy is in direct opposition to her actions just two months ago — when she led her own caucus to vote down the MND's requests for these exact capabilities..

The special act the KMT and TPP forced through last month capped the package at NT\$780 billion and cut NT\$470 billion that the MND — after close and extensive consultations with the United States — had deemed essential. Items the KMT eliminated include the AI-assisted intelligence and decision-making systems, the Tactical Assault Kit, and the Taiwan Tactical Network that connect reconnaissance, command, and strike into a functioning kill chain. Also gone: the unmanned aerial and surface

systems and counter-drone capabilities at the core of asymmetric warfare, and the Chiang-Kung medium-range anti-ballistic missile the MND designed as the backbone of Taiwan's layered air defense.

On American campuses, Cheng brags about these capabilities. But in Taipei, she was personally responsible for gutting them, according to KMT stalwart Jaw Shaw-kong,

Cheng claims the budget was hidden. She's betting you won't look.

At Harvard's Kennedy School last Friday, Cheng dismissed the special defense budget as a "black-box budget" with no real detail. The charge misstates how Taiwan's budgeting works. A special act sets a maximum spending ceiling; it is not an item-by-item appropriation. The line-by-line review comes at the next stage, when the Executive Yuan submits the budget bill for the legislature's approval. She is attacking the framework for not doing something it was never designed to do.

Nor was the planning hidden. The MND briefed lawmakers on the program in detail — necessarily in part behind closed doors, because much of it involves arms sales and cutting-edge technologies still moving through the U.S. system, where Direct Commercial Sales and co-production carry their own extensive compliance requirements. The details Cheng claimed were missing were available to every legislator who wanted them.

That's the part she's counting on Washington to overlook. The demand for a full public review before the budget bill even reaches the floor isn't oversight, it's a thinly veiled delay tactic and potential security breach. And what she's delayed was shaped, step by step, in close cooperation with the United States.

Cheng raises the specter of corruption. Her party's history invites the question.

Cheng has taken to warning that the special defense budget invites graft — that its funds could be misused. She's produced nothing to back it up: no evidence, no concrete finding, no transaction anyone can name. The charge isn't oversight, but a pretext to keep blocking a budget Taiwan urgently needs.

It's also a remarkable charge for her party to make. The KMT itself presided over the largest defense-corruption scandal in Taiwan's history — more

than US\$500 million in illegal kickbacks on its 1991 purchase of French frigates, routed through Swiss accounts to figures tied to the party, with a naval officer found dead after he gathered evidence against it. Switzerland is still returning the stolen money to Taiwan three decades later.

Cheng is asking Washington to doubt this budget on the strength of her word. Her party's record is the reason not to.

In short, Cheng will spend her days in D.C. promising peace at all costs. But the record she left in Beijing and Taipei tells a different story, one she hopes no one remembers. Don't let her leave town without answering for it.

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China Influence Tracker (XX)



July 1st, 2026

Welcome back to the CIT, we hope you're beating the heat. Grab something cold, because Beijing gave us no shortage to cover this month. In June, the CCP moved past pressure and toward control, exercising jurisdiction it doesn't actually hold. Today, its new Ethnic Unity law takes effect, claiming a legal reach that extends far beyond China's borders. The lawfare puts on paper what Chinese vessels and diplomats were already doing in practice. Chinese coast guard formations ran fabricated "law-enforcement" patrols in the waters east of Taiwan and stopped foreign merchant ships to demand their origin and destination. China barred four New Zealand lawmakers for visiting Taipei, and Kenya detained Taiwanese delegates for more than 20 hours at Beijing's urging.

Here's how last month bore out.

June's Toplines

- ***Beijing Codifies Repression Beyond Its Borders:*** China's Ethnic Unity law takes effect today, asserting a power to punish people outside China that no government legitimately holds. It gives a legal face to entry bans, threats to relatives, and detentions already in use. The aim is to make the reach feel lawful, so targets abroad censor themselves before Beijing has to act.
 - ***Manufacturing Jurisdiction East of Taiwan:*** Chinese agencies ran named "law-enforcement" patrols in waters they don't govern and stopped 198 passing ships. The same sequence moved from Kinmen and Dongsha to Taiping Island. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany raised the alarm.
 - ***Submit, or Be Shut Out:*** The restructured Taiwan Affairs Office and the 18th Straits Forum tied farm orders, cultural access, and youth trips to the "1992 Consensus," and Kenya detained Taiwanese delegates to keep them out of an ocean conference. From markets to conference halls, Beijing sets the terms and makes others enforce them.
-

CCP Codifies Transnational Repression through Its "Ethnic Unity" Law

A new law makes loyalty to the Party a legal duty. China's 65-article Ethnic Unity law, passed in March and effective today, reaches into education, language, religion, media, business, and family life. Article 20 requires parents to teach children to love the Chinese Communist Party. Eight UN special rapporteurs and the European Parliament flagged forced assimilation, vague offenses, and extraterritorial reach. Beijing promotes it as a milestone in shared national consciousness. In practice, it turns political loyalty into an obligation carried across schools, platforms, companies, and homes.

Its claimed reach runs well past China's borders. Article 62 criminalizes organizing, inciting, or funding what Beijing calls separatism or religious extremism, without defining when speech, research, or a donation crosses the line, and Article 63 purports to prosecute people who are neither

Chinese nor in China. Because Beijing routinely labels any support for Taiwan, minority rights, and criticism of the Party as separatism, foreign lawmakers, journalists, academics, and ordinary citizens fall within its claimed reach. The logic is already in use: in early June, China barred four New Zealand lawmakers who had visited Taiwan a month earlier, accusing them of violating its "one China principle." Prime Minister Christopher Luxon called the ban inappropriate and said lawmakers decide for themselves whom they meet.

None of this is new. The law just makes it feel enforceable. Even before today, Beijing was using entry bans, surveillance, family intimidation, and detention against people inside and outside China. Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) has tracked 313 Taiwanese reported missing, detained, or restricted in China since January 2024, with I-Kuan Tao practitioners among those held. On June 18th, President Lai told the Taiwan Foreign Correspondents' Club that reporters who had worked in China often faced threats of transnational repression, and days later called it a shared challenge for democracies. On the day the law took effect, President Lai refused to acquiesce to Beijing's "red terror and united front infiltration," pledging to expand public education on its repression tactics, build protection mechanisms for those it targets, and widen Taiwan's international participation. Even so, he warned, the law is designed to create a chilling effect and force Taiwanese into submission. The law's real force isn't in mass arrests abroad. It's self-censorship, bought not through prosecution but through the fear of it.

Beijing Polices Waters It Doesn't Control

Beijing wrote itself into a maritime negotiation it was never party to. In late May, Japan and the Philippines announced talks to delimit their overlapping maritime zones. Beijing recast a bilateral matter between Tokyo and Manila as a sovereignty question, giving China standing east of Taiwan. The Chinese coast guard announced a "law-enforcement patrol" in what it called waters east of "China's Taiwan Island," and its foreign ministry claimed an exclusive economic zone there. The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) then urged Taiwanese to stand with the nation, casting Taiwan's refusal to let Beijing speak for it as betrayal.

It then acted out an authority it never held. China's transport ministry deployed four government ships for a "special maritime traffic law-enforcement operation" east of Taiwan, entered Taiwan's restricted waters southwest of Eluanbi, declared the area under Chinese control, and told

Taiwan's Coast Guard not to interfere. Over five days, Beijing claimed it had stopped 198 passing ships and asked international vessels to state their origin and destination. Executive Yuan spokesperson Michelle Lee called it fake enforcement and real expansion, and Coast Guard Deputy Director-General Hsieh Ching-chin said Beijing held no jurisdiction and that Taiwan had broadcast as much to passing ships. Beijing wasn't managing traffic. It wanted a single reply it could later cite as proof that foreign vessels recognize Chinese jurisdiction there.

The model spread from one front to the next. In mid-June, two Chinese government vessels entered waters around Taiping Island for the first time, twice making abrupt turns that endangered Taiwan's Coast Guard. Taiwan's MOFA and MAC condemned the operation as a breach of international law and reaffirmed Taiping as Taiwan's territory. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany raised the alarm over the activity off Taiwan's east coast. From Kinmen and Dongsha to the waters east of Taiwan and now Taiping, Beijing ran the same sequence: intrude, assert, enforce, normalize. The aim isn't to exhaust Taiwan's Coast Guard so much as to condition the world to accept Chinese ships giving orders in Taiwan's waters.

Access Comes at a Political Price

A restructured TAO splits pressure from enticement. In late May, the TAO reorganized, folding Taiwan-related legal affairs and complaints into a new Ninth Bureau and creating a Tenth Bureau for Taiwanese who study, intern, work, or start businesses in China. The TAO said the new bureau would help Taiwanese share in China's modernization. One arm tightens legal oversight while the other builds networks of Taiwanese it can cultivate over time.

The Straits Forum turned exchange into a political bargain. The TAO announced the 18th Straits Forum would feature 58 events across youth, religion, agriculture, culture, and business, and Taiwan's MAC restricted government participation, identifying it as a united front platform. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Chairman Wang Huning reaffirmed the "one China principle," the "1992 Consensus," and opposition to Taiwan independence, while KMT Vice Chairman Chang Jung-kung echoed Beijing's framing. Chang later joined TAO Director Song Tao to sign ten measures on farm purchases, transport links, cultural access, and youth programs, with Chinese officials tying the benefits to the "1992 Consensus." Beijing supplied the access; KMT figures lent the conditions a

false sense of legitimacy.

Agricultural dependence became leverage, and a wedge. TAO

spokesperson Chen Binhua stated explicitly that China would expand sales of Taiwanese farm goods only if the "1992 Consensus" held and independence was off the table. MAC Minister Chiu Chui-cheng warned that markets tied to political conditions can be opened or shut at Beijing's discretion, citing past bans on Taiwanese pineapples, wax apples, citrus, and grouper. After Taitung County Commissioner Yao Ching-ling joined the forum by prerecorded video, the KMT cast the government's scrutiny as an attack on farmers. The pattern is deliberate: create dependence through orders, weaponize it through bans and selective reopening, then leave Taiwan to absorb the fight between livelihoods and security.

Kenya enforced Beijing's exclusion by detaining visiting Taiwanese

scholars. In mid-June, Taiwanese scholars invited to the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa were denied credentials because Kenya refused to recognize their Taiwan passports. Kenyan immigration held them for more than 20 hours, seizing their passports and phones and forcing the delegation to withdraw. Taiwan's Ocean Affairs Council and MOFA traced the obstruction to Chinese pressure, and Beijing praised Kenya's adherence to its "one China principle." Beijing didn't just block Taiwan's seat. It got Kenyan authorities to detain Taiwanese citizens on its behalf.

June's Throughline? June was all about the manufacturing of Orwellian authority. Beijing spent the month asserting power it doesn't hold: via an edict purporting to govern people who've never been to China, coast guard ships policing waters that aren't China's, and market access sold for political submission. None of it's legitimate. ***It holds only if the world stops challenging claims that were never Beijing's to make.***

In collaboration with the DPP China Affairs Department, the latest DPP U.S. Mission report provides key updates on the evolving cross-strait situation, detailing the escalation of China's military intimidation, gray zone activities, cognitive warfare, and United Front infiltration targeting Taiwan. Enclosed

are the recent developments, offering a comprehensive overview of the current threat landscape, Taiwan's countermeasures, and emerging public opinion trends shaping the strategic environment.

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
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China Influence Tracker (XIX)



May 29th, 2026

Welcome back to this Spring edition of the CIT. May was a busy month for Beijing's narrative warfare. In the wake of President Trump's Beijing visit, China moved to reframe Taiwan's self-defense and international participation as provocation, 100 Chinese vessels massed around the first island chain, Taiwanese civil servants had their phones searched in Chinese hotel rooms, and Taiwan was shut out of the World Health Assembly for another year.

Here's what happened.

May's Toplines

- ***Beijing's Burden-of-Proof Trap:*** Beijing seized on the international attention following President Trump's Beijing visit to reframe Taiwan's maintenance of the status quo as provocation. Some KMT figures carried that message home.
 - ***Gray Zone Escalation:*** China deployed over 100 vessels around the first island chain, ran two combat patrols in a single week, and kept up coast guard pressure at Kinmen and Pratas.
 - ***Cross-Border Repression Expands:*** 343 cumulative detention cases since January 2024. Religious cult followers detained in Fujian. A Taiwanese illustrator barred from a Hong Kong cultural exhibition.
 - ***Shutting Taiwan Out:*** WHO member states rejected Taiwan's WHA participation again. China and Russia weaponized Resolution 2758. Twenty-six countries and the EU pushed back.
-

Beijing's Burden-of-Proof Trap

With international attention fixed on the Taiwan Strait following President Trump's Beijing visit earlier this month, Beijing moved quickly to exploit the moment. Some KMT figures reframed the moment as a U.S. warning against Taiwan independence, calling on the Lai administration to return to the "1992 Consensus" — a scheme Taiwan's government has long warned Beijing uses as a stepping stone toward "one country, two systems." KMT Chair Cheng Li-wun immediately mischaracterized President Trump's words to attack President Lai, and the MAC warned that redirecting the conversation in that direction obscured China's military threat as the actual source of risks, forcing Taiwan's elected government onto the defensive.

Cheng had already set the table in a Yomiuri Shimbun interview on May 12th, suggesting U.S. opposition to Taiwan independence would be "fully consistent with the KMT's position." The MAC warned that urging Washington toward an "anti-independence" stance would send a deeply misleading signal internationally. The KMT's claim on May 20th that the Lai administration would push Taiwan toward war without the "1992 Consensus" landed in the same news cycle as China's TAO calling Lai's government a "destroyer of peace." ***The KMT and CCP play different roles, with identical goals.***

President Lai's second-anniversary address on May 20th reaffirmed

maintaining the status quo and rejected packaging unification as peace. China's TAO, Foreign Ministry, and Defense Ministry immediately labeled his remarks "stubborn Taiwan independence." The opposition-led Legislative Yuan's NT\$780 billion special defense procurement act, passed on May 8th, met the same treatment: normal defense investment reframed as arms purchases that "lead to war." Beijing promoted a Cairo Declaration monument in Egypt in early May claiming it confirmed Taiwan as an inseparable part of China, while TAO Deputy Director Wu Xi used China's 7th Cross-Strait Media Summit on May 12th to call on Taiwanese media to "expose Taiwan independence separatist activities." The MAC warned compliance could violate the Anti-Infiltration Act and the Criminal Code.

Gray Zone Escalation

Four Chinese coast guard vessels intruded into Kinmen's restricted waters on May 21st before Taiwan's CGA drove them out. The following day, Taiwan's coast guard expelled the Chinese research vessel Tongji after detecting it conducting illegal seabed surveys in Taiwan's waters. A tense standoff near Pratas on May 24th saw a Chinese coast guard vessel claim jurisdiction over surrounding waters before being driven off by radio.

NSC Secretary-General Joseph Wu stated on May 23rd that Taiwan's intelligence showed China had deployed more than 100 vessels around the first island chain, identifying China as the root cause of regional instability. Taiwan detected a second Chinese combat readiness patrol within a single week on May 25th and deployed aircraft and naval vessels to monitor. ***Beijing's peace messaging and its operational tempo were running on entirely separate tracks.***

Cross-Border Repression Expands

Two civil servants from Taiwan's National Immigration Agency and Customs Administration had their hotel room entered late at night by Chinese national security officers while traveling in China, with their phones, LINE messages, and personal background information inspected. The MAC disclosed the incident and noted that cumulative cases of Taiwanese citizens detained or having their personal freedom restricted in China had reached 343 since January 2024, a figure that now encompasses civil servants, religious practitioners, and cultural figures alongside the politicians and officials who once made up the bulk of cases.

Three I-Kuan Tao cult followers were detained after traveling to Fujian and Guangdong in May, bringing the total detained in China for religious reasons since 2019 to 19 people across 17 cases. Taiwanese illustrator ChuChuMei was abruptly barred from a Hong Kong cultural exhibition on May 21st. The sweep of cases this month confirmed what the detention figures have been signaling: ***China's political screening now reaches into religion, cultural creation, and ordinary travel.***

The business community faced the sharpest version of that pressure. Ever Carbon Technology dismissed Yen Wen-chun, a relative of Interior Minister Liu Shyh-fang, from positions at its Taiwan and China subsidiaries in early May after TAO spokesperson Chen Binhua said "diehard Taiwan independence separatists" and their relatives would not be allowed to invest or conduct business in China. The MAC called it cross-border repression escalating to collective punishment, with Deputy Minister Liang noting Beijing has used supply chain blacklisting and bank account freezes to force Taiwanese companies to issue statements supporting the one-China principle. ***Normal business activity in China now carries political liability that has nothing to do with its conduct.***

Shutting Taiwan Out

WHO member states rejected the proposal to invite Taiwan to the World Health Assembly on May 18th, as China had made clear before the meeting it would ensure. Minister of Health and Welfare Shih Chung-liang noted Taiwan's WHA action team appeared to be monitored by Chinese personnel during Geneva activities, and that attendance at Taiwan Night civil society events had declined under apparent Chinese pressure. The representative offices of nine countries including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Japan issued a joint statement on May 21st supporting Taiwan's meaningful participation in the WHO. Taiwan's public health record is not in dispute. ***The exclusion is entirely political.***

A China-Russia joint statement on May 20th emphasized the authority of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 while Russia reiterated its "one China principle". Nauru issued an administrative order the same day requiring officials to follow the "one-China principle" and referring to Taiwan as "a province of China." Taiwan's MOFA condemned both on May 21st, reiterating that the ROC and PRC are not subordinate to each other and that the PRC has never governed Taiwan. The European Parliament adopted recommendations the same day emphasizing that UN Res. 2758

did not determine Taiwan's sovereignty and cannot serve as a basis for excluding Taiwan from the international system, with 26 countries and the EU having already voiced support for Taiwan's WHA participation by May 20th. ***This manufactured consensus has more cracks in it than Beijing would like to admit.***

May's Throughline? May's hybrid warfare wasn't incidental to the CCP's broader campaign against Taiwan. Amidst President Trump's visit to Beijing, China sought to reframe Taiwan's self-defense as provocation, and some KMT figures immediately amplified China's united front message from within. Beijing ratcheted up the military pressure, the detention cases, its international lawfare, and the WHA exclusion together — ***and 26 countries stood with Taipei anyway.***

In collaboration with the DPP China Affairs Department, the latest DPP U.S. Mission report provides key updates on the evolving cross-strait situation, detailing the escalation of China's military intimidation, gray zone activities, cognitive warfare, and United Front infiltration targeting Taiwan. Enclosed are the recent developments, offering a comprehensive overview of the current threat landscape, Taiwan's countermeasures, and emerging public opinion trends shaping the strategic environment.

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DPP Youth Diplomacy Empowerment Program Happy Hour Reception

HAPPY HOUR



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July 2nd, 2026

Dear Friends,

Join Us for the DPP Youth Diplomacy Empowerment Program Happy Hour!

The Democratic Progressive Party's Youth Diplomacy Empowerment Program (YDEP) brings together emerging political leaders and public policy professionals from Taiwan for an immersive exchange with policymakers, think tanks, and civil society organizations in Washington, D.C. Through dialogue and firsthand engagement, the program aims to strengthen participants' understanding of U.S.-Taiwan relations, democratic governance, and international affairs while fostering lasting

connections with partners in the United States.

The DPP Mission warmly invites you to join us for a Happy Hour reception with this year's YDEP delegation. Come meet the participants and enjoy an evening of conversation with friends and colleagues from the Taiwan policy, democracy, and international affairs communities.

Event Details

 Wednesday, July 15th  5:30-7:30 PM
 329 Pennsylvania Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20003

Registration

RSVP by Monday, July 13th via Eventbrite. Plus-ones are welcome, and registration is required.

For any questions or accommodation requests, please contact **Peng-Hsuan Chen** at phchen@dppusmission.org.

Warm Regards,
Taiwan DPP U.S. Mission

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