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The Price of Protection: Missile Defense and the New Currency of Dependency

18/09/2026

COMMENTARIES

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By Mark Ginsberg

When Greece **signed for a complete Israeli air-defense array** at the end of August, the contract read like an arms sale and behaved like something else.


Mark Ginsberg

The Achilles Shield package, David's Sling interceptors, SPYDER batteries, Barak MX modules and the radars that knit them into one sky, is worth some three and a half billion dollars, and Athens is now the first European Union state to own a national missile-defense dome built entirely of Israeli systems. Arms deals used to be the receipts of alliances. This one, and the pattern forming around it, suggests the order has flipped: the hardware is now the commitment itself, signed in interceptors rather than communiques.

The Greek Signature

Greece did not buy a widget. It bought a relationship with the country that runs the world's only continuously tested multi-layer air-defense system, **live-fired in war for two years** against everything from drones to ballistic missiles. Buying Israeli means plugging into that operational legacy: the software updates written overnight during real barrages, the doctrine that only a state under fire can write. For Athens, watching Turkish drone production expand and the eastern Mediterranean thicken with threat, a communique from Brussels promises debate; **a dome over the national sky** promises survival. The choice tells you which currency Athens now trusts.

A Widening Ledger

The Greek signature is the loudest entry in a ledger that has been filling for two years. Germany's Arrow 3 purchase, anchored in the same Israeli-American industrial line, gives Berlin a capability no European program offered on any timeline. **Barak MX has found buyers** in Cyprus, Slovakia, India and Azerbaijan, with Morocco and the Emirates appearing in foreign reports. The buyers share no single bloc, religion or constitution. What they share is the calculation that protection from the sky is now a sovereign good, that the traditional guarantors deliver it slower and less surely than the small state that has been forced to live under the problem, and that writing the check is itself the alliance.

The Procurement Tail

Anyone who has bought a large system knows the sticker price is the beginning of the conversation, and missile defense is a textbook case. The interceptors are consumables: a single sustained barrage can burn through ammunition budgets built for peacetime assumptions, as the last two years demonstrated in public, and replenishment contracts arrive with their own diplomacy attached. The radar and battle-management software carry lifecycle costs that routinely reach multiples of the purchase price across a platform's service life: upgrades, spares, training pipelines, the certification of every firmware release. A state that adopts a foreign dome adopts its vendor's calendar, and the vendor's wars, as its own procurement rhythm. The three and a half billion euros Athens signed for is the entry fee; the subscription is the real product, renewed annually in a currency called dependence.

That tail has a political barbed tip, and it is worth stating plainly. Major Israeli air-defense exports of American co-developed systems run through Washington's export-approval machinery, which means every dome sold abroad carries a third signature, and the alliance being purchased is triangular whether the buyer planned for it or not. It means the supplier gains standing in the buyer's national security debates that no treaty formally grants: when Berlin or Athens weighs a policy that Jerusalem or Washington dislikes, the dome is in the room, silently, the way a mortgage sits in a household's decisions. Purchases at this scale are not transactions. They are constitutions of a small commonwealth, and constitutions are hard to leave.

The Debt Side of the Ledger

Strategic dependency compounds like financial debt, and the balance sheet has a way of arriving due at the worst moment. A client whose deterrent umbrella is maintained abroad has wagered its survival on the supplier's continuity: Israel's own war-driven production priorities this year meant customers waited on deliveries, even as the country's **record exports** kept climbing through the war, a small preview of what a real regional escalation would do to export commitments. One failed interception, anywhere in the chain, would devalue every contract downstream, and the supplier knows it; performance is the collateral backing this currency, and it has to be kept nightly. The buyers are, knowingly, underwriting that exchange rate.

There is a subtler cost, which the defense economics literature calls lock-in and which plainer language calls marriage. Training regimes, command software, interceptor stockpiles and doctrine all converge on one vendor's system, and switching costs rise every year after adoption. The Greek dome will make the next Greek procurement decision before any Greek minister does. Sovereignty is not lost in a signature; it is amortized across a decade of maintenance contracts, and the states now buying a piece of the Israeli sky have chosen, with open eyes, to spend it.

What the Ledger Means

Three consequences deserve attention. First, deterrence by procurement: a state that installs Israeli layers acquires a stake in Israeli survival, and Jerusalem acquires a stake in its clients' skies, an interdependency denser than any joint declaration.

Second, the transatlantic geometry bends. European capitals that buy Israeli systems are hedging inside NATO, not leaving it, but the hedge itself redistributes influence from Washington's monopoly on reassurance toward a new supplier of it, with Washington's own signature on each sale as the quiet guarantee. Third, the precedent is exportable beyond missiles: whoever proves he can deliver the most urgent protection, cyber, drones, rocket warning, will collect the alliances of the next decade.

The currency of protection, like all currencies, is a promise, and promises have failure modes that treaties were invented to soften. The states joining this ledger are trading the old alliance machinery, with its endless consultation and its slow, reliable patience, for a faster instrument with sharper edges. They may be right to. But the deal should be read for what it is: not an arms purchase but a refinancing, in which the mortgage on national survival is transferred from a committee of allies to a single small country that must keep intercepting, nightly, to keep the currency good.

Author: Mark Ginsberg – Israel-based writer and commentator on technology and artificial intelligence, with over two decades of firsthand perspective on the country's innovation economy. Originally from South Florida and now based in Efrat, he analyzes the growth of Israel's tech ecosystem and the broader implications of AI on business, policy, and society.

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Image Source: Israel Ministry of Defense (Israel's director-general of the Israel Ministry of Defense, Maj. Gen. Amir Baram, and his Greek counterpart, Maj. Gen. Ioannis Bouras, signing an approximately \$3.4 billion defense agreement, on Aug. 31, 2026.).

Mark Ginsberg Military Strategy



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OPINION

SAFETY FIRST

Your rabbi's voice on the phone is not always your rabbi

By [Mark Ginsberg](#) · August 26, 2026


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The call sounds exactly right. The rabbi's voice, the cadence, the little verbal habits everyone knows from Shabbat *drashot*. There is an emergency, the voice says. A family in the congregation needs help tonight. Could you please send gift cards right away?

Congregants at synagogues in multiple states have received versions of that call over the past year. Every one of them was fake. Voice-cloning tools that once required studio equipment now need 30 seconds of audio pulled from a public sermon recording and a few dollars a month.



Illustrative.

I write about AI and cybersecurity from Israel, and the gap I keep running into is this: the technology producing convincing fake voices, faces and emails went mainstream, while the security practices of most Jewish institutions did not move at all. The people running our federations, synagogues, schools and camps are facing adversaries with industrial-grade tools, and they are defending themselves with advice written for a threat that no longer exists.

The threat is not hypothetical. The Secure Community Network documented 190 cyberattacks against synagogues and Jewish organizations across 16 states between January and mid-April of this year alone, a tally cybersecurity experts laid out in these pages. Phishing, fraud, data exposure, doxxing. The criminals are not only after money. Some campaigns harvest membership lists and donor records to map who in the community can be targeted next.

The fakes are getting harder to spot. Israeli security researchers have tracked online campaigns built on fabricated outrage and invented victims for years, and the same machinery now powers scams aimed directly at Jewish donors: fake charity sites after every disaster, AI-written appeals that mirror the language of real organizations, and manipulated video. In May, Israel's National Cyber Directorate flagged deepfake videos of Chief Rabbi David Yosef apparently endorsing a

medical product he had never seen. If the chief rabbi can be convincingly faked from a public clip, so can your executive director from last month's federation gala.

What actually works? I put that question to security practitioners in Israel, where defending civilian institutions against sophisticated adversaries is a national specialty. Their answers were strikingly unglamorous.

Kill the assumption that voice proves identity

First, no financial request, credential change or sensitive data transfer happens on the strength of a call or video alone, no matter who appears to be asking. Call back on a known number. This costs nothing and defeats most voice-clone scams instantly.

Treat email as hostile until verified

Second, AI writes flawless, personalized phishing now, free of the grammar errors people were trained to spot. An email from your board president asking for a wire transfer gets the same callback treatment as the phone call. Multi-factor authentication on every account, especially email, blocks the majority of account takeovers even when a password is stolen.

Rehearse the human moment

Third, the Israeli approach to institutional security runs on drills, not documents. Run one tabletop exercise: the executive director's email asks finance staff to move funds Friday afternoon before a deadline. Do staff verify? Who calls whom? A community that has practiced saying no politely is a community a scammer cannot script against.

Small does not mean safe

Fourth, security experts repeatedly note that attackers look for the path of least resistance, and smaller organizations with older systems and thinner training get hit precisely because they assume they are beneath notice. The hostage-taking of a small congregation's donor database is just as damaging to that congregation as a larger breach would be to a federation.

There is a positive here worth naming: The same country that built a civilian cyber defense ecosystem out of necessity, and whose technology sector now underpins security tools used far beyond its borders, has made much of this expertise publicly accessible. Israeli-developed threat intelligence, training curricula and hardened communications tools are within reach of a mid-sized federation's budget. A closer look at Israel's technology sector shows how much of the world's

defensive capability now flows from institutions built to protect a small, persistently targeted society.

Jewish organizations have rewritten their physical security playbooks since Oct. 7, 2023. The digital playbook needs the same urgency, the same budget line and the same assumption that someone is actively planning for the next attempt. Because someone is.

Mark Ginsberg writes about AI, cybersecurity and Israel. His work has appeared in The Times of Israel and WGI World.

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WHAT DO WE TELL THE CHILDREN?

Guest September 14, 2026 Jewish Life

By Mark Ginsberg

Your reporting on the Boulder Valley School District settlement, concrete measures after real harm, arrives at the question every Jewish parent now meets sooner or later: what do we tell the children? I write from Efrat, where my children practice walking to the shelter alongside their math lessons, and where that question stopped being hypothetical two years ago. Israeli families have been forced to develop scripts for these conversations, and the ones that work may be worth trading across the water.

The Lessons That Arrive Early

Israeli schools teach the siren the way American schools teach the fire drill, as routine rather than alarm, and the routine is the first lesson for parents too. Fear with a procedure attached becomes a task; fear without one becomes a mood that follows a child home. When the war began, the guidance that circulated among parents here was to answer the question asked and not the question feared. A child who asks whether the sirens will come tonight wants to know about tonight, not about the region's future. Short true answers, calibrated to the age in front of you, beat thorough ones every time.

The second lesson took longer to learn. Children absorb far more from what we do than from what we say, and a parent who checks the phone with clenched shoulders is teaching a class of one. The families I know

who have held up best gave their children jobs: packing the shelter bag, learning the neighbor's name, being the one who reminds everyone where the flashlight lives. Psychologists who study communities under rocket fire keep finding the same pattern, that belonging and usefulness are the armor, and the pattern works in ordinary hard times as much as in wartime.

The Dinner-Table Version

The hardest conversations are not about the sirens at all. They are about the hatred behind them, the ones a child hears about from a classmate or sees on a screen. Here the Israeli instinct is to name the thing plainly and then widen the frame: some people hate us for what we are, and what we are is a family with a table, a holiday coming, a history we love telling. The hate gets one sentence. The table gets the rest of the evening. That ratio, one part naming to five parts living, is the closest thing to a vaccine we have found.

What Travels to Boulder

What would I offer a Boulder family reading about the settlement and wondering what to say at dinner? The same blueprint with local materials. Name what happened honestly, since children will hear it anyway and secrets teach shame. Give them a role, since a child who helps make the household ready stands a little straighter. And keep the ratio: one sentence for the harm, the rest of the evening for the joy, which is the family's own and cannot be settled away. The measures your district agreed to matter, and the belonging you build at the table matters more. Our two communities are proof of the same sentence: children do not need the danger hidden. They need the love to be visible.



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THE GUESTS WHO COULDN'T COME

Guest September 17, 2026 Jewish Life

By Mark Ginsberg

Every Jewish holiday table is a census, and wartime Israel has learned to read the count the way one reads an x-ray, for what is present and for what is not. This year, across the holidays just ended, households set their tables with a new arithmetic: the chair for the son on reserve duty, who may or may not make it home by candle-lighting; the chair that stays empty for the hostage, set by families who are not his; the chairs of the murdered, filled by relatives who now sit twice as close to each other. I want to describe this quietly, from my own table in Efrat, since it is the piece of the war that never makes the news and the one your readers' tables have the most in common with.

Setting for the Missing

The customs differ by household and none of them are official. Some families pour the wine cup for the missing the way one does for Elijah, a placeholder with prophetic patience. Some leave the chair with its coat draped over the back, the coat that went to the base in October and has not come home for a holiday since. One mother I know photographs the empty place at each festival and sends the picture to her son at the front, a message that needs no caption: we kept it for you. The rabbis never had to rule on any of this.

The practices invented themselves, the way liturgy does, from the ground up, and by the second year they had hardened into tradition, which is what grief does when it plans to stay.

The Table as Census

There is a harder kind of counting, and honesty requires it. The war added names to the community's permanent list, and the holidays are when the loss recalculates itself. The friend who used to carve is carved out of the evening now; his joke survives at the table, told in his cadence by someone else, and the first time each joke lands, the room holds still for half a second, a moment of silence nobody announces. New faces appear too: the lone soldier whose family is abroad, the widow brought in by the neighborhood, the friend of the fallen who has become a seventh child to a family of six. When a community absorbs a blow, it reconfigures its tables rather than merely mourning at them, and the holiday version of that reconfiguration is the most visible inventory the country takes.

What the Empty Chairs Teach

What the table teaches, two years in, is a theology of the placeholder. The empty chair is not denial; nobody at these tables believes the missing are merely late. It is a statement of account: this person belongs here, the seat is held, and the holding itself is the family's answer to everything the war tried to take. The world kept coming to celebrate in Jerusalem through every season of alarm, and the tables did the same in miniature, refusing to subtract the missing from the guest list even when subtraction was the honest arithmetic.

For readers who set their own tables with absences, medical wings, distant cities, chairs that will not be filled again, the Israeli version is not exotic. It is the same tradition arriving at the same answer under harder pressure: the table is a promise, and a promise does not depend on everyone being present to keep it. We lit the candles, sang the songs that go too high for us, and passed the food toward the empty places, which is how a family says, out loud, in the only liturgy it has: next year, complete.