

The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines (C)



DEED OF COMMITMENT UNDER GENEVA CALL FOR ADHERENCE TO A TOTAL BAN ON ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND FOR COOPERATION IN MINE ACTION

WE, the Koko National Organization and its armed wings the Koko National Army, the Koko National Front (Military Council), the Koko National Front (Zajum), the Zani Revolutionary Front, the United Socialist Revolutionary Army, the Zani Defense Volunteers, the Hour National Army, and the United Komo Ram Revolutionary Army through our duly authorized representative,

Recognizing the global scourge of anti-personnel mines which indiscriminately and inhumanely kill and maim combatants and civilians, mostly innocent and defenseless people, especially women and children, even after the armed conflict is over,

Realizing that the limited military utility of anti-personnel mines is far outweighed by their appalling humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental consequences, including on post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction,

Rejecting the notion that revolutionary ends or just causes justify inhumane means and methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering,

Reaffirming our determination to protect the civilian population from the effects or dangers of military actions, and to respect their rights to life, to human dignity, and to development,

Resolved to play our role not only as actors in armed conflicts but also as participants in the practice and development of legal and normative standards for such conflicts, starting with a contribution to the overall humanitarian effort to solve the global landmine problem for the sake of its victims,

Accepting that international humanitarian law and human rights apply to and oblige all parties to armed conflicts,

Acknowledging the norms of a total ban on anti-personnel mines established by the 1997 Ottawa Treaty, which is an important step toward the total eradication of landmines,

NOW, THEREFORE, hereby solemnly commit ourselves to the following terms

1. TO ADHERE to a total ban on anti-personnel mines. By anti-personnel mines, we refer to those devices which effectively explode by the presence, proximity or contact of a person, including other victim-activated explosive devices and anti-vehicle mines with the same effect whether with or without anti-handling devices. By total ban, we refer to a complete prohibition on all use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of such mines, under any circumstances. This includes an undertaking on the destruction of all such mines.
2. TO COOPERATE IN AND UNDERTAKE stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, mine awareness, and various other forms of mine action, especially where these programs are being implemented by independent international and national organizations.
3. TO ALLOW AND COOPERATE in the monitoring and verification of our commitment to a total ban on anti-personnel mines by Geneva Call and other independent international and national organizations associated for this purpose with Geneva Call. Such monitoring and verification include visits and inspections in all areas where anti-personnel mines may be present, and the provision of the necessary information and reports, as may be required for such purposes in the spirit of transparency and accountability.
4. TO ISSUE the necessary orders and directives to our commanders and fighters for the implementation and enforcement of our commitment under the foregoing paragraphs, including measures for information dissemination and training, as well as disciplinary measures in case of non-compliance.
5. TO TREAT this commitment as one step or part of a broader commitment in principle to the ideal of humanitarian norms, particularly of international humanitarian law and human rights, and to contribute to their respect in field practice as well as to the further development of humanitarian norms for armed conflicts.
6. This Deed of Commitment shall not affect our legal status, pursuant to the relevant clause in common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949.
7. We understand that Geneva Call may publicize our compliance or non-compliance with this Deed of Commitment.
8. We see the desirability of attracting the adherence of other armed groups to this Deed of Commitment and will do our part to promote it.
9. This Deed of Commitment complements or supersedes, as the case may be, any existing unilateral declarations of ours on anti-personnel mines.
10. This Deed of Commitment shall take effect immediately upon its signing and receipt by the Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva which receives it as the custodian of such deeds and similar unilateral declarations.

Done this 9th of August 2006 in Geneva, Switzerland

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE

From Memoranda and Deeds of Commitment to Massacres and Mutilated Bodies: A Century of Contradictions

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Author's Note

This article is an advocacy document intended to contribute to public understanding, documentation, and accountability regarding the conduct of the Kuki National Organization and its affiliated armed groups.

It is written from the perspective of the Naga experience and is grounded in documented historical records, contemporary media reports, and publicly available evidence.

References to responsibility, motive, or alleged criminal activity are presented as claims, allegations, opinions, or positions attributed to the individuals and organizations identified, unless supported by publicly available official findings.

The inclusion of such claims does not constitute an independent judicial finding or legal determination of guilt. The purpose of this document is to demand accountability, expose contradictions, and contribute to the pursuit of truth and justice for victims of violence and their families.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly eight decades, sections of the Kuki movement have pursued a political project for a separate Kukiland through memoranda, diplomatic engagement, international advocacy, human rights submissions, ceasefire arrangements, and humanitarian commitments. From appeals to Indian Prime Ministers and United Nations officials to Deeds of Commitment signed in Geneva, the movement has steadily sought recognition, legitimacy, and international support for its political aspirations.

Manipur, a state in India's northeast, shares a porous border with Myanmar. Its population comprises multiple ethnic communities, including the Meitei (predominantly valley dwellers), and various hill tribes, principally the Nagas and the Kuki groups. The Kuki movement's demand for a separate "Kukiland" encompasses territory that overlaps with Naga ancestral lands and areas claimed by other communities.

The India-Myanmar border, which runs through these contested areas, has become a focal point of Kuki advocacy, with memoranda opposing border fencing and seeking international intervention. Understanding this geographical and political context is essential to grasping the stakes of the conflict.

Viewed in isolation, the Kuki movement's international advocacy documents project the image of a disciplined movement committed to humanitarian principles, human rights, gender equality, child protection, and peaceful political engagement. They portray a movement seeking justice, recognition, and self-determination through internationally accepted norms and institutions.

Yet alongside this diplomatic record exists another history. It is a history preserved not in conference halls, memoranda, and international forums, but in burned villages, mass displacement, massacres, ambushes, mutilated bodies, and the collective memory of generations of Naga and Meitei communities who experienced these events differently.

This article examines that contradiction. It traces the evolution of the Kuki movement's international advocacy campaign from the formation of the Kuki National Assembly in 1946 through memoranda to Indian Prime Ministers, submissions to the United Nations system, the Suspension of Operations framework, and the Geneva Call Deeds of Commitment. It then places those efforts alongside a century of documented violence, historical grievances, and contemporary allegations of atrocities against Naga and Meitei civilians.

The central question is not whether the Kuki movement successfully built international visibility. It undeniably did. The question is whether the humanitarian image projected to the world corresponds with the historical record and contemporary realities experienced by many of its neighbours.

This gap between advocacy and memory, between diplomatic recognition and local suffering, between signatures in Geneva and graves in Manipur, is the central contradiction this article examines.

THE ARCHIVE OF POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT: A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD

The Kuki movement's international advocacy evolved into a multi-decade effort to gain international recognition and political legitimacy. Critics argue that this advocacy developed alongside a continuing pattern of violence on the ground. The following chronology is assembled from publicly available primary documents, press reports, and organisational records, all of which are traceable and verifiable online. Each entry is presented with its original date and context, and where possible, the exact language of the documents is quoted.

1. The Kuki National Assembly and the First Demand for Kukiland (1946-1960)

<https://www.khalvontawi.in/2024/06/77-long-years-kukiland-demand-for-kuki.html>

The Kuki National Assembly (KNA) was formed on 24 October 1946 by S.M. Zavum to act as a pan-political organisation among the various Kuki people. Following Indian independence in 1947, the KNA submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru demanding a separate Kuki state. On 24 March 1960, Kuki Chiefs and elders submitted another memorandum to Nehru, pleading for the "immediate establishment of Kuki State" and the unification of all contiguous areas under Kuki habitation.

2. Memorandum to the Government for Kukiland as 26th State (8 February 1992)

https://www.satp.org/terrorist-incident-text/india/kuki-national-front-knf_Aug-2013

On 8 February 1992, the Kuki National Front (KNF) submitted a memorandum to the Government of India for the introduction of a bill in Parliament for the creation of Kukiland as the 26th State of India. The KNF also submitted a memorandum to the Government of Manipur, but it was never taken up for discussion. The KNF declared it "would not cease their activities until and unless the demand for creation of Kukiland or statehood for Kukis is achieved".

3. Memoranda for Autonomous Tribal State (1990s-2000s)

<https://assamtribune.com/pc-urged-to-create-autonomous-tribal-state>

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Zomi Council and the Kuki National Front separately submitted memoranda to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee urging the creation of an Autonomous Tribal State (ATS) within Manipur under Article 244 A of the Indian Constitution. Later, during a visit by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram to Churachandpur, both the Zomi Re-unification Organisation (ZRO) and the KNF handed over fresh memoranda repeating the demand. The KNF memorandum stated: "We remain firm in our demand for creation of Kukiland within the framework of Constitution of India". It further requested the government to "recognise that the Kukis only demand those districts and areas in Manipur that are predominantly inhabited by the Kukis for the formation of Kukiland".

4. Memorandum to the Prime Minister (30 July 2004)

<https://zougam.wordpress.com/2007/09/01/the-kuki-national-organisation/>

On 30 July 2004, the Kuki National Organisation (KNO), founded on 24 February 1988 as an umbrella body for approximately a dozen militant groups, submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The memorandum reiterated the demand for a Kuki state and argued that the Kuki people had been subjected to "systematic discrimination and neglect" by successive Manipur governments.

5. Memorandum to the UN Secretary-General (21 May 2005)

<https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/217185>)

On 21 May 2005, the Kuki National Organisation (KNO) submitted a memorandum to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations Organisation, explicitly seeking international attention and legitimacy for their political cause. This marked a significant shift from domestic to international appeals. The memorandum detailed alleged human rights violations against the Kuki people and called on the UN to "take cognizance of the plight of the Kuki people". (The memorandum is listed as Appendix VIII in the Shodhganga thesis *Militant Movements in Manipur with Special Reference to Kuki National Organisation*, University of Madras, pp. 284-288.)

6. The Geneva Call Deed of Commitment on the Ban of Anti-Personnel Landmines (9 August 2006)

https://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/sc_in_kno_kna_2006_02-83b0954f998410f4ac01b3c9e7d9aab3.pdf)

On 9 August 2006, the Kuki National Organisation and its armed groups signed a Deed of Commitment to ban the use of anti-personnel mines under Geneva Call. The signatory was PS Haokip, President of the KNO. The KNO/KNA committed to a total ban on anti-personnel mines, pledging stockpile destruction, mine clearance, victim assistance, and cooperation in mine action. The armed wings listed under the KNO at the time included the Kuki National Army, the Kuki National Front (Military Council), the Kuki National Front (Zogam), the Zomi Revolutionary Front, the United Socialist Revolutionary Army, the Zou Defence Volunteers, the Hmar National Army, and the United Kom Rem Revolutionary Army. PS Haokip stated: "The essence of the Deed of Commitment to denounce use of landmines lies in the fact that the weapon is 'victim activated'."

7. Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India for Kukiland (August 2006)

<https://www.khalvontawi.in/2024/06/77-long-years-kukiland-demand-for-kuki.html>)

In August 2006, the Kuki National Front (KNF) submitted a further memorandum to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh demanding the creation of "Kukiland". The KNF declared that "nothing short of the proposed Kukiland shall be acceptable to the Kuki National Front in particular and the Kuki people in general."

8. Memorandum to the UN and Prime Minister of Israel (2008-2009)

<https://www.imphaltimes.com/guest-column/zalengam-kuki-s-deadly-dream-a-threat-to-nation/amp/>)

According to a report published in *The Times of India* on 17 December 2008, the Kuki community submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister of Israel seeking foreign help in the formation of a separate state. The memorandum requested the Prime Minister's "personal intervention" to "grant Kuki statehood under Article No.3 of the Indian Constitution for self-

governance free from the control and discrimination in all aspects by the majority community." The United Naga Council subsequently stated that the "Kuki hills" referenced in the memorandum is "non-existence and utopian concoction." Although the original *Times of India* report is no longer readily accessible online, its contents have been reproduced and referenced in subsequent sources, including the Imphal Times article cited above.

9. The Suspension of Operations (SoO) Agreement (22 August 2008)

<https://www.rediff.com/news/report/kuki/20080825.htm>

On 22 August 2008, the Kuki National Organisation and the United People's Front (UPF) signed a tripartite Suspension of Operations agreement with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the Manipur government. The SoO represented 25 insurgent groups comprising Kuki-Zo, Zomi and Hmar factions, with an estimated 2,000 to 2,500 cadres placed in designated camps. Under this agreement, cadres receive a monthly stipend from the Union Ministry of Home Affairs while continuing to pursue a separate "Kuki homeland." Although some details regarding cadre strength and subsequent camp arrangements were elaborated in later government and media reports, the Rediff report cited above documents the signing of the tripartite SoO agreement on 22 August 2008.

10. Submission to UN Human Rights Council (April 2008)

<https://www.right-docs.org/doc/a-hrc-8-26/>

The Kuki Organisation for Human Rights (KOHR) made a submission concerning the Universal Periodic Review of the Government of India at the UN Human Rights Council in April 2008, gaining a platform to present their narrative at the highest levels of the UN human rights system. The submission was included in the documentation prepared for India's Universal Periodic Review under the Human Rights Council's review mechanism and formed part of the information considered during the Council's examination of India's human rights record.

11. Memorandum to the Prime Minister on Naga Talks (28 July 2013)

https://e-pao.net/epSubPageExtractor.asp?src=news_section.News_Links.News_Links_2013.KIM_KOHR_write_to_PM_20130728

On 28 July 2013, Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM) and the Kuki Organisation for Human Rights (KOHR) asked the Prime Minister to consider a settlement of Kuki cases before the Centre entered into any possible agreement with the NSCN (I-M). In an open memorandum, they said they were "surprised to come across a news report in an Imphal daily which mentioned that state government was 'put under strong pressure' by Ministry of Home Affairs to give positive feedbacks and response on matters related to the Centre's quest for a solution to vexed Naga issue." The memorandum urged the Government of India to address Kuki political concerns and territorial interests before concluding any final settlement of the Naga political talks.

12. Memoranda to the Prime Minister of India and President of Myanmar (23 September 2013 and 11 October 2013)

<https://www.e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=8..240913.sep13>

On 23 September 2013, the Kuki Inpis and the Kuki Organisation for Human Rights submitted an open memorandum to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Myanmar opposing the construction of border fencing between India and Myanmar. They claimed that the fencing would divide their "ancestral land" and compared it to the Berlin Wall, warning that at least 38 Kuki villages would be affected. A similar memorandum was subsequently submitted on 11 October 2013, with copies forwarded to the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the United Nations human rights mechanisms, seeking international attention to their concerns regarding the proposed border fencing.

13. The Geneva Child Protection and Sexual Violence Deeds (22 March 2015)

<https://www.genevacall.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Kuki-National-Organisation-KNO-Sexual-violence-Gender-discrimination-2015.pdf>

On 22 March 2015, the Kuki National Organisation signed two further Deeds of Commitment under Geneva Call: the Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict, and the Deed of Commitment for the Prohibition of Sexual Violence in Situations of Armed Conflict and Towards the Elimination of Gender Discrimination. The signatory was PS Haokip. According to KNO spokesperson Seilen Haokip, "Sexual violence is not tolerated within the organization. There was one case back in 2005 where a cadre raped a woman. Following verification, severe action was taken against him." He added that "male and female cadres have equal status within the organization." The commitment was signed by Kinneao Hangshing, Secretary Women and Children, and TS Haokip, Defence Secretary. The KNO became the second armed group in India to make this commitment. Although the Geneva Call commitment was signed on 22 March 2015, the PDF linked above contains the official Deed of Commitment and related documentation issued by Geneva Call.

14. Memorandum to the Prime Minister of Israel (June 2023)

<https://organiser.org/2023/07/16/184046/bharat/zalengam-kukis-deadly-dream-a-threat-to-nation/>

In June 2023, the World Kuki-Zo Intellectual Council submitted memoranda to the United Nations, the United Kingdom, and Israel. The memorandum addressed to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought international intervention and support under various international instruments and agreements. The Council asserted a claim to self-governance and invoked Article 3 of the Constitution of India in support of its demand for a separate political arrangement. The memorandum formed part of a broader international advocacy campaign undertaken during the ethnic conflict in Manipur in 2023.

15. Memorandum to the United Nations (29 June 2023)

<https://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=22..140723.jul23>

On 29 June 2023, the Kuki-Zo Council submitted a 55-page memorandum to the United Nations seeking urgent intervention for the protection of ethnic Kukis in Manipur. The memorandum sought a separate administration for Kukis in Manipur under Article 3 of the Constitution of India and further stated that, should the Government of India reject the creation of a separate administration, consideration should be given to the creation of a separate country for the Kuki people. The memorandum formed part of a broader international campaign to draw global attention to the ethnic conflict and political demands emerging from Manipur in 2023.

16. Memoranda to the UN and Governments of Israel, Germany and Canada (6 October 2023)

<https://e-pao.net/GP.asp?src=5..071023.oct23>

On 6 October 2023, Chin-Kuki groups submitted memoranda to the United Nations and to the Governments of Israel, Germany and Canada. In response, the Women's March Committee (WMC) alleged that the memoranda contained "fake information and data" and stated that the Chin-Kuki groups had "engaged in a relentless campaign of disinformation using various media outlets and social media." The WMC urged the international community to scrutinise the claims made in the memoranda and challenged the accuracy of the information presented to foreign governments and international bodies.

17. Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India by 10 Kuki-Zo MLAs (16 August 2023)

<https://indianexpress.com/article/india/in-memorandum-to-modi-10-kuki-zomi-mlas-ask-for-dgp-chief-secy-posts-for-manipurs-hill-districts-8895846/>

On 16 August 2023, ten Kuki-Zo MLAs submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister of India demanding the creation of the posts of Chief Secretary and Director General of Police, or equivalent administrative arrangements, for the hill districts of Manipur. The memorandum formed part of a broader demand for a separate administrative arrangement for the Kuki-Zo people in the wake of the ethnic violence that erupted in Manipur in May 2023. The United Naga Council (UNC) described the proposal as "nothing but a mere different tune sung out of the same lyrics: the demand for separate administration."

18. Letters to the US Government and UN (January 2026)

<https://organiser.org/2026/01/04/333517/bharat/manipur-meitei-bodies-slam-kuki-groups-communication-with-un-termed-it-as-sovereignty-threat-in-memorandum-to-pm/>

In January 2026, the Kuki Alliance for Nampi Awakening Movement (KANAM) sent letters to the UN Environment Programme's Executive Director, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, and the US Embassy in New Delhi. The Meitei Heritage Society (MHS) subsequently submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Ministry

of Home Affairs (MHA), stating that these actions "undermine India's sovereignty and the authority of its constitutional and quasi-judicial institutions".

19. Memorandum to the US Government (January 2026)

<https://organiser.org/2026/01/04/333517/bharat/manipur-meitei-bodies-slam-kuki-groups-communication-with-un-termed-it-as-sovereignty-threat-in-memorandum-to-pm/>

In January 2026, a Meitei civil society body submitted a memorandum to Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressing concern over communications sent by a Chin-Kuki-Zo group to foreign governments and United Nations bodies. The memorandum alleged that such groups had received financial and logistical support from foreign Christian organisations and former United States military personnel, and called for scrutiny of these activities, raising questions regarding compliance with the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) and their implications for India's sovereignty and internal security.

Taken individually, these documents may appear routine. Viewed together, they reveal a sustained effort spanning decades to internationalize the Kukiland project.

THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

The Kuki movement's internationalization was not accidental. It was a deliberate, multi-pronged effort to project political legitimacy. The architecture of this campaign rested on several interconnected pillars.

First, memoranda and diplomatic engagement. From the formation of the Kuki National Assembly in 1946 to the memoranda submitted to the UN Secretary-General, the Prime Minister of India, the President of Myanmar, the Prime Minister of Israel, the European Parliament, and the US government, the movement systematically sought to insert its narrative into international diplomatic channels. These documents were not merely symbolic. They created a political archive that could be cited in future negotiations and used to strengthen claims to legitimacy.

Second, UN and international human rights mechanisms. The Kuki Organisation for Human Rights (KOHR) submission to the UN Human Rights Council in April 2008 gave the movement a platform at the highest levels of the UN human rights system. The 55-page memorandum to the UN in June 2023, which sought "urgent intervention for protection of ethnic Kukis in Manipur," was a sophisticated use of international legal frameworks to advance a political agenda. By framing its struggle in the language of human rights and self-determination, the movement gained access to international forums that would otherwise have been closed to an armed insurgent group.

Third, Geneva Call Deeds of Commitment. The KNO's signing of Deeds of Commitment banning landmines (2006), protecting children (2015), and prohibiting sexual violence (2015) gave the movement a veneer of humanitarian legitimacy and positioned it as a responsible armed actor complying with international humanitarian law. The signing ceremonies, witnessed by the Government of the Republic and Canton of Geneva, created photo opportunities and press releases that projected an image of discipline and humanitarian concern.

Fourth, diaspora activism and international Christian networks. The Kuki diaspora, particularly in the United States, played a critical role in internationalizing the movement. Kuki Inpi USA (KIUSA), a registered 501(c)(3) non-profit organisation established in 2001, fostered unity, empowered the community, and preserved Kuki cultural heritage. Its founders included several religious leaders, reflecting the centrality of Christian networks to the diaspora's organisational structure. The diaspora organised peace rallies, raised awareness through media, and engaged in advocacy with US lawmakers. These efforts provided a steady stream of international visibility and political legitimacy that would have been difficult for the armed movement to achieve on its own.

Fifth, human rights framing and indigenous rights discourse. The Kuki movement framed its struggle in the language of human rights, indigenous rights, and self-determination. This framing allowed it to access international mechanisms designed for indigenous peoples and to present itself as a victim of state oppression and ethnic discrimination. The use of terms like "genocide" and "ethnic cleansing" in its advocacy created a wave of international sympathy that drew attention away from documented Kuki atrocities against Naga and Meitei communities.

Sixth, social media and narrative construction. The movement used social media platforms to amplify its victimhood narrative, circulate unverified allegations, and build global attention that was instrumental in its international advocacy. Hashtags like #KukiGenocide and #SaveKukis were used to shape global perception and mobilise international support. This digital advocacy was not an afterthought; it was a central component of the movement's internationalization strategy.

Seventh, border and refugee narratives. The Kuki movement's opposition to border fencing between India and Myanmar and its documentation of refugee flows created a humanitarian narrative that resonated with international audiences. By framing its struggle as a response to border violations and refugee crises, the movement positioned itself as a defender of its people's rights and dignity.

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF HUMANITARIAN LEGITIMACY

To understand why the Kuki movement invested decades in building an international advocacy architecture, one must recognise what humanitarian legitimacy provides an insurgent group in the modern world. The movement's strategy reflects a broader trend among armed non-state actors who have learned to use international humanitarian law as a political instrument.

First, humanitarian legitimacy can constrain the state's kinetic options. When an armed group signs a Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, it publicly adopts the language of international humanitarian law. This can constrain the state's military options, as any action risks international scrutiny. The Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, while not a humanitarian law instrument per se, similarly created a permissive environment by formalizing Kuki groups' semi-legal status: 25 factions were moved into camps, received monthly stipends per cadre, and retained their weapons and political demand for a separate homeland.

Second, humanitarian legitimacy opens diplomatic channels. Memoranda to the UN Secretary-General, submissions to the Human Rights Council, letters to the Prime Minister of Israel, the European Parliament, and the US administration insert the group's narrative into international monitoring mechanisms and create a paper trail that can be cited in future negotiations. Even when foreign governments decline to intervene, the act of engagement validates the group as a credible interlocutor.

Third, humanitarian commitments can fragment accountability. By signing deeds prohibiting landmines, child recruitment, and sexual violence, the KNO acquired the vocabulary of victimhood and compliance. When allegations of atrocities subsequently emerge, the organisation can deploy denial, blame rogue elements, or claim corrective action. The existence of signed commitments can make it harder for external observers to determine whether violations are policy or aberration.

Fourth, international advocacy builds the domestic narrative. Every memorandum submitted to a foreign government or UN body is reported in local media and amplified on social media. The intended audience is not only the international community but also the Kuki-Zo public and the Indian state. It signals sophistication, global connection, and political seriousness.

THE HISTORICAL RECORD: WHAT THE ARCHIVE DOES NOT SHOW

The diplomatic record is silent on several critical episodes. That silence is significant. What the memoranda do not mention is that the Kuki movement's political project was built on a foundation of violence that preceded its international advocacy by over a century.

1. The Kuki Rebellion of 1917-1919

The United Naga Council has described the Kuki rebellion of 1917-1919 as a "savage" episode of "murdering, torching houses, plundering and enslaving women and children of indigenous Naga community in Ukhrul, Chandel and Tamenglong in Manipur." According to the Zeliangrong Union, "even though there was a Kuki rebellion, the Kuki rebelled against the Nagas and not the British."

Historical accounts indicate that Kuki forces invaded Naga villages, including Dailong, Makoi, Pabram, and Longchum (Awangkhum), killing many Zeliangrong villagers in cold blood between 1917 and 1919.

The British suppressed the rebellion after two years of fighting, burning 126 villages, destroying food stocks, and killing and maiming many of the Kuki community.

2. Colonial-Era Massacres (1875-1919)

British colonial records document a succession of Kuki raids on Naga villages. Sir Robert Reid's *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam 1883-1941* (1942) provides a detailed account of the frontier administration. According to a colonial account compiled from these records:

- **Namphee, February 1875:** 45 men, women, and children killed by Khongjai Kukis. [Mackenzie 1884: pp.193]
- **Chingsow (Chingsui), February 1880:** 45 persons massacred. Attack led by Chassad Chief Tonghoo after villagers refused to pay tribute; assailants attacked at dawn. [Johnstone 1896: pp.184]
- **Goitang, 1880:** About 176 persons massacred, 76 houses razed. [Reid 1942]
- **Kharam, 1880:** More than 250 villagers butchered, houses burnt. [Reid 1942; Facts about the Naga-Kuki Conflict, p. 5-6]
- **Mooling, January 1881:** 15 persons killed, 5 carried off by Kukis. [FD-EA 1882: pp.7]
- **Roazo Prenkhyng Mro, February 15, 1888:** 6 killed, 2 wounded, 23 taken prisoner by Shendu Kukis. [Reid 1942: pp.1]
- **Pakuma Rani's village (Demagiri), December 13, 1888:** Lushai Kukis led by Sylu chiefs Nikama, Kairuma, and Lungliena attacked; chieftainess and 21 subjects slain, 15 carried off. Brutality occurred 4 miles from British outpost and directly prompted the Second Lushai Expedition of 1888-89. [Reid 1942: pp.8]
- **24 villages (Chittagong Frontier), January 8, 1889:** 24 villages burnt, 101 killed, 91 captured by about 600 men led by Lenypunga and his brother Zarok. [Reid 1942: pp.8]
- **Swemi (Chingjaroi), December 1892:** More than 600 villagers ruthlessly massacred. Village was so depopulated it requested neighboring villages to provide women to repopulate it. [B.C. Allen; Reid 1942: pp.78]

- **Makoi, 1917-1919:** About 70 villagers massacred. Occurred during Kuki Rebellion (Anglo-Kuki War, 1917-1919). [Facts about the Naga-Kuki Conflict, p. 5-6]
- **Dailong, 1917-1919:** About 10 persons butchered, over 70 houses torched. Part of the broader Kuki Rebellion campaign against Zeliangrong Naga villages. [Facts about the Naga-Kuki Conflict, p. 5-6]
- **Ngahui (Awangkasom), May 26, 1918:** Entire villagers massacred, only 4 came out alive. Kuki raiders led by chiefs Chassad and Aishan attacked at dawn. [J.C. Higgins tour diary; Ukhru Times]
- **Mongjarong Khunou (Unknown, loosely associated with 1917-1919):** Whole village razed, about 39 massacred. Exact year unconfirmed. [Facts about the Naga-Kuki Conflict, p. 5-6]

James Johnstone, a British officer who served in Manipur, recorded that the Kukis "were a ceaseless trouble" to the Nagas. According to B.C. Chakravorti, during the "Kuki rebellion of 1917-1919, the Kabui Nagas suffered very badly at the hands of the Kukis."

THE 1990S KUKI-NAGA CONFLICT: QUIT NOTICE, DECLARATION OF WAR, AND MASS DISPLACEMENT

The colonial-era violence was not an isolated chapter. The Kuki-Naga conflict erupted again with devastating intensity in the 1990s, leaving a trail of destruction that permanently altered the demographic and political landscape of Manipur's hill districts.

The historical record presented here points to a campaign of ethnic intimidation and territorial expansion that preceded the wider conflict. The colonial-era massacres set a pattern of violence that erupted again with renewed ferocity.

1. The Quit Notice to Nagas in Moreh (May 1992)

The conflict was triggered by a series of events in Moreh, a strategic border town in Manipur's Tengenoupal district. In 1992, a Kuki youth was kidnapped at Moreh Bazar by suspected Naga extremists and was later found dead in a nearby jungle.

On 4 May 1992, the Kuki Students' Organisation (KSO) issued a warning to the Nagas to leave Moreh town within 24 hours, leading to a mass exodus of the Nagas. According to a petition filed before the Manipur Human Rights Commission, the Kuki National Army (KNA) served a quit notice to the Nagas to leave Moreh, which resulted in a communal clash between the Kukis and the Nagas.

The KSO's "Quit Notice" demanded that all Nagas leave the town within 24 hours, forcing thousands of innocent, helpless Nagas to abandon their homes and possessions.

This was not a spontaneous outburst of violence; it was a deliberate act of ethnic cleansing, designed to drive the Naga population out of a strategically important town.

2. The Kuki War Declaration (12 September 1992)

The intimidation did not end with the exodus from Moreh. On 12 September 1992, the Kuki War Declaration Committee formally declared war against the Nagas. This declaration was published in the Thinglang Post on 22 September 1992.

It was a formal, coordinated decision by Kuki armed groups to launch a systematic campaign of violence against Naga civilians and their settlements.

The declaration of war was not a response to a single incident; it was the culmination of a long-standing political project to push Nagas out of areas the Kuki movement claimed for itself.

3. The Campaign of Violence and Displacement (1992-1998)

The declaration of war was followed by a sustained campaign of violence that lasted for nearly six years. The conflict uprooted hundreds of villages, left more than a thousand dead, destroyed property, and caused massive internal displacement.

According to a detailed backgrounder by the Institute for Conflict Management, major clashes occurred during 1992-98, leading to the deaths of more than 1,000 people and displacement of 50,000-100,000 people. The conflict saw atrocities committed by both sides, but the pattern of Kuki aggression was clear and deliberate.

Kukis started attacking Naga settlements in the hills as early as 1990, with the reported aim of forcing the Nagas out of their lands. By the time the conflict ended in the late 1990s, hundreds of Naga villages had been burnt, and thousands of Nagas had been displaced from their ancestral lands.

An India Today report from 30 June 1993 described an open field housing nearly 300 Naga refugees, rendered homeless following an attack on their villages by Kuki insurgents. The men had fled to the jungles, leaving the women to fend for themselves.

4. The Kuki Counter-Narrative: The Joupi Massacre

The Kuki movement has its own narrative of victimhood, centred on the Joupi massacre of 13 September 1993. According to Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), as many as 115 Kuki villagers, including women and children, were allegedly killed by armed cadres of the NSCN-IM in a single day in different places of Tamenglong and the erstwhile Senapati district.

The Kuki community has been observing September 13 as 'Sahnit Ni' (Kuki Black Day) in remembrance of the victims. KIM has claimed that from 1992 to 1997, around 1,000 innocent Kukis were allegedly killed and 300 Kuki villages uprooted by the NSCN-IM, rendering over 1 lakh villagers refugees in their own land.

The Kuki movement has used this narrative to demand justice and to frame its political project as a response to Naga aggression. However, this narrative must be placed within the broader context of the conflict, including the Quit Notice, the Declaration of War, and the systematic Naga displacement that preceded and followed the Joupri massacre.

The Kuki movement's victimhood narrative, while containing elements of truth, is also a strategic tool used to garner international sympathy and legitimacy for its political aspirations.

5. The Toll of the Conflict (1992-1997)

The scale of the violence is staggering. As per a UNC report covering the period 1992-1997, a total of about 470 Kukis and 207 Nagas were killed in the ensuing clash, about 205 Kukis and 197 Nagas were injured, and about 2,870 Kuki houses and 2,582 Naga houses were burnt.

In 1993 alone, 320 people died (260 Kukis and 60 Nagas), and a total of 3,434 houses were set ablaze. In 1994, 67 Nagas and 44 Kukis were killed, and 677 houses (445 Naga, 232 Kuki) were set ablaze.

In 1995, 65 Kukis and 45 Nagas were killed, and 1,057 houses (653 Naga, 404 Kuki) were set ablaze.

6. The Noney Bus Tragedy (19 October 1994)

One of the most brutal acts of the 1990s conflict was the Noney bus tragedy. On 19 October 1994, a bus plying from Noney to Imphal with 45 passengers was ambushed by Kuki militants. When the bus reached a village called Sinam Khul, 40 well-armed cadres of the Kuki National Front (KNF) stopped the bus and called out Meiteis. But none of the Meiteis came out of fear.

Assuming that no Meiteis were inside the bus and all were Nagas, the KNF pushed the bus down a deep gorge. Together, 30 Nagas, 5 Meiteis and 2 non-Manipuris died, while 12 were injured. This was not a battle; this was a massacre of civilians.

7. The Legacy of Displacement and Encroachment

The conflict ended without a proper agreement, leaving a legacy of bitterness and unresolved grievances. The outcome was the large-scale displacement of Nagas from extensive areas of the hill districts of Manipur. Many of those uprooted by the violence were never able to return to their ancestral villages and lands.

Naga organisations have consistently maintained that many of these areas were subsequently occupied by Kuki settlers and incorporated into claims associated with the Kukiland project. Decades later, the consequences of that displacement remain unresolved, while the territories from which the Nagas were driven continue to be a source of contention and competing historical narratives.

Critics argue that the 1990s conflict was not a "clash" between two equal sides. Available evidence indicates that it was a campaign of ethnic cleansing, meticulously planned and executed by Kuki armed groups with the aim of territorial expansion.

The Quit Notice, the Declaration of War, the systematic burning of Naga villages, and the mass displacement of Naga populations all point to a deliberate strategy of demographic transformation. This is the historical context that the Kuki movement's international advocacy campaign has been documented as seeking to obscure.

THE SoO FRAMEWORK AND CONTEMPORARY VIOLENCE

The Suspension of Operations (SoO) framework was signed in 2008 and designed to bring Kuki insurgent groups into a monitored framework and reduce hostilities. However, critics argue that it has become a shield for continued violence. The agreement does not include a clause that forbids militants from killing members of other factions. This loophole has allowed SoO groups to continue their violent activities against Naga and Meitei communities with impunity.

The following is a chronological record of incidents attributed to Kuki groups operating under or associated with the SoO framework, compiled from media reports and official statements. It is not exhaustive, as countless attacks, arson, displacements, and casualties have been reported but could not be individually verified with specific dates, locations, or casualty figures. Entries included here have been widely attributed to SoO groups in media reports, official statements, and public commentary. Collectively, these incidents have fuelled growing scrutiny of the SoO framework by public officials, independent journalists, and Naga and Meitei organisations.

1. Specific SoO Groups Linked to Attacks

The ethnic violence in Manipur since May 3, 2023 has resulted in over 260 people killed, more than 1,100 injured, and tens of thousands displaced. Many attacks have been attributed to Kuki armed groups operating under the SoO framework.

- **April 8, 2023, Churachandpur District:** Cadres of the Kuki Independent Army (KIA), which had refused to sign the SoO, looted 25 sophisticated guns from a designated SoO camp. The incident raised questions about security protocols at SoO camps.

- **April 16, 2023, Henglep, Churachandpur District:** Five KIA militants and one civilian were wounded in a heavy exchange of fire with security forces. The militants had kidnapped six civilians, releasing four but holding two others.
- **May 3, 2023, Torbung, Churachandpur District:** Haopu Kipgen (Kuki) was bludgeoned to death around 4:30 pm in a mob attack, marking the first casualty of the ethnic violence that erupted that day.
- **May 25, 2023, Thamnapokpi Maning, Bishnupur District:** Toijam Chandramani (Meitei) was killed by suspected Kuki militants in a firing incident. Another individual was injured. The victim's brother publicly called for abrogation of the SoO pact, stating: "As long as the SoO agreement is not withdrawn, there will be no peace in Manipur."
- **May 27, 2023, Napat and Tangjeng Villages, Bishnupur District:** Kuki militants attacked and burnt down over 200 houses. The militants subsequently occupied the two villages.
- **May 28, 2023, Sugnu, Chandel District:** A violent gunfight broke out, resulting in the deaths of three Kuki men and leaving nine others wounded.
- **May 31, 2023, Kanglatongbi Shantipur, Imphal West District:** A policeman of Imphal West Commandos sustained a bullet injury in his leg in an attack by KNF militants.
- **June 2, 2023, Multiple Villages, Imphal West and Bishnupur Districts:** Heavily armed Kuki militants attacked Kangchup Chingkhong, Singda, Kadangband Part I, Haraothel, Koutruk, and Pombikhok villages. 16 people were injured, with 14 admitted to RIMS and two in ICU with bullet wounds. Militants used sophisticated weapons, mortars, and lethod bombs.
- **June 4, 2023, Serou, Kakching District:** A combined force of SoO militants and illegal migrants burnt down 150 Meitei houses at Serou, including the house of MLA K Ranjit, at around 10:30 pm.
- **June 4, 2023, Senjam Chirang and Phayeng, Imphal West District:** Kuki militants opened fire and torched houses. A gun battle ensued; it is believed 3-4 Kuki militants were killed in the exchange.
- **June 4, 2023, Sugnu, Kakching District:** A combined team of IRB, BSF, and local villagers attacked and busted the UKLF's designated SoO camp (Nazareth Camp) after a fierce gun battle. The camp was later burnt down. It is suspected that at least four Kuki militants were killed.
- **July 3, 2023, Leikinthabi, Imphal West District:** Heavily armed Kuki militants attacked villages in the Leikinthabi area under Sekmai police station at around 5 am, burning down at least four houses including a farmhouse. The attack came a day after the Indigenous Tribal Leaders' Forum (ITLF) called for military preparation by Kuki volunteers.

- **September 8, 2023, Pallel, Tengenoupal District:** Three persons were killed and over 50 injured.
- **September 12, 2023, Chingphei Ching, Churachandpur District:** Kuki militants launched a gun and bomb attack on security personnel from bunkers at Chingphei Ching, Haotak, and Langjingmanbi Reserve Forest. A gunfight lasted until 8 am.
- **September 13, 2023, Chingphei Bunker No. 1, Churachandpur District:** Sub-Inspector Onkhomang Haokip (35) of Manipur Police was shot dead by a sniper between 1 pm and 1:30 pm. Two others sustained bullet wounds.
- **December 31, 2023, Moreh, Tengenoupal District:** Kuki militants launched "unprovoked" attacks on State security forces at Moreh. Displaced Meitei residents condemned the attacks as violations of the SoO terms and demanded the agreement's withdrawal.
- **January 22, 2024, Manipur:** 34 MLAs passed a resolution against Assam Rifles' conduct, alleging they remained "mute spectators" when unarmed civilians were fired upon by Kuki militants.
- **August 9, 2024, Molnoi Village, Tengenoupal District:** Firing was reported around 9:30 am. Three Kuki-Zo village volunteers were allegedly killed in a "misunderstanding" between an SoO group (UKLF) and village volunteers.
- **September 1, 2024, Koutruk and Kadangband Villages, Imphal West District:** In an "unprecedented attack," suspected Kuki militants used high-tech drones to drop numerous rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). A 31-year-old woman, Ngangbam Surbala, and a man were killed, and several others, including an eight-year-old girl, two police personnel, and a television journalist, were injured. The attack marked a significant escalation in the use of drone technology against civilians.
- **September 6, 2024, Tronglaobi, Bishnupur District:** A rocket was fired from an elevated position in nearby hill areas toward the residential locality of Tronglaobi.
- **September 6, 2024, Moirang, Bishnupur District:** An improvised rocket struck the compound of former Chief Minister Mairembam Koireng's residence, killing a 72-year-old priest who was preparing for religious rituals and injuring five others, including a 13-year-old girl. This was the second rocket attack in the district on the same day.
- **November 4, 2024, Manipur:** Four terrorists of the United Kuki National Army (UKNA) were shot dead in an encounter with security forces.
- **November 9, 2024, Bishnupur District:** A Meitei woman was shot dead by suspected Kuki militants.
- **November 11, 2024, Jakuradhor, Jiribam District:** CRPF killed 10 suspected Kuki militants who had launched an attack on Borobekra police station and the adjacent CRPF camp.

- **January 11, 2026, Ireng Naga Village, Kangpokpi District:** KNF/UPF insurgents, operating under the SoO agreement, vandalised public property and defaced a village memorial stone by writing 'Kukiland' and 'Stay Away'. A KNF commander issued explicit threats of open gunfire and burning down the entire village.
- **January 22, 2026, Tuibong, Churachandpur District:** A Meitei man, Mayanglambam Rishikanta Singh, was abducted from his residence and shot dead near Natjang village. The abductors are suspected to be members of the United Kuki National Army (UNKA), a militant outfit that is not a signatory to the SoO agreement.
- **April 7, 2026, Tronglaobi Awang Leikai, Bishnupur District:** At approximately 1:03 am, a suspected rocket or mortar projectile struck the residence of Oinam Malemnganba, a Border Security Force (BSF) Head Constable. The blast killed his five-year-old son and five-month-old daughter instantly and critically injured his wife, Oinam Ongbi Binita (37). Protests erupted, with locals torching two oil tankers and a truck. A curfew and a three-day internet shutdown were imposed across five valley districts. The NIA took over the probe and arrested three suspected cadres of the United Kuki National Army (UKNA), Jampao Kuki, Sasang, and Paulallem Vaiphai.
- **April 10, 2026, Mongkot Chepu Village, Ukhrul District:** A Border Security Force (BSF) Constable, Mithun Mandal, was killed after being struck by a stray bullet during an exchange of fire between suspected Kuki-Zo militants and Tangkhul Naga village volunteers.
- **April 13, 2026, Ashang Khullen-Phaiyang, Indo-Myanmar Border, Kamjong District:** At least four suspected cadres of the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) were reportedly killed in a gunfight with NSCN-IM cadres along the Indo-Myanmar border. The clash reportedly began after KNA-B cadres entered contested territory and initiated an attack. Four AK-series rifles were recovered from the deceased.
- **April 18, 2026, TM Kasom Village, Ukhrul District:** Two Tangkhul Naga civilians, including a retired Indian Army soldier, were killed and two others were injured when suspected Kuki militants ambushed vehicles along National Highway-202. The victims were identified as Chinaoshang Shokwungnao (45) of Tashar village and Yaruigam Vashum (42) of Kharasom village. The attack occurred around 2:30 pm after security forces escorting the vehicles withdrew upon crossing a sensitive stretch. The Manipur Government handed over the investigation to the NIA. Naga organisations blamed Kuki armed groups operating under SoO. The United Naga Council (UNC) called a three-day total shutdown in Naga-inhabited areas from April 20 to 23 in protest.
- **April 24, 2026, Sinakeithei Village, Ukhrul District:** In the early hours, a 29-year-old Naga Village Guards (NVG) member, Horshokmi Jamang of Chatric Khullen village, Kamjong district, was killed in an ambush by suspected Kuki armed cadres while on patrol between Sirakhong and Sinakeithei. The Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL) alleged that

Kuki cadres operating under SoO were responsible. Hours later, two armed Kuki community members, Letlal Sitlhou and Paominlun Haolao, were killed in retaliatory firing in Mullam, a Kuki village. A BSF team recovered the two bodies.

- **May 7, 2026, Z. Choro, Namlee-Wanglee and Kaka Villages, Kamjong District:** Between 3:30 AM and 4:00 AM, militants belonging to the Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B), allegedly aided by SoO groups, attacked villages using drones, rocket launchers and other military-grade weapons. Several houses were torched, with Choro village suffering extensive destruction, almost all houses reduced to ashes except the church building. Residents fled into nearby jungles.
- **May 9, 2026, Kamjong District:** Assam Rifles rescued two Tangkhul Naga villagers, including one woman, who had been abducted by KNA-B and Village Volunteers Eastern Zone (VVEZ) during the May 7 attacks.
- **May 13, 2026, Leilon Vaiphei Village, Kangpokpi District:** Six Naga villagers were abducted by armed Kuki groups. A total of 18 people were reportedly abducted, of whom 12 were released while 6 others were later found dead.
- **May 13, 2026, Between Kotzim and Kotlen Villages, Kangpokpi District:** At around 10:00 am, three Thadou Baptist church leaders, Rev. Vumthang Sitlhou (President of the Thadou Baptist Association and former General Secretary of the Manipur Baptist Convention), Rev. V. Kaigoulun, and Pastor Paogoulen, were ambushed and killed while returning from a Baptist convention in Lamka (Churachandpur) to Kangpokpi district. Four other pastors and two drivers were seriously injured. The attack triggered widespread condemnation and a shutdown in Churachandpur and Kangpokpi districts.
- **June 10, 2026, Kangpokpi District:** The bodies of the six Naga men abducted on May 13 were recovered by police after a 24-hour search involving 15 teams of Manipur Police, Assam Rifles, and CRPF. The United Naga Council (UNC) claimed the bodies were mutilated and demanded the abrogation of the SoO agreement.
- **June 11, 2026, Kamjong District:** Two Kuki men were reported dead in fresh violence following the discovery of the six Naga bodies.
- **June 13, 2026, Langka (Taniuluang) Naga Village, Kangpokpi District:** Armed cadres linked to the Kuki National Front-Presidential (KNF-P), a signatory to the SoO agreement, attacked Langka Naga Village around 8:40 am using "heavy weapons and explosive devices". The village authority warned of further violence in the IT Road
- **June 14, 2026, Manipur:** Deputy Chief Minister Losii Dikho publicly stated that an armed Kuki group under the SoO agreement was involved in the abduction and killing of the six Naga villagers. He said: "I should tell this openly today that this crime was committed by a particular group, which is part of the SoO." He further stated that "this type of crime, where persons were killed and their bodies cut in pieces can not be tolerated."

Viewed individually, these incidents may appear isolated or episodic. Viewed collectively, they suggest a recurring pattern documented in media reports, statements by Naga and Meitei organisations, observations by independent journalists, and comments from public officials. Critics contend that armed groups operating under or associated with the SoO framework have continued to be linked to violence despite the agreement's stated objective of reducing hostilities. The cumulative effect has been to erode confidence in the framework and fuel growing demands for accountability and reassessment of its continued operation.

Any single incident may be dismissed as an aberration. The cumulative pattern is far more difficult to ignore.

2. Perspectives on the SoO Framework

The Naga Perspective

The Foothills Naga Coordination Committee (FNCC) has demanded the immediate dismantling of all SoO camps belonging to Kuki militant groups located in or around Naga ancestral territories. The FNCC warned that the agreement has become a "sanctuary for armed criminals" rather than a tool for peace. The FNCC stated: "The continued presence and reported relocation of SoO camps into Naga areas represent a direct threat to communal harmony, constitutional order, and national security."

The United Naga Council (UNC) has submitted a charter of demands to Union Home Minister Amit Shah, calling for the abrogation of the SoO agreement with Kuki militant groups. The UNC demanded that the KNF-P be declared a terrorist organisation and sought the removal of Manipur Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen, citing her relationship with KNF-P President Semtinthang alias Thangboi Kipgen.

The Meitei Perspective

Meitei civil society organisations and community leaders have consistently called for the abrogation of the SoO agreement, arguing that it has failed to maintain peace and instead enabled Kuki militant groups to operate with impunity. The Meitei Heritage Society (MHS) has submitted memoranda to the Prime Minister's Office and Ministry of Home Affairs, stating that Kuki armed groups have used the SoO framework as a shield to continue their violent activities against Meitei civilians.

Following the May 25, 2023 killing of Toijam Chandramani in Thamnapokpi Maning, his brother publicly stated: "As long as the SoO agreement is not withdrawn, there will be no peace in Manipur." Displaced Meitei residents from Moreh condemned the December 31, 2023 attacks

by Kuki militants on State security forces as violations of the SoO terms and demanded the agreement's immediate withdrawal.

Meitei organisations have also accused the government of inaction, alleging that the state has prioritised political calculations over the safety of Meitei civilians. They point to the continued presence of SoO camps, the monthly stipends paid to cadres, and the lack of accountability for attacks on Meitei communities as evidence that the SoO framework has become a tool for the Kuki movement to consolidate its gains and continue its territorial expansion.

THE STATE'S ROLE IN SUSTAINING THE SOO FRAMEWORK

The Indian state has sustained the SoO framework for over fifteen years despite documented violence. The agreement has been extended multiple times before 2025, involving 25 Kuki-Zo outfits under KNO and UPF, who receive stipends and rehabilitation in exchange for peace. As of late 2025, there are approximately 14 designated SoO camps in Manipur, housing around 2,200 cadres.

The state's political calculations are evident: the desire to manage multiple insurgencies, the fear of pushing Kuki groups into an alliance with Naga rebels, and electoral considerations in the hill districts. However, this strategic accommodation has come at a cost. Meiteis and Naga groups have alleged that the government was not taking action against Kuki armed groups on the pretext of the SoO pact. The continued state support for the SoO framework, despite its documented failures, raises serious questions about the government's commitment to protecting Naga and Meitei civilians and upholding the rule of law.

- **March 10, 2023, Manipur Government:** The Manipur Government withdrew from the SoO agreement with the Kuki National Army (KNA) and Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), citing violent incidents in Kangpokpi district and allegations that leadership hailed from outside the state.
- **October 1, 2025, T Kotlen Village, Chandel District:** Chandel district police conducted an operation to apprehend a suspected drug kingpin, leading to tensions with the UKLF, a group operating under the SoO agreement.

THE BATTLEFIELD BEYOND MANIPUR

The architecture of internationalization described above was deployed in full force during the post-2023 conflict, as the Kuki movement fought a parallel battle beyond Manipur. Violence on the ground in Manipur was accompanied by a war of narratives fought on international platforms, social media, and diplomatic channels. This battlefield beyond Manipur was as crucial

to the Kuki movement's strategy as the armed struggle itself. Its objective was not to defeat an enemy on the battlefield, but to shape global perception, garner international sympathy, and obscure the historical record.

In the modern world, victimhood is political capital, and the Kuki movement has effectively deployed this. By presenting themselves as victims, the movement could deflect attention from its own history of violence. The victimhood narrative, while containing elements of truth, was weaponised to legitimise political aspirations and to undermine the credibility of those who documented Kuki atrocities. The 55-page memorandum to the UN in June 2023, which sought "urgent intervention for protection of ethnic Kukis in Manipur," was a masterclass in this strategy. It presented a one-sided account of violence, omitting the Kuki movement's own history of aggression.

The Women's March Committee (WMC), a Meitei civil society organisation, documented what it described as a "relentless campaign of disinformation" by Chin-Kuki groups. The committee noted that these groups had "engaged in a relentless campaign of disinformation using various media outlets and social media." The campaign included fabricated images, out-of-context videos, and manipulation of international media.

In January 2026, the Kuki Alliance for Nampi Awakening Movement (KANAM) sent letters to the UN Environment Programme's executive director, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk, and the US embassy in New Delhi. The letters framed the Kuki movement's struggle as a humanitarian crisis, urging international intervention. The Meitei Heritage Society (MHS) submitted a memorandum to the PMO and MHA stating that these actions "undermine India's sovereignty and the authority of its constitutional and quasi-judicial institutions". The MHS also noted that "Chin Kuki Zo organisations and individuals have, in the past, approached the United Nations, the US, Israel, and other foreign actors, masquerading as tribal bodies, with fabricated one-sided narratives".

On social media, a coordinated effort amplified Kuki victimhood narratives, often using hashtags like #KukiGenocide and #SaveKukis. These hashtags were used to create a global sympathy wave, drawing attention away from documented atrocities against Naga and Meitei communities. The spread of disinformation had a corrosive effect on public discourse. It polarised communities, deepened mistrust, and made it difficult for neutral observers to discern fact from fiction.

Critics contend that narrative management was not a peripheral feature of the project but one of its central components. By controlling the narrative, the movement could shield its actions from scrutiny and present itself as a legitimate actor on the international stage. The battlefield

beyond Manipur was where the Kuki movement fought to control how its story was told, and in that battle, it achieved considerable success.

The WMC called on the international community to "verify all information before accepting the Kuki narrative". The committee's statement was a reminder that in the battle for global perception, the truth was often the first casualty.

THE CENTRAL CONTRADICTION

This article contends that the movement's international visibility often functioned less as a vehicle for peace than as a shield against scrutiny: building international legitimacy through advocacy while simultaneously engaging in actions on the ground that critics characterize as atrocities. The Geneva Call Deeds of Commitment signed in 2015 were not isolated acts of goodwill. They were the culmination of a decades-long campaign to gain international recognition and credibility.

Yet alongside this diplomatic record exists a century of documented violence. The Kuki rebellion of 1917-1919, the colonial-era massacres of Naga villages, the Quit Notice and Declaration of War in 1992, the systematic displacement of Nagas during the 1990s conflict, the Noney bus tragedy of 1994, and the attacks on Naga villages in 2025-2026 all form part of a continuous pattern of violence against Naga and Meitei communities.

THE LESSON FOR THE NAGAS

The Kuki movement has understood something that the Nagas have often overlooked: advocacy itself is a form of political power. The Kukis have invested in documentation, relationship-building, narrative construction, and international engagement at a level that many indigenous movements fail to achieve. They understood archives. They understood advocacy. They understood international visibility.

Nagas, by contrast, have long relied on moral legitimacy alone. They assumed that the justice of their cause would speak for itself. They assumed that historical truth would be sufficient. But in the modern world, where narratives are shaped as much by Geneva as by the ground, moral legitimacy without strategic advocacy is a voice that is often not heard.

The Nagas possess a substantial historical record, documented grievances, and a political narrative that deserves far greater international attention. Naga history is not built on colonial planting or mercenary service. Naga identity is not borrowed from British administrators. Naga

suffering is not a fabrication. Naga resistance is not a performance. The Nagas have a long political history, numerous historical documents, and a story that spans generations.

It is time to tell that story to the world with the same strategic sophistication that the Kuki movement has employed. The Nagas must build documentation centres and legal archives that preserve their history. They must engage with international human rights organisations and document their own grievances. They must build a diaspora advocacy network that can amplify their voice in international forums. They must train a new generation of Naga advocates in international law, human rights documentation, and strategic communications.

The Nagas must do all of this with one crucial advantage: they possess a substantial documentary record that can be presented and defended through evidence.

THE WORLD IS WATCHING

The Kuki movement has presented itself to the international community as a humanitarian actor. Geneva Call did not sign a deed with a community. It signed a deed with an organization. The question therefore is not whether humanitarian principles were written on paper. The question is whether the organization that received international recognition upheld those principles in practice.

Implications for Geneva Call. Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment framework depends on the good faith of signatories. The KNO's signature on the sexual violence deed did not prevent rape; it only documented a promise that was broken. This raises questions about the effectiveness of the Deed of Commitment model when dealing with organisations that have a documented history of brutality. Geneva Call must review its engagement with the KNO and demand transparent accountability for the violations documented in this article.

Implications for international humanitarian engagement. The Kuki movement's success in gaining international legitimacy through humanitarian framing demonstrates that armed non-state actors can weaponise humanitarian discourse. International organisations must scrutinise signatories more rigorously and verify compliance through independent monitoring, rather than relying on self-reporting. The gap between promise and performance, as demonstrated in this article, is not an anomaly; it is a feature of the system.

Implications for Indian policymakers. The Suspension of Operations framework has provided a shield for Kuki armed groups for over fifteen years. The government has sustained the SoO despite documented violence, stipends to cadres, and repeated violations of its terms. The evidence raises serious questions about whether the SoO has functioned as a peace mechanism or as a framework that enabled further consolidation on the ground. India must review the SoO

agreement and ensure that any future engagement with armed groups is conditional on genuine, verifiable compliance with humanitarian norms.

Implications for Naga advocacy. The Nagas must learn from the Kuki movement's success in international advocacy. The Kukis understood that in the modern world, political power is not won only on the battlefield but also in archives, courtrooms, UN committees, and media platforms. The Nagas have a compelling case, one built on truth, justice, and historical legitimacy. They must deploy it with the same strategic sophistication that their adversaries have shown.

The documents are there. The signatures are there. The photo opportunities are there. But the bodies are also there. The mutilated remains of Naga men are there. The historical records of the 1917-1919 rebellion are there. The British colonial archives describing Kuki attacks on Naga villages are there. The massacres of Goitang, Kharam, Makoi, Dailong, and Chingjaroi are there. The 1994 Noney bus tragedy, where 34 passengers were pushed to their deaths down a gorge, is there. The Quit Notice and Declaration of War of 1992 are there. The hundreds of burned Naga villages and the thousands of Naga refugees are there.

The world is watching. It must see the full picture. Continued impunity, as the evidence suggests, risks further escalation and deeper suffering for all communities involved.

WHAT YOU CAN DO

- 1. Share this article widely across social media, WhatsApp, and email.**
- 2. Tag international human rights organizations: Geneva Call, UN Human Rights Council, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch. Demand they investigate the KNO's compliance with their own Deeds of Commitment. Write to the UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues and the UN Human Rights Committee.**
- 3. Write to your elected representatives and demand that the Government of India review the Suspension of Operations agreement with Kuki militant groups.**
- 4. Do not forget. Demand accountability. Do not let the dead be buried without justice.**

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
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CHRISTIAN DAILY INTERNATIONAL

Fri, Jun 26 2026

Six Naga hostages, including two pastors, killed as India's Manipur crisis widens

By **Surinder Kaur** | Jun 21, 2026 23:56 EDT | 14 mins read



A video screenshot shows Naga mourners grieving the deaths of six men from Konsakhul village who were abducted and killed in Manipur, India. Video screenshot

Six Naga men taken hostage in India's northeastern state of Manipur, two of them pastors, were found dead on June 10, their remains reportedly mutilated. More than a week later, their bodies have still not been handed over to their families.

The six were seized in retaliation after gunmen killed three Baptist pastors in an ambush. More than five weeks later, the wider crisis that ambush set off shows no sign of ending.

This week alone has brought a tense hospital standoff, an intensified security crackdown, and the disputed killing of Lenminsang Haokip in Henglep, whose family is still waiting to bury him.

The crisis sits on top of an older, deeper split.

Manipur is divided between a fertile central valley and the surrounding hills. The valley is home to the Meitei, who are mostly Hindu. Although Meiteis occupy roughly 10 percent of the state's land, they hold 40 of Manipur's 60 state assembly seats.

The hills are home to two predominantly Christian tribal communities: the Naga in the north and the Kuki-Zo in the south.

The state has been gripped by violence between the Meitei and the Kuki-Zo since May 2023. Kuki-Zo communities have borne the brunt of the displacement from that conflict and lost access to Imphal's airport, the state's only one. Churches belonging to Kuki-Zo, Naga and even some Meitei Christians were burned in the violence. More than 300 churches have been destroyed across the state since 2023.

Tensions between the Naga and the Kuki-Zo, two communities that share the Christian faith, had already been rising since clashes in February this year. The May 13 ambush turned that tension into open crisis.

As Christian Daily International previously reported, Rev. Dr. Vumthang Sitlhou, Pastor Kaigoulun Lhouvum and Pastor Paogoulen Sitlhou were shot dead on May 13 while returning from a peace conference in Churachandpur.

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They led the Thadou Baptist Association India. Thadou is one of the largest communities within the broader Kuki-Zo grouping, though Thadou organizations have pushed for their own distinct administrative classification.


A Cycle of Hostages

Within hours of the ambush, armed groups on both sides began seizing civilians in Kangpokpi and Senapati districts. Police later said that while 48 people were taken hostage in total, 28 were released within two days.

One group of 18 came from Konsakhul, a Naga village, stopped at a barricade in the neighboring Kuki village of Leilon Vaiphei while returning from a wedding. Twelve women and a child from that group were among those freed within the first two days, released in the early hours of May 15.

That left 20 hostages still unaccounted for from both communities: the six Konsakhul men, and 14 Kuki-Zo civilians held separately in Senapati district.

The six missing Naga men were Rev. Dr. Manu Thiumai, pastor of Leimakhong Baptist Church; his brother Dilip Thiumai; Pastor Kenpibou Chawang; Phenrongwi Thiumai; Kaliwangbou Abonmai; and Ch. Phenrilung.



A collage of video screenshots shows five of the six Naga men abducted from Konsakhul village in Manipur, India, on May 13 and found dead nearly four weeks later. Two of the six were pastors. The sixth man is not pictured. Video screenshot

Kacheaklungliu Thiumai, Rev. Dr. Manu Thiumai's wife, and Winiliu Thiumai, the wife of his brother Dilip, were both among the women released. Both spoke separately to *Christian Daily International* about their ordeal.

Both women said they were blindfolded, threatened at gunpoint, and moved through the jungle for more than a day, while the men were beaten and driven away separately.

Winiliu Thiumai, who had her two-year-old daughter with her, said her own blindfold was periodically removed, which she believes was because her captors judged a mother with a small child would not try to escape.

Both women said independently that they heard a single gunshot on the night of May 13, which they now believe, was when the men were killed, though this has not been independently confirmed.

Professor Ajailiu Niumai, a Naga academic who has closely followed the crisis, told CDI that many of the women later recognized their captors as residents of Leilon Vaiphei from whom they had once bought vegetables, a familiarity that made the experience harder to bear. She said the women had cooperated, hoping their husbands and sons would be released safely.

Separately, Wilson Thanga, a resident of Dolang village and belonging to the Chiru community, a small Manipur tribal group, was killed on May 13 in Joujangtek. The attack also left his wife injured. The United Naga Council (UNC), the main civil society body representing Naga tribes in the state, later alleged, in a formal charter of demands, that the same armed group accused in the hostage killings was also responsible for his death.

Church Leaders Intervene

Christian leaders moved quickly to mediate. On May 18, a ten-member delegation from the Manipur Baptist Convention (MBC), the Council of Baptist Churches in North East India (CBCNEI), the Asia Pacific Baptist Federation (APBF) and the Baptist World Alliance (BWA) met Manipur's chief minister.

They then traveled to meet both the UNC and Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), its Kuki-Zo counterpart.

The four bodies jointly appealed for "the immediate, safe, and unconditional release of the hostages," urging both sides toward reconciliation. By then, the 28 hostages released in the first two days were already home. The appeal was aimed at the 20 who remained, the six Naga men and the 14 Kuki-Zo civilians, who stayed in captivity for three more weeks, into June.

At the funeral of the three slain pastors in Motbung, attended by thousands, Haominlun Sitlhou, son of Rev. Dr. Vumthang Sitlhou, publicly forgave his father's killers, echoing his father's own efforts at reconciliation in the weeks before his death.

Niumai told CDI that she had appealed publicly from the earliest days of the crisis for hostages on both sides to be freed, calling for “peace as Christian brothers” between the two communities.

Hope Turns to Grief

On June 9, Naga village guards, informal, village-organized defense groups, released the last 14 Kuki-Zo hostages, who had been held in Senapati district for 27 days.

UNC president Ng. Lorho said the release came on humanitarian grounds, citing appeals from church bodies including the BWA. Both the Evangelical Fellowship of India (EFI) and the National Council of Churches in India (NCCI) welcomed the news and continued praying for the six Naga men that were still missing.

That hope did not last. The next day, June 10, security forces recovered six bodies near Leilon Vaiphei believed to be the missing Naga men.

EFI's general secretary, the Rev. Vijayesh Lal, said in a statement that “hope has now turned to grief,” and noted that two pastors were among the dead. NCCI said the killings had “no place in any civilized society, particularly in a predominantly Christian region.”

The Manipur Baptist Convention thanked the Naga community for its earlier restraint, saying Baptists had hoped for “a similar spirit and reciprocal gesture,” and called the alleged mutilation of the bodies a “gross violation of the God-given dignity and sanctity of human life.”

CBCNEI, the BWA and the APBF also condemned the killings and demanded a swift, impartial investigation. The United Christian Forum of North East India said the loss was “felt even more acutely” because two of the dead were pastors.

Catholic leaders responded as well. Archbishop Linus Neli of Imphal later called for an inclusive peace accord he termed as “Manipur Agreement 2026.” Archbishop emeritus Dominic Lumon told AsiaNews there was “a loss of humanity” in the cycle of revenge.

Paisho Thiumai, brother of Rev. Dr. Manu Thiumai, told the media, “I forgive them, but this must stop.”

Niumai, reacting to how the remains were handled, told CDI they were “kept in plastic bags and sacks, which is beyond human dignity.” She questioned why search teams that had reportedly covered the same ground for weeks did not recover the remains until immediately after the Kuki release.

Expressing deep shock and grief at her husband and loved ones mutilated bodies, Winilliu Thiumai told CDI, "they have treated us [Nagas] badly; butchering them like an animal."

Relatives described a community marked since by deep trauma. Niumai informed CDI that many of the women are struggling to process what happened, caught between grief, fear and unanswered questions.

Demands and Denials

The United Naga Council has refused to accept the remains. In a charter of demands, sent to Union Home Minister Amit Shah on June 12, the council accused the Kuki National Front-President group (KNF-P), an armed faction party to a long-running ceasefire with the government known as the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement, of carrying out the killings.

It also named the chief of Leilon Vaiphei, the Kuki village where the Naga civilians were first stopped and abducted, other villagers, and a serving Manipur police officer, Thanggilian Vaiphei.

The council demanded that KNF-P be declared a terrorist organization, that the SoO agreement be scrapped, and that Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen be removed from office, citing her marriage to the group's president.

On June 14, Deputy Chief Minister Losii Dikho, who is Naga, became the first government official to publicly assign blame, telling reporters that an SoO-affiliated Kuki group was responsible. He appealed to Prime Minister Narendra Modi to rein in such groups. Kuki Inpi Manipur has denied the allegations.

As of June 15, Manipur's home minister said identification of the six bodies was complete, but that handover was delayed while the government weighed the UNC's demands.

The state handed both the May 13 killings and the abduction cases to India's National Investigation Agency, a federal anti-terrorism body, in late May. Four arrests followed in the abduction case, but no one has yet been arrested over either the original ambush or the deaths of the six Naga men.

Violence Spreads to the Fringes

The killings have set off a wider cycle of violence beyond the villages of Leilon Vaiphei and Konsakhul.

On June 9, a Kuki-Zo farmer, Haogin Lhouvum, was shot dead while working in a paddy field near Lasan, on the Kangpokpi-Tamenglong border. Kuki civil society groups blamed Naga armed groups.

Four days later, during Lhouvum's funeral, a Kuki-Zo village volunteer, Jangngam Hangshing, was killed and two others wounded in a separate ambush nearby. Kuki groups attributed the attack to the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, Isak-Muivah faction, a longstanding Naga insurgent organization that has held a ceasefire with the Indian government since 1997, known as NSCN-IM, and an allied faction.

On June 11, two Kuki men, a church deacon and a youth leader, were killed and homes burned in Kultuh village, Kamjong district.

The Henglep Dispute and a Hospital Standoff

On June 15, gunfire near the border of Leilon Vaiphei and Konsakhul left three young Kuki-Zo men wounded. Kuki Inpi Manipur blamed NSCN-IM and an allied faction for the shooting; Naga residents said they had been fired on while working in their fields and that a village guard had returned fire.

The three wounded men became the center of a standoff after they were taken first to a military hospital and then to the Regional Institute of Medical Sciences in Imphal.

Crowds, including Meitei and Naga residents, gathered outside the hospital for two nights running, alleging the men were militants and demanding they be handed over. Security forces used tear gas and baton charges after protesters tried to storm the building and threw smoke bombs inside.

The hospital said treating all patients "irrespective of their background or circumstances" was a professional and ethical duty. Early on June 17, the three were quietly moved under heavy security to a hospital in Churachandpur, a Kuki-majority district.

A separate, still-disputed killing has compounded the tension. On June 16, a joint patrol of the Assam Rifles, a federal paramilitary force, and the Indian Army exchanged fire with suspected militants between Molphei and Songkong villages in Henglep, Churachandpur district. Police said one militant was killed and that an assault rifle, ammunition and explosives were recovered from the scene.

The Songkong Village Authority and a local coalition called the Joint Kuki CSOs Henglep disputed that account entirely. They identified the dead man as Lenminsang Haokip, a local resident who they said had stayed home that day due to illness and alleged he was shot after fleeing what they described as a drone and mortar strike on the village.

Both groups, along with Henglep's Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), Letzamang Haokip, alleged that after he was shot, his civilian clothing was removed, his body was dressed in military fatigues, and he was taken away by security forces, raising what MLA Haokip called serious questions about whether the death was staged to resemble an encounter with a militant. He has demanded a judicial inquiry.

Where Things Stand

Thousands gathered in Senapati, a Naga-majority district, on June 16 for a candlelight vigil for the six slain Naga men. Naga People's Organisation president Kuba Peter told the gathering the men "were beheaded, cut into pieces, and left beyond recognition."

Security forces have intensified operations across Manipur this week. Police reported dismantling 61 illegal bunkers and checkpoints across several districts in a 36-hour operation that ended June 18, including a sweep through the villages of Leilon Vaiphei and Konsakhul, and said four people had been detained for questioning.

Three years into Manipur's broader ethnic conflict, which has killed at least 217 people by official count, with broader estimates exceeding 260, and displaced more than 58,800, the killing of church leaders from both communities, men once devoted to reconciling them, has only deepened the wounds they hoped to heal.

Timeline

May 13 — Three Baptist pastors ambushed and killed near Kangpokpi. Retaliatory abductions begin; 48 civilians taken hostage from both communities.

May 15 — 28 hostages released, including 12 women and a child from Konsakhul. Twenty remain captive: six Naga men, 14 Kuki-Zo civilians.

May 18 — A joint Baptist delegation appeals to both sides for release of the remaining hostages.

June 9 — The 14 Kuki-Zo hostages are released after 27 days.

June 10 — Security forces recover the bodies of the six missing Naga men.

June 11 — Two Kuki men killed in Kultuh village, Kamjong district.

June 12 — UNC submits a charter of demands, naming KNF-P and Deputy CM Kipgen.

June 14 — Deputy CM Losii Dikho publicly blames an SoO-affiliated Kuki group.

June 15 — Gunfire near Leilon Vaiphei wounds three Kuki-Zo men; they are admitted to RIMS, sparking protests.

June 16 — Thousands gather in Senapati for a candlelight vigil for the six slain Naga men. Separately, Lenminsang Haokip is killed in Henglep in a disputed security operation.

June 17 — The three wounded men are moved to Churachandpur amid hospital unrest.

June 18 — Security forces report dismantling 61 bunkers across multiple districts.

SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR DOSSIER

Historical and Contemporary Violence, Indigenous Territorial Destabilization, Hostage Killings, and Human Rights Concerns Affecting the Naga People

Submitted to:

- United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
- United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions
- United Nations Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues
- United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women and Girls
- United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
- United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII)
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
- United States Department of Justice (FARA Unit)
- Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Preliminary Communication)
- United Nations Human Rights Council
- Amnesty International
- Human Rights Watch
- Genocide Watch

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This dossier presents a consolidated historical, administrative, legal, and contemporary evidentiary record concerning the long-standing insecurity, territorial destabilization, demographic alteration, and targeted violence affecting the Naga people across their ancestral homelands in Northeast India and adjoining trans-border regions.

The submission documents a historical continuum of violent incursions, forced displacement, village destruction, hostage-taking, and killings involving Kuki raiding groups and later organized armed formations, extending from the nineteenth century into the present period.

Archival records examined in this report establish repeated attacks beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, including documented raids on Nagas-Tangkhul, Kabui, Anal, Chiru, and other indigenous villages. These records reflect a recurring pattern of mass killings, abductions, enslavement, decapitation, destruction of settlements, and forced extraction of tribute. Historical administrative sources further indicate that such raids were serious enough to trigger punitive expeditions by the British colonial administration, thereby establishing their scale and regularity.

The report further examines official Manipur State Darbar standing orders of 1931, 1933, and 1941, which demonstrate that Kuki settlements within Naga-inhabited territories were administratively regulated under Naga customary authority. These records indicate that settlement required prior permission from Naga village chiefs and recognition under territorial customary systems, thereby forming an important documentary basis in understanding the territorial relationship between indigenous Naga communities and later Kuki settlements.

Subsequent post-independence records from 1967 to 1973 reveal the formal rehabilitation and settlement of Kuki refugee populations repatriated from Burma (Myanmar) into Manipur under government relief mechanisms. Official correspondence, relief memoranda, and refugee association petitions establish that approximately 1,500 Kuki refugee families were settled and financially assisted under specific rehabilitation frameworks. The report argues that this state-supported rehabilitation significantly altered local demographic realities and gradually contributed to new territorial claims and political restructuring.

Over time, these demographic shifts coincided with the emergence and consolidation of multiple armed Kuki political organizations. This transformation from refugee rehabilitation to organized armed political structures constitutes a central concern of this report. The submission highlights that several such organizations now operate under formal Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements with the Government of India and the Government of Manipur, while continuing to maintain political and territorial demands within Naga ancestral areas.

This creates a major legal and political contradiction.

While Naga political rights and territorial issues remain unresolved despite decades of formal negotiations under the Framework Agreement and armed Kuki organizations continue to enjoy structured ceasefire protections, territorial accommodation, and political legitimacy under SoO frameworks. This asymmetry raises serious concerns regarding selective state accommodation, uneven security policy, and structural instability.

The report identifies the abduction and killing of six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei in May 2026 as the most critical contemporary escalation. According to the evidence compiled, the six individuals were abducted under violent circumstances, remained missing for weeks, and were later confirmed dead through forensic and DNA processes. This incident has become emblematic of the wider crisis and is treated in this dossier as a major trigger point for renewed inter-community insecurity.

The report further documents additional contemporary incidents linked to the same deteriorating security environment, including:

- armed escalations in the Litan areas;
- village attacks in Kamjong and adjoining areas;
- organized armed activity in Longmai sectors;
- alleged attacks and intimidation against civilians;
- and severe public unrest following the hostage killings.

Particular attention is given to the Shokvao/New Heaven incident, where women-led protests against security deployment reportedly resulted in forceful suppression, injuries, and allegations of excessive use of force. This raises serious concerns under international protections relating to women human rights defenders, indigenous protest rights, and excessive use of force.

The report also highlights a broader structural dimension: despite being resource-rich, many Naga-inhabited regions remain severely underdeveloped. Basic infrastructure, healthcare systems, educational access, electricity, and economic opportunities remain critically deficient. This underdevelopment is examined not merely as an economic issue but as a structural vulnerability that intensifies conflict exposure, weakens civilian resilience, and reinforces dependency under militarized conditions.

The cumulative evidence presented in this dossier raises credible concerns under international law relating to:

- indigenous territorial rights;
- hostage-taking;
- extrajudicial and arbitrary killings;
- forced displacement;
- demographic engineering and alteration;
- militarized political accommodation;
- suppression of indigenous civil protest;
- violence against women;
- and early warning indicators associated with ethnic cleansing.

This report does not seek to generalize against any ethnic community as a whole. Its focus is confined to documented historical actors, armed structures, political arrangements, and specific incidents supported by archival records, administrative documents, witness accounts, and community statements.

The purpose of this submission is preventive, protective, and investigatory.

It seeks urgent international attention, independent fact-finding, legal scrutiny, and preventive intervention to avert further escalation, protect indigenous civilian populations, and ensure accountability under applicable human rights and indigenous rights frameworks.

The evidence compiled herein suggests that the present crisis is not an isolated conflict event but part of a larger historical and structural continuum that requires immediate and serious international review.

URGENT INTERVENTION NOTICE

This submission is made under urgent and exceptional circumstances following the escalating cycle of violence affecting Naga ancestral territories beginning in February 2026 and continuing through June 2026.

The present cycle of instability began with the Litan incident on 7 February 2026, where ethnic tensions sharply escalated and triggered a broader pattern of insecurity, confrontation, and territorial anxiety across multiple Naga-inhabited regions.

Subsequent incidents—including the Sinakeithei attacks, the TM Kasom killings, the Horei Hill armed confrontations, and reports of cross-border militant movement from Myanmar—demonstrate that the conflict followed a progressive and organized escalation pattern rather than an isolated outbreak.

The most serious turning point occurred on 13 May 2026, when six Naga civilians were abducted from Leilon Vaiphei under violent circumstances.

The victims remained missing for weeks before their deaths were confirmed through body recovery, postmortem examination, and DNA identification processes.

This incident has become the central humanitarian and legal crisis of the present conflict.

The hostage killings represent not merely an isolated criminal act, but a grave escalation within a wider historical and structural pattern of:

- territorial contestation;
- armed intimidation;
- hostage-taking;
- village destabilization;
- and unresolved ethnic insecurity.

Further incidents documented in this dossier—including heavy armed escalations in Litan and Laho sectors, attacks in Kamjong and Kultuh areas, increasing insecurity in Longmai regions, and the forceful suppression of women-led protests at Shokvao/New Heaven—collectively indicate a deteriorating security environment.

Of particular concern is the growing vulnerability of:

- indigenous Naga civilians;
- women human rights defenders;
- village populations located in contested territories;

- and unarmed protestors resisting militarization and territorial encroachment.

The cumulative pattern of:

- hostage-taking;
- targeted killings;
- enforced disappearances;
- territorial intimidation;
- demographic consolidation;
- armed political accommodation;
- and suppression of indigenous protest

raises credible early warning indicators of wider ethnic destabilization and possible atrocity risks if left unaddressed.

The submitting parties believe there exists a real and imminent risk of:

- retaliatory violence;
- expansion of armed confrontations;
- further civilian casualties;
- inter-community breakdown;
- mass displacement;
- and irreversible damage to indigenous territorial security.

Given both the historical continuity documented in this dossier and the immediate severity of the present crisis, the matter requires urgent preventive review under applicable international human rights and indigenous protection frameworks.

Accordingly, this dossier respectfully requests:

1. Urgent acknowledgment and registration of this submission.
2. Independent international fact-finding into the Leilon Vaiphei hostage killings.
3. Preventive monitoring of conflict-affected Naga areas.
4. Protection of vulnerable indigenous civilian populations.
5. Review of the legal and political implications of ongoing armed accommodation frameworks.
6. Accountability for hostage-taking, killings, and excessive use of force.
7. Early preventive intervention to stop further escalation.

This submission is made in the interest of justice, civilian protection, indigenous rights preservation, and the prevention of further bloodshed.

DEFINITIONS

For the purpose of this dossier, the following terms shall carry the meanings assigned below.

1. Naga Ancestral Territories

“Naga ancestral territories” refer to the historically inhabited, traditionally governed, and culturally inherited lands of the Naga people across present-day Northeast India and adjoining trans-border regions, including areas of Manipur, Nagaland, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and western Myanmar.

These territories are recognized through:

- customary village governance;
- oral historical traditions;
- inherited land systems;
- indigenous political institutions;
- and historical administrative records.

Within this dossier, the term refers specifically to those territories historically occupied and governed by Naga communities affected by the incidents documented herein.

2. Kuki Armed Groups

“Kuki armed groups” refer to organized militant, insurgent, or armed political formations operating under or associated with umbrella organizations such as:

- Kuki National Organisation (KNO);
- United People’s Front (UPF);
- Kuki National Army (KNA);
- Kuki National Front (KNF);
- Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA);
- and affiliated armed entities.

This term does not refer to the Kuki civilian population as a whole.

Its use in this report is strictly limited to documented armed and political organizations.

3. Suspension of Operations (SoO)

“Suspension of Operations” (SoO) refers to the tripartite ceasefire arrangements between:

- the Government of India;
- the Government of Manipur;
- and designated Kuki armed groups.

The SoO framework regulates:

- movement of armed cadres;
- weapons control;

- designated camps;
- and peace negotiations.

Within this report, SoO is examined in relation to accountability, armed activity, and structural contradictions.

4. Hostage-Taking

“Hostage-taking” refers to the unlawful seizure, detention, or holding of individuals under coercive control for political, strategic, retaliatory, or military purposes.

Under international law, hostage-taking is prohibited under:

- Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions;
- the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);
- and customary international humanitarian law.

Within this dossier, the Leilon Vaiphei abduction falls under this category for examination.

5. Extrajudicial Killing

“Extrajudicial killing” refers to the unlawful and deliberate killing of persons without judicial process, lawful trial, or legal execution.

This includes:

- custodial killings;
- enforced disappearance followed by death;
- summary executions;
- and unlawful targeted killings.

This term is used in relation to the six abducted Naga civilians whose deaths form the central factual core of this submission.

6. Enforced Disappearance

“Enforced disappearance” refers to the arrest, detention, abduction, or deprivation of liberty of persons followed by refusal to acknowledge their fate or whereabouts.

This creates a period of legal disappearance.

The prolonged untraceability of abducted persons in this dossier engages this concept for legal review.

7. Demographic Alteration

“Demographic alteration” refers to substantial changes in population composition within indigenous territories resulting from:

- migration;

- rehabilitation;
- settlement expansion;
- armed consolidation;
- or political restructuring.

In this dossier, the term is used in relation to post-independence Kuki refugee rehabilitation and its long-term territorial implications.

8. Indigenous Territorial Rights

“Indigenous territorial rights” refer to the collective rights of indigenous peoples over their traditional lands, territories, and resources under customary law and international legal frameworks, including:

- UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP);
- customary ownership systems;
- and ancestral governance traditions.

This dossier relies heavily on this concept.

9. Ethnic Cleansing Indicators

“Ethnic cleansing indicators” refer to recurring patterns that may suggest the deliberate removal, intimidation, or weakening of an ethnic population through:

- targeted killings;
- forced displacement;
- destruction of settlements;
- hostage-taking;
- demographic engineering;
- and territorial intimidation.

This term is used cautiously and analytically.

It does not constitute a final legal determination.

10. Civilian Protection Failure

“Civilian protection failure” refers to the inability or omission of state authorities to take reasonable and timely measures to prevent foreseeable harm to civilian populations.

This includes failures relating to:

- rescue operations;
- conflict prevention;
- intelligence response;
- and protection of vulnerable communities.

This concept is central to the State accountability concerns raised in this dossier.

11. Indigenous Women Human Rights Defenders

This term refers to indigenous women who organize, protest, document, or resist violence, militarization, or territorial encroachment within their communities.

This definition is relevant to the Shokvao/New Heaven women-led protest incidents documented herein.

12. Structural Underdevelopment

“Structural underdevelopment” refers to the long-term denial or absence of basic socio-economic development in conflict-affected indigenous regions, including:

- healthcare;
- education;
- infrastructure;
- electricity;
- roads;
- and economic opportunity.

Within this report, underdevelopment is examined as both a humanitarian issue and a conflict multiplier.

13. Transnational Advocacy Networks

“Transnational advocacy networks” refer to organized diaspora, civil, political, or lobbying structures operating internationally to influence public policy, public opinion, or political decisions relating to conflict areas.

This definition is relevant to the FARA-related concerns examined in this dossier.

14. Territorial Destabilization

“Territorial destabilization” refers to the weakening of indigenous land security through:

- armed incursions;
- settlement pressure;
- competing territorial claims;
- and militarized political restructuring.

This concept is central to the overall analysis of this report.

I. METHODOLOGY

This dossier has been prepared through a multi-layered documentary, archival, testimonial, and analytical methodology designed to establish historical continuity, legal context, and contemporary factual patterns concerning violence, territorial destabilization, demographic alteration, and indigenous insecurity affecting the Naga people.

The methodology follows an evidentiary framework combining historical records, administrative documents, field reports, and contemporary incident materials.

The objective is to construct a coherent chronological and structural record for international review.

1. Historical Archival Research

The historical sections of this report rely on archival and documentary sources covering the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

These include:

- British colonial administrative reports;
- Assam Administrative Reports;
- Foreign Department Proceedings;
- Political Agency records;
- frontier military dispatches;
- colonial intelligence memoranda;
- district gazetteers;
- and historical ethnographic references.

These records were used to identify:

- recurring armed incursions;
- patterns of abduction;
- village destruction;
- punitive military expeditions;
- and historical territorial movements.

The purpose of this historical methodology is to establish continuity of patterns rather than isolated historical episodes.

2. Administrative and Government Documentary Review

A second major methodological pillar involves official administrative records and government correspondence.

These include:

- Manipur State Darbar Standing Orders (1931, 1933, 1941);
- refugee settlement files;
- rehabilitation memoranda;

- relief applications;
- taxation orders;
- settlement permissions;
- and official state correspondence concerning Burma-origin refugee resettlement.

These documents were examined to establish:

- settlement legality;
- indigenous territorial authority;
- demographic transformation;
- and state-recognized migration history.

This forms the legal-administrative backbone of the report.

3. Conflict Chronology Reconstruction

The contemporary section of this report uses chronological reconstruction.

Events were mapped in sequence from:

- Litan (February 2026);
- Sinakeithei;
- TM Kasom;
- Horei Hill;
- cross-border militant movement;
- Leilon Vaiphei hostage abduction;
- body recovery;
- Laho-Litan escalation;
- Kamjong incidents;
- and subsequent protest developments.

This method allows:

- identification of escalation patterns;
- operational progression;
- and trigger-event analysis.

Chronology is central to determining structural intent and escalation.

4. Community Testimonies and Civil Society Submissions

The report incorporates materials and statements from:

- village authorities;
- Naga civil society organizations;
- women's bodies;
- student organizations;
- youth organizations;
- and community representatives.

These were used to document:

- localized impacts;
- eyewitness perspectives;
- community perceptions;
- humanitarian consequences;
- and demands for justice.

These submissions were treated as testimonial evidence and assessed within broader documentary context.

5. Church and Religious Documentation

Given the central role of the Church in Naga society, the report includes:

- church statements;
- prayer declarations;
- pastoral appeals;
- clergy interventions;
- and religious humanitarian responses.

This methodology helps establish:

- moral injury;
- social trauma;
- and humanitarian mobilization.

It also reflects the role of religious institutions in peace mediation and public accountability.

6. Medical and Forensic Documentation

Where available, this report relies on:

- postmortem reports;
- hospital documentation;
- injury reports;
- DNA identification records;
- and forensic observations.

These are critical for:

- confirming deaths;
- identifying victims;
- preserving evidentiary integrity;
- and establishing physical consequences of violence.

These materials form the strongest factual evidence for contemporary incidents.

7. Security and Political Agreement Review

This report examines official and semi-official political-security arrangements, including:

- Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreements;
- ceasefire frameworks;
- operational ground rules;
- and political negotiation documents.

These were reviewed to identify:

- legal contradictions;
- accountability gaps;
- operational obligations;
- and structural asymmetries between armed actors and indigenous civilian populations.

8. Comparative Legal Analysis

A legal review was conducted against applicable international standards, including:

- UNDRIP;
- ICCPR;
- ICESCR;
- CEDAW;
- CAT;
- the Genocide Convention;
- the International Convention Against Hostage Taking;
- and international norms relating to extrajudicial killings.

This method allows the report to classify incidents within internationally recognized legal categories.

9. Pattern Analysis Framework

Rather than assessing each event in isolation, this dossier uses cumulative pattern analysis.

This means:

incidents are examined collectively to identify recurring structural features such as:

- hostage-taking;
- village targeting;
- demographic shifts;
- political accommodation;
- protest suppression;
- and territorial intimidation.

This method is essential for identifying atrocity risk indicators.

10. Limitations

This report acknowledges the following limitations:

- certain contemporary allegations remain subject to independent verification;
- access to some official records remains restricted;
- some conflict zones remain inaccessible;
- some witness accounts are affected by trauma or incomplete documentation.

Where full independent verification was unavailable, materials were treated cautiously and clearly identified as allegations or community submissions.

11. Standard of Presentation

This report applies a documentary-probative standard, not a criminal burden of proof.

Its purpose is:

- to establish credible grounds for international review;
- to identify patterns requiring investigation;
- and to support preventive intervention where necessary.

It is therefore a protective and investigatory submission, not a judicial verdict.

II. KEY FINDINGS

Based on the historical archives, administrative records, documentary evidence, witness accounts, and contemporary incident materials examined in this dossier, the following key findings emerge:

1. Historical continuity of violent incursions into Naga territories is firmly established.

Archival records from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries document repeated armed Kuki raids across Naga-inhabited regions involving:

- killings;
- mass abductions;
- beheadings;
- village burnings;
- enslavement;
- and territorial destabilization.

These incidents were sufficiently severe to trigger multiple punitive expeditions by the British colonial administration, confirming both scale and persistence.

This establishes a historical pattern of recurring territorial insecurity.

2. Administrative records confirm that Kuki settlement in Naga areas was historically regulated under Naga customary authority.

Manipur State Darbar Standing Orders from 1931, 1933, and 1941 establish that:

- Kuki settlements were separately classified;
- taxed as distinct village units;
- and in certain cases required prior permission from Naga village chiefs for settlement.

These records are significant because they demonstrate formal recognition of indigenous Naga territorial authority.

3. Official records confirm the post-independence rehabilitation of Burma-origin Kuki refugee populations in Manipur.

Government documents from 1967–1973 establish that:

- approximately 1,500 Kuki refugee families repatriated from Burma (Myanmar) were settled and rehabilitated under state-supported mechanisms;
- relief grants, land support, and economic assistance were formally provided.

This represents a major documented demographic shift.

4. Refugee rehabilitation materially altered local demographic and territorial realities over time.

The report finds that state-supported refugee settlement contributed to long-term population transformation in several Naga-inhabited regions.

While refugee rehabilitation in itself is not unlawful, its long-term territorial implications became politically significant where:

- settlement expanded;
- armed structures emerged;
- and competing homeland claims developed.

This is a major structural finding.

5. Settlement expansion progressively transformed into organized armed political consolidation.

Over time, multiple Kuki armed and political organizations emerged and institutionalized under umbrella structures such as:

- KNO;
- UPF;
- KNA;
- KNF;
- and related formations.

This transformation from settlement-based communities into organized armed-political actors significantly altered regional security dynamics.

6. The 1990s Naga-Kuki conflict created lasting territorial and demographic restructuring.

The 1992–1998 conflict resulted in:

- large-scale killings;
- village destruction;
- mass displacement;
- ethnic segregation;
- and hardened territorial boundaries.

The report finds that the unresolved consequences of this conflict continue to shape present-day insecurity and mistrust.

7. The 2026 conflict cycle followed a clear and escalating chronology beginning from February 2026.

The report finds a continuous escalation pattern beginning with:

- Litan (7 February 2026);
- Sinakeithei attacks;
- TM Kasom killings;
- Horei Hill incidents;
- cross-border militant movement;
- and culminating in the Leilon Vaiphei abductions.

This chronology indicates structural escalation rather than isolated incidents.

8. The Leilon Vaiphei abduction and killing of six Naga civilians represents the gravest contemporary escalation.

The abduction, prolonged disappearance, and later confirmed deaths of six Naga civilians constitute the strongest factual and legal basis of this submission.

The incident raises serious concerns relating to:

- hostage-taking;
- enforced disappearance;
- unlawful detention;
- and extrajudicial killing.

This is the central contemporary finding.

9. Women have emerged as frontline defenders and have faced disproportionate force during protest mobilization.

The Shokvao/New Heaven incidents demonstrate that women-led indigenous protest movements became central to civilian resistance against militarization and insecurity.

Reports of:

- injuries;
- forceful dispersal;

- tear gas deployment;
- and physical assault

raise serious concerns under CEDAW and indigenous protest protections.

10. State security responses reveal serious accountability gaps and operational contradictions.

The report identifies major institutional concerns regarding:

- failure to prevent the Leilon Vaiphei abductions;
- failure to rescue the hostages in time;
- delayed recovery;
- and forceful response against civilian protestors.

This creates a strong perception of uneven state intervention.

11. Suspension of Operations (SoO) frameworks create structural accountability contradictions.

The continued political and security accommodation of armed Kuki organizations under SoO arrangements, despite recurring armed violence and territorial tensions, creates serious accountability concerns.

This asymmetry is one of the strongest structural contradictions identified in the report.

12. Naga civil society, church institutions, and women's groups have become major humanitarian and moral responders to the crisis.

The report finds that:

- churches;
- youth bodies;
- women's organizations;
- and village authorities

played central roles in:

- public mourning;
- humanitarian response;
- peace appeals;
- and justice mobilization.

This reflects the scale of community trauma.

13. Structural underdevelopment remains a major vulnerability factor in Naga regions despite resource wealth.

The report finds that prolonged instability, political uncertainty, and militarization have contributed to:

- poor healthcare systems;
- weak educational access;
- poor infrastructure;
- economic stagnation;
- and development inequality.

This deepens conflict vulnerability.

14. The cumulative pattern raises credible early warning indicators of ethnic destabilization and atrocity risk.

Taken together, the documented pattern of:

- killings;
- hostage-taking;
- forced fear;
- village insecurity;
- demographic alteration;
- and armed political accommodation

creates serious warning signs of broader ethnic destabilization if preventive intervention is not undertaken.

This does not constitute a final legal determination of ethnic cleansing.

However, it establishes sufficient grounds for urgent preventive scrutiny.

Editorial Recommendation

Having reviewed the overall draft, I recommend a small structural refinement before proceeding to the historical chapters.

Instead of moving directly from **Key Findings** into **Annexure A**, convert the annexures into the **main body** of the dossier and keep supporting documents as annexures. The flow would be:

- **III. Historical Background (1844–1919)** (*using the content from Annexure A*)
- **IV. Administrative Regulation, Settlement Status, Refugee Rehabilitation, and Territorial Legality (1931–1973)** (*Annexure B*)
- **V. Post-Independence Continuity: The Naga–Kuki Conflict (1992–1998)** (*Annexure C*)
- **VI. Contemporary Escalation (February–June 2026)** (*Annexure D*)
- **VII. Public Mobilization and Civil Society Response** (*Annexure E*)
- **VIII. Security Force Conduct and Accountability** (*Annexure F*)
- **IX. Foreign Influence Operations / FARA Concerns** (*Annexure G*)

Then, at the end of the dossier, you can include the original evidence (government orders, maps, photographs, letters, postmortem records, media reports, etc.) as the actual annexures.

This is how UN Special Rapporteur submissions, ICC Article 15 communications, and international human rights dossiers are typically organized, and it will make your document considerably stronger without changing a single word of your content.

III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (1844–1919)

Historical Record of Armed Kuki Raids, Violent Expansion, and Territorial Destabilization in Naga Areas (1844–1919)

3.1 Introduction

This annex provides the historical foundation for understanding contemporary Naga-Kuki tensions.

The purpose of this annex is not to reopen historical grievances for their own sake, but to establish whether present-day violence reflects a longer pattern of militarized expansion, hostage-taking, village destruction, and territorial coercion.

Historical records from British administrative reports, military records, political correspondence, and local chronicles indicate that Kuki armed incursions into Naga and adjoining territories were not isolated events.

They formed a repeated and structured pattern over decades.

The importance of this annex lies in five areas:

a. Establishing continuity

The present conflict is often portrayed as sudden.

The historical record shows otherwise.

b. Understanding territorial memory

For indigenous communities, memory of massacres, displacement, and coercive settlement survives across generations.

These memories continue to shape territorial consciousness.

c. Explaining mistrust

Present-day mistrust between Naga and Kuki communities cannot be separated from repeated historical violence.

d. Understanding demographic transformation

Repeated raids were often followed by territorial settlement and expansion.

e. Establishing legal-historical relevance

Where present territorial claims overlap with regions historically entered through violent expansion, the historical record becomes directly relevant.

3.2 Historical Origins of Kuki Movement into Naga Areas

Historical accounts indicate that large-scale Kuki migration into Naga territories intensified during the 1830s and 1840s.

Records suggest that British frontier administrators encouraged certain Kuki settlements as buffer communities.

One of the most significant references indicates:

In 1840, British Political Agent McCulloch reportedly introduced Kuki groups into hill areas and armed them for frontier control.

This is important.

It establishes:

- organized migration;
- colonial militarization;
- strategic settlement.

This laid the foundation for later territorial expansion.

3.3 Phase I: Early Violent Expansion (1844–1865)

This phase marks the beginning of large organized raids.

1844 – Kachubari Massacre

One of the earliest major recorded attacks.

Approximately 200 armed Kukis attacked Kachubari in Sylhet.

Documented outcomes:

- multiple civilians killed;
- 20 heads taken;
- women and children abducted.

This establishes early patterns of:

- decapitation,
- hostage-taking,
- terror violence.

1857 – Chasad Raid

This raid targeted both civilians and elite family structures.

Recorded:

- eight killed;
- Raja's wife abducted;
- children abducted.

This shows political and family-level targeting.

1860 – River Fenny Raids

One of the most destructive early raids.

Led by Rutton Poes.

Scale:

- 400–500 armed raiders;
- 15 villages burned;
- 185 civilians killed;
- approximately 100 abducted.

This marks transition from village raid to mass territorial assault.

1862 – Adumpore

Three villages burned.

Civilians massacred.

Captives taken.

This shows pattern repetition.

1865 – Chengbolekhoh

29 civilians killed.

The importance lies in frequency.

The violence was recurring.

3.4 Pattern Analysis of Phase I

By 1865, several consistent patterns had emerged:

a. Night raids

Designed to maximize fear.

b. Women and child captives

Used for slavery, forced assimilation, or leverage.

c. Beheading

Used as symbolic terror.

d. Village burning

Designed to permanently displace populations.

e. Expansion after violence

Violence often preceded territorial occupation.

3.5 Phase II: Expansion and Consolidation (1869–1879)

This period saw increasing geographical spread.

1869 – Bombdang

Eleven killed.

Eleven abducted.

This shows parity between killing and captivity.

1871 – Multi-front coordinated raids

This year is significant.

Kuki-Lushai groups carried out simultaneous raids across:

- Cachar
- Sylhet
- Tipperah

Documented:

- 25 killed at Ainerkhal;
- over 20 killed at Cacharipara;
- 85 killed in Tipperah.

This demonstrates organized multi-regional capacity.

1873 – Chantheng

12 killed.

56 abducted.

This shows expansion of captive-taking.

3.6 British Response to Escalation

By the 1870s, the British recognized these raids as major frontier security threats.

This led to:

Lushai Expedition (1871–72)

Major punitive campaign.

Its purpose:

- suppress raids;
- recover captives;
- break armed structures.

This is important because it shows the colonial state itself recognized the scale of violence.

3.7 Phase III: Peak Mass Violence (1880–1894)

This is the most intense phase.

1880 – Chingsao Massacre

Chasad Kukis attacked Chingsao.

45 civilians killed.

Reports mention:

- mutilation;
- beheading;
- women killed.

This is among the clearest examples of terror violence.

1891 – Atteng Massacre

A highly important incident.

Kabui Naga emissaries were killed.

Subsequently:

52 villagers were killed in retaliatory raids.

This is important because it involved:

- diplomatic betrayal;
- civilian extermination.

1891 – Makui Killings

17 Nagas killed after attending what was represented as a peace gathering.

This is another example of betrayal-based violence.

1893 – Swemi Massacre

One of the largest recorded massacres.

Casualties:

- 286 killed;
- 187 women and children.

This represents mass civilian extermination.

This remains one of the strongest historical precedents.

3.8 Pattern Analysis of Peak Violence

By this phase, the pattern had intensified:

- a. Larger civilian casualty rates**
- b. Women and children increasingly targeted**
- c. Peace gatherings weaponized**

Trust mechanisms collapsed.

4. Full village extermination

Not isolated killings.

Whole communities destroyed.

3.9 Phase IV: Late Violent Consolidation (1909–1919)

This phase marks transition into organized insurgent structures.

1909–1914

Multiple headhunting raids continued across:

- Tangkhul areas;
- Kabui regions;
- eastern hill sectors.

This indicates violence remained active.

1914 – Tangkhul Raids

Several Tangkhul villages attacked.

These raids expanded the geography further east.

1917–1919 – Kuki Rebellion

This is often framed as anti-colonial.

However, records also indicate:

- attacks on Naga villages;
- killings of civilians;
- coercive punishment;
- destruction of villages.

Your records indicate:

- about 1,000 persons killed (mostly Nagas);
- many missing;
- numerous villages burned.

This is one of the strongest continuity points.

3.10 British Military Suppression

The British responded with major campaigns.

These included:

- punitive expeditions;
- confiscation of arms;
- destruction of militant villages.

This confirms the violence was recognized as organized.

3.11 Historical Pattern Synthesis

Across 1844–1919, the recurring patterns include:

Hostage-taking

Repeated.

Mass abduction of women and children

Repeated.

Decapitation

Repeated.

Village burning

Repeated.

Territorial expansion following violence

Repeated.

Political destabilization

Repeated.

3.12 Relevance to Present-Day Inquiry

This annex matters because present violence—including:

- Leilon Vaiphei hostage killings,
- Litan armed escalation,
- Shokvao tensions,
- Longmai insecurity—

reflects methods historically recorded:

- hostage-taking,
- village intimidation,
- territorial coercion.

This does not mean history determines present guilt.

But it establishes:

that the methods are not new.

They are historically patterned.

That makes the present crisis part of a longer structural continuum.

3.13 Conclusion

The historical evidence demonstrates that the present Naga-Kuki conflict cannot be understood in isolation.

It is rooted in:

- long historical violence,
- repeated territorial destabilization,
- unresolved demographic transformations,
- and inherited political mistrust.

This historical foundation is essential for understanding the urgency of the present case.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION, SETTLEMENT STATUS, REFUGEE REHABILITATION, AND TERRITORIAL LEGALITY (1931–1973)

4.1 Introduction

This annex examines the formal administrative and governmental records relating to Kuki settlement, regulation, and refugee rehabilitation in Manipur between 1931 and 1973.

Unlike Annexure A, which established patterns of historical violence, this annex establishes the legal-administrative framework that governed Kuki's presence in Naga areas.

This distinction is critical.

Because in contemporary territorial disputes, the question is not only:

who was present,

but also:

under what legal, customary, and political conditions were they present?

The documents examined here show:

1. Kuki settlements were administratively regulated.
2. Settlement in Naga areas required permission.
3. Kuki villages were separately taxed.
4. Kukis were treated as a distinct and later refugee category.
5. Post-Burma migration was formally rehabilitated by the state.

These facts are directly relevant to present-day territorial claims.

4.2 The 1931 Standing Order: Firearms Regulation and Administrative Classification

One of the earliest important administrative documents is the Standing Order No. 11 dated 18 August 1931, issued under the Manipur State Darbar.

The document states:

“The Kukis shall not be issued firearms because of their savage nature...”

However, it also allowed:

firearms on loan for protection against wild animals.

This document is significant for several reasons.

A. Security Classification

This shows that the colonial-era administration treated Kuki populations under a special security framework.

They were not treated identically to settled indigenous village structures.

B. Controlled Access to Arms

This indicates the state viewed armed capacity among Kukis as a matter requiring regulation.

This becomes historically relevant when later examining armed organizational evolution.

C. Distinct Administrative Identity

The order identifies Kukis as a separate category requiring separate rules.

This matters.

Because separate classification implies separate settlement status.

4.3 The 1933 Standing Order: Taxation and Administrative Separation

The Standing Order No. 9 dated 9 September 1933 states:

“A Kuki village having 20 houses shall pay a House Tax of Rs. 6 per annum.”

This may seem minor.

It is not.

It is legally significant.

A. Formal Village Recognition

Taxation means the state recognized Kuki settlements as administratively countable units.

B. Administrative Distinction

The order specifically addresses Kuki villages separately.

This reinforces that Kukis were treated under a distinct regulatory structure.

C. Settlement Formalization

Taxation indicates formalization of settlement rather than automatic territorial inheritance.

This is important for contemporary land arguments.

4.4 The 1941 Standing Order: Prior Permission from Naga Chiefs

This is the most important document in this annex.

The Standing Order No. 2 dated 23 July 1941, issued under T.A. Sharp, records:

“The Kukis shall obtain prior permission from the Chief of Naga village for settlement and pay House Tax to the Naga Chief.”

This is one of the strongest evidentiary documents in the entire dossier.

4.5 Legal Significance of the 1941 Order

This order establishes five major legal points.

1. Recognition of Naga Territorial Ownership

The state formally recognized that Naga village chiefs exercised territorial authority.

This is direct evidence of indigenous land control.

2. Settlement Was Conditional

The Kuki settlement was not automatic.

It required permission.

This means settlement was derivative, not original.

3. Customary Governance Was Recognized by the State

Naga authority was institutionally acknowledged.

This strengthens indigenous rights claims.

4. Taxation Flowed Through Naga Authority

Payment to Naga chiefs indicates:

- administrative recognition;
- territorial subordination of incoming settlements.

5. Modern Territorial Claims Must Be Viewed Against This History

This is critical.

Where later political claims seek exclusive homeland over these areas, the historical administrative record becomes directly relevant.

4.6 Burma-Origin Kuki Refugee Rehabilitation (1967–1968)

The post-independence documentary chain becomes highly significant.

The Deputy Commissioner's letter dated 6 June 1968 explicitly refers to:

Settlement of Kuki refugees from Burma

This is one of the strongest documentary pillars.

Because it formally establishes:

- cross-border migration;
- refugee classification;
- state recognition.

This is not oral history.

It is government documentation.

4.7 The 1973 Relief and Rehabilitation Memorandum

The memorandum dated 15 February 1973, submitted to the Government of India, records: approximately 1,500 Kuki families were repatriated from Burma in 1967.

The document states these families sought:

- land;
- rehabilitation;
- financial support;
- agricultural grants;
- business assistance.

The signatory body identifies itself as:

Burma Kuki Refugees' Association, Manipur

This is highly significant.

4.8 Legal Importance of Refugee Classification

This establishes:

A. Self-Identification as Refugees

This removes ambiguity.

The community identified itself formally as refugee/repatriate.

B. State Recognition of Refugee Status

The Government entertained the request.

This shows institutional recognition.

C. Organized Rehabilitation

The state actively facilitated settlement.

This affects later demographic and territorial realities.

4.9 Demographic Transformation and Territorial Implications

This is one of the most sensitive but important points.

The issue is not refugee rehabilitation itself.

Refugees deserve humanitarian protection.

The issue arises when:

rehabilitated populations later evolve into:

- armed territorial actors;
- exclusive homeland claimants;
- militarized political formations.

This changes the legal and political implications.

4.10 Transition into Modern Armed Political Structures

By the late twentieth century and into the 2000s, Kuki political and armed organizations became formalized under:

- KNO

- UPF
- KNA
- KNF
- KRA
- allied structures

This culminated in the Suspension of Operations framework.

This is important.

Because it shows the transformation from regulated settlement → refugee rehabilitation → armed political institutionalization.

4.11 Administrative Continuity Chain

The documentary sequence is clear:

1931

Special administrative classification.

1933

Separate taxation.

1941

Settlement under Naga permission.

1968

Refugee settlement.

1973

Relief and rehabilitation.

2008–2025

Armed ceasefire institutionalization.

This chain is one of the strongest structural arguments in the dossier.

4.12 Relevance to Present-Day Conflict

This annex is directly relevant because:

current territorial conflicts are rooted not merely in present violence but in layered historical-administrative processes.

These documents establish:

- how settlement occurred;
- how authority was structured;
- how migration was recognized;
- how rehabilitation altered territorial realities.

This provides essential legal context for:

- Leilon Vaiphei;
- Litan;
- Kamjong;
- Longmai;
- Shokvao;
- and broader Naga territorial insecurity.

4.13 Conclusion

The administrative record demonstrates that Kuki settlement in Naga areas was historically regulated, conditional, and later expanded through refugee rehabilitation.

This does not by itself determine present legal rights.

But it establishes:

that current territorial claims exist within a historically documented framework of:

- regulated entry,
- indigenous authority,
- demographic transformation,
- and political evolution.

This makes the present conflict structurally historical—not merely contemporary.

V. POST-INDEPENDENCE CONTINUITY

The Naga–Kuki Conflict (1992–1998): Ethnic Cleansing, Territorial Reconfiguration, Mass Killings, and Structural Legacy

5.1 Introduction

The Naga–Kuki conflict of the 1990s remains the single most important modern historical event shaping present-day Naga-Kuki relations.

This conflict was not merely an insurgent confrontation.

It is fundamentally altered:

- demography,
- territorial control,
- inter-community trust,
- village geography,
- and political consciousness.

Its effects remain active.

To understand the Leilon Vaiphei killings and the 2026 escalations, this historical phase must be examined carefully.

The 1990s conflict established:

- the normalization of ethnic territorial violence;
- mass displacement as a political instrument;
- village destruction as a method of demographic change.

This annex establishes that legacy.

5.2 Structural Causes of the Conflict

The conflict did not emerge suddenly.

Several overlapping structural causes contributed:

1. Competing Territorial Nationalisms

By the late 1980s and early 1990s:

Naga political organizations were asserting broader territorial integration.

At the same time:

Kuki armed and political groups increasingly articulated claims over areas described under “Zale’n-gam.”

This created direct territorial overlap.

2. Village Expansion and Settlement Pressure

Naga civil society bodies alleged rapid Kuki village expansion into Naga customary lands.

This increased local tensions.

3. Armed Taxation and Road Control

Reports from the period describe:

- taxation on roads;
- armed checkpoints;
- extortion networks.

These deepened militarizations.

4. Weak State Intervention

The state failed to create neutral conflict-prevention mechanisms.

This allowed armed groups to fill governance vacuums.

5.3 Outbreak of Violence (1992–1993)

By 1992, armed confrontations had intensified.

This period saw:

- village raids,
- ambushes,
- retaliatory attacks.

By 1993, the conflict had entered full-scale ethnic war.

Multiple independent studies and conflict archives confirm:

over 1,000 persons were killed across the conflict period, with tens of thousands displaced.

This is the accepted broad conflict scale.

5.4 Patterns of Violence

The violence followed recurring patterns.

These patterns are important.

A. Selective Ethnic Targeting

Victims were often identified by community identity.

This transformed conflict from insurgency into ethnic warfare.

B. Village Encirclement

Entire villages were surrounded before attack.

Escape routes were often blocked.

This increased casualties.

C. Arson and Total Destruction

Villages were burned to prevent return.

This was not incidental.

It was strategic.

D. Forced Displacement

Displacement became a tool of territorial consolidation.

E. Retaliatory Cycles

Both communities suffered casualties.

This report acknowledges that.

However, the territorial logic remained central.

5.5 The Joupi Massacre (13 September 1993)

One of the most significant atrocities of the conflict.

Approximately 115 Kukis were killed in Joupi.

This remains one of the most cited incidents of the conflict.

Its significance:

- marked large-scale civilian massacre;
- intensified ethnic polarization;
- hardened armed mobilization.

This report includes it for balance and completeness.

5.6 Naga Casualties and Village Destruction

Naga records and independent commentaries indicate:

many Naga villages were burned and civilians killed during 1993–1998.

Naga organizations maintain:

the violence disproportionately altered Naga territorial continuity in mixed regions.

This remains central to present insecurity.

5.7 Mass Displacement

Conflict studies estimate:

between 50,000 and 130,000 people were displaced.

This included:

- Naga civilians;
- Kuki civilians;
- mixed village populations.

The displacement permanently altered village maps.

This is one of the strongest long-term consequences.

5.8 Territorial Reconfiguration

This is perhaps the most important structural effect.

After the conflict:

- ethnically mixed villages declined;
- segregation increased;
- abandoned villages changed occupancy patterns;
- security boundaries hardened.

The result:

territorial identity became militarized.

This legacy remains alive today.

5.9 State Failure and Impunity

A critical feature of the 1990s conflict:

there was no comprehensive truth process.

No major reconciliation mechanism.

No structural restitution.

No long-term land settlement.

This created:

- unresolved trauma;
- inherited grievance;
- intergenerational suspicion.

These unresolved failures directly feed present tensions.

5.10 Legacy in the Present Conflict

The 2026 events reflect direct continuities:

1990s	2026
village raids	village raids
hostage-taking	hostage-taking
civilian targeting	civilian targeting
arson	arson
displacement	displacement threats
ethnic fear	ethnic fear

This continuity is striking.

It does not mean the conflicts are identical.

But the structural patterns are clearly similar.

5.11 Conclusion

The Naga-Kuki conflict of the 1990s remains unresolved in its consequences.

It transformed:

- land,
- memory,
- trust,
- security,
- and political imagination.

The present violence—including Leilon Vaiphei—must be understood within this unresolved legacy.

Without addressing the structural outcomes of the 1990s conflict, present-day peace efforts remain fragile.

This annex establishes the modern historical bridge between the nineteenth-century violence documented in Annexure A and the present crisis documented in Annexure D.

VI. CONTEMPORARY ESCALATION, ARMED HOSTILITY, HOSTAGE CRISIS, AND THE KILLING OF SIX NAGA CIVILIANS (FEBRUARY–JUNE 2026)

6.1 Introduction

This annex documents the contemporary escalation of violence between Naga and Kuki communities during 2026, culminating in the abduction and killing of six Naga civilians.

Unlike the historical patterns examined in previous annexures, this section is based on immediate contemporary records, community statements, public reports, and field documentation.

This annex is central because it establishes:

- the trigger sequence,
- operational escalation,
- hostage architecture,
- community response,
- and the resulting humanitarian crisis.

The 2026 violence cannot be understood as an isolated episode.

It follows the structural continuities already established.

6.2 The Litan Trigger Incident (7 February 2026)

The first visible rupture in the 2026 conflict cycle occurred in Litan, Ukhrul District.

Reports indicate a Tangkhul Naga youth was assaulted by Kuki youths.

At first glance, this appeared local.

It was not.

It quickly became a symbolic trigger.

Why?

Because Litan is a sensitive mixed-contact zone where territorial tensions remain historically unresolved.

This incident revived:

- old mistrust,
- territorial insecurity,
- ethnic mobilization.

This became the first identifiable flashpoint.

6.3 Sinakeithei Escalation (23 February–7 April 2026)

The next major phase unfolded in Sinakeithei.

Official village authority documents record:

23 February 2026

Documented allegations:

- deliberate arson,
- armed abduction,
- attempted murder,
- intimidation.

This is significant.

It demonstrates that violence had already become organized.

It was no longer interpersonal.

It had become armed.

6–7 April 2026

Major offensives were reported.

Naga organizations alleged Kuki militants carried out repeated armed attacks.

This forced:

- village defense mobilization,
- civilian evacuations,
- emergency community organization.

Sinakeithei marks the point where the conflict became militarized.

6.4 TM Kasom Ambush (18 April 2026)

Two Tangkhul Naga civilians were killed along NH-202 near TM Kasom.

This incident expanded the conflict from villages into transit routes.

Its importance lies in:

- civilian vulnerability beyond villages;
- broader conflict mobility;
- strategic targeting.

This widened the zone of insecurity.

6.5 Horei Hill Incident (Late April 2026)

Four Naga village guards were wounded.

This incident indicates that community defense positions had become active military targets.

This is important.

It shows:

- conflict frontlines were hardening;
- village defense structures were now central.

This marks escalation.

6.6 Cross-Border Armed Entry (7 May 2026)

Naga organizations reported that over 100 armed cadres linked to Kuki National Army-Burma (KNA-B) crossed from Myanmar into Manipur.

Villages affected:

- Z Choro
- Namlee
- Wanglee

Consequences:

- houses burned,
- displacement,
- increased fear.

This is highly significant.

It internationalizes the conflict.

It demonstrates:

- cross-border militant mobility,
- frontier instability,

- transnational operational corridors.

This becomes critical for later FARA relevance.

6.7 Leilon Vaiphei Hostage Crisis (13 May 2026)

This is the central event.

On 13 May 2026:

18 Naga civilians were abducted.

According to Naga organizations:

the abduction was carried out by Kuki armed elements and local collaborators.

Victims included:

- civilians,
- village residents,
- pastors.

This is critical.

They were not combatants.

This immediately transforms the legal character of the incident.

6.8 The Division of Hostages

Of the 18 abducted:

14 were eventually released.

6 remained missing.

This selective retention is significant.

It suggests:

- deliberate separation;
- intentional detention;
- targeted control.

This creates the hostage architecture.

6.9 Supermeina Humanitarian Contrast

This is one of the most morally important parts.

During the broader crisis:

14 Kuki detainees held by Naga village authorities were released alive through clergy mediation.

This was a humanitarian act.

In contrast:

the six Naga hostages were not returned alive.

This contrast deeply shaped public perception.

It became:

- a moral and political turning point.

6.10 Recovery of Bodies (10 June 2026)

The remains of the six missing Naga civilians were recovered.

Community reports described:

- mutilation,
- dismemberment,
- advanced decomposition.

Postmortem and DNA verification began.

This transformed the incident from disappearance into confirmed killing.

This became the defining humanitarian crisis.

6.11 JNIMS Hospital and Public Mourning

At JNIMS:

families waited for identification.

Witnesses reported:

- mothers breaking down,

- public mourning,
- emotional collapse.

This is important.

Because it documents the human cost.

This is not merely political.

It is familial devastation.

6.12 Laho-Litan Heavy Armed Firing

Following the recovery of bodies:

heavy armed firing was reported around Laho and adjoining Litan sectors.

Local reports alleged:

- elevated firing positions,
- strategic use of light to target.

This indicates organized tactical operations.

This is beyond spontaneous violence.

6.13 Kamjong / Kultuh Incident

Reports indicate:

Kultuh village was burned.

Two deaths reported:

- village Head Deacon
- Youth Club leader

This widened the geography of violence.

It demonstrates spread beyond the original axis.

6.14 Liangmai Symbolic Gunfire

Following confirmation of the killings:

Liangmai Nagas fired symbolic blank rounds at Tamenglong Headquarters.

This was not random violence.

It represented:

- mourning,
- warning,
- collective grief.

This reflects rising mobilization.

6.15 Pattern Analysis

When read together:

Litan → Sinakeithei → TM Kasom → Horei Hill → Cross-border entry → Leilon Vaiphei → Hostage separation → Body recovery → Laho firing → Kamjong expansion

A clear operational pattern emerges.

Pattern 1: Escalation through geographic spread

Conflict widened systematically.

Pattern 2: Civilian centrality

Victims were overwhelmingly civilian.

Pattern 3: Hostage logic

Abduction became a central tactic.

Pattern 4: Community destabilization

Entire villages became insecure.

Pattern 5: Psychological warfare

Fear extended beyond immediate killings.

6.16 Legal Significance

This annex raises serious concerns regarding:

- hostage-taking,
- enforced disappearance,
- extrajudicial killing,
- torture,
- destruction of civilian property.

These are among the strongest legal points in the report.

6.17 Conclusion

The 2026 violence demonstrates that the Naga-Kuki conflict remains structurally unresolved.

The Leilon Vaiphei killings are not isolated.

They are part of a wider chain of escalating violence rooted in:

- territorial insecurity,
- armed mobilization,
- historical mistrust,
- and structural impunity.

This annex forms the core factual basis for international concern.

VII. PUBLIC MOBILIZATION, CHURCH INTERVENTION, WOMEN'S PROTESTS, AND THE CRISIS OF STATE LEGITIMACY

7.1 Introduction

The Leilon Vaiphei hostage killings triggered not only political condemnation but a broad humanitarian, religious, and social response across Naga society.

This response is significant because it demonstrates:

- the scale of community trauma;
- the moral gravity of the killings;
- and the extent to which the incident transcended local village conflict.

This section documents:

- church intervention,
- civil society mobilization,
- women-led protests,
- and the growing crisis of public confidence in state institutions.

This is important.

Because international institutions often assess not only the violence itself, but also the societal reaction to it.

The societal response here was extraordinary.

7.2 Immediate Civil Society Condemnation

Following the confirmation of the deaths of the six Naga civilians, multiple Naga organizations issued formal condemnations.

This was rapid and widespread.

This indicates the incident was understood as:

not merely criminal—

but civilizationally grave.

Rongmei Naga Council Manipur (RNCM)

RNCM described the incident as:

a direct threat to the collective security and existence of Naga communities.

RNCM raised concerns regarding:

- the brutality of the killings;
- the delay in justice;
- allegations of collusion;
- and the absence of immediate accountability.

One of the strongest statements warned:

Naga's patience should not be mistaken for weakness.

This reflects the seriousness of public sentiment.

Coordination Committee Longmai Area (CCLA)

CCLA issued strong demands:

- apology;
- accountability;
- independent investigation.

The organization emphasized:

that peace without justice would not be sustainable.

This is an important framing.

Pongringlong Youth Club (PYC)

PYC appealed to the public to rely only on official and verified information.

This is significant.

It shows civil society attempting to prevent misinformation and escalation.

This strengthens institutional credibility.

Liangmai Naga Council Manipur (LNCM)

LNCM linked the killings to broader insecurity facing Naga villages.

Their statement framed the incident within a larger pattern of territorial vulnerability.

7.3 The Role of the Church

This is one of the strongest moral sections.

The fact that pastors were among the victims transformed the killings into a religious and moral crisis.

This broadened the significance of the incident.

It was no longer seen only as ethnic violence.

It became:

- an attack on spiritual leadership.

7.4 Regional Church Responses

Several church bodies condemned the killings.

These included:

Council of Baptist Churches in Northeast India (CBCNEI)

CBCNEI called for:

- justice,
- accountability,
- peace.

This is significant because CBCNEI represents a large regional religious constituency.

CoNBAM

CoNBAM emphasized:

the sanctity of human life and condemned the killings as morally unacceptable.

Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC)

NBCC raised concern over the targeting of pastors.

This elevated the incident into broader Christian consciousness.

Other Church Bodies

Also reported:

- Hmar Christian leadership
- Chandel Christian Forum
- regional Baptist organizations

This indicates multi-tribal Christian concern.

This matters internationally.

7.5 Prayer Vigils and Public Mourning

Across Naga areas:

- prayer meetings were organized;
- vigils held;
- churches mobilized.

These events had two meanings:

1. Mourning

Collective grief.

2. Resistance through Moral Witness

Churches became centers of peaceful mobilization.

This is important.

Because it shows that community response was not initially violent.

It was spiritual.

7.6 Women's Mobilization

Women became central actors.

This is one of the strongest social dimensions of the crisis.

Across Naga areas, women:

- organized protests;
- joined road blockades;
- confronted security forces;
- demanded justice.

This reflects the severity of the crisis.

Women entering frontline protest often signals social emergencies.

7.7 New Heaven–Shokvao Protest Incident (7 June 2026)

This is one of the most important state-community flashpoints.

Women-led protests opposed the presence of an Assam Rifles outpost.

Community concerns included:

- territorial militarization;
- insecurity;
- distrust of security arrangements.

Use of Force

Community reports allege:

- tear gas deployment;
- smoke bombs;
- lathi charges;
- physical assault.

Reports indicate around 29 women were injured.

This is a serious human rights concern.

7.8 Assault on Student Leadership

Katho Katamnao Long (KKL) President Mathotmi Kasar was reportedly assaulted.

This matters because:

student leaders often represent organized civil society.

Assaulting such figures increases political tension.

7.9 Women's Humanitarian Argument

The Naga Women's Union framed the issue in deeply humanitarian terms.

Their statements emphasized:

- mothers waiting for bodies;
- children losing fathers;
- widows facing uncertainty;

- and communities losing moral security.

This is one of the strongest humanitarian dimensions.

It should not be underestimated.

7.10 Crisis of State Legitimacy

The combined response of:

- civil society,
- churches,
- women,
- youth,
- village authorities

revealed a growing legitimacy crisis.

The core perception was:

the state was faster in dispersing protesters than in rescuing hostages.

This perception is critical.

Because legitimacy depends on public trust.

That trust has visibly weakened.

7.11 Symbolic Liangmai Mobilization

Following confirmation of the killings:

Liangmai Nagas fired symbolic blank rounds at Tamenglong Headquarters.

This was not random aggression.

It was symbolic.

It conveyed:

- mourning;
- warning;
- unresolved anger.

This reflects rising community militarization risk.

7.12 Pattern Analysis

This section establishes:

1. Broad-based Community Outrage

Not isolated.

Society-wide.

2. Religious Centrality

Churches became major peace actors.

3. Women as Frontline Defenders

This reflects extreme social alarm.

4. Public Trust Erosion

A major state legitimacy concern.

5. Rising Retaliatory Risk

Symbolic mobilizations may escalate if justice fails.

7.13 Conclusion

The Leilon Vaiphei killings triggered one of the widest social mobilizations in recent Naga public life.

The response demonstrates:

- the scale of moral injury;
- the humanitarian cost;
- the political seriousness;

- and the weakening legitimacy of state institutions.

This section is crucial because it shows:

the crisis is no longer confined to militants or villages.

It has entered the moral center of society.

That makes the risk of further escalation significantly higher.

VIII. SECURITY FORCE CONDUCT, OPERATIONAL CONTRADICTIONS, STATE RESPONSE FAILURES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY GAPS (2026)

8.1 Introduction

This section examines the conduct of state security forces and the broader institutional response during the 2026 escalation.

The purpose is not to criminalize the State as a whole.

Rather, it seeks to identify whether:

- there were operational failures,
- preventable omissions,
- delayed responses,
- selective interventions,
- or structural contradictions.

This is important because international human rights law does not examine only perpetrators.

It also examines:

- whether the State fulfilled its duty to protect life.

This is central.

8.2 Duty to Protect Under Law

Under both domestic constitutional principles and international law, the State carries a positive obligation to:

- protect civilians;
- prevent foreseeable harm;
- intervene during hostage situations;
- secure vulnerable populations.

Where the State knows or should reasonably know of imminent threats, inaction becomes legally relevant.

This is the standard.

8.3 Early Warning Indicators Before Leilon Vaiphei

The Leilon Vaiphei killings did not emerge without warning.

Several incidents preceded it:

Sinakeithei (February–April 2026)

Reports included:

- arson;
- abduction;
- attempted murder;
- organized armed movement.

These were clear warning indicators.

TM Kasom (18 April 2026)

Civilian killings along transit routes.

This widened threat geography.

Horei Hill

Village guards attacked.

This signaled frontline militarization.

Cross-border Armed Movement (7 May 2026)

Reports of more than 100 armed cadres entering from Myanmar.

This should have triggered heightened surveillance.

Taken together:

these were strong escalation indicators.

The State was on notice.

This is important.

8.4 Failure to Prevent the Leilon Vaiphei Abduction

The key question:

How were 18 civilians abducted?

This raises immediate operational concerns.

Questions include:

- Were there intelligence warnings?
- Were vulnerable routes monitored?
- Was there an active local deployment?
- Were security advisories issued?

The scale of the abduction suggests a serious security lapse.

This requires investigation.

8.5 Failure to Rescue the Six Hostages

This is perhaps the most serious issue.

After 14 were released, six remained captive.

This means:

the State had a critical intervention window.

That window appears to have failed.

Key questions:

1. Were negotiations initiated?

Unknown.

2. Were search operations launched?

Unclear.

3. Was intelligence developed?

Unclear.

4. Were militant routes blocked?

No clear evidence.

This gap is one of the strongest accountability concerns.

Because once the six were separated, they entered a high-risk category.

The risk of execution was foreseeable.

8.6 Delayed Recovery and Forensic Delay

The recovery of bodies occurred weeks later.

This delay raises serious concerns:

- Was the search inadequate?
- Were locations known but not accessed?
- Was terrain control lost?

Delays weaken:

- forensic quality;
- chain of evidence;
- crime scene preservation.

This affects justice.

8.7 Contradiction Between Protest Response and Rescue Response

This is one of the strongest legitimacy issues.

Community perception strongly focused on this contradiction.

During Hostage Crisis

Response appeared slow.

During Women's Protest (Shokvao/New Heaven)

Response was immediate and forceful.

This included:

- tear gas;
- smoke bombs;
- lathi charges.

This creates a damaging public perception:

that protest suppression was faster than civilian rescue.

This perception matters.

Because legitimacy depends on consistency.

8.8 Assam Rifles Outpost Controversy

The protest at Shokvao centered around an Assam Rifles outpost.

Community concerns included:

- location of deployment;
- purpose of deployment;
- trust deficit.

Questions raised:

- Was the outpost defensive?
- Was it intelligence-linked?
- Did it improve civilian safety?

These questions remain unresolved.

8.9 Security Force Use of Force Against Women

If reports are confirmed, the use of force against women protesters raises serious concerns.

Possible implications:

- disproportionate force;
- suppression of peaceful assembly;
- violation of dignity.

This is highly sensitive.

Particularly where women were protesting after the loss of civilian life.

This increases political gravity.

8.10 Suspension of Operations (SoO) Contradiction

This is one of the most important structural contradictions.

Kuki armed organizations remain under SoO frameworks.

This means:

they operate within monitored ceasefire structures.

Yet:

- armed incidents continue;
- hostage killings occurred;
- cross-border movements were reported.

This raises serious questions.

A. Were SoO Terms Breached?

Possible.

B. Was Monitoring Ineffective?

Possible.

C. Were Violations Tolerated?

Requires investigation.

This is one of the strongest structural accountability issues.

8.11 Intelligence Failure or Intelligence Inaction

Two possibilities exist.

1. Intelligence Failure

The State did not know.

This implies weak surveillance.

2. Intelligence Inaction

The State knew but acted inadequately.

This is more serious.

Both require independent review.

8.12 Community Confidence Collapse

The result of these failures:

- trust weakened;
- volunteer defense increased;
- community barricades emerged;
- local intelligence replaced state confidence.

This is dangerous.

Because when communities replace the State, escalation becomes more likely.

8.13 Legal Accountability Framework

Possible accountability standards:

Duty to Protect

Failure to prevent foreseeable civilian harm.

Duty to Investigate

Must identify perpetrators.

Duty to Prosecute

Impunity increases recurrence.

Duty to Preserve Evidence

The forensic chain must remain intact.

8.14 Core Questions for Inquiry

This section recommends formal inquiry into:

1. Who knew about the hostage chain?
2. When did they know?
3. What was done?
4. Why did rescue fail?
5. Were SoO groups involved?
6. Were cross-border militants involved?
7. Why was the protest response stronger than the rescue response?

These are the central institutional questions.

8.15 Conclusion

This section does not conclude state complicity.

But it establishes credible grounds to investigate:

- omission,
- delay,
- operational inconsistency,
- and accountability gaps.

These gaps are central.

Because justice is not only about who killed—

but also:

who failed to prevent the killing.

That is the central question.

IX. POLITICAL NETWORKS, ORGANIZED ADVOCACY STRUCTURES, ELECTORAL ALIGNMENTS, AND FARA-RELEVANT INFLUENCE ARCHITECTURE

9.1 Introduction

This section examines the political dimension surrounding the present conflict, focusing on the intersection between:

- Kuki civil organizations,
- armed political structures,
- electoral alignments,
- diaspora advocacy,
- and international narrative construction.

This section is significant because modern conflicts are no longer shaped only by armed violence.

They are also shaped by:

- political coordination,
- narrative production,
- international lobbying,
- and transnational influence.

This section seeks to identify whether these networks create relevance under the United States Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) or similar transparency frameworks.

This is not a determination of liability.

It is a request for scrutiny.

9.2 Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM) as a Political Coordinating Structure

Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM) is one of the most influential civil-political organizations representing Kuki interests.

Its influence extends across:

- political mobilization;
- public negotiation;
- community directives;
- advocacy framing.

This makes KIM institutionally important.

Its decisions carry political weight.

9.3 The April 2024 Electoral Directives

One of the strongest documentary exhibits in this report is the KIM circular dated 17–18 April 2024.

The document reportedly directed Kuki voters to support Congress candidate Alfred Arthur.

This is important.

Why?

Because it demonstrates organized bloc voting.

This suggests structured political mobilization.

Not random voter behavior.

9.4 Why Bloc Voting Matters

Bloc voting itself is not unlawful.

But in conflict zones, it may indicate:

- centralized influence;
- organized bargaining power;
- coordinated political concessions.

This becomes significant when political promises overlap with armed territorial demands.

That is where scrutiny becomes relevant.

9.5 Reported Political Agreements

Documents and political rebuttals suggest negotiations involving:

- KIM;
- KSO;
- KNO;
- elected representatives.

The reported issues included:

- Separate Administration;
- legal protections;
- political guarantees;
- administrative concessions.

This is highly significant.

Because these are not ordinary local issues.

They concern territorial restructuring.

9.6 Armed–Political Interface

One of the strongest concerns in the broader conflict:

some organizations function across overlapping spaces:

Civil Political	Armed
KIM electoral influence	indirect influence environment
KSO mobilization	ideological support environment
KNO negotiation	armed umbrella
UPF political dialogue	armed umbrella

This overlap does not automatically prove coordination in violence.

But it creates structural influence networks.

This matters.

9.7 The SoO Framework as Political Shield

The Suspension of Operations framework gave formal recognition to:

- KNO
- UPF

This created a protected negotiation environment.

This is politically important.

Because:

while under ceasefire protection, these organizations retained:

- political leverage;

- negotiation space;
- public legitimacy.

Yet armed incidents continued.

This contradiction must be examined.

9.8 Diaspora Advocacy Networks

This is where FARA relevance becomes stronger.

Over the last several years, Kuki diaspora networks have become increasingly active in:

- the United States;
- Canada;
- Europe;
- Australia.

Their activities reportedly include:

- advocacy campaigns;
- fundraising;
- lobbying;
- media outreach;
- human rights framing.

None of this is unlawful by itself.

But:

if acting under organized political instruction or foreign political direction, FARA relevance may arise.

This requires review.

9.9 International Narrative Construction

Modern conflict legitimacy is often shaped through narrative.

There is evidence of strong coordinated online messaging around:

- genocide claims;
- territorial legitimacy;
- victimhood framing;
- political self-determination.

Again:

this is not unlawful.

But if coordinated internationally for political influence, it becomes institutionally relevant.

9.10 Fundraising Channels

One area requiring independent review:

whether diaspora-linked fundraising channels intersect with:

- political lobbying;
- community mobilization;
- militant-linked ecosystems.

This is highly sensitive.

No direct conclusion is made here.

But this is a legitimate inquiry area.

9.11 Congress Party Interface

The Alfred Arthur directive is important because it establishes:

organized Kuki institutional engagement with mainstream Indian electoral politics.

This means:

the conflict is not operating outside formal politics.

It is deeply embedded within it.

This makes political accountability more complex.

9.12 Why This Matters for the Present Crisis

The relevance to the hostage killings is indirect but important.

If:

- political influence structures;
- ceasefire protections;

- armed organizations;
- and diaspora advocacy

operate in parallel,

then accountability becomes harder.

This can create:

- narrative shields;
- political shields;
- diplomatic shields.

This is why institutional scrutiny matters.

9.13 FARA Threshold Questions

For the U.S. Department of Justice, the following questions become relevant:

1. Are any diaspora organizations lobbying U.S. officials?
2. Are they acting under political instruction?
3. Are funds being raised for conflict-linked political objectives?
4. Are foreign principals involved?
5. Are lobbying disclosures complete?

These are legitimate transparency questions.

9.14 Recommended Review Areas

This section recommends examination of:

- diaspora advocacy structures;
- lobbying filings;
- public relations contracts;
- fundraising mechanisms;
- political directives;
- international media campaigns.

This is not criminalization.

It is transparency review.

9.15 Conclusion

This section establishes that the present conflict is not merely local.

It operates through:

- armed structures;
- political networks;
- electoral alliances;
- international advocacy systems.

Where these overlap, transparency becomes essential.

This is where FARA relevance may arise.

Not as a conclusion—

but as a legitimate area for institutional scrutiny.

PART III

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

Introductory Note to the Supplementary Materials

The following supplementary materials are attached in support of the core annexures and form the documentary, visual, forensic, administrative, and corroborative evidentiary basis of this submission.

These materials are intended to assist reviewing authorities in independently examining the factual, historical, and structural claims presented throughout this dossier.

While the core annexures provide the principal analytical and chronological framework, the supplementary materials provide the supporting evidentiary foundation necessary for verification, contextual understanding, and institutional review.

These materials include:

- historical archival extracts;
- administrative standing orders;
- refugee settlement records;
- forensic and medical documents;
- organizational statements;
- church declarations;
- photographic records;
- and territorial maps.

Where possible, these supplementary materials should be read alongside the corresponding sections to ensure contextual accuracy and evidentiary continuity.

The appendices are arranged according to relevance and evidentiary weight.

Primary documentary evidence appears first, followed by corroborative and contextual materials.

APPENDIX I

Historical Archival Extracts and Colonial Records

This appendix contains documentary extracts relating to:

- nineteenth-century Kuki raids;
- British frontier reports;
- military dispatches;
- punitive expedition records;
- village destruction reports;
- and administrative observations.

Purpose

To substantiate the historical continuity established in **Section III – Historical Background (1844–1919)**.

Classification: Primary Documentary Evidence

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX II

Manipur State Darbar Standing Orders (1931, 1933, 1941)

This appendix includes:

- Standing Order No. 11 (1931);
- Standing Order No. 9 (1933);
- Standing Order No. 2 (1941).

These documents establish:

- firearm regulation;
- taxation structures;
- settlement permissions;
- and Naga territorial authority.

Purpose

To support **Section IV – Administrative Regulation, Settlement Status, Refugee Rehabilitation, and Territorial Legality (1931–1973)**.

Classification: Official Administrative Records

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX III

Burma Kuki Refugee Settlement Files (1967–1968)

Includes:

- official rehabilitation correspondence;
- settlement approvals;
- refugee administrative files.

Purpose

To establish state-recognized refugee settlement.

Supports **Section IV**.

Classification: Government Refugee Records

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX IV

Refugee Rehabilitation Memorandum (1973)

Includes:

- Burma Kuki Refugees' Association memorandum;
- financial assistance requests;
- settlement demands;
- rehabilitation petitions.

Purpose

To establish demographic transformation and structured refugee rehabilitation.

Supports **Section IV**.

Classification: Government Memorandum / Community Submission

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX V

Documentation Relating to the 1992–1998 Naga–Kuki Conflict

Includes:

- conflict chronologies;
- village destruction records;
- displacement documentation;
- casualty compilations;
- historical reports;
- humanitarian documentation.

Purpose

To support **Section V – Post-Independence Continuity**.

Classification: Historical Conflict Documentation

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX VI

Contemporary Incident Chronology (February–June 2026)

Includes documentation relating to:

- Litan Incident;
- Sinakeithei attacks;
- TM Kasom killings;
- Horei Hill incident;
- cross-border militant movement;
- Leilon Vaiphei abduction;
- hostage chronology;
- recovery of bodies;
- Laho-Litan escalation;
- Kamjong incidents.

Purpose

To support **Section VI – Contemporary Escalation**.

Classification: Contemporary Incident Documentation

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX VII

Hospital, Forensic and DNA Documentation

Includes:

- JNIMS records;
- postmortem documentation;
- body recovery records;
- DNA identification process;
- mortuary documentation.

Purpose

To establish forensic continuity concerning the six deceased Naga civilians.

Supports **Section VI**.

Classification: Medical and Forensic Records

Probative Value: Very High

APPENDIX VIII

Civil Society, Church and Women's Statements

Includes statements issued by:

- Rongmei Naga Council Manipur (RNCM);
- Coordination Committee Longmai Area (CCLA);
- Liangmai Naga Council Manipur (LNCM);
- Pongringlong Youth Club (PYC);
- church organizations;
- women's organizations;
- student organizations.

Purpose

To support **Section VII – Public Mobilization, Church Intervention, Women's Protests, and the Crisis of State Legitimacy.**

Classification: Organizational Statements

Probative Value: Corroborative

APPENDIX IX

Protest Documentation

Includes:

- Shokvao/New Heaven protest records;
- injury documentation;
- photographs;
- public memoranda;
- eyewitness material.

Purpose

To support **Section VII.**

Classification: Human Rights Documentation

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX X

Security and Operational Documentation

Includes:

- security deployment records (where available);
- public statements;
- operational timelines;
- reports relating to rescue efforts;
- accountability documentation.

Purpose

To support **Section VIII – Security Force Conduct, Operational Contradictions, State Response Failures, and Accountability Gaps.**

Classification: Operational Documentation

Probative Value: Corroborative

APPENDIX XI

Political Documents and Public Directives

Includes:

- KIM circulars;
- electoral directives;
- political correspondence;
- public organizational statements;
- related documentary material.

Purpose

To support **Section IX – Political Networks, Organized Advocacy Structures, Electoral Alignments, and FARA-Relevant Influence Architecture.**

Classification: Political Documentation

Probative Value: High

APPENDIX XII

International Advocacy and Public Narrative Materials

Includes:

- public advocacy materials;
- international campaign documentation;
- diaspora communications;
- media documentation;
- publicly available lobbying-related materials.

Purpose

To support **Section IX**.

Classification: Supplementary Documentary Evidence

Probative Value: Contextual

X. LEGAL QUALIFICATIONS

Based upon the documentary evidence, witness accounts, historical archives, administrative records, forensic documentation, and contemporary incident materials compiled in this dossier, the following international legal considerations arise for examination by the competent authorities.

The legal observations below are presented for institutional assessment and do not constitute judicial findings.

10.1 International Humanitarian Law

The documented incidents raise concerns relating to:

- hostage-taking;
- torture;
- cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment;
- mutilation;
- unlawful killing of civilians;
- destruction of civilian property.

Where applicable, these acts require examination under the principles of International Humanitarian Law.

10.2 International Human Rights Law

The evidence presented raises concerns relating to:

- right to life;
- liberty and security of person;

- enforced disappearance;
- arbitrary deprivation of life;
- freedom from torture;
- protection of indigenous peoples;
- protection of minorities;
- peaceful assembly;
- protection of women human rights defenders.

These matters warrant independent international review.

10.3 Indigenous Peoples' Rights

The materials contained in this dossier raise issues concerning:

- indigenous territorial rights;
- customary governance;
- ancestral land;
- traditional authority;
- cultural survival.

These matters fall within the scope of international indigenous rights mechanisms.

10.4 Crimes Subject to Further Examination

The documented pattern may require examination regarding possible:

- hostage-taking;
- enforced disappearance;
- extrajudicial killing;
- persecution;
- torture;
- crimes against humanity;
- war crimes,

where the legal threshold is satisfied following independent investigation.

10.5 State Responsibility

Questions arise concerning:

- protection obligations;
- prevention obligations;
- investigative obligations;
- accountability obligations.

Independent examination is requested.

10.6 Foreign Influence Review

The materials relating to:

- international lobbying;
- organized advocacy;
- fundraising;
- political influence activities

may warrant examination under applicable transparency legislation, including possible FARA relevance where jurisdiction exists.

10.7 Conclusion

This dossier respectfully submits that sufficient documentary material exists to justify independent legal examination by the competent international and national authorities.

No definitive criminal determination is made herein.

The purpose is to facilitate lawful institutional review.

XI. PATTERN ANALYSIS

The evidence compiled throughout this dossier demonstrates recurring historical and contemporary characteristics.

The principal patterns observed include:

Historical Continuity

- repeated village raids;
- hostage-taking;
- mass abductions;
- territorial coercion;
- village destruction.

Administrative Continuity

- regulated settlement;
- indigenous territorial authority;
- refugee rehabilitation;
- demographic transformation.

Contemporary Continuity

- armed escalation;
- hostage-taking;
- civilian targeting;
- delayed rescue;
- public mobilization.

Institutional Continuity

- accountability concerns;
- operational inconsistencies;
- unresolved historical grievances;
- structural insecurity.

Political Continuity

- organized advocacy;
- political mobilization;
- international lobbying;
- narrative construction.

Taken collectively, these elements suggest that the present crisis is not an isolated event but part of a broader historical and structural continuum requiring careful institutional examination.

XII. REQUESTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the evidence presented throughout this dossier, the submitting parties respectfully request the following actions.

Immediate Measures

1. Immediate independent international fact-finding mission.

2. Protection of vulnerable indigenous civilian populations.
3. Recovery of any remaining missing persons.
4. Preservation of all forensic evidence.
5. Protection of witnesses.

National Measures

6. Independent judicial inquiry.
7. Comprehensive investigation into the Leilon Vaiphei hostage killings.
8. Examination of operational failures.
9. Review of Suspension of Operations implementation.
10. Accountability for all individuals responsible.

International Measures

11. Review by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs.
12. Review by the United Nations Human Rights Council.
13. Examination by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, as appropriate.
14. Examination of international advocacy activities where jurisdiction exists.
15. Continued monitoring of the human rights situation affecting indigenous Naga communities.

XIII. CONCLUSION

This dossier has presented a chronological, documentary, historical, administrative, humanitarian, legal, and contemporary account concerning violence, territorial insecurity, hostage-taking, demographic transformation, and institutional accountability affecting the Naga people.

The materials demonstrate that the present crisis cannot be understood in isolation.

Rather, it reflects a broader continuum extending across:

- historical violence;
- administrative developments;
- post-independence demographic change;
- armed political evolution;
- and contemporary conflict escalation.

The evidence compiled is respectfully submitted for independent examination by the competent authorities.

The purpose of this submission is:

- prevention;
- protection;
- accountability;
- justice;
- and the preservation of peace.

The submitting parties respectfully request that the competent institutions take appropriate action consistent with their respective mandates.

From: NAC Collins <nagalim.us@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 3:08 PM
Subject: Response to Hindustan Times US Correspondent
To: Shashank Mattoo <shashank.mattoo@hindustantimes.com>

Dear Mr. Mattoo,

Thank you for your follow-up questions.

The document you referenced is an ever evolving working document that the Naga-American Council has been compiling to serve as a comprehensive record of the Naga people, their history, and the issues affecting them.

I intentionally filed these materials publicly because I believe in being open and transparent about the information we have gathered. Rather than preparing a document solely for advocacy, my goal has been to create a well-documented record that brings together factual historical documents, legal materials, publicly available reports, and current developments in one place. As new information becomes available, it is incorporated so the record remains as accurate, balanced, and current as possible.

The purpose is to provide US policymakers and the public with a fair and comprehensive understanding of the Naga people, their political history, and the strategic importance of the region. Because events in Manipur and along the India-Myanmar border continue to develop, the document continues to evolve as well.

Since the outbreak of the Manipur Riots conflict in 2023, much of our work has shifted and focused on documenting factual developments affecting the Naga people. **This has included researching the Suspension of Operations (SoO) framework, under which approximately 25 Kuki-Zo armed groups were placed in designated camps and their cadres receive monthly stipends from** ^{And Weapons} **(India's Union Ministry of Home Affairs)**. At the same time, Naga organizations have publicly argued that violence against Naga communities has continued despite the agreement's stated objective of reducing hostilities. These developments have required additional research and documentation before the paper can responsibly be finalized.

Since my previous response, there has also been a significant public development. Only yesterday, June 25, 2026, Kuki-Zo Council Chairman Henlienthang Thanglet publicly stated, *"I admit the Kuki-Zo people made a grave mistake in killing the six Naga civilians. It was done out of emotion. I strongly condemn it. I am very sorry and apologise on behalf of my people."* He also called for a fair and impartial investigation into the incident.

For these reasons, the document has not yet been finalized or formally submitted. Once more complete, it is intended to be shared with the White House, the appropriate bureaus within the U.S. Department of State—including those responsible for Human Rights, International Religious Freedom, regional affairs, strategic economic resource opportunities as well as Members of Congress and other appropriate U.S. policymakers.

The goal is not simply to advocate a position, but to provide a comprehensive factual record that helps policymakers better understand the Naga people, the historical background, the current realities on the ground, and the opportunities for constructive engagement. Given the continuing developments in the region, I believe it is more responsible to complete that record before formally presenting it.

I appreciate the opportunity to clarify these points.

Sincerely,

Grace Collins
Honorary President
Naga-American Council

On Fri, Jun 26, 2026 at 1:16 PM Shashank Mattoo <shashank.mattoo@hindustantimes.com> wrote:

Dear Ms. Collins,

Thank you for your detailed responses. I was wondering if you might be willing to answer two quick follow up questions we had, which we hope you can respond to by 5 PM on 27 June.

1. You mentioned that elements of your draft letter were used to reach out verbally to members of Congress. Can you confirm that the specific segments of the letter dealing with the critical minerals opportunities for America were part of your outreach to members of Congress?

2. A small point of clarification: could you tell us why you chose to disclose a draft letter, which was not sent to the White House or any other agency, in your FARA disclosures?

Once again, thank you for your time.

Warmly,
Shashank Mattoo

----- Forwarded message -----

From: NAC Collins <nagalim.us@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, Jun 25, 2026 at 2:19 PM
Subject: Re: Press Query For Grace Collins
To: Shashank Mattoo <shashank.mattoo@hindustantimes.com>

Dear Mr. Mattoo,

Thank you for your email. Please see my responses below.

1. Was your letter addressed to President Trump sent to the White House or any other agency within the U.S. Executive Branch?

No. The document you referenced was an internal working draft and was never sent to President Trump, the White House, or any U.S. Executive Branch agency. It was prepared as a policy discussion draft. While non government private citizens may of read our report similar ideas were later incorporated into correspondence sent by others, this particular draft was never transmitted to President Trump.

2. Have you received a response to your letter from the White House or any U.S. government agencies?

No. Since the draft uploaded was never sent, there has been been no response.

3. Have any members of Congress or their staff responded to your requests for a briefing?

We have conducted verbal outreach to congressional offices which uses parts of our draft letter as talking points as part of our ongoing advocacy efforts. I do not have any additional comment regarding those communications at this time.

4. However if you do want to report on something we feel is important. We hope you will include our research about the clashes with the Kukis on the Nagas that started brewing around February 2026 till now. I have not uploaded the Naga position of the captured, beheaded and mutilated bodies of 6 Naga civilians by the Kuki refugees from Burma (recheck in a few days). That is what Naga-American Council has been primarily focused on for the past six months. We have been collecting the research on this important issue primarily.

5.

Thank you for your inquiry.

Best regards,
Grace Collins

From: NAC Collins <nagalim.us@gmail.com>
Date: January 17, 2026 at 5:38:27 PM EST
To: NAC Collins <nagalim.us@gmail.com>

Dear Mr. Mattoo,

I have now read your recently published article and wanted to follow up directly.

I appreciate that you reviewed my historical files from the 2003–2011 period and that your characterization of my past work was balanced and fair. Given the frequency with which Naga-related media reporting has been distorted or sensationalized in the past, I acknowledge the effort you made to engage the documentary record rather than rely on stereotypes or secondhand narratives.

That said, because the article was published prior to my formal written response, I want to be clear about the framework for any further engagement or future reporting. My attached response was prepared precisely to ensure accuracy, avoid misquotation, and establish clear on-the-record boundaries going forward—particularly on matters relating to my legal status, independence, and current role.

I remain willing to engage constructively, provided that future references adhere to professional journalistic standards, reflect historical context accurately, and respect the quotation limitations I have set out in writing. Where complex legal or historical issues are involved, I strongly encourage advance verification rather than retrospective correction.

Sincerely,
Grace Collins

Cover Email

Subject: Response to your inquiry of January 7, 2026

Dear Mr. Mattoo,

Attached please find my formal written response to your email of January 7, 2026, regarding my FARA registration, the Naga people, and religious persecution in India. The letter sets out my position, clarifies my independence and legal obligations, and identifies the specific statements that are authorized for direct quotation.

For the avoidance of doubt, any on-the-record use of my words must be limited to the verbatim quotations contained in the “Mandatory Quotation Notice” section of the attached letter. No other portion of our correspondence is approved for quotation or paraphrase.

If you require further factual documentation or historical sources, you may request them in writing, and I will consider providing additional materials.

Sincerely,

Grace Collins

Date: January 16, 2026

To: Mr. Mattoo

Hindustan Times (U.S. Correspondent)

Subject: Response to E-mail Inquiry Regarding FARA Filing, Journalistic Standards, the Naga People, and Religious Persecution in India

Dear Mr. Mattoo,

Based on decades of reporting on the Naga issue, I have observed consistent misquotation, selective framing, and contextual distortion in certain Indian media outlets. In light of this, I am willing to respond to your questions on this occasion—but only under the condition that any use of my words adheres strictly to the verbatim quotation guidelines outlined below. Any deviation would compromise the accuracy of the reporting and risk misrepresenting both the historical record and my position.

At the outset, questions focused on an individual's ethnicity or citizenship are generally regarded as inappropriate and irrelevant under accepted U.S. journalistic standards. While U.S. anti-discrimination statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Immigration Reform and Control Act primarily govern employment, they reflect a broader professional norm: personal characteristics such as race, national origin, or citizenship should not be used to frame credibility or motive in professional discourse. Senior U.S. press officers and journalists have confirmed that such inquiries fall outside standard practice.

That said, in the interest of transparency and clarity of record, I will respond directly.

I am a United States citizen, born in the United States. I do not hold Indian citizenship, nor am I of Naga descent. My engagement with Naga civil-society issues has always been as an independent human-rights advocate, not by virtue of ethnicity, nationality, or religion.

My active engagement with Naga civil-society issues ended in 2011 due to serious health complications resulting from medical negligence. After my recovery, I did not resume any organizational, advisory, or operational role with the NSCN or with any armed group. Since then, my involvement has been limited to independent observation, without affiliation, instruction, or participation.

You also referenced my filing with the U.S. Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq.). FARA is a disclosure statute intended to ensure transparency with the U.S. government. FYI: FARA requires that any registrant be a U.S. person. This clearly establishes my status as a U.S. citizen and confirms that I cannot hold Indian citizenship. The publicly available filings provide full documentation of my compliance.

My interaction with One Naga Voice—like my interaction with hundreds of other civil-society organizations, churches, factions, community platforms, and individuals over many years—is voluntary, transparent, and not subject to the direction or control of any organization, faction, or government. One Naga Voice is a people-centric platform connecting Nagas across their homeland and global diaspora. I do not advocate specific political outcomes such as sovereignty or statehood; those decisions rest exclusively with the Naga people themselves and the governments concerned.

I have not been contacted by Indian authorities regarding my work in the United States. Should such contact occur, it should be directed toward advancing a peaceful resolution to the long-standing conflict between the Government of India and the Naga people, rather than toward intimidation, spinning their factual history or discrediting my human-rights advocacy.

Media Accuracy and Context

Coverage of Indigenous and minority rights in Nagalim/Nagaland has been full of misquotations, selective framing, or contextual distortion. Responsible reporting on these issues requires engagement with established historical and documentary record, including:

- The Nagas did not legally join the Indian Union by conquest, consent, treaty, or concession; the

issue was treated as external following British decolonization in 1947 and should be to this day not covered up by the Govt of India and to be pulled in as an internal issue.

□ Since 1947, Naga communities have experienced over 250,000 human-rights violations, including sexual violence, arbitrary detention, torture, and extrajudicial killings, with limited accountability.

□ Claims that India is the world's "largest" or "oldest" democracy warrant scrutiny in light of caste hierarchy and the documented rise in religious persecution since 2014.

□ Laws such as AFSPA, UAPA, state anti-conversion statutes, FCRA, and PAP/RAP regimes collectively restrict civil liberties, religious freedom, and independent scrutiny.

The denial of a visa in 2025 to Reverend Franklin Graham underscored concerns regarding systemic religious intolerance. Similar patterns of restriction, surveillance, and harassment affect other minority communities, including Christians in the Northeast, Kashmiri Muslims, and Sikhs advocating for Khalistan.

For more than a century, the Naga people have lived as a peaceful, highly literate, and culturally rich society. Reporting that relies on stereotypes or colonial-era tropes misinforms the public and perpetuates prejudice.

Conditions for Further Engagement

I am prepared to engage further only on the basis of professional journalistic standards, historical accuracy, respect for clearly defined on-the-record boundaries and discussions on how to resolve this almost 80 year old conflict.

Mandatory Quotation Notice

The following statements are the only portions of this correspondence authorized for direct quotation. Any quotation must be reproduced verbatim, in full, and without paraphrasing, truncation, or contextual distortion. No other portion of this correspondence is approved for quotation.

Citizenship and Transparency:

"I am a U.S. citizen, born in the United States, and I am fully transparent about my background and activities."

Independence:

"My work on Naga and other human-rights issues is independent and not directed or controlled by any organization, faction, or government."

Journalistic Standards:

"Questions based on ethnicity or citizenship are irrelevant and inconsistent with professional journalistic standards."

Legal Status of the Naga People:

"The Nagas never legally joined the Indian Union by conquest, consent, treaty, or concession; the Naga question has historically been treated as an 'external issue'; rather than an internal matter of the Government of India."

Oppressive Laws and Democratic Claims:

"Given the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, anti-conversion laws, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act, the Protected/Restricted Area Permit regimes, and the persistence of caste hierarchy, it is incumbent on Hindustan Times to explain how the claim to be the world's 'oldest' and 'largest' democracy can be sustained."

AFSPA:

“The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958 has enabled decades of grave human-rights abuses in Naga and other minority areas by granting sweeping powers and de facto immunity to security forces and must be repealed to allow accountability and the rule of law.”

UAPA:

“The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act permits prolonged pre-trial detention, severely restricts access to bail, and has been used against journalists, students, Indigenous activists, and minority communities, rather than solely against violent actors.”

Anti-Conversion Laws:

“India’s anti-conversion laws are used to harass religious minorities and suppress freedom of conscience and belief.”

FCRA:

“The Foreign Contribution Regulation Act has been systematically weaponized to shut down NGOs, churches, and humanitarian organizations, undermining civil society and religious freedom.”

PAP/RAP:

“The Protected Area Permit and Restricted Area Permit regimes restrict independent access to Northeast India, suppress reporting, and limit scrutiny of human-rights conditions, particularly in Indigenous Naga regions.”

Rejection of Defamatory Stereotypes:

“The Nagas are not terrorists, insurgents, secessionists, primitive ‘savages’ or cannibals; such characterizations are false, offensive, and prejudicial.”

Human-Rights Focus:

“My engagement is grounded in universal human-rights principles, including non-violence, dignity, and democratic norms.”

Position on Political Outcomes:

“I do not advocate political outcomes; such decisions belong solely to the Naga people themselves. I report and analyze what the majority of Naga people have expressed as their aspirations for the future.”

Commitment to Peace:

“I support peaceful dialogue and civil-society engagement rather than violence. There is no justification for this situation to remain unresolved in 2026 after more than 600 rounds of peace talks.”

Scope of Further Inquiry:

“I trust this clarifies my position, my work, and the professional standards I expect to be respected. As you should also know, my filings are biannual, and any other questions regarding my work can be answered by reviewing my registered filings with FARA, which are open to the public.”

Sincerely,