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DATA REPORT AUGUST 10, 2026

Have Israeli Heavy Bombs Wiped Out Entire Families and Neighborhoods?

Multigenerational families killed in single strikes are counted and dated in the record; neighborhood-level erasure is described rather than counted.

Gaza

Civilian Harm

Casualty Counts

Official Records

Lebanon



Yes, in cases that named news organizations have reconstructed household by household: Reuters reported on 8 November 2023 that a single Israeli air strike on

the Hamdan family home in Gaza killed 35 members of one family spanning three generations. At the aggregate level the Palestinian health ministry in Gaza counted 312 families that had lost 10 or more relatives as of 12 November 2023, a party's own count relayed by The Guardian in 2023, and the Gaza Ministry of Health's earlier tally relayed by the Associated Press in 2023 gave about 304 families at 10 or more relatives with roughly 31 families losing more than 30. The second half of the question is counted differently: destroyed apartment blocks, family compounds and emptied towns are documented and dated, while no record carried here reports a neighborhood in which every building and every resident was eliminated.

Key Findings

- Reuters reported on 8 November 2023 that one Israeli air strike on the Hamdan family home in Gaza killed 35 relatives across three generations.
- The Palestinian health ministry counted 312 families that had lost 10 or more relatives as of 12 November 2023, as relayed by The Guardian in 2023; the Gaza Ministry of Health tally relayed by the Associated Press in 2023 gave about 304 families at that threshold and roughly 31 families losing more than 30. Both are a party's own counts on its own registry.
- The Guardian reported in 2026 that eight members of the Ham family, spanning three generations, were killed in one Israeli strike in Lebanon, and that the offensive destroyed villages and emptied towns.
- The Israel Defense Forces spokesperson stated on 29 February 2024 that the military had killed over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza, the IDF's own count and characterization; no household-level or family-level count appears in Israel's published records carried here.
- The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported Gaza at about 2.13 million people at the end of 2025, a decline of approximately 254,000, which it states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates and attributes to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration.

Have entire multigenerational families been killed in single strikes?

Yes. Reuters reported on 8 November 2023 that an Israeli air strike on the Hamdan family home in Gaza killed **35 members of one family across three generations**, from grandparents to infants. It is one of several single-building cases that named news organizations have reconstructed by household, date and location rather than described in general terms.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated in 2026 that Israeli air strikes in Gaza have killed entire families spanning two, three, or even four generations, a characterization by that body. Amnesty International, in its October 2023 documentation, recorded 15 members of the al-Dos family killed across three generations in a strike on 7 October 2023, Amnesty's own count on its own investigative criteria. The Explosive Weapons Monitor, summarizing reconstruction work by the monitoring group Airwars, documented a strike on the Joudeh family in Deir al-Balah on 22 October 2023. NPR published a building-by-building reconstruction of one strike on a residential building in Gaza in October 2024.

What each of these records measures is worth stating precisely, because the phrasings differ. Reuters counted relatives killed in one strike on one address. Amnesty counted members of a named family in a documented attack. Neither is a finding that a family line ended: a household of 35 people can be destroyed while relatives outside the building survive, and none of the published tallies here reports the number of families confirmed to have no surviving members. The counted unit is people killed who share a family name and an address, not a lineage certified extinguished.

The Guardian's reporting of 12 November 2023 on strikes against apartment blocks in Gaza describes the same structural pattern from the survivors' side: multi-storey residential buildings holding several related households at once, so that a single munition reaches an extended family rather than a nuclear one. That building type is why the family-level tolls in this record run to dozens rather than to single digits, and it is the mechanism behind the counts in the next section.


How common is the loss of a whole extended family?

It is often said that whole family lines have been erased in Gaza. The closest published quantity is a threshold count: the Palestinian health ministry recorded **312 families that had lost 10 or more relatives as of 12 November 2023**, as The Guardian reported in 2023, attributing the figure to the ministry rather than measuring it independently.

The Associated Press, reporting in 2023, relayed the Gaza Ministry of Health's tally of about 304 families that had lost at least 10 relatives, with roughly 31 families that had lost more than 30. The same AP reporting relayed the ministry's earlier figure of roughly 300 families losing more than 10 members during the first month after 7 October 2023. The three numbers are close because they are successive readings of one registry at different dates, not independent measurements of the same quantity.

Families in Gaza counted as losing multiple relatives

PALESTINIAN HEALTH MINISTRY TALLIES, AS RELAYED BY NEWS ORGANIZATIONS IN 2023



Source: Palestinian health ministry counts relayed by The Guardian, 2023, and the Associated Press, 2023. The categories overlap and are not a partition.

The direction of the common claim is supported by these tallies, and the base rate is what the tallies count: families with 10 or more members killed. A family that loses 10 of 40 relatives and a family that loses its last surviving member are recorded identically at that threshold. No count in this record reports how many of the 312 families had no surviving members, and the ministry has not published a category for that.

Both readings are dated within five weeks of 7 October 2023 and are the counts available at that point in the record. Later cumulative totals for families, as distinct from individuals, do not appear in the sources carried here.

Which single strikes killed the most relatives at once?

The heaviest single-strike family tolls in this record run into the dozens. Reuters reported **35 members of the Hamdan family killed in one strike on 7 November 2023**, three generations of one household in Gaza, and it remains the largest single-strike family toll here that a wire service reconstructed and published under its own byline.

Amnesty International documented 15 members of the al-Dos family killed on 7 October 2023, its own count. The Explosive Weapons Monitor, summarizing Airwars, documented the strike on the Joudeh family in Deir al-Balah on 22 October 2023. NPR's 2024 reconstruction covered a single building strike in October 2024. Each of these is a case record produced by a different body on a different method: an investigative organization's field documentation, a monitoring project's incident reconstruction, and a broadcaster's building-level casualty audit. They are not entries in one series and do not sum.

The pattern is not confined to Gaza. The Guardian reported in 2026 that an Israeli strike in Lebanon killed eight members of the Ham family across three generations, and its April 2026 reporting documented the destruction of villages in southern Lebanon during the same offensive. The generational span, rather than the raw number, is the recurring feature of these case records: grandparents, adult children and infants counted at one address.

One methodological note carries through the whole set. A single-strike toll is a count of bodies recovered or identified at one site, and identification in a collapsed multi-storey building proceeds over days or weeks. The Guardian's November 2023 reporting describes relatives searching rubble for people not yet counted. Case tolls reported early are therefore floors, and figures that later rise are not corrections of the earlier ones but continuations of the same recovery.

Set against the aggregate registry counts in the previous section, the case records answer a different question. The registry says how many families crossed a loss threshold. The case records say what one munition did to one address on one date, with names and generations attached.

Have entire neighborhoods been eliminated, or severely damaged?

At the territorial level the emptying is counted. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics reported Gaza at about 2.13 million people at the end of 2025, **a decline of approximately 254,000 people**, which the bureau states is a decrease of 10.6% against pre-aggression population estimates and attributes to war-related deaths, missing persons, reduced births and forced out-migration. It is a demographic net change, not a casualty count.

The same brief reports that roughly 2.2 million people were living in Gaza on the eve of the war, that nearly two million of them were displaced, and that roughly 100,000 have left the Strip. Those are the bureau's own estimates rather than an enumeration, and the displacement figure is the closest published measure of residential areas being emptied of their residents.

The Guardian reported in March 2026 that families were wiped out and towns emptied during Israel's war in Lebanon, and in April 2026 documented how the offensive destroyed entire villages there. That is the strongest published description of destruction at a scale above the individual building in this record, and it is a description with named localities rather than a tally of localities.

The two halves of the question are therefore evidenced differently. Family-level loss is counted: 312 families at a stated threshold, 35 relatives at one address, three generations named. Neighborhood-level loss is documented as destroyed apartment blocks, destroyed family compounds, destroyed villages and depopulated areas, and no record carried here reports a neighborhood in which every building and every resident was eliminated, nor publishes a count of neighborhoods meeting that description. The Institute's report on [what the documentary record shows about civilian harm in Gaza](#) sets out the building and infrastructure records in more detail.

Where a claim is quantified on one side and described on the other, the asymmetry belongs in the answer rather than being smoothed over. The family counts have a registry behind them and a number attached. The neighborhood claim has named places, dated reporting and photographs behind it, and no unit of account.

Where do the family-loss counts come from?

Both the roughly 304-family and the 312-family tallies trace to one body. The Palestinian health ministry in Gaza, which maintains the territory's death registry, produced them, and the Associated Press and The Guardian each stated in 2023 that they were relaying the ministry's count rather than measuring it. It is **a party to the conflict counting its own population**, and it is the only body publishing family-level totals.

The registry sits on a demographic base that is itself a decade old. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted 1,899,291 residents of the Gaza Strip in the 2017 census, on a reference date of 1 December 2017, and that is the last full enumeration; every later population total for the territory is a projection off it. Family composition in the registry comes from civil-registration records rather than from a survey.

A figure of 825 families circulates for late October 2023, attributed to the Palestine News and Information Agency. The underlying agency report is not identified in the sources carried here, so the figure appears in this record only as a relayed number without a locatable measurement behind it. That absence is recorded rather than filled.

Two further limits belong with these tallies. First, the ministry's category is families that lost a stated number of relatives, so it does not distinguish a family reduced from 40 members to 30 from one reduced to none. Second, a registry captures deaths that reach it, and recovery from collapsed buildings is slow, so a threshold count taken in November 2023 is a count of what had been registered by that date. The Institute's report on [what the published Gaza death counts actually measure](#) sets out how the individual-level totals from the same registry are compiled and where they are contested.

None of that makes the family counts unusable. It makes them what they are: one ministry's registry-derived tallies, relayed by named news organizations, at stated thresholds, on stated dates.

What does Israel's own account of these strikes say?

Israel's published records count strikes and casualties by category, not by household. The Israel Defense Forces spokesperson, Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari, stated at a briefing on 29 February 2024 that the military had killed **over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza** since the war began, the IDF's own count and its own classification, not an independently verified one.

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement current to 14 September 2025, reported more than 106,000 aid trucks entering Gaza carrying over two million tons of supplies, and 207 hostages returned or recovered against 48 remaining in captivity, all Israel's stated totals. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, COGAT's own operational records, resting on self-declaration by suppliers rather than weighing at the crossings.

Two Israeli research institutes publish related arithmetic. The Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, in 2025, set a ceiling of at most 41,000 civilian war-related deaths in Gaza, derived by subtracting estimated natural deaths and Israel's estimate of Hamas fighters killed from the Gaza Ministry of Health total, and stated on the same page that neither the Hamas-reported total nor Israel's fighter estimate has been independently confirmed. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies reported 1,664 Israelis confirmed killed and 17,809 wounded as of 5 September 2024, including 1,184 killed on 7 October 2023.


Set against the question, the notable feature of these records is what they do not contain. None of the Israeli publications carried here reports a count of families killed in single strikes, of multigenerational households, or of buildings struck with their occupants inside. The Israeli categories are strikes, sorties, people classified as combatants, aid tonnage and Israeli casualties. The Palestinian categories include families at loss thresholds. The two sides publish counts of different units, so no direct comparison between them is available in the record, and the family-level question has one publishing party rather than two.

Does population density figure into the recorded toll?

Gaza's residential concentration is on the official record. The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics counted **1,899,291 residents of the Gaza Strip** in its 2017 census, the last full

enumeration in the territory, on a reference date of 1 December 2017, alongside 2,881,687 in the West Bank.

Recorded and estimated population of the Gaza Strip



Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018 census final results and 2025 year-end brief. The 2023 and 2025 figures are the bureau's estimates, not enumerations.

The World Bank's World Development Indicators put the combined West Bank and Gaza population at 5,289,152 for 2024, with values after 2017 projected off the census rather than counted, and with post-October-2023 values carrying the UN's war-adjusted mortality treatment. The UN Population Division's World Population Prospects 2024 reports the State of Palestine as a single area and does not publish Gaza separately, so no Gaza-specific figure exists in that series.

Household size for Gaza does not appear in these releases. What the census establishes is the number of people and localities, and what the bureau's 2025 brief establishes is that roughly 2.2 million people were living in the Strip before the war and nearly two million of them were displaced. The building type described in the case records, multi-storey residential blocks holding several related households, is the link between those population figures and the family tolls: where an extended family occupies one structure, a single strike reaches a number of relatives that a dispersed settlement pattern would not put at one address. The Institute's report on [how densely Israelis and Palestinians live](#) works through the official density series in full.

That relationship is structural rather than causal in these records. The census reports where people live; the case records report what happened at particular addresses. No source carried

here measures the two together.

What has been measured about Gaza coverage and attitudes toward Jews?

Where attitudes have been measured in the political context of the war, the findings are correlational. Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), in two British experiments with samples of **354 and 490 participants**, found political orientation positively associated with anti-Jewish hostility through social dominance orientation, and separately found conservative orientation negatively associated with antisemitism through out-group identity fusion with the Palestinian people.

The second pathway is the one the authors describe as identity-based: a fusion with the Palestinian people that, in their measurement, coincides with attitudes toward Israel and prejudice toward Jews being conflated. The study measures associations in two primed British samples and makes no causal claim about media coverage.

Huesmann, Dubow, Boxer, Souweidane and Ginges (2012), surveying 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American high-school students, found that total media exposure to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict did not directly predict ethnic stereotypes. The association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed, and ethnic identity correlated with implicit out-group stereotyping at $r = -0.70$. Exposure alone, in that sample, was not the operative variable.

Enstad (2026), in two nationally representative Norwegian surveys with samples of 1,575 and 1,653 including a preregistered replication, measured endorsement of Holocaust inversion, defined there as the belief that Israel treats Palestinians as badly as Jews were treated during the Second World War. In both studies endorsement was associated with justification of harassment and violence against Jews and with refusal to take a stance against such aggression, and also with refusal to answer questions measuring blatant antisemitic prejudice.

These three studies measure attitudes in Britain, the United States and Norway, in samples of a few hundred to a few thousand, at three different dates. None of them measures Gaza

coverage volume, none measures the events described in the sections above, and each reports associations rather than causes, as the authors themselves state. The Institute's report on [whether antisemitism rises after conflict](#) carries the incident-count evidence on the same question.

Methodology and limitations

This report assembles published counts and case records that bear on two distinct claims: that single Israeli strikes have killed entire multigenerational families, and that bombardment has wiped out entire neighborhoods. It draws on four source types, each labelled where used.

Official and primary records: the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2017 census final results and its 2025 year-end brief, the World Bank's World Development Indicators, and the UN Population Division's World Population Prospects 2024. Census figures are enumerations; every post-2017 total for Gaza in either series is a projection off that base, and the UN series does not publish Gaza separately.

Parties' own published counts: the Palestinian health ministry in Gaza for the family-loss tallies, relayed by named news organizations; and, on the Israeli side, the IDF spokesperson's briefing of 29 February 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement current to September 2025, COGAT's 2026 humanitarian situation report, and the Jerusalem Center and Begin-Sadat Center institute publications. Each is a count produced by a party to the events it describes and is presented as that party's own, not as neutral or independently verified. Combatant and civilian classifications in these records are the classifying party's own.

Named news organizations: Reuters (2023), the Associated Press (2023) and The Guardian (2023, 2026) for case reconstructions and for relaying the ministry tallies. Where a figure originates with a ministry and is relayed by a news organization, this report attributes it to the ministry and names the relay.

Peer-reviewed research: Ozer, Obaidi and Bergh (2025), Huesmann and colleagues (2012) and Enstad (2026) for measured attitudes, all correlational, each carrying its sample size as reported.

Descriptions produced by advocacy and intergovernmental bodies, including Amnesty International and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, are named and dated in the body where their characterizations are the ones in circulation, and are identified as those bodies' own accounts on their own criteria.

Limits on what can be established from this material: the family tallies are threshold counts, so no figure here reports the number of families with no surviving members; a circulating figure of 825 families attributed to the Palestine News and Information Agency has no locatable underlying report in this record; no count of neighborhoods in which every building and every resident was eliminated appears in any source used; household-size figures for Gaza are not published in the releases carried here; and Israel's published records contain no family-level or household-level count.

Conclusion

Have Israeli heavy bombs wiped out entire multigenerational families and neighborhoods? On families, the record answers with names, dates and numbers. Reuters counted 35 Hamdan relatives across three generations at one address on 7 November 2023. The Palestinian health ministry counted 312 families past a 10-relative threshold by 12 November 2023, and about 31 families past 30. The Guardian counted eight Ham relatives across three generations in Lebanon in 2026. These are counts of relatives killed at shared addresses, not certificates that a lineage ended, and the difference is in the record rather than in the phrasing that travels.

On neighborhoods, the record answers in a different currency. Villages destroyed in southern Lebanon, apartment blocks and family compounds destroyed in Gaza, nearly two million of Gaza's roughly 2.2 million pre-war residents displaced, and a population the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics puts about 254,000 lower at the end of 2025 than its pre-war estimates. Places emptied and buildings flattened are documented; a neighborhood counted as wholly eliminated, every building and every resident, is not a unit any of these bodies publishes. The party conducting the strikes publishes strikes, sorties, aid tonnage and a count of people it classifies as combatants, and publishes no household unit at all.

That asymmetry is where the two vocabularies of this war meet. One side of the record counts families and the other counts targets, and the sentence a reader encounters afterward, in a headline or a caption or an argument at a dinner table, has to choose between them. The Norwegian surveys and the British experiments in this report measure something adjacent and uncomfortable: that endorsement of one framing of these events travels with justification of harassment against Jews, in samples of 1,575 and 1,653 people who have never been near Gaza. Which of these countable losses becomes a story about a state's conduct, and which becomes a story about a people, is decided in the retelling. That is the seam worth watching.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does the Palestinian health ministry decide that a family has lost 10 relatives?

The tallies relayed by the Associated Press and The Guardian in 2023 are drawn from the ministry's death registry and civil-registration records, which record names and family affiliation. The ministry has not published the matching rule it applies, and the counts are threshold tallies rather than a category for families with no survivors.

Why do the two family counts from November 2023 differ?

The Gaza Ministry of Health figure of about 304 families and the 312-family figure relayed by The Guardian on 12 November 2023 are successive readings of the same registry days apart, not separate measurements. Registry counts rise as bodies are recovered and identified, which in collapsed multi-storey buildings can take weeks.

When was Gaza's population last actually counted?

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics enumerated 1,899,291 Gaza residents in its 2017 census, with a reference date of 1 December 2017. Every later total, including the World Bank's and the UN Population Division's, is projected off that base rather than counted.

Which Israeli bodies publish counts related to the strikes?

The Israel Defense Forces publishes strike and casualty figures through spokesperson briefings, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes hostage and aid totals, and COGAT publishes aid tonnage. All are counts by a party to the conflict, and the IDF's classification of those it counts is its own.

Why are casualty figures from monitoring and advocacy organizations treated differently from official statistics?

They are produced on the organization's own definitions and investigative criteria, which differ from a registry's and from a statistical office's. Amnesty International's case documentation and a census enumeration answer different questions and are not interchangeable, so each is labelled by what produced it.

What has been measured about how conflict coverage relates to prejudice?

Huesmann and colleagues (2012), surveying 89 Jewish American and 180 Arab American students, found that exposure to conflict coverage did not directly predict stereotypes; the association ran through identification with the groups as portrayed. The finding is correlational and specific to that adolescent sample.

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