

RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Why Did Israel Fail to See the October 7 Attack Coming?

The IDF's expert team named 6 central factors for the 7 October failure, and the Israel Security Agency dates detection of the plans to 2018 and 2022.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY October 7 IDF Israel Security Agency Intelligence
Military Investigations



6 central explanatory factors for the failure of 7 October 2023 are named in the summary the Israel Defense Forces published on 10 November 2025, setting out the conclusions of an expert team appointed by the Chief of Staff on 22 March 2025. The team examined 25 IDF investigations in depth and interviewed about 80 relevant office-holders, and its central finding, in its own words, is that the surprise “did not emerge from a vacuum empty of information”. This is a party reviewing its own investigations of its own failure, and the team stated that it examined IDF investigations only, and not the space between the political and military echelons or between the IDF and parallel security bodies.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
6	Central explanatory factors the expert team named for the failure	Israel Defense Forces	Summary published 10 November 2025
25	IDF investigations examined in depth by the team	Israel Defense Forces	Investigations held from 7 March 2024
About 80	Office-holders interviewed by the team, on its own count	Israel Defense Forces	Team appointed 22 March 2025
None	Commanders or intelligence personnel the team identified as having assembled an enemy situation picture, on its own review	Israel Defense Forces	Night before the attack, 7 October 2023
2018 and 2022	Years Hamas invasion plans were detected by Israeli intelligence, on the agency's own account	Israel Security Agency	Findings published 2025

The IDF expert team named 6 central factors for the failure

The Israel Defense Forces summary records six central explanatory factors, drawn by a team of its own appointment reviewing its own investigations. The factors are the team's own framing and the summary does not rank or weight them.

- A conceptual failure about Gaza and Hamas
- An intelligence failure in understanding the threat and in not giving the warning
- The absence of engagement with the “Jericho Wall” plan
- An organisational and operational culture of deficient norms entrenched over years
- A substantial continuing gap at every command level between the reference threat and the operational response
- Deficient decision-making and force employment on the night itself

The Security Agency says the attack could have been prevented

The Israel Security Agency states that Hamas invasion plans were detected by Israeli intelligence in 2018 and again, in greater detail, in 2022, and that “these plans were never fully processed as an imminent threat, which led to a lack of preparation”. The agency states the attack could have been prevented had it acted differently. This is the agency's own inquiry into its own conduct,

published by it and reported through Ynetnews and The Times of Israel.

Dates in Israel's own account of the failure

DETECTION YEARS, THE ATTACK, AND THE REVIEWS THAT FOLLOWED



Source: Israel Security Agency, 2025, for the 2018 and 2022 detections; Israel Defense Forces, 2025, for the review dates. Each is the body's own account of its own conduct.

No one assembled an enemy situation picture that night

On the night before the attack the Israel Defense Forces team identified no one, among commanders or in the intelligence community, who assembled an enemy situation picture thoroughly and professionally, on its own review of the IDF's own investigations. The summary records that no intelligence picture was formed and no professional discussion was held on raising the alert level, and that in the critical hours before the attack "not one significant action was taken among the line forces or the reserves".

The same summary records that during 2023 senior military figures warned that Israel's enemies had identified a process of internal weakening that harmed deterrence and raised the

likelihood of escalation, and that the required military steps to improve readiness were not taken.

The team attributed failures to the General Staff and 4 commands

The Israel Defense Forces summary attributes the failure by body, in its own review of its own conduct. It also lists the Air Force and Navy as contributing, with the qualification that no alert level was raised and no readiness level changed, which might have let them respond faster.

Body named	What the summary attributes to it
General Staff	Severely underestimating an enemy it had itself defined as a “terror army”
Operations Directorate	Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed
Intelligence Directorate	A collection concept in Gaza resting on access too narrow to permit warning
Southern Command	Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed
Gaza Division	Named among the bodies to which failure is attributed

Source: Israel Defense Forces, Chief of Staff's summary of the expert report, published 10 November 2025, the IDF's own attribution of its own failure.

The “Jericho Wall” plan was never investigated, the team found

The Israel Defense Forces team identified subjects that had not been investigated at all and recommended completing them, chief among them how information that arrived over the years was handled, and the systemic and operational aspects of the “Jericho

Wall” plan. The Chief of Staff stated that a broad systemic investigation is still needed covering the inter-organisational and inter-echelon interfaces not yet examined, accepted the recommendations, and appointed the Deputy Chief of Staff to oversee implementation.

The published record here is the military’s own. On the political echelon, and on the interfaces between the IDF and parallel security bodies, this summary states that the team did not examine them and publishes no findings.

Which figures here are a body’s own account of its own conduct?

The Israel Defense Forces summary is a review of the IDF’s own investigations by a team the Chief of Staff appointed, and the Israel Security Agency findings are that agency’s inquiry into itself.

The 25 and the about 80 count different things: 25 is investigations examined, 80 is people interviewed, and neither is a count of the investigations the IDF conducted in total, which the summary does not give.

The 2018 and 2022 detection dates are the Israel Security Agency’s, and the review dates are the Israel Defense Forces’; they belong to two bodies and to two separate inquiries.

The six factors are the team’s own framing, are not ranked, and are not presented by the team as a causal chain.

Questions readers ask

Who conducted the review of the 7 October investigations?

A team headed by a major general in the reserves, appointed by the Chief of Staff on 22 March 2025, reporting to the Chief of Staff and the General Staff forum, as the Israel Defense Forces published on 10 November 2025.

Did Israeli intelligence hold the Hamas attack plans before 7 October?

The Israel Security Agency states that invasion plans were detected in 2018 and in greater detail in 2022, and that the plans were never fully processed as an imminent threat.

Does any Israeli body say the attack was preventable?

The Israel Security Agency states, in its own investigation into its own conduct, that the attack could have been prevented had it acted differently.

How many investigations did the expert team examine?

The Israel Defense Forces reports that the team examined 25 investigations in depth and interviewed about 80 relevant office-holders.

Which investigations were under review?

Those held from 7 March 2024, on the then Chief of Staff's order for an internal General Staff investigation of the war, as the Israel Defense Forces published.

What did the team say about the hours before the attack?

The Israel Defense Forces summary records that no intelligence picture was formed, no professional discussion was held on raising the alert level, and "not one significant action was taken among the line forces or the reserves".

Which bodies did the review name?

The Israel Defense Forces named the General Staff, the Operations Directorate, the Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command and the Gaza Division, with the Air Force and Navy listed as contributing.

What did the review say about the intelligence collection in Gaza?

The Israel Defense Forces states that the Intelligence Directorate's collection concept in Gaza rested on access too narrow to permit warning.

Were there warnings during 2023?

The Israel Defense Forces summary records that senior military figures warned during 2023 that Israel's enemies had identified a process of internal weakening that harmed deterrence and raised

the likelihood of escalation, and that the required readiness steps were not taken.

What remains uninvestigated on the IDF's own account?

The Israel Defense Forces reports that how information arriving over the years was handled, and the systemic and operational aspects of the “Jericho Wall” plan, had not been investigated, and recommends completing them.

Does the review cover the political echelon?

No. The Israel Defense Forces states that the team examined IDF investigations only, and that a broad systemic investigation of the inter-organisational and inter-echelon interfaces is still needed.

Does another Israeli body audit military conduct?

The State Comptroller of Israel published a special report in March 2018 auditing the IDF's examination and control mechanisms in Operation Protective Edge, including whether training carried the humanitarian rules of international law; that report also records that an earlier audit, drafted in 2014, was not published.

Sources

- Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Chief of Staff's summary of the expert report on the quality of the 7 October investigations and the lessons drawn from them. IDF Spokesperson's Unit,

idf.il/315803, published 10 November 2025. Official or primary record.

- Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), 2025. Findings of its own investigation into 7 October. Reported by Ynetnews and The Times of Israel. Official or primary record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2018. Operation Protective Edge: IDF Activity in Aspects of International Law, and the Examination and Control Mechanisms of the Civilian and Military Echelons. Special report, March 2018. Official or primary record.

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Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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PRIMARY DOCUMENT September 9, 2026

What Does Israel's Ceasefire Decision Say About Its Forces in Gaza?

Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025, sets two IDF deployment stages by annexed map and carries no disarmament paragraph in its published text.

TREATIES AND FOREIGN RELATIONS


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48 hostages, 250 prisoners and 1,722 detainees from Gaza are the quantities the Government of Israel published in Decision 3396, adopted on 9 October 2025, and no paragraph of the published text addresses weapons, tunnels, military production sites or a decommissioning period. The decision is Israel's own instrument, approved by its cabinet on the basis of a security-political opinion of the National Security Council, and it records what Israel decided rather than what any other party undertook. It provides for two IDF deployment stages by reference to annexed maps, and it cancels the ceasefire if the hostages are not returned.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
0 paragraphs	Published paragraphs addressing weapons, tunnels, production sites or a decommissioning period	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	Adopted 9 October 2025
2 deployment stages	IDF deployments set by reference to annexed maps, at Annex D and Annex E	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	Adopted 9 October 2025
24 hours	Window within which the IDF was to deploy per the maps at Annex D	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	From adoption, 9 October 2025
48 hostages	20 living, 2 whose deaths had not been determined, 26 deceased, to be returned	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	Within 72 hours of that deployment
2 ministers	Office holders authorised jointly to terminate execution of the framework	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	Adopted 9 October 2025
1 classified annex	Annex B, carrying further conditions and the humanitarian aid arrangements	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	Held in the Government Secretariat

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
0 dates	Withdrawal dates or milestones published in the war diary dispatches	IDF Spokesperson	4 November 2025 and 13 April 2026

The aid terms sit inside Annex B, which is classified

The Government of Israel states in paragraph 1 of Decision 3396 that the framework includes further conditions set out in Annex B, and in paragraph 7 that humanitarian aid will be brought into the Gaza Strip as detailed in that same Annex B. Annex B is classified. Annexes C to F, carrying the prisoner lists, the maps and the hostage list, sit in the Government Secretariat files rather than in the text published on 9 October 2025, so the published decision is not the whole instrument.

- Annex B: further conditions and the aid arrangements. Classified.
- Annexes C to F: prisoner lists, hostage list and deployment maps. Held in the Government Secretariat.
- Paragraph 8.1: the Government of Israel required publication of the decision and Annex C on the Ministry of Justice website, withholding the names of the Gaza detainees not involved in the events of 7 October, of the further 20, and of the minors among the 250, for whom the police file and criminal proceeding numbers were to be given so far as possible.

Decision 3396 carries no disarmament clause in its published text

The published paragraphs of Decision 3396 cover the ceasefire, the deployment, the hostage return, the releases, the transfer of bodies, a permanent-removal condition, termination authority and publication. The Government of Israel published no paragraph on weapons, tunnels, production sites or a period over which any decommissioning would run. This is the Israeli cabinet's own record of its own decision.

Paragraph	What the Government of Israel decided
2.1	Ceasefire from adoption; IDF deployment within 24 hours per the maps at Annex D
2.2	Return of 48 hostages within 72 hours of that deployment
2.3.1	Release of 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Prison Service, plus some of a further 20, and 1,722 detainees from Gaza including 22 minors
2.3.2	Transfer of 360 bodies to Gaza
3.1	Release of a prisoner convicted of murder conditional on permanent transfer to Gaza or abroad
6	Cancellation of the ceasefire if paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled

Source: Government of Israel, Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025. Of the 1,722, the decision records 1,411 as held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF.


Annex D no longer binds the IDF if the 48 are unreturned

Paragraph 6 of Decision 3396 states that “in the event that paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled, the ceasefire shall be cancelled and the IDF shall no longer be bound by the deployment at Annex D.”

Paragraph 2.2 is the hostage return: 20 living, 2 whose lives were gravely feared for but whose deaths had not been determined, and 26 deceased. In the Government of Israel's own decision, the deployment obligation is conditioned on that return and on nothing else the published text names. The second stage, at Annex E, is described in paragraph 2.1 as being in order to prevent friction with the population in the Gaza Strip.

The sequence set by Decision 3396

PUBLISHED PARAGRAPHS ONLY; THE ANNEXED MAPS ARE NOT PUBLISHED.



If paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled, paragraph 6 cancels the ceasefire and Annex D ceases to bind.

Source: Government of Israel, Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025. The governments own decision; Annexes D and E are held in the Government Secretariat.

Paragraph 4.3 lets 2 ministers terminate execution of the framework

The Government of Israel authorised the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, jointly, to decide to terminate execution of the framework, including where paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled. That authority is named in the decision the cabinet itself adopted on 9 October 2025, which is Israel's own record of its own decision-making, and it identifies two office holders rather than a body.

- Approval basis: a security-political opinion of the National Security Council, formed after the positions of the security and

political bodies were received.

- Termination: the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, acting jointly, under paragraph 4.3.
- Automatic cancellation: paragraph 6, on non-fulfilment of the hostage return.

No Israeli body publishes a withdrawal timetable or phased schedule

Decision 3396 publishes two deployment stages by reference to Annexes D and E and no dates beyond the 24-hour and 72-hour windows in paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2. The IDF Spokesperson published dated dispatches during the ceasefire stating that forces are deployed and operating in accordance with the agreement, which is the IDF's own characterisation of its own conduct. Those dispatches give no schedule, no milestone list and no count of positions held or vacated.

Dispatch	What the IDF Spokesperson published	Date
Division 252, yellow line area	Battle-team forces of Brigade 11 and Brigade 188 operating east of the yellow line, a forward line inside the northern Gaza Strip, "in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon"	4 November 2025
War diary, 18:15 entry	Strikes during that week on armed operatives approaching the yellow line, and forces under Southern Command "deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement"	13 April 2026

Which figures here may not be added together?

Every figure on this page is the Government of Israel's or the IDF's own published record of its own decisions and operations. The 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Prison Service and the 1,722 detainees from Gaza are separate categories in Decision 3396, which describes the 1,722 as not having been involved in the events of 7 October 2023; they may not be summed into one release figure. The two war diary dispatches are single dated publications, not a series, and support no count of operations across the ceasefire. The published text is partial: Annex B is classified, and Annexes C to F are held in the Government Secretariat.

Questions readers ask

Does Decision 3396 mention disarmament?

The Government of Israel published no paragraph on weapons, tunnels, military production sites or a decommissioning period in the text of Decision 3396 released on 9 October 2025.

Does the decision provide for an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza?

The Government of Israel published two deployment stages, at Annex D and Annex E, in paragraph 2.1 of Decision 3396. The published text sets positions by reference to annexed maps and does not provide for forces to leave the Strip.

What conditions the ceasefire?

Paragraph 6 of Decision 3396 states that the ceasefire is cancelled if the return of the 48 hostages under paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled.

Who can end the framework?

The Government of Israel authorised the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, jointly, under paragraph 4.3.

When did the ceasefire begin?

Decision 3396 provides that the ceasefire commences at the time of the adoption of the decision, which the Government Secretariat published as 9 October 2025.

How many hostages were covered?

Paragraph 2.2 of Decision 3396 lists 48: 20 living, 2 whose deaths had not been determined, and 26 deceased, including 1 non-Israeli feared for and 3 non-Israeli deceased.

How many people were to be released?

The Government of Israel approved the release of 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Prison Service, some of a further list of 20, and 1,722 detainees from Gaza including 22 minors, of whom 1,411 were held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF.

Are the deployment maps public?

Annexes C to F, which include the maps, are held in the Government Secretariat files. The Government of Israel published

the decision and Annex C on the Ministry of Justice website under paragraph 8.1.

What has the IDF published about its activity during the ceasefire?

The IDF Spokesperson published dated war diary dispatches, including on 4 November 2025 and 13 April 2026, describing operations east of the yellow line and strikes near it, and stating that forces are deployed in accordance with the agreement. Those are the IDF's own accounts of its own operations.

Is there a published timetable for the stages?

The Government of Israel published a 24-hour window for the Annex D deployment and a 72-hour window for the hostage return, and no further dates. The IDF Spokesperson published no schedule or milestone list in the dispatches recorded here.

Does any Israeli body publish a count of positions vacated?

No count of positions held or vacated appears in Decision 3396 or in the IDF Spokesperson dispatches recorded here.

Sources

- Government of Israel, 2025. Decision 3396, Framework for the release of all Israeli hostages. Government Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office, adopted 9 October 2025, made under section

8b(a) of the Government Law, 5761-2001. gov.il. Official or primary record.

- Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson, 2025. Division 252 activity in the yellow line area. War diary, published 4 November 2025. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson, 2026. War diary, 13 April 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.

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What Did Israel's Cabinet Decide About the Gaza Ceasefire?



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Is Israel Striking Gaza During the Ceasefire?



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Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the Ceasefire?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Who Can Get Israeli Citizenship?

Israel's Citizenship Law 5712-1952 sets 4 routes to citizenship, and about 95% of residents acquired it on one day in 1952.

LAW AND COURTS [Citizenship Law](#) [Law Of Return](#) [Naturalisation](#) [Ministry Of Justice](#) [Supreme Court](#)



About 95% of the population then living in Israel, roughly a million and a half people, Jewish and Arab alike, acquired Israeli citizenship automatically on 14 July 1952, the day the Citizenship Law 5712-1952 entered into force, on the Ministry

of Justice's own published account of the statute it administers. The Ministry records four routes in the law: automatic acquisition by residents, acquisition by return, acquisition by birth in Israel to an Israeli parent, and naturalisation by choice. The Ministry also records that the automatic route was not open to everyone present, but required three conditions together.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
4	Routes to citizenship set out in the Citizenship Law 5712-1952	Ministry of Justice of Israel	Law in force from 14 July 1952
About 95%	Share of the population living in Israel that acquired citizenship automatically when the law came into force	Ministry of Justice of Israel	14 July 1952
About 1.5 million	People acquiring citizenship on that day, Jewish and Arab alike	Ministry of Justice of Israel	14 July 1952
3	Conditions required together for the automatic route	Ministry of Justice of Israel	Statehood to 14 July 1952
1 March 1952	Deadline for registration as a resident under the Residents Registry Ordinance	Ministry of Justice of Israel	1952
4 years	Period in which the State had no legal determination of who its citizens were	Ministry of Justice of Israel	1948 to 1952
2	Supreme Court judgments construing the contested third condition	Supreme Court of Israel	1953

The Citizenship Law 5712-1952 sets 4 routes to citizenship

The Ministry of Justice, in its own published account of the law it administers, lists four routes and no others. It also records that the Citizenship Law and the Law of Return were drafted together and then deliberately separated, the Law of Return's essence being a distinction between Jews and non-Jews for the purpose of immigration, while the Citizenship Law was intended as a general law blind to those considerations. The Ministry's account names naturalisation by choice as a route and does not set out its conditions, so the residence, language and renunciation requirements are not stated in that record.

Route	What it turns on
Automatic acquisition by residents	Residence and registration when the law entered into force in 1952
Acquisition by return	Immigration under the Law of Return 5710-1950
Acquisition by birth in Israel	Birth in Israel to an Israeli parent
Naturalisation by choice	Application, on conditions the Ministry's account does not set out

Source: Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019, Roots in Law project.

About 95% acquired citizenship automatically on 14 July 1952

The Ministry of Justice records that about 95% of the population then living in Israel, roughly a million and a half people, became citizens on the single day the law entered into force, and that the statute applied retroactively to the day the State was established. Those two figures reach the Ministry's account through its own footnotes to 1952 press reports rather than through a statistical series. The Ministry also records the four years that preceded it.

- For four years, from 1948 to 1952, the State had no legal determination of who its citizens were, on the Ministry of Justice's account.
- Two Knesset elections were held in that period, in January 1949 and July 1951, without voters or elected members being citizens.
- The judges, ministers, Prime Minister and President were not citizens either.
- The bill's explanatory notes describe the Citizenship Law as "one of the Basic Laws", and the Minister of the Interior presented it to the Knesset as a law guaranteeing full equality in rights and obligations for all citizens of the State. It is ordinary legislation, not a Basic Law.

The automatic route required registration by 1 March 1952

The Ministry of Justice records three conditions that had to be met together for automatic acquisition, and registration was the first of them. A person had to be registered as a resident under the Residents Registry Ordinance by 1 March 1952, had to be an Israeli resident, and had, from the establishment of the State to the law's entry into force, to have been in Israel or to have entered it lawfully. Israeli law on [equality between citizens](#) sits after that gate, not at it.

The 3 conditions for automatic acquisition

ALL THREE REQUIRED TOGETHER, IN FORCE 14 JULY 1952



Registration under the Residents Registry Ordinance.

Source: Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019, Roots in Law project, the Ministry account of the statute it administers.

Ka'adan calls the Law of Return a special key

The Supreme Court held, at paragraph 31 of HCJ 6698/95 Ka'adan v Israel Land Administration, delivered 8 March 2000, that “members of the Jewish nation were granted a special key to enter (see the Law of Return-5710-1950), but once a person has lawfully entered the home, he enjoys equal rights with all other household members.” The same paragraph states that the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish state would not justify discrimination by the State between its citizens on the basis of religion or nationality. The Knesset published [Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People](#) in 2018, in an English translation the Knesset itself labels unofficial, whose clause 5 provides that the State “shall be open to Jewish immigration, and the ingathering of the exiles.”

The third condition was contested and 2 judgments construed it

The Ministry of Justice records that the third condition was attacked during enactment as preventing part of the Arab population from acquiring citizenship, the argument turning on

people who left during or before the 1948 war and returned unlawfully. The Ministry states that the government said it did not intend to strip citizenship from a large group among the Arab population, and that the Minister of Justice said an Interior Ministry official had been appointed to ensure the automatic naturalisation of the Arab population was fair and proper. Those are statements recorded by the Ministry in its own account of the enactment.

Judgment	Report	Year
HCI 112/52 Khalaf v Minister of the Interior	PD 7 185	1953
HCI 112/53 Nakara v Minister of the Interior	PD 7 955	1953

Source: Supreme Court of Israel, as cited by the Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019.

Which figures here come from the Ministry's own account?

Every figure above is the Ministry of Justice's own published account of the Citizenship Law 5712-1952, except the two 1953 judgments, which are Supreme Court records, and clause 5, which is the Knesset's enacted text in a translation the Knesset labels unofficial. The 95% and the roughly 1.5 million are approximations as the Ministry prints them and are not a Central Bureau of Statistics series; do not multiply one by the other or restate either as exact. The Ministry's account covers acquisition only, so it carries nothing on revocation, on later amendments, or on the conditions of naturalisation today.

Questions readers ask

How many routes to citizenship does Israeli law set out?

The Ministry of Justice records four routes in the Citizenship Law 5712-1952: automatic acquisition by residents, acquisition by return, acquisition by birth in Israel to an Israeli parent, and naturalisation by choice.

When did the Citizenship Law come into force?

The Ministry of Justice records that the law entered into force on 14 July 1952 and applied retroactively to the day the State was established.

Did Arab residents acquire citizenship in 1952?

The Ministry of Justice records that about 95% of the population then living in Israel, Jewish and Arab alike, acquired citizenship automatically on 14 July 1952.

Who was left outside the automatic route?

The Ministry of Justice records that the automatic route required registration by 1 March 1952, Israeli residence, and presence in Israel or lawful entry between statehood and 14 July 1952.

Why is the Law of Return a separate law?

The Ministry of Justice records that the two laws were drafted together and deliberately separated, the Law of Return being a

distinction between Jews and non-Jews for immigration and the Citizenship Law a general law.

What did the Supreme Court say about the Law of Return?

The Supreme Court held in Ka'adan, on 8 March 2000, that members of the Jewish nation were granted a special key to enter, and that once a person has lawfully entered he enjoys equal rights with all other household members.

Does the Nation-State Law deal with immigration?

The Knesset published the Basic Law in 2018, and clause 5 states that the State shall be open to Jewish immigration and the ingathering of the exiles.

Who was a citizen between 1948 and 1952?

The Ministry of Justice records that for four years the State had no legal determination of who its citizens were, and that two Knesset elections were held in that period.

Was the Citizenship Law a Basic Law?

The Ministry of Justice records that the bill's explanatory notes called it "one of the Basic Laws" and that the Minister of the Interior presented it that way. It is ordinary legislation.

Which courts construed the contested condition?

The Ministry of Justice records that the Supreme Court construed it in HCJ 112/52 Khalaf and HCJ 112/53 Nakara, both reported in 1953.

Does this record cover naturalisation requirements?

The Ministry of Justice names naturalisation by choice as a route and does not set out its conditions in that account, so no residence, language or renunciation requirement is stated here.

Does this record cover a Palestinian spouse of an Israeli?

No. That process runs under separate legislation and is covered in the record on [Palestinian spouses and Israeli residency](#).

Sources

- Israeli Supreme Court, 2000. HCJ 6698/95 Ka'adan v. Israel Land Administration. Judgment of 8 March 2000. Official or primary record.
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- Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019. The Citizenship Law, 5712-1952. Roots in Law project, gov.il. Official or primary record.



RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

Does Israeli Law Privilege Jews Over Non-Jews?



PRIMARY DOCUMENT August 20, 2026

What Does Israel's Nation-State Law Actually Say?



KEY FIGURES August 31, 2026

Can a Palestinian Spouse Get Israeli Residency?

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Why Did Israel Fail to See the October 7 Attack Coming?

The IDF's expert team named 6 central factors for the 7 October failure, and the Israel Security Agency dates detection of the plans to 2018 and 2022.

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PRIMARY DOCUMENT September 9, 2026

What Did Israel's Cabinet Decide About the Gaza Ceasefire?

Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025: a ceasefire on adoption, 48 hostages in 72 hours, 250 prisoners and 1,722 Gaza detainees.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY [Gaza Ceasefire](#) [Decision 3396](#) [Hostages](#) [Prisoner Release](#)
Government of Israel



48 hostages were to be returned within 72 hours under Decision 3396, which the Government of Israel adopted on 9 October 2025 under section 8b(a) of the Government Law. The Government of Israel approved a ceasefire commencing at the time of the decision's adoption, an IDF deployment within 24 hours to lines drawn on maps at Annex D, the release of 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Israel Prison Service, and separately the release of 1,722 detainees from Gaza. The Government Secretariat published the decision on 9 October 2025 and updated it on 10 October 2025, with Annex B classified and Annexes C to F held in the Secretariat's files.

Figure	What it counts	Period
48	Hostages to be returned under paragraph 2.2: 20 living, 2 whose deaths had not been determined, 26 deceased	Within 72 hours of the Annex D deployment
24 hours	Deadline for the IDF to deploy per the maps at Annex D, with the ceasefire commencing on adoption	From adoption, 9 October 2025
250	Prisoners and detainees held by the Prison Service approved for release under paragraph 2.3.1, plus some of a further list of 20	On adoption, 9 October 2025
1,722	Detainees from Gaza the decision states were not involved in the events of 7 October 2023 and were arrested after that date, including 22 minors under 18	On adoption, 9 October 2025
1,411 and 311	Split of the 1,722 between Prison Service custody and IDF custody, as the decision states it	On adoption, 9 October 2025
360	Bodies approved for transfer to Gaza under paragraph 2.3.2	On adoption, 9 October 2025


Source: Government of Israel, Decision 3396, adopted and published 9 October 2025, the Government's own decision text.

Decision 3396 approved a ceasefire and the return of 48 hostages

The Government of Israel approved the framework on the basis of a security-political opinion of the National Security Council, formed after the positions of the security and political bodies were received. Paragraph 2.1 provides that within 24 hours the IDF deploy per the maps at Annex D, and that there be a ceasefire commencing at the time of the decision's adoption; after the hostage release the IDF was to deploy per Annex E, stated in the decision to be in order to prevent friction with the population in the Gaza Strip. Paragraph 2.2 sets the 72-hour window and the composition of the 48, which on the Government's own count includes one non-Israeli among those feared for and 3 non-Israelis among the deceased.

The 48 hostages named in paragraph 2.2

COMPOSITION AS SET OUT IN DECISION 3396, ADOPTED 9 OCTOBER 2025



■ Living Israeli hostages ■ Deaths not determined ■ Deceased hostages

Source: Government of Israel, Decision 3396, paragraph 2.2, the Government of Israel's own decision text.

250 prisoners and 1,722 Gaza detainees are two separate lists

Paragraph 2.3.1 approves two categories with different bases, and the Government of Israel's own decision text keeps them apart. The first is 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Israel Prison Service, plus some of a further list of 20. The second is 1,700 detainees from Gaza whom the decision itself describes as not involved in the events of 7 October 2023 and as arrested after that date, together with 22 minors under 18 in the same category, 1,722 in all, of whom the decision states 1,411 were held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF. Paragraph 2.3.2 approves, separately again, the transfer to Gaza of 360 bodies.

List	Count	Basis stated in the decision	Custody
Prisoners and detainees, paragraph 2.3.1	250, plus some of a further list of 20	Held by the Israel Prison Service	Prison Service
Gaza detainees, paragraph 2.3.1	1,722, including 22 minors under 18	Not involved in the events of 7 October 2023, arrested after that date	1,411 Prison Service, 311 IDF
Bodies, paragraph 2.3.2	360	Approved for transfer to Gaza	Not stated

Source: Government of Israel, Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025, the Government's own decision text.

Paragraph 3.1 conditions a murderer's release on permanent removal

The Government of Israel set a condition on part of the release. Paragraph 3.1 provides that a security prisoner convicted of murder, of producing weapons used for murder, or of dispatching an attacker to an attack with fatalities was to be released only on condition of transfer to Gaza or abroad, and of never returning to Israel or to Judea and Samaria, permanently. The condition attaches to the offence of conviction rather than to a list of names, and the decision, which is the Government's own instrument, publishes no count of how many of the 250 fall inside it.

Paragraph 6 cancels the ceasefire if the 48 are not returned

The ceasefire the Government of Israel approved is conditional on the face of its own decision. Paragraph 6 provides that in the event that paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled, the ceasefire shall be cancelled and the IDF shall no longer be bound by the deployment at Annex D. Paragraph 4.3 authorises the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, jointly, to decide to terminate execution of the framework, including where paragraph 2.2 is not fulfilled.

- The trigger named in paragraph 6 is non-fulfilment of the 72-hour return of the 48.
- The consequence named is cancellation of the ceasefire and release from the Annex D deployment.
- The power to terminate execution sits with two ministers acting jointly, under paragraph 4.3.

The decision publishes no map of the Annex D deployment line

Paragraph 8.1 requires publication of the decision and Annex C on the Ministry of Justice website, withholding the names of the Gaza detainees not involved in 7 October, of the further list of 20, and of the minors among the 250, for whom the police file and criminal proceeding numbers were to be given so far as possible. The deployment maps at Annexes D and E are not among the published material, so no line appears in the published record of the Government of Israel's own decision. The IDF Spokesperson published on 4 November 2025, in the army's own war diary, that the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, that the yellow line is a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, and that Division 252 forces were operating east of it, which the IDF states was in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon. That is the army's own account of its own [operations inside the Strip](#).

Which figures in Decision 3396 may not be added together?

The Government of Israel published every figure above in its own decision text, and each belongs to the paragraph that carries it. The 250 and the 1,722 are separate categories on separate bases and do not form one release total; the 360 bodies are a third approval again. The 1,411 and the 311 are the two custody components of the 1,722 and are not additional people. Annex B is classified and Annexes C to F are held in the Government

Secretariat files, so conditions material to the framework, including the humanitarian-aid arrangements at paragraph 7, are not in the published text.

Questions readers ask

When did the Government of Israel adopt Decision 3396?

The Government of Israel adopted the decision on 9 October 2025 and the Government Secretariat published it that day, with an update on 10 October 2025.

When did the ceasefire begin?

Paragraph 2.1 states that the ceasefire commences at the time of the decision's adoption. The IDF Spokesperson published that the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00.

How many hostages were to be returned, and in what condition?

The Government of Israel approved the return of 48: 20 living Israeli hostages, 2 whose lives were gravely feared for but whose deaths had not been determined, and 26 deceased hostages.

How long did the framework allow for the return?

Paragraph 2.2 gives 72 hours from the deployment set out in paragraph 2.1, which itself falls within 24 hours of adoption.

How many Palestinian prisoners did the cabinet approve for release?

The Government of Israel approved 250 prisoners and detainees held by the Israel Prison Service, plus some of a further list of 20, and separately 1,722 detainees from Gaza, including 22 minors.

Who was holding the 1,722?

The Government of Israel states in its own decision that 1,411 were held by the Israel Prison Service and 311 by the IDF.

Did the decision approve a withdrawal from Gaza?

The Government of Israel approved deployment to the lines at Annex D and then at Annex E, described in the decision as preventing friction with the population in the Gaza Strip. No withdrawal from the Strip appears in the text.

Who can end the ceasefire under the decision?

Paragraph 4.3 authorises the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence, jointly, to decide to terminate execution of the framework, and paragraph 6 cancels the ceasefire if the 72-hour return is not fulfilled.

Were the names of those released published?

Paragraph 8.1 required publication of the decision and Annex C while withholding the names of the Gaza detainees, of the further list of 20, and of the minors among the 250.

Has the IDF published operations inside Gaza since the ceasefire began?

Yes. The IDF Spokesperson published on 13 April 2026, in the army's own war diary, that forces directed by Southern Command and the Israel Security Agency had struck armed operatives who approached the yellow line in the centre of the Gaza Strip during that week, and stated that its forces are deployed in accordance with the agreement. Those are the army's own dated dispatches about its [use of fire during the ceasefire](#), and no cumulative total appears in them.

Has anyone been prosecuted over the 7 October attack?

The State Comptroller of Israel reported that as at February 2026 no indictments had been filed against those suspected of grave crimes in the 7 October attack, on a joint decision of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice not to advance prosecutions while hostages were held, with several hundred expected.

How many security prisoners was Israel holding before the framework?

The State Comptroller of Israel reported 10,147 security prisoners held in Israel Prison Service facilities as at February 2025, with a further 2,366 held in IDF facilities, on the Prison Service's own figures relayed in the audit.

Sources

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Is Israel Striking Gaza During the Ceasefire?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the

Ceasefire?

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LATEST

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Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025, sets two IDF deployment stages by annexed map and carries no disarmament paragraph in its published text.

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

What Is the Natural Growth Argument for Settlement Expansion?

The Levy Commission recommended fixing settlement jurisdiction for “future natural growth”. The Bureau recorded 40.9 per 1,000 in Modi'in Illit in 2020.

LAND AND PLANNING Natural Increase Settlements Levy Report Central Bureau Of Statistics
State Land



40.9 per 1,000 residents was the rate of natural increase the Central Bureau of Statistics recorded for Modi'in Illit in 2020, the highest of any Jewish local authority and about three times the national rate of 13.9 in the same year. The argument itself appears in Israel's own record in the report of the Levy Commission, appointed by the government in 2012, which recommended that each settlement's municipal jurisdiction be determined by order "taking into due consideration future natural growth". That report was a government-appointed commission's own recommendation and was not adopted as such. Natural increase, on the Bureau's definition, is live births less deaths per 1,000 residents and carries no migration component.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
"future natural growth"	The criterion recommended for fixing each settlement's municipal jurisdiction by order	Levy Commission, appointed by the Israeli government	Report signed 21 June 2012
40.9 per 1,000	Natural increase in Modi'in Illit, live births less deaths, highest Jewish local authority	Central Bureau of Statistics	2020
13.9 per 1,000	National rate of natural increase, against 14.9 in 2019	Central Bureau of Statistics	2020
minus 4.7 per 1,000	Natural increase in Kfar Shmaryahu, deaths exceeding live births	Central Bureau of Statistics	2020
26 of 105	Unauthorized outposts standing on State land, on data supplied by the Civil Administration	Prime Minister's Office	March 2005

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
6,605	Illegal-construction cases identified in the Israeli sector by the Civil Administration's supervision unit	State Comptroller of Israel	1997 to 2013

The Levy Report ties jurisdiction orders to future natural growth

The Levy Commission stated its recommendations at paragraph 65 of its report, signed on 21 June 2012 and released on 9 July 2012. This is a legal opinion by a commission the Israeli government appointed to examine the government's own conduct, and it is that commission's own position rather than adopted policy: its closing page reads, "Should the government decide to adopt our recommendations, it will be necessary to implement those principles in detail."

The three recommendations that carry the argument, as printed:

- Determine each settlement's municipal jurisdiction by order, "taking into due consideration future natural growth".
- Remove "the administrative barriers imposed on the planning and zoning authorities ... without any further need for additional approval by the political level".
- Pending completion, "the state is advised to refrain from carrying out demolition orders, since it brought about the present situation through its own actions."


The report publishes no settlement count, no outpost count and no housing figure of its own.

Modi'in Illit recorded 40.9 natural increase per 1,000 in 2020

The Central Bureau of Statistics publishes natural increase for every local authority in Israel, settlements included, in Local Authorities in Israel 2020. It records Modi'in Illit as a municipality in the Judea and Samaria District and Immanuel as a local council in the same district, and gives the character of both as Haredi. The Bureau prints its own explanation above the table: high rates of natural increase are found mainly in Jewish local authorities of Haredi character and in Muslim local authorities.

Natural increase, highest Jewish authorities

RATE PER 1,000 RESIDENTS, 2020. NATIONAL RATE 13.9.



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Local Authorities in Israel 2020, Table D. Live births less deaths per 1,000 residents.

Of these four, only Modi'in Illit and Immanuel were located in the volume's district listing, so no district is stated here for the other

two.

The 13.9 national rate counts births minus deaths only

The Central Bureau of Statistics defines natural increase as the difference between live births and deaths during a year, expressed per 1,000 residents on the average population. The series carries no migration component, which is why several authorities record a negative rate, and why the Bureau publishes population change and natural increase as separate measures.

Local authority	Natural increase per 1,000, 2020	What a negative rate means
Kfar Shmaryahu	minus 4.7	Deaths exceeded live births
Kiryat Yam	minus 1.1	Deaths exceeded live births
Bat Yam	0.2	Live births exceeded deaths
Omer	0.3	Live births exceeded deaths
National rate	13.9	Live births exceeded deaths

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Local Authorities in Israel 2020, Table D, rates for 2020.

The 1979 resolution requires State land and a government decision

The Prime Minister's Office published, in March 2005, the English summary of an opinion it commissioned on unauthorized outposts. The legality test it applies is a 1979 government resolution, taken after the High Court of Justice ruling in Elon

Moreh, that “Israeli settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza shall be established only on State land”, and the first characteristic of an unauthorized outpost is that “There was no government decision to establish it, and in any case no authorized political echelon approved its establishment.” The land figures below are the reviewer’s own count off data supplied by the Civil Administration, which the summary states was incomplete, and the total of 105 is described in the same document as probably not reflecting the true number, so both counts are floors. The [statutory position on the state’s role in settlement](#) sits in Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, and [what State land means in the area](#) rests on separate instruments.

- 26 of the 105 outposts on State land, 7 on survey lands, 15 on Palestinian private property, 39 on mixed lands, and a remainder whose land status the reviewer could not resolve.
- 71 established before March 2001, 24 afterwards, 10 with no established date.

No Israeli body here publishes housing units attributed to natural growth

None of the Israeli official records used on this page carries a count of housing units, building permits or dunams approved on a natural-growth ground. The State Comptroller of Israel published, in Annual Report 66b of 2016, the supervision unit’s own counts of its own enforcement activity in the area, and those counts are broken down by sector rather than by any ground for approval. In Annual Report 70C the State Comptroller stated that real estate in

Judea and Samaria is registered in hard-copy registers, with no computerised system.

Figure	What it counts	Period
6,605	Illegal-construction cases identified in the Israeli sector, of which 1,807 demolished, 27%	1997 to 2013
13,481	Illegal-construction cases identified in the Palestinian sector, of which 3,813 demolished, 28%	1997 to 2013
120	Israeli localities in Area C, 87 of them established by the Settlement Division, holding about 100,000 residents	As at the audit, 2014
About 450,000 dunams	Area C land allocated by the Custodian to the Settlement Division under permit agreements	As at the audit, 2014

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 66b, 2016, relaying counts published by the Civil Administration's Central Supervision Unit.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The Central Bureau of Statistics rates are rates per 1,000 residents, not percentages and not counts of people, and natural increase excludes migration entirely, so a locality's natural increase is not its population growth. The two demolition shares have different denominators, 3,813 of 13,481 and 1,807 of 6,605, and each is a share of that sector's own identified cases across a cumulative window. The 105 outposts and the 26 on State land are both floors on partial data, and the four land categories in that review total 87, leaving 18 unresolved. Land allocated under permit agreements, land declared State land and land built on are three separate objects.

Questions readers ask

What is the natural growth argument for settlement expansion?

It is the argument that building should follow the growth of existing communities. The Levy Commission published it as a planning criterion in June 2012, recommending that municipal jurisdiction be fixed by order “taking into due consideration future natural growth”.

Where does the phrase appear in an Israeli official document?

The Levy Commission stated it at paragraph 65 of its report, signed 21 June 2012, in the recommendations addressed to the Israeli government that appointed it.

Were the Levy Commission’s recommendations adopted?

The commission stated that adoption was a matter for the government, writing, “Should the government decide to adopt our recommendations, it will be necessary to implement those principles in detail.” Its recommendations were not adopted as such.

What was the highest natural increase rate recorded in 2020?

The Central Bureau of Statistics recorded 40.9 per 1,000 residents in Modi’in Illit, followed by Beitar Illit at 40.4, Immanuel at 39.8

and Kiryat Ye'arim at 39.0.

What was the national rate?

The Central Bureau of Statistics recorded 13.9 per 1,000 in 2020, slightly below 14.9 in 2019.

Does natural increase measure how fast a place is growing?

No. The Central Bureau of Statistics defines it as live births less deaths only, and publishes it separately from population change, so people moving in or out are outside the measure.

Which localities recorded negative natural increase?

The Central Bureau of Statistics recorded minus 4.7 per 1,000 in Kfar Shmaryahu and minus 1.1 in Kiryat Yam in 2020, meaning deaths exceeded live births.

Why are some rates so high?

The Central Bureau of Statistics prints its own note that high rates are found mainly in Jewish local authorities of Haredi character and in Muslim local authorities, and it records the character of Modi'in Illit and Immanuel as Haredi.

What does the Israeli policy test require before a settlement is established?

The Prime Minister's Office published a March 2005 summary stating the 1979 government resolution that settlements "shall be

established only on State land”, and that an unauthorized outpost is one established without a government decision.

How many outposts stood on State land in 2005?

The Prime Minister’s Office published, in March 2005, that 26 of the 105 outposts then known stood on State land, on data supplied by the Civil Administration that the summary describes as incomplete.

Does any Israeli body publish housing approved on natural-growth grounds?

None of the records used here does. The State Comptroller of Israel counted illegal-construction cases by sector for 1997 to 2013 and Israeli localities in Area C as at 2014, with no breakdown by ground for approval.

How is land in the area registered?

The State Comptroller of Israel stated in Annual Report 70C that real estate in Judea and Samaria is registered in hard-copy registers with no computerised system, and that about four years of computerisation work had not been completed.

Sources

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- Levy Commission to Examine the Status of Building in Judea and Samaria, 2012. Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria. Signed 21 June 2012, released 9 July 2012. Government-appointed commission report.
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RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

What Does Israeli Law Say About the State's Role in Settlements?

How Many Unauthorized Outposts Are There in the West Bank?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

How Does Israel Define State Land in the West Bank?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Is Israel Striking Gaza During the Ceasefire?

What Israeli bodies published about strikes inside Gaza after the ceasefire of 10 October 2025, and the count they do not give.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS [Gaza Ceasefire](#) [IDF War Diary](#) [Yellow Line](#) [COGAT](#) [Israeli Official Record](#)



21 soldiers' deaths are the only count the IDF Spokesperson's Unit attached to the strikes it published on 13 April 2026, in a

dispatch stating that Israeli forces had struck armed operatives who approached the yellow line inside the Gaza Strip during that week. The dispatch calls them precise strikes and says the forces are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement, both the Israeli military's own account and characterisation of its own operations. The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, on the same unit's earlier dispatch. Neither dispatch gives a number of strikes.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
10 October 2025, 12:00	Time the ceasefire took effect, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	War diary dispatch of 4 November 2025
21	IDF soldiers whose deaths the dispatch attributes to one of the operatives struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack, the army's own count of its own losses	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	Published 13 April 2026, strike dated only to that week
Hundreds of metres	Length of an underground route the IDF states its forces located and destroyed in the Jabalia area, on its own account	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	Since the ceasefire entered force, published 4 November 2025
10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026	Period COGAT treats as the ceasefire in its own humanitarian reporting	COGAT	Report of July 2026

The IDF records precise strikes near the yellow line in April 2026

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published at 18:15 on 13 April 2026 that Israeli forces had struck during that week a number of armed operatives who approached the yellow line and who it says planned attacks in the immediate term against its forces operating in the centre of the Gaza Strip. The dispatch's own wording is that they were "attacked in precise strikes", and it is the Israeli military's own account of its own operations.

What the dispatch carries, and what it does not:

- The theatre: the centre of the Gaza Strip, on the IDF's own description.
- The timing: "during the week", with no date given for any strike.
- The quantity: "a number of" operatives, with no figure attached.
- The outcome: no casualty count for those struck.

Southern Command directed the strikes on operatives approaching the yellow line

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported on 13 April 2026 that the strikes were directed by Southern Command and the Israel Security Agency, which is the Israeli military naming which of its own bodies ordered its own operations. The same dispatch states that IDF forces under Southern Command "are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement and will continue to act to remove any immediate threat", Israel's own characterisation of its own conduct rather than a finding by any other body.

The [yellow line](#) is a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, on the IDF's own description published in its war diary on 4 November 2025. Activity described as east of the yellow line is activity within the Strip.

The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on 4 November 2025 that the ceasefire entered force on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages, and that battle-team forces of the Yiftach and 188 brigades under Division 252 were then operating east of the yellow line in the northern Strip in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon. That framing is the army's own account of its own deployment. COGAT records the same ceasefire period as 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026 in its own humanitarian reporting, which is that unit's own count of its own coordination activity and covers supply rather than fire.

Dated Israeli publications on the ceasefire

PUBLICATION AND PERIOD DATES, NOT A COUNT OF EVENTS



Source: IDF Spokesperson's Unit war diary dispatches, and COGAT, Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire.

21 soldiers' deaths are attributed to one of those struck

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported on 13 April 2026 that the deaths of 21 IDF soldiers were attributable to the activity of one of the operatives struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack on buildings where its forces were operating and on a tank crew securing them. The 21 is the army's own count of its own personnel, and it belongs to that earlier attack rather than to the April 2026 strikes.

- Whose count: the Israeli military's, of its own soldiers.
- What it counts: deaths in an anti-tank attack preceding the strikes reported.
- What it does not count: anyone killed or injured in the strikes themselves, for which the dispatch gives no figure.

The IDF publishes no count of strikes during the ceasefire

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published no strike tally in either dispatch: the 13 April 2026 entry gives no number and no date beyond that week, and the 4 November 2025 entry reports a located compound of launchers, rockets and launch positions in the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood and a destroyed underground route in the Jabalia area, again without a count of strikes. Both are individual dated dispatches from a continuing war diary, and no cumulative figure for the ceasefire period appears in either.

The same army does publish running operational totals for another theatre and period, which is where a reader will find figures of that kind:

- The Israel Defense Forces reported approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran and more than 4,700 operational sorties during Operation Roaring Lion, to 13 March 2026, on its own count. Those are Iran figures for a separate operation, and they are not Gaza figures.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The Gaza figures and the Iran figures come from different operations, theatres and periods, and neither set may be summed with or compared against the other. The 21 is a count of Israeli soldiers killed in an anti-tank attack that preceded the strikes reported on 13 April 2026, so it is not a casualty figure for those strikes and not a Palestinian casualty figure of any kind. Each dispatch is one day's publication and supports a statement about what the IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on that date, never a count of operations across the ceasefire. COGAT's ceasefire reporting covers food, water and medical supply on that unit's own records and carries no strike or casualty data. No Israeli body cited here publishes a count of strikes, shelling or resulting casualties in Gaza during the ceasefire.

Questions readers ask

Which ceasefire do these figures cover?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published that the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, and COGAT records the ceasefire period as 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026.

Who published the April 2026 strike dispatch?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published it in its war diary, timestamped 18:15 on 13 April 2026.

How many strikes has Israel carried out in Gaza since the ceasefire began?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit publishes no such figure. Its 13 April 2026 dispatch reports strikes on "a number of" armed operatives, with no total and no date beyond that week.

Does the IDF say the strikes were consistent with the agreement?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit stated that its forces under Southern Command are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement, which is the army's own characterisation of its own conduct.

Where is the yellow line?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit describes it as a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, in its war diary dispatch of 4 November 2025.

Which Israeli bodies directed the strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported that Southern Command and the Israel Security Agency directed them, on the military's own account.

How many people were killed in the April 2026 strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published no casualty figure for those struck, and no Israeli body cited here publishes a Palestinian casualty count for the ceasefire period.

What is the figure of 21 a count of?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit attributes the deaths of 21 IDF soldiers to the activity of one operative struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack. It is the army's own count of its own personnel.

What did the IDF report locating in Shuja'iyya?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on 4 November 2025 that Brigade 11 forces located a compound containing launchers, rockets and launch positions there, on the army's own account.

Which units did the IDF say were operating east of the yellow line?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit named battle-team forces of the Yiftach and 188 brigades under Division 252, with Yahalom engineers, in its dispatch of 4 November 2025.

Does COGAT report on strikes?

COGAT recorded food, water and medical supply entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026 on its own records, and reports no strike or fire data.

Does the IDF publish operational totals anywhere?

The Israel Defense Forces reported approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran and more than 4,700 operational sorties to 13 March 2026, on its own count, in a separate theatre and period.

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the Ceasefire?



KEY FIGURES August 20, 2026

How Much Aid Has Entered Gaza, and Who Counted It?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Does Israel Publish a Proportionality Assessment for Gaza Strikes?

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KEY FIGURES September 9, 2026

What Land and Water Has Israel Allocated to Settlements?

About 450,000 dunams of Area C allocated to the Settlement Division, and what Israeli audits publish on settlement water and outpost land status.

LAND AND PLANNING Area C Settlements State Comptroller Land Allocation Water



About 450,000 dunams in Area C were allocated by the Custodian of Government and Abandoned Property to the

Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization under permit agreements, for establishing and settling rural localities, on the State Comptroller of Israel's 2016 audit of the Judea and Samaria Area. The same audit records that about 0.6% of Area C, about 20,845 dunams, was included in Palestinian master plans, some still in approval. On water, the Comptroller's audit of the Samaria water economy counts 463,000 residents in Jewish localities in Judea and Samaria at the end of 2019 and publishes a single freshwater consumption figure covering Palestinians and Israelis alike. All of these are Israeli audit bodies' own figures on the state's own administration.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
About 450,000 dunams	Area C land allocated by the Custodian to the Settlement Division under permit agreements	State Comptroller of Israel	Audit conducted January to December 2014, checks to December 2015
120 localities, 87 of them	Israeli localities in Area C, and those established and settled by the Settlement Division	State Comptroller of Israel	Same audit
About 20,845 dunams, about 0.6%	Area C included in Palestinian master plans, some still in approval	State Comptroller of Israel	Same audit
463,000 residents	Residents of Jewish localities in Judea and Samaria, about 100,000 of them in Samaria	State Comptroller of Israel	End of 2019
150.6 million cubic metres	Freshwater consumed by Palestinians and Israelis alike, published as one combined figure	State Comptroller of Israel	Figure given for 2020

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
15 of 105	Unauthorized outposts standing on Palestinian private property	Prime Minister's Office of Israel	March 2005

About 450,000 dunams of Area C went to the Settlement Division

The Comptroller reports about 450,000 dunams in Area C allocated by the Custodian to the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization under permit agreements, land the Custodian holds under the government-property regime that defines [state land](#) in the area. These are the state auditor's own figures on the state's own allocation machinery, drawn from Civil Administration records during an audit conducted in 2014.

- 120 Israeli localities stand in Area C, on the Civil Administration's own count as relayed by the audit.
- 87 of those 120 were established and settled by the Settlement Division.
- Those 87 localities hold about 100,000 residents.
- The audit publishes no ownership breakdown of the about 450,000 dunams.

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 66b, 2016, p. 58.

About 0.6% of Area C, 20,845 dunams, sits in Palestinian plans

The same 2016 audit records that about 0.6% of Area C, about 20,845 dunams, was included in Palestinian master plans, some of them still in approval at the time of the audit. About 20,000 structures stand in those areas on the Civil Administration's own June 2014 estimate, which the Comptroller relays rather than measures.

Figure	What it counts	Period
About 20,845 dunams	Area C included in Palestinian master plans, some in approval	Audit year 2014
About 0.6%	The same area as a share of Area C, printed as an approximation	Audit year 2014
About 20,000 structures	Structures standing in those planned areas, Civil Administration estimate	June 2014

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Annual Report 66b, 2016, p. 29. The planning share and the permit allocation above are different measures and are not two parts of one quantity.

The Samaria water audit counts 463,000 residents in Israeli localities

The Comptroller's audit of selected issues in the Samaria water economy counts 463,000 residents in Jewish localities in Judea and Samaria at the end of 2019, about 100,000 of them in Samaria, and states that the number is expected to grow to about 580,000 by 2030. For consumption it publishes one figure for 2020 covering Palestinians and Israelis alike, with no settlement subtotal and no Palestinian subtotal beside it. The tariffs below are the ones the audit records for supply in the area.

Figure	What it counts	Period
463,000 residents	Residents of Jewish localities in Judea and Samaria	End of 2019
About 580,000	The same population, on the audit's stated expectation	2030, expected
150.6 million cubic metres	Freshwater consumed by Palestinians and Israelis alike, one combined figure	Figure given for 2020
212.9 million cubic metres	The same combined measure, stated as forecast consumption	2030, forecast
5% and 30%	Water loss in the Israeli supply systems and in the Palestinian systems, on the water master plan	As stated in the plan
NIS 0.3 and NIS 3.37 per cubic metre	Samaria water corporation tariff up to the permitted quantity of 3.5 cubic metres per person per month, and above it	As stated in the audit


Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Selected Issues in the Samaria Water Economy, local government audit. For a local authority that has not incorporated, the audit gives NIS 0.468 to NIS 2.272 up to the permitted quantity and NIS 5.583 to NIS 7.387 above it.

15 of 105 outposts stood on Palestinian private property in 2005

The Prime Minister's Office of Israel published in March 2005 a summary of a commissioned opinion on [unauthorized outposts](#), listing 105 outposts known to the author and stating that the figure probably does not reflect the true number in the area. It is the government's own review of its own administration, and its land-status categories were compiled from Infrastructure Department data of the Civil Administration, which the author states did not deliver all of it. Of the 105, the opinion places 15 on Palestinian private property and 39 on mixed lands, part State, part survey, part owned by Palestinians.

Land status of unauthorized outposts

CATEGORIES AS PUBLISHED IN MARCH 2005. THE FOUR DO NOT SUM TO THE 105 OUTPOSTS LISTED.



Source: Prime Minister's Office of Israel, Summary of the Opinion Concerning Unauthorized Outposts, March 2005. The summary states the count of 105 probably does not reflect the true number.

In the Migron litigation the State did not dispute that the lands at issue are registered under private Palestinian ownership within the villages of Burqa and Dir Dabwan, and that the outpost is illegal; the Supreme Court issued a final order on 2 August 2011 requiring the State to evacuate it. The Supreme Court ordered the Amona outpost removed within two years on 25 December 2014, on the ground that it stood on privately owned Palestinian land without authorisation.

No Israeli body publishes a total of resources transferred to settlements

Across the Israeli publications drawn on here, no consolidated figure appears for land, water, minerals, quarry output or archaeological sites transferred from Palestinian to settlement use. What the Comptroller publishes instead is the state of the registration and enforcement machinery, in its own audits of its own administration.

- The Comptroller's 2021 audit of staff officers in the Civil Administration records that real estate in Judea and Samaria is registered in hard-copy registers, with no computerised system, and that about four years spent computerising the land registers had not been completed.
- The same audit records that 60% of the real-estate transaction files scanned were scanned without the certification of the transfer of rights, which is the basis for registration in the land registers.
- The 2016 audit records that the Defence Minister decided in December 2013 to establish a unit to conduct criminal investigations of planning and building offences in the area, and that it had not been established at the audit's close.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The about 450,000 dunams is land allocated under permit agreements and the about 20,845 dunams is planning coverage, so the two are different measures and neither is a subset of the other. The 2016 audit publishes no ownership breakdown of the 450,000 dunams, and the about 100,000 residents belongs to the 87 Settlement Division localities rather than to all 120. The 150.6 million cubic metres covers Palestinians and Israelis together, with no split published, and the 212.9 million cubic metres is stated as a forecast. The 105 outposts is stated as probably not the true number, so the 15 and the 39 sit inside a count that is itself a floor. Every figure printed with "about" keeps it.

Questions readers ask

How much Area C land went to the Settlement Division?

The State Comptroller of Israel reports about 450,000 dunams in Area C allocated by the Custodian to the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization under permit agreements, in its 2016 audit.

Does that audit say who owned the land before the allocation?

The State Comptroller of Israel publishes no ownership breakdown of the about 450,000 dunams in that audit.

How many Israeli localities are in Area C?

The State Comptroller of Israel records 120 Israeli localities in Area C, 87 of them established and settled by the Settlement Division, holding about 100,000 residents.

How much of Area C is covered by Palestinian master plans?

The State Comptroller of Israel puts it at about 0.6% of Area C, about 20,845 dunams, some of the plans still in approval at the time of the 2014 audit.

How many structures stand in those planned areas?

The State Comptroller of Israel relays a Civil Administration estimate of about 20,000 structures, the Civil Administration's own figure from June 2014.

How many residents do Israeli bodies count in Judea and Samaria?

The State Comptroller of Israel counts 463,000 residents in Jewish localities in Judea and Samaria at the end of 2019, about 100,000 of them in Samaria.

Does Israel publish a settlement-only water figure for Samaria?

The State Comptroller of Israel publishes 150.6 million cubic metres of freshwater for 2020 covering Palestinians and Israelis alike, and states no split between them.

What water tariffs does the audit record?

The State Comptroller of Israel records NIS 0.3 per cubic metre set by the Samaria water corporation up to a permitted quantity of 3.5 cubic metres per person per month, and NIS 3.37 above it.

What water loss does the master plan record?

The State Comptroller of Israel reports 5% water loss in the Israeli supply systems in Judea and Samaria on the water master plan, against 30% in the Palestinian systems.

How many outposts stood on Palestinian private land?

The Prime Minister's Office of Israel published 15 of 105 unauthorized outposts on Palestinian private property in March 2005, on a count the summary states probably does not reflect the true number.

What did the Supreme Court decide about Migron?

The Supreme Court issued a final order on 2 August 2011 requiring the State to evacuate the outpost, after the State did not dispute that the land is registered under private Palestinian ownership.

Is the West Bank land register computerised?

The State Comptroller of Israel states that real estate in Judea and Samaria is registered in hard-copy registers with no computerised system, and that about four years of computerisation had not been completed at the time of its 2021 audit.

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KEY FIGURES September 9, 2026



RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

What Land and Water Has Israel Allocated to Settlements?

How Many Unauthorized Outposts Are There in the West Bank?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

How Does Israel Define State Land in the West Bank?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the Ceasefire?

Israel's own war diary places 2 IDF brigades east of the yellow line in Shuja'iyya and Jabalia after the 10 October 2025 ceasefire.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS [Gaza](#) [Ceasefire](#) [IDF](#) [Shuja'iyya](#) [Jabalia](#)



2 IDF brigades were operating east of the yellow line inside the Gaza Strip during the ceasefire, on a war diary entry the IDF Spokesperson published on 4 November 2025. The entry is the IDF's own account of its own forces, and it names Shuja'iyya in the northern Gaza Strip and the Jabalia area as the places where the activity took place. The same entry dates the ceasefire's entry into force to 10 October 2025 at 12:00. It carries no count of entries, strikes or demolitions, and no Israeli body in this record publishes one for the ceasefire period.

Figure	What it counts	Period
2 brigades	Battle teams of Yiftach (11) and 188, under Division 252, operating east of the yellow line inside the Gaza Strip	Since the ceasefire entered into force, as published 4 November 2025
1 compound	Launchers, rockets and launch positions located by Brigade 11 forces, in the IDF's words "in the heart of the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood"	Since the ceasefire entered into force, as published 4 November 2025
1 underground route	Located and destroyed by Brigade 188 forces with Yahalom engineers in the Jabalia area, stated as hundreds of metres long and tens of metres deep	Since the ceasefire entered into force, as published 4 November 2025
10 October 2025, 12:00	The hour the ceasefire entered into force, as the diary dates it	10 October 2025
72 hours	The window designated for the return of hostages	From 10 October 2025

Source: IDF Spokesperson, Division 252 activity in the yellow line area, war diary, published 4 November 2025. Every row is the IDF's own account of its own operations.

The IDF records Brigade 11 activity in Shuja'iyya during the ceasefire

The IDF Spokesperson published on 4 November 2025 that Brigade 11 forces had located a compound containing launchers, rockets and launch positions, in the diary's wording "in the heart of the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood" in the northern Gaza Strip, since the ceasefire agreement entered into force. Shuja'iyya is a named residential neighbourhood of Gaza City, and the diary names it. The account is the IDF's own dated description of its own forces' activity, self-published by the party carrying it out, and it is written as a narrative dispatch rather than as a count.

What the entry attributes to Brigade 11:

- The unit: battle-team forces of the Yiftach brigade, numbered 11, under Division 252.
- The place: Shuja'iyya, in the northern Gaza Strip, east of the yellow line.
- The find: a compound containing launchers, rockets and launch positions.
- The period: since the ceasefire agreement entered into force on 10 October 2025.

Brigade 188 destroyed an underground route in the Jabalia area

The IDF Spokesperson recorded in the same entry that Brigade 188 forces, working with Yahalom engineers, located and destroyed an

underground route in the Jabalia area, and states that it had been used for prolonged stay and for organising activity against its forces. The route is given as hundreds of metres long and tens of metres deep, the IDF's own stated measurements of its own engineering work, and both figures stay approximations rather than measured lengths. Jabalia is a named populated area of the northern Gaza Strip.

Element	As the diary states it
Forces	Brigade 188 with Yahalom engineers
Location	The Jabalia area, northern Gaza Strip
Length	Hundreds of metres
Depth	Tens of metres
Stated use	Prolonged stay and organising activity against IDF forces


Source: IDF Spokesperson, Division 252 war diary, published 4 November 2025, the IDF's own account of its own activity.

The yellow line sits inside Gaza, the IDF states

The IDF Spokesperson describes the yellow line as a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, and places the Division 252 activity east of it. That places the activity within Gaza rather than along its perimeter, on the IDF's own description of its own positions. The same entry dates the ceasefire's entry into force to 10 October 2025 at 12:00, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages.

Ceasefire sequence as the IDF dates it

DATES AND HOURS AS PUBLISHED IN THE WAR DIARY ENTRY OF 4 NOVEMBER 2025.



Source: IDF Spokesperson, Division 252 war diary, the IDF's own dated account of its own operations.

The IDF calls the activity consistent with the ceasefire agreement

The IDF Spokesperson states that the activity was carried out “in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon”. That is the characterisation of the party carrying out the activity, published in the same dispatch that describes it, so the account of the conduct and the assessment of it come from one body. No other body assesses it in this record.

- The conduct described: brigade activity east of the yellow line, in Shuja'iyya and the Jabalia area.
- The body describing it: the IDF Spokesperson, on 4 November 2025.
- The compliance statement: the IDF's own, quoted from the same entry.
- The people described as operating against its forces: the IDF's own term, “ Hamas terrorists”, attributed to it.

The IDF publishes no count of entries into residential areas

The war diary is a single dated dispatch naming 2 brigades and 2 locations, and the IDF Spokesperson publishes no total for the period alongside it. COGAT reported on the ceasefire period from 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026 in figures of food, water and medical supply, its own count of its own coordination activity resting on tonnages self-declared by suppliers, and that report carries no operational count. Where a reader is looking for a number of ground entries, strikes or demolitions during the ceasefire, Israel's bodies publish named incidents and no tally.

Question	What is published	Who published it
Ground activity in named areas during the ceasefire	2 brigades, Shuja'iyya and the Jabalia area, in one dated dispatch	IDF Spokesperson, 4 November 2025
A count of ground entries, strikes, artillery firings or demolitions	No count published	IDF Spokesperson, 4 November 2025
A casualty figure for the ceasefire period	No figure published	No Israeli body in this record
Aid entering during the ceasefire	1,778,363 metric tons of food, and more than 70,000 cubic meters of water per day	COGAT, 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026

Every operational figure here is the IDF's own

The IDF Spokesperson published the brigade, location and route figures as its own account of its own operations, dated to the period after the ceasefire entered into force. The route length and depth are stated as hundreds of metres and tens of metres and stay approximations. The war diary is a running series of dispatches, so

this entry supports what the IDF published on 4 November 2025 and not a total for the ceasefire. COGAT's tonnage figures and the war diary's operational description count different things on different bases and may not be combined. The State Comptroller of Israel reported in March 2018 on the machinery for examining alleged misconduct, and Israel publishes no proportionality determination for any individual strike.

Questions readers ask

Which Gaza neighbourhoods does Israel name in its ceasefire reporting?

The IDF Spokesperson named Shuja'iyya in the northern Gaza Strip and the Jabalia area in its war diary entry of 4 November 2025.

Were Israeli ground forces inside Gaza after 10 October 2025?

The IDF Spokesperson recorded battle teams of the Yiftach (11) and 188 brigades operating east of the yellow line inside the Gaza Strip since the ceasefire entered into force, on its own account published 4 November 2025.

What is the yellow line?

The IDF Spokesperson describes it as a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, and places its Division 252 activity east of it.

When did the ceasefire take effect?

The IDF Spokesperson dated its entry into force to 10 October 2025 at 12:00, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages.

Does the IDF say this activity broke the ceasefire?

The IDF Spokesperson states the activity was carried out “in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon”, which is that body’s own characterisation of its own conduct.

How many raids does Israel report during the ceasefire?

The IDF Spokesperson published no total. The war diary carries dated dispatches, and the entry of 4 November 2025 describes activity by 2 brigades in 2 areas.

Does any Israeli body publish Palestinian casualties for the ceasefire period?

No Israeli body in this record publishes a casualty or injury series for Gaza during the ceasefire.

What did Brigade 188 report finding in Jabalia?

The IDF Spokesperson recorded that Brigade 188 forces with Yahalom engineers located and destroyed an underground route of hundreds of metres in length and tens of metres in depth, on the IDF’s own stated measurements.

What does COGAT publish about the ceasefire period?

COGAT reported 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, its own count resting on tonnages self-declared by suppliers rather than weighed at the crossings, and more than 70,000 cubic meters of water per day facilitated as of its July 2026 report.

Does Israel publish an assessment of whether a strike was proportionate?

The State Comptroller of Israel reported in March 2018 on training, exercises and the examination mechanisms rather than on any individual attack, and Israel publishes no proportionality determination for a strike.

Who publishes the war diary?

The IDF Spokesperson publishes it, and the entry cited here appeared on 4 November 2025.

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How Much Aid Has Entered Gaza, and Who Counted It?



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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Can You Get Married in Israel Without a Religious Ceremony?

Israel's Civil Union Law registers couples only where both partners are recorded as having no religion, on the Ministry of Justice's own published rules.

SOCIETY AND SERVICES Marriage In Israel Civil Union Law Ministry Of Justice
Central Bureau Of Statistics Population Registry



51,643 couples married in Israel in 2022 on the Central Bureau of Statistics count published in its Tu B'Av release of 15 August 2024, a count whose universe is marriages conducted by authorised religious institutions in Israel where at least one spouse is registered in the Population Registry. One route in Israeli law sits outside that universe. The Civil Union Law for Citizens Having No Religion, 5770-2010, registers a union where both partners are recorded in the population registry as having no religion, which is the first condition the Ministry of Justice's Registrar of the Civil Union lists on its own service page, last updated 7 July 2025.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
51,643	Couples married in Israel, in ceremonies by authorised religious institutions, at least one spouse in the Population Registry	Central Bureau of Statistics	2022
37,135	Jewish couples within that total, 71.9% of 51,643	Central Bureau of Statistics	2022
12,756	Muslim couples within that total, 24.7% of 51,643	Central Bureau of Statistics	2022
18	Minimum age of each applicant for civil union registration	Ministry of Justice, Registrar of the Civil Union	Service rules as published, page updated 7 July 2025
3 of the last 5 years	Required presence in Israel for each applicant	Ministry of Justice, Registrar of the Civil Union	Service rules as published, page updated 7 July 2025
30 days	Window in which any person may object after the application is published	Ministry of Justice, Registrar of the Civil Union	Service rules as published, page updated 7 July 2025

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
About 150 days	The Ministry's own estimate of how long registration may take	Ministry of Justice, Registrar of the Civil Union	Service rules as published, page updated 7 July 2025

The Civil Union Law registers only couples with no religion

The Ministry of Justice's Registrar of the Civil Union publishes the conditions for registration in the conjugality registry, and the Ministry states the first of them without qualification: both partners must be registered as having no religion. That classification is a population registry entry, so a person recorded as Jewish, Muslim, Christian or Druze is outside this route whatever they practise. The remaining conditions, as the Ministry lists them in its own service rules:

- Each applicant is an Israeli citizen or resident aged 18 or over.
- Each applicant has been in Israel for at least 3 of the last 5 years.
- The partners are not relatives.
- The partners are not already married to, or registered as married to, each other.
- Neither partner is married to, or registered as married to, anyone else in the population registry or in a comparable foreign register.

The Ministry states religious authorities may reject a registration

On the Ministry of Justice's own description of its procedure, the application is referred to the religious authorities as the law directs. The same page states that the religious authorities have the power to reject the registration. Both facts come from the state body that administers the registry, describing its own process, and the Ministry publishes no further criteria on that page for how a rejection is reached.

Registration takes about 150 days, with a 30-day objection window

The Registrar of the Civil Union publishes the application for public inspection on the civil union website and in a daily newspaper, and any person may file an objection within 30 days of that publication. The Ministry of Justice states that registration may take about 150 days, which is the Ministry's own estimate for its own process rather than a deadline set in the statute. The Ministry also publishes a reduced fee in stated cases.

Step or condition	As the Ministry publishes it
Publication	Application published on the civil union website and in a daily newspaper
Objection	Any person may object within 30 days of that publication
Referral	Application referred to the religious authorities as the law directs
Duration	May take about 150 days, on the Ministry's estimate

**Step or
condition****As the Ministry publishes it**

Reduced fee

Conscript soldier or national service, student, new immigrant in the first two years, or entitled to income support


Source: Ministry of Justice, Registrar of the Civil Union and the Unit for Religious Communities, service page for registration in the conjugality registrar, page last updated 7 July 2025.

The Bureau's 51,643 counts only marriages performed by religious institutions

The Central Bureau of Statistics draws its marriage series from the Population Registry and states its universe: marriages conducted by authorised religious institutions in Israel where at least one spouse is registered there. Within that universe it counts [51,643 couples married in 2022](#), of whom 37,135 were Jewish (71.9%), 12,756 Muslim (24.7%), 959 Druze (1.9%) and 762 Christian. Those four counts do not exhaust the published total, falling 31 short of 51,643, and the Bureau's own component counts should not be summed to it.

Couples married in Israel, by group

2022. THE FOUR COUNTS FALL 31 SHORT OF THE PUBLISHED TOTAL OF 51,643.



Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Marriages in Israel, Tu B'Av release, 15 August 2024. The Bureau's own count, covering marriages conducted by authorised religious institutions; the components may not be summed to the total.

No body publishes how many couples have used the civil union registry

The Ministry of Justice publishes the conditions, the procedure, the timetable and the fee reductions for the conjugality registry, and publishes no count of registrations made under the Civil Union Law, in total or for any year. The statute as recorded in the Knesset legislation database carries no count either. The Central Bureau of Statistics reports that 10% of those recorded in the Population Registry as married abroad did so during the period its release specifies, and its 51,643 counts no marriage performed abroad, so that total is silent on registrations under the civil union route in both directions.

Which figures on this page may not be added?

The Central Bureau of Statistics counts marriages conducted by authorised religious institutions in Israel; registrations of marriages contracted abroad are a separate object in the same release and are never added to the 51,643. The four religious component counts fall 31 short of that total, so a reader who sums them finds a gap of 31 in one line, and every published share divides against 51,643. The Ministry of Justice figures are conditions, a publication window and the Ministry's own duration estimate, not counts of couples, and none of them may be read as a volume of registrations. The civil union registry creates a status

alongside marriage under the 2010 statute and is not counted in any marriage figure on this page.

Questions readers ask

Does Israel have civil marriage?

The Ministry of Justice publishes one non-religious route, the conjugality registry created by the Civil Union Law for Citizens Having No Religion, 5770-2010, and it registers a civil union rather than a marriage. The Central Bureau of Statistics counts marriages in Israel only where they were conducted by authorised religious institutions.

Who can register a civil union in Israel?

The Ministry of Justice states that both partners must be registered as having no religion, and that each must be an Israeli citizen or resident aged 18 or over who has been in Israel for at least 3 of the last 5 years.

What does “having no religion” mean here?

The Ministry of Justice applies the population registry classification, so the condition turns on the registry entry and not on a person’s practice or belief.

Can a secular Jewish couple use the civil union route?

The Ministry of Justice lists registration as having no religion for both partners as an absolute condition, so a partner recorded in

the registry under a religion is outside the route as the Ministry publishes it.

Do religious authorities have a role in a civil union?

The Ministry of Justice states that the application is referred to the religious authorities as the law directs, and that they have the power to reject the registration.

How long does registration take?

The Ministry of Justice estimates that registration may take about 150 days.

Can anyone object to a registration?

The Registrar of the Civil Union publishes each application on the civil union website and in a daily newspaper, and states that any person may file an objection within 30 days of that publication.

Is there a reduced fee?

The Ministry of Justice publishes a reduced fee where one partner is a conscript soldier or in national service, a student, a new immigrant in the first two years, or entitled to income support.

How many couples have registered a civil union?

The Ministry of Justice publishes no count of registrations in the conjugality registry, and the statute records none.

How many couples marry in Israel each year?

The Central Bureau of Statistics counted 51,643 couples married in Israel in 2022, within a universe of marriages conducted by authorised religious institutions where at least one spouse is in the Population Registry.

Which groups make up that total?

The Central Bureau of Statistics recorded 37,135 Jewish couples, 12,756 Muslim, 959 Druze and 762 Christian in 2022, and those components fall 31 short of the published total.

Does the Bureau count marriages contracted abroad?

The Central Bureau of Statistics counts registrations of marriage abroad separately and does not include them in the 51,643; it reports that 10% of those recorded in the Population Registry as married abroad did so in the period its release specifies.

When was the Civil Union Law passed?

The Knesset enacted the Civil Union Law for Citizens Having No Religion, 5770-2010, published in Sefer HaChukkim 2235 on 22 March 2010, and the Knesset legislation database lists no amending act.

Sources

- Central Bureau of Statistics, 2024. Marriages in Israel, Tu B'Av data release, media release 253/2024, 15 August 2024. Demography and Census Division. Official or primary record.

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KEY FIGURES August 28, 2026

**How Many Couples Get Married in Israel Each Year?
51,643 in 2022**



KEY FIGURES August 31, 2026

Can a Palestinian Spouse Get Israeli Residency?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

What Does Israel's Ceasefire Decision Say About Its Forces in Gaza?

Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025, sets two IDF deployment stages by annexed map and carries no disarmament paragraph in its published text.

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

What Is Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank?

Clause 7 of Israel's 2018 Nation-State Basic Law, the 1979 Beit El and Elon Moreh judgments, and the Oslo II definition of the settlements.

LAND AND PLANNING West Bank Settlements Basic Law Supreme Court Area C
State Comptroller



Clause 7 of Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People, which the Knesset adopted in 2018, states that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” That clause names no territory. What ties settlement to a place in Israel’s own record is the Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995, which defines “the Settlements” as, in the West Bank, the settlements in Area C, and two Supreme Court judgments of 1979 that set the terms on which private land may be requisitioned for one.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
Clause 7	The single clause of the Nation-State Basic Law on Jewish settlement, naming no territory	Knesset	Adopted 2018, translation updated through 1 May 2022
5 justices	The expanded panel that dismissed the Beit El petitions, HCJ 606/78	Ministry of Justice of Israel	Judgment of 15 March 1979
Area C	The area to which the defined term “the Settlements” is tied in the West Bank	Israel and the PLO	Agreement signed 28 September 1995
13,481	Illegal construction cases identified in the Palestinian sector, on the Supervision Unit’s own identifications	State Comptroller of Israel	1997 to 2013
6,605	Illegal construction cases identified in the Israeli sector, on the same unit’s identifications	State Comptroller of Israel	1997 to 2013
57 employees	Staffing of the Civil Administration’s Central Supervision Unit, on a budget of about NIS 17.5 million	State Comptroller of Israel	2014

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
0 bodies	Bodies charged with criminally investigating planning and building offences in the area	State Comptroller of Israel	At the audit's close, completion checks to December 2015

Clause 7 declares settlement a national value and names no territory

The Knesset published the enacted clause in its own English translation, which the Knesset labels unofficial: “The State views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.” The clause names Jewish settlement without naming the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, Area C or any other territory, while other clauses of the same Basic Law do name places. The Israeli Supreme Court, sitting as High Court of Justice, upheld the Basic Law in HCJ 5555/18 Hasson v. Knesset on 8 July 2021, holding at the same time that the Knesset as constituent authority may not deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic. What clause 7 requires of the State is set out separately in [what Israeli law says about the State’s role in settlements](#).

- Clause 3: “The complete and united Jerusalem is the capital of Israel.”
- Clause 5: the State “shall be open to Jewish immigration, and the ingathering of the exiles.”

- Clause 7: Jewish settlement as a national value, with no territory named.

HCJ 606/78 Beit El dismissed the petitions in 1979

The Ministry of Justice of Israel records, in its own published account of the two 1979 judgments, that HCJ 606/78 was decided on 15 March 1979 by an expanded panel of five justices including Deputy President Moshe Landau, and that the petitions were dismissed. The Court held that the international-law provisions relied on were conventional law between states rather than customary law, so that the legality of Israeli settlement was a political question and not justiciable, which is a refusal to decide rather than a finding of legality. It further held that taking the petitioners' land was not prohibited expropriation, given the temporary security consideration underlying the settlement.

Element	What the Court decided
Panel	Expanded, five justices, including the Deputy President
Outcome	Petitions dismissed
International law	Conventional between states, not customary, so not justiciable
Requisition	Not prohibited expropriation, on the stated temporary security consideration

Source: Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019, reporting HCJ 606/78, PD 33[2] 113.

Elon Moreh voided a requisition nine months after Beit El

The same Ministry of Justice account records that HCJ 390/79 reaffirmed that there is no legal bar to establishing a settlement on the basis of military needs, but that the Court was not persuaded such a need existed in that case and ordered the site evacuated. The two judgments are one pair applying one test, nine months apart, and the difference lay in the facts rather than in a change of law. The residents moved to Har Kabir on the other side of Nablus, where the locality was established on State land; the judgment itself is set out in [what Israel's Supreme Court decided in the Elon Moreh case](#).

The reasons the Ministry of Justice records:

- The nucleus went up to the site without government consent, and approval followed only afterwards.
- The Deputy Prime Minister opposed it before a ministerial committee, which rejected his objection.
- The Defence Minister's position was that there was no security necessity at the requested point.
- The settlers, once joined to the proceedings, stated that the security need was subordinate to the commandment of settling the land.

Oslo II defines the settlements as those in Area C

The Interim Agreement signed by Israel and the PLO at Washington DC on 28 September 1995, in the text published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a party to it, states at Article

XII(5): “the Settlements’ means, in the West Bank the settlements in Area C.” Article XVII(1) lists what is carved out of the Council’s jurisdiction entirely, including “Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis.”

Provision	What the text says
Article XII(5)	“the Settlements” means, in the West Bank, the settlements in Area C
Article XVII(1)	Settlements, Jerusalem, borders and Israelis are outside the Council’s jurisdiction
Article XVII(2)	Territorial jurisdiction covers West Bank territory “except for Area C”
Article XVII(4) [a]	Israel, through its military government, has authority over areas outside that territorial jurisdiction

Source: Israel and the PLO, 1995, Interim Agreement, Articles XII and XVII.


No Israeli body investigates planning offences criminally in the area

The State Comptroller of Israel reported, in a 2016 audit of the Civil Administration conducted through 2014 with completion checks to December 2015, that the Defence Minister decided in December 2013 to establish a unit to conduct criminal investigations of planning and building offences in the area, that at the audit’s close it had not been established, and that no body is charged with investigating those offences criminally. The same audit puts the Central Supervision Unit at 57 employees on a 2014 budget of about NIS 17.5 million. Its construction figures are the unit’s own identifications of cases it located, relayed by the

Comptroller, and each demolition share is of that sector's own identifications.

Illegal construction cases and demolitions

JUDEA AND SAMARIA AREA, 1997 TO 2013, BY SECTOR



Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2016. The counts are the Supervision Unit's own identifications; 3,813 is 28% of 13,481 and 1,807 is 27% of 6,605.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The two sector counts are separate identification totals with different denominators and are not summed on this page. The 28% and the 27% are each a share of that sector's own identifications across 1997 to 2013, and a case identified late in that window had less time to be demolished than one identified early, so neither share is a per-case completion rate. The Supervision Unit's figures are its own count of its own detection activity, so they are a floor

on construction rather than a measure of it. The Knesset states that its English translation of the Basic Law is unofficial, and the Hebrew governs. The Interim Agreement text quoted here is the copy published by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the two signatories.

Questions readers ask

Does Israeli law mention West Bank settlement by name?

Clause 7 of the Basic Law adopted by the Knesset in 2018 declares Jewish settlement a national value and names no territory.

Did Israel's Supreme Court rule settlements legal?

The Ministry of Justice of Israel records that in HCJ 606/78 the Court held the question not justiciable, which is a refusal to decide rather than a ruling of legality.

What did the Elon Moreh judgment decide?

The Ministry of Justice of Israel records that the Court reaffirmed that military need can justify a settlement, was not persuaded of one in that case, and ordered the site evacuated.

Where did the Elon Moreh residents go?

The Ministry of Justice of Israel records that they moved to Har Kabir on the other side of Nablus, where the locality was established on State land.

What is Area C?

The Interim Agreement of 28 September 1995 defines Area C residually as the areas of the West Bank outside Areas A and B, and Article XII(5) ties the defined term “the Settlements” to it.

Are settlements inside the Palestinian Council’s jurisdiction?

Article XVII(1) of the Interim Agreement lists settlements, along with Jerusalem, borders and Israelis, as carved out of the Council’s jurisdiction entirely.

Who enforces planning law in Area C?

The State Comptroller of Israel reported that the Civil Administration’s Central Supervision Unit had 57 employees in 2014, on a budget of about NIS 17.5 million.

Does anyone investigate building offences there as crimes?

The State Comptroller of Israel found that a unit decided on in December 2013 had not been established, and that no body is charged with investigating those offences criminally.

How many construction cases did the unit locate?

The State Comptroller of Israel published 13,481 cases in the Palestinian sector and 6,605 in the Israeli sector for 1997 to 2013, on the unit’s own identifications.

How many of those were demolished?

The State Comptroller of Israel recorded 3,813 demolitions in the Palestinian sector, 28% of that sector's identifications, and 1,807 in the Israeli sector, 27% of its own.

Did Israel's Supreme Court set any limit on the Nation-State Basic Law?

The Israeli Supreme Court held in HCJ 5555/18 on 8 July 2021 that the Knesset may not deny the core character of the state as Jewish and democratic, while dismissing the petitions.

Which language of the Basic Law governs?

The Knesset publishes the English text and labels it unofficial, directing readers to the Hebrew in the National Legislation Database.

Sources

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- Israeli Supreme Court, 2021. HCJ 5555/18 Akram Hasson v. Knesset. Judgment of 8 July 2021. Official record.
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- Ministry of Justice of Israel, 2019. There Are Judges in Jerusalem: on the Beit El and Elon Moreh judgments. Roots in Law project. Official record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2016. Judea and Samaria Area: Activity of the Supervision and Enforcement Unit and Aspects of Land Registration. Annual Report 66b. Official record.

LAND AND PLANNING

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RECORD EXPLAINER August 25, 2026

What Does Israeli Law Say About the State's Role in Settlements?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 21, 2026

What Did Israel's Supreme Court Decide in the Elon Moreh Case?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

How Does Israel Define State Land in the West Bank?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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What Does Israel's Ceasefire Decision Say About Its Forces in Gaza?

Decision 3396, adopted 9 October 2025, sets two IDF deployment stages by annexed map and carries no disarmament paragraph in its published text.

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PRIMARY DOCUMENT September 9, 2026

Does Israeli Law Say Self-Determination Is Exclusive to Jews?

Clause 1(c) of Israel's 2018 Nation-State Basic Law, the 2021 judgment upholding it, and the 2000 Ka'adan ruling on land allocation.

LAW AND COURTS Nation-State Law Basic Laws Supreme Court of Israel Equality Land Allocation



11 justices heard HCJ 5555/18, and the Supreme Court of Israel held Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People

valid on 8 July 2021, dismissing the 15 petitions against it. The Knesset published the enacted text in English, and clause 1(c) states that “the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish People.” In the same judgment the Supreme Court of Israel held that the Knesset, acting as constituent authority, is “not all powerful” and may not, even by Basic Law, deny or facially contradict the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state. Israeli bodies publish no classification of the State as supremacist or otherwise; what they publish is enacted text, judgments and one commissioned review, set out below.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
11 justices	Panel hearing the petitions against the Nation-State Basic Law	Supreme Court of Israel	Heard 22 December 2020, judgment 8 July 2021
15 petitions	Challenges to the Basic Law, all dismissed	Supreme Court of Israel	Judgment of 8 July 2021
Clause 1(c)	Self-determination in Israel stated to be exclusive to the Jewish People	The Knesset	Adopted 2018, text as amended to 1 May 2022
Clause 4(b)	Arabic given “a special status in the State”	The Knesset	Adopted 2018, text as amended to 1 May 2022
Paragraph 40A	Allocation of state land to the Jewish Agency for a Jews-only settlement declared not permitted by law	Supreme Court of Israel	Judgment of 8 March 2000
19 November	Date a commissioned review recommended against further	Ruth Gavison, on the Minister of Justice’s	Commissioned 12 August 2013,

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2014	constitutional anchoring of the State's vision	appointment	published February 2015
2 statutes	Ordinary anti-discrimination laws with no current official English text on an Israeli state host	The Knesset publishes English translations of the Basic Laws only	As at 2026

The Knesset may not deny democratic character, HCJ 5555/18 held

The petitions failed and the law stands. Alongside that result, the Supreme Court of Israel stated a limit on constituent power: the test is whether an amendment denies the core democratic identity of the State, or inflicts mortal harm on the minimal core characteristics of its identity as a Jewish and democratic state. The Court derived that limit from the elements of the constitution developed since the founding, naming the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and Supreme Court case law.

The clauses of the enacted text, in [the Knesset's own published translation](#):

- Clause 1(b) states that Israel “is the nation state of the Jewish People in which it realizes its natural, cultural, religious and historical right to self-determination.”
- Clause 1(c) states that the realization of that right in the State of Israel “is exclusive to the Jewish People.”

- Clause 4 states that “Hebrew is the language of the State,” that “Arabic has a special status in the State,” and that nothing in the article compromises the status given to Arabic in practice before the law came into force.
- Clause 7 states that the State “views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value, and shall act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation.”
- The text carries no equality clause and no individual-rights clause. That is a fact about the wording of this instrument.

Ka’adan holds the State cannot discriminate indirectly through the Jewish Agency

The Supreme Court of Israel ruled on 8 March 2000, in HCJ 6698/95, that the State “was not permitted, by law, to allocate state land to the Jewish Agency, for the purpose of establishing the communal settlement of Katzir on the basis of discrimination between Jews and non-Jews.” The remedy was narrower than the declaration: the Court ordered the State to consider the petitioners’ request to purchase a parcel in Katzir on the principle of equality, and left open whether it could enable that within the framework of the law. The judgment was decided by majority, with Kedmi J dissenting on retrospectivity alone.

- Paragraph 34: “The State cannot escape its legal obligation to respect the principle of equality by using a third party that adopts a discriminatory policy. What the State cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly.”

- Paragraph 38: “Discrimination does not lose its discriminatory character, even if it is being carried out through the Jewish Agency, and therefore is not permitted to the State.”
- Paragraph 31, on the Law of Return: “members of the Jewish nation were granted a special key to enter ... but once a person has lawfully entered the home, he enjoys equal rights with all other household members.”
- Paragraph 31 also states that the Court does not accept that the values of the State as a Jewish state would justify discrimination by the State between its citizens on the basis of religion or nationality.


Gavison recommended in 2014 against anchoring the vision in legislation

Ruth Gavison submitted her recommendations to the Israeli Minister of Justice on 19 November 2014, four years before the Basic Law was adopted. This is one jurist’s recommendation, commissioned on 12 August 2013 with the agreement of all coalition factions and never adopted by any government or by the Knesset, and it contains no statistic. Her central recommendation was to refrain, at that stage, from additional constitutional anchoring of the core vision through legislation, in part or as a whole, and to leave the Declaration of Independence as it is rather than expose it to the controversies of a campaign to enact it as a Basic Law “in totally different social and political circumstances.” Her conditional recommendation was that if anchoring were legislated anyway, the law and its legislative process should strengthen civic solidarity in Israel and Jewish solidarity in Israel

and abroad, and manifest a fair, generous and inclusive attitude to the Arab minority; the Hebrew volume adds that the law must be a vision law and not a nation law, a clause that does not appear in her own published English translation of the same bullet.

The Israeli texts quoted on this page

ENACTED INSTRUMENTS, JUDGMENTS AND ONE COMMISSIONED REVIEW, 1948 TO 2021



Source: The Knesset and the Supreme Court of Israel, each as published by that body. The Gavison review was commissioned by the Minister of Justice and was not adopted.

No state host publishes an English text of 2 anti-discrimination statutes

The two ordinary Israeli anti-discrimination statutes are not readable in English on any Israeli state host. The Knesset publishes English translations of the Basic Laws only, and marks even those unofficial; the Ministry of Justice's authorised series "Laws of the State of Israel" ran from volume 1 (1948) to volume 45 (1989/90) and was discontinued. This page therefore quotes neither statute.

- Equal Employment Opportunities Law, 5748-1988: no current official English text located on an Israeli state host, and every amendment to it postdates the discontinued series.

- Prohibition of Discrimination in Products, Services and Entry into Places of Entertainment and Public Places Law, 5761-2000: enacted after the series ended, so it never appeared in it.
- The closest state-published English rendering is Israel's 14th periodic report under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published on gov.il in 2010. That report is a party's own account of its own compliance, describes rather than reproduces section 3 of the 2000 Law, and carries no grounds list at all for the 1988 Law.

Which of these texts is an unofficial translation?

The Knesset marks its own English translations of the Basic Laws unofficial, and directs readers to the Hebrew for the operative law, so every clause quoted above is quoted from that English text and the Hebrew governs. The Ka'adan text quoted here is the Cardozo Israeli Supreme Court Project's translation, not the Judicial Authority's. [Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty](#) contains no equality clause, so the equality rule quoted in the Ka'adan section is judge-made and belongs to that judgment rather than to the statute book. The Gavison recommendation is dated by three different years in circulation: commissioned 12 August 2013, submitted 19 November 2014, published February 2015. The Basic Law was adopted on 19 July 2018, three years and eight months after the submission.

Questions readers ask

Does Israel's Nation-State Law say self-determination is exclusive to Jews?

Yes, in those terms. The Knesset published clause 1(c), which states that the realization of the right to national self-determination in the State of Israel “is exclusive to the Jewish People.”

Did Israel's Supreme Court strike any part of the law down?

No. The Supreme Court of Israel held the Basic Law valid on 8 July 2021 and dismissed all 15 petitions.

What limit did the Court set?

The Supreme Court of Israel held that the Knesset has no authority, even by Basic Law, to deny or facially contradict the core character of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state.

Where does the Court get that limit from?

The Supreme Court of Israel derived it from the Declaration of Independence, the Basic Laws, Knesset legislation and its own case law.

Does the Nation-State Law contain an equality clause?

No. The Knesset published a text with no equality clause and no individual-rights clause, which is a fact about the wording of that instrument.

What status does the law give Arabic?

Clause 4, as the Knesset published it, states that Hebrew is the language of the State and that Arabic “has a special status in the State,” while preserving the status Arabic had in practice before the law came into force.

Can the State allocate land for a Jews-only community?

The Supreme Court of Israel declared in 2000 that the State was not permitted by law to allocate state land to the Jewish Agency for a settlement founded on discrimination between Jews and non-Jews.

Did the Ka’adan family win the right to live in Katzir?

The judgment did not order that. The Supreme Court of Israel ordered the State to consider their request on the principle of equality, and left open whether it could enable it within the framework of the law.

What did the Court say about the Law of Return?

The Supreme Court of Israel stated that members of the Jewish nation were granted “a special key to enter,” and that once a person has lawfully entered, that person enjoys equal rights with all other household members.

Who reviewed the question before the law was passed?

Ruth Gavison, on the Israeli Minister of Justice's appointment of 12 August 2013, and she recommended on 19 November 2014 against further constitutional anchoring of the State's vision through legislation.

Was her review adopted?

No. No government or Knesset acted on it, and the printed volume was issued by the author rather than by the ministry.

Where can Israel's ordinary anti-discrimination laws be read in English?

Not on an Israeli state host, as at 2026. The Knesset publishes English translations of the Basic Laws only, and the Ministry of Justice's authorised English series ended with volume 45, covering 1989/90.

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LAW AND COURTS

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PRIMARY DOCUMENT August 20, 2026

What Does Israel's Nation-State Law Actually Say?

RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

Does Israeli Law Privilege Jews Over Non-Jews?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

Does Israeli Law Guarantee Equality?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST —

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Does Israel Publish a Proportionality Assessment for Gaza Strikes?

Israel's bodies publish investigation counts, thresholds and a judicial proportionality test. No Israeli body publishes a strike-level assessment.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Gaza Proportionality Military Advocate General
Israeli Supreme Court State Comptroller



74 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct in Gaza had been opened by the Military Advocate General's Corps as at 3 August 2024, the Corps' own count of its own processes, produced under a stated reasonable-suspicion standard. No Israeli body publishes a proportionality determination on any individual strike in Gaza. What Israel's bodies do publish is a judicial proportionality test stated in 2004, an operational tally the Israel Defense Forces attributes to itself, referral and investigation counts with the threshold that produced them, and a State Comptroller audit of the machinery that examines conduct in combat.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
74	Criminal investigations opened into alleged misconduct in Gaza, the Corps' own count, under a reasonable-suspicion standard	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
Over 1,000	Incidents referred for factual assessment to the General Staff's Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, the Corps' own count, a floor	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
Over 13,000	People the IDF describes as terrorists it says it has eliminated in Gaza, the IDF's own count on its own classification, a floor	Israel Defense Forces	Since the start of the war, stated 29 February 2024
3	Limbs of the proportionality test applied to a military measure	Israeli Supreme Court, HCI 2056/04	Judgment of 30 June 2004
3 years and 5 months	Interval from the second Turkel report to government approval of the recommendations implementing it	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2013 to 3 July 2016
2,125	Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge, on	State Comptroller of Israel, relaying the	2014

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
	figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party's own count	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	

Turkel reported in 2013, the government approved implementation in July 2016

The State Comptroller records that the Turkel Commission delivered the first part of its report in January 2011 and the second, on Israel's examination and investigation mechanisms, in February 2013. The Ciechanover team delivered its implementing recommendations to the Prime Minister on 20 September 2015, about a year after the October 2014 date set for them, and the government approved them on 3 July 2016 in decision B/125 of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs, about three years and five months after Turkel reported. The same audit records that a 2012 to 2013 audit of the civilian component in combat was completed in draft, circulated 12 February 2014 and updated in May 2014, and was not published because Operation Protective Edge intervened. These are the findings of Israel's state audit institution, reporting to the Knesset on Israeli bodies, and the audit sits alongside the same report's findings on [training in the laws of war](#).

From the Turkel report to government approval

DATES AS RECORDED IN THE MARCH 2018 AUDIT.

Turkel report, part one

Turkel report, part two

Ciechanover recommendations

Government approval

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Operation Protective Edge, March 2018.

Beit Sourik applied a three-part proportionality test to military measures

HCJ 2056/04 concerns the route of the West Bank separation barrier, not operations in Gaza, and it states the test Israel's own court applies to a military measure rather than applying that test to Gaza. The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 that the military commander had authority to build the obstacle for security reasons, rejected the claim that the route served a political rather than a security purpose, and voided several seizure orders because the route was disproportionate. The figures below are the Court's own statements in the judgment, and the [ruling on the barrier route](#) carries them in full.

Figure	What the Court stated it counts
3 limbs	Rational connection, least injurious means, and injury in proper proportion to the gain
About 40 kilometres	Length of the segment covered by the challenged seizure orders
35,000	Local inhabitants whose lives the Court found the route injures
4,000 dunams	Local inhabitants' land taken up by the route of the fence itself

Figure	What the Court stated it counts
1,500 dunams	Cultivated land left on the far side of the fence

Source: Israeli Supreme Court, HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, judgment of 30 June 2004.

The IDF counts over 13,000 it describes as terrorists killed

The Israel Defense Forces stated at a press briefing on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the beginning of the war. That is the IDF's own count, on the IDF's own classification of who is counted, stated at a single date, and "over 13,000" is a floor rather than an exact total. The briefing gives a separate count for a separate territory, which counts a different action.

Figure	What the IDF states it counts	Period
Over 13,000	People it describes as terrorists eliminated in Gaza	Since the start of the war, stated 29 February 2024
About 3,400	People it describes as terrorists apprehended by IDF forces together with the ISA in Judea and Samaria	During the war, stated 29 February 2024
1,500	Of those apprehended, people it describes as Hamas terrorists	During the war, stated 29 February 2024

Source: Israel Defense Forces, press briefing by the IDF Spokesperson, 29 February 2024. Each figure is the IDF's own reported count.

The IDF publishes no civilian casualty count of its own

The Israel Defense Forces publishes no count of civilians killed in Gaza in the material used here. The 2,125 Palestinians killed during Operation Protective Edge appears in the State Comptroller's March 2018 report, which attributes it to figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the wounded and housing figures in the same report are attributed by the report to Palestinian bodies and international organisations. The IDF also states measures it says it takes before a strike, and publishes no number for any of them:

- Warnings to civilians by telephone call, text message and leaflet
- Roof knocking, a loud non-lethal munition, before striking a building
- Strikes aborted when civilians are present
- A numbered evacuation-area map published so residents could follow instructions by area

Source: Israel Defense Forces, stated precautions in Gaza and the human-shields position, the IDF's own account of its own conduct, carrying no count of warnings issued, roof-knocks performed or strikes aborted.

No Israeli body publishes a proportionality assessment of any strike

The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes counts of what its own machinery has done, and no assessment of whether any particular attack was proportionate. The Corps states that in armed conflict, death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful

operational activity, and its counts are a function of that threshold. The breakdown of the 74 by category sits in the record on [how the Corps examines misconduct](#).

Item	What the Corps publishes
Criminal investigations opened	74, as at 3 August 2024, its own count
Incidents referred for factual assessment	Over 1,000, with hundreds still under assessment at the time of writing
Threshold applied	A reasonable-suspicion standard, stated in the publication
Findings, indictments and convictions	No count in that publication
Proportionality determination on an individual attack	None in that publication

Source: IDF Military Advocate General's Corps, Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza, published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. The counts are the party's own counts of its own processes.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The 74 investigations and the over 1,000 referrals count stages of one process and are not two populations to be summed. The over 13,000 is a count of people the IDF describes as terrorists, on the IDF's own classification, and no total of any kind may be derived by subtracting it from a figure published by another body. The 2,125 belongs to Operation Protective Edge in 2014 and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not to the current war and not to the State Comptroller. Both the 13,000 and the over 1,000 are floors and are never restated as exact numbers.

Questions readers ask

Does Israel publish a proportionality assessment of any strike in Gaza?

The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes investigation and referral counts, and its publication carries no proportionality determination on an individual attack.

How many criminal investigations has the Corps opened?

The Military Advocate General's Corps opened 74 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct in Gaza as at 3 August 2024, on its own count.

What threshold produces that count?

The Corps states that civilian death or injury in armed conflict does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and the 74 rests on that standard.

Are the 74 findings or convictions?

The Corps counts investigations opened, and its publication records no findings, indictment or conviction count.

What proportionality test do Israel's courts apply?

The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 that a military measure must show a rational connection to its objective, use the

least injurious means, and stand in proper proportion between injury and gain.

Did that judgment concern Gaza?

HCJ 2056/04 concerns the route of the West Bank separation barrier, and the Israeli Supreme Court decided it on 30 June 2004.

How many people does the IDF say it has killed in Gaza?

The Israel Defense Forces stated on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists, its own count and a floor.

Does the IDF publish a civilian casualty count for Gaza?

The Israel Defense Forces publishes no civilian casualty count in the material used here, and its 29 February 2024 briefing counts only those it describes as terrorists.

Where does the 2,125 figure come from?

The State Comptroller reported 2,125 Palestinians killed during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, on figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Does the IDF publish how many warnings it issued?

The Israel Defense Forces states that it warns civilians by telephone, text message and leaflet and performs roof knocking,

and publishes no count of those actions.

How long did the examination machinery take to stand up?

The State Comptroller recorded about three years and five months between the second Turkel report of February 2013 and the government's approval of the implementing recommendations on 3 July 2016.

Was any earlier audit of conduct in combat published?

The State Comptroller records that a 2012 to 2013 audit of the civilian component in combat was completed in draft in 2014 and was not published because Operation Protective Edge intervened.

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RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

How Many Criminal Investigations Has the IDF Opened Over Gaza?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 27, 2026

What Did Israel's Supreme Court Rule on the Barrier Route?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 31, 2026

Were Israeli Soldiers Trained in the Laws of War?

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LATEST

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KEY FIGURES September 9, 2026

Why Are So Few Building Permits Granted in East Jerusalem?

The State Comptroller recorded 965 permits granted in the east of Jerusalem against 6,003 in the west, 2010 to 2014.

LAND AND PLANNING East Jerusalem Building Permits State Comptroller Jerusalem Municipality Planning



965 building permits were granted in the Arab neighbourhoods of the east of Jerusalem across 2010 to 2014, against 6,003 in the Jewish neighbourhoods of the west, on figures the State Comptroller of Israel published in its 2016 audit of the Jerusalem local planning and building committee. The same audit recorded 1,609 permit applications from the east against 9,143 from the west, and the Comptroller attributed the small number of applications to a shortage of outline plans, a shortage of municipal infrastructure and the absence of land settlement. The permit and application counts are the Jerusalem Municipality's own licensing records, examined by Israel's state audit institution.

Figure	What it counts	Period
965	Permits granted in the east of the city	2010 to 2014
6,003	Permits granted in the west of the city	2010 to 2014
About 14%	The east's share of the 6,968 permits granted city-wide	2010 to 2014
1,609	Permit applications submitted from the east	2010 to 2014
9,143	Permit applications submitted from the west	2010 to 2014
About 15%	The east's share of the 10,752 applications submitted	2010 to 2014
About 20%	Share of housing units approved city-wide that were approved in the east	2010 to 2014

Figure	What it counts	Period
About 10,000	Illegal structures in East Jerusalem not being dealt with, on the municipal prosecution's own document	Early 2016


Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2016 audit of the Jerusalem local planning and building committee. Permits and applications are separate counts.

The Comptroller counts 965 permits in East Jerusalem against 6,003

The State Comptroller recorded 6,968 building permits granted across Jerusalem in the five years, 965 of them in the east and 6,003 in the west, which the audit writes as about 14% and about 86%. These are permits granted, the Municipality's own licensing records as examined by the state auditor, and one permit may carry many housing units. The yearly split runs from 180 in the east and 1,135 in the west in 2010 to 210 and 1,272 in 2014.

Building permits granted in Jerusalem, by year

PERMITS GRANTED 2010 TO 2014, EAST AND WEST OF THE CITY



■ East Jerusalem ■ West Jerusalem

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2016 audit of the Jerusalem local planning and building committee. Permits granted, not housing units.

East Jerusalem produced 1,609 of 10,752 permit applications

The State Comptroller published the application counts alongside the permit counts, and 1,609 of the 10,752 applications submitted city-wide across the five years came from the east, about 15%. The audit reports applications submitted and permits granted as two separate series, drawn from the Municipality's own records, and does not present the difference between them as refusals.

Year	Applications, east	Applications, west
2010	263	1,653
2011	273	2,033
2012	345	1,774

Year	Applications, east	Applications, west
2013	367	1,875
2014	361	1,808
Total	1,609	9,143

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2016. Applications submitted to the Jerusalem local committee.

The Comptroller names 3 constraints behind the low application count

The State Comptroller attributed the small number of applications submitted from the east to structural constraints, and named three. The audit also records what the planning bodies said in reply in May 2016, and those replies are the bodies' own accounts of their own conduct.

- A shortage of outline plans on which permits could be based.
- A shortage of municipal infrastructure, including water and sewage.
- The absence of land settlement, which produces uncertainty of title.

The Jerusalem District Planner replied in May 2016 that the District Committee had acted to ease planning in the east, including a very lenient procedure for proving connection to the land. The Jerusalem Municipality replied in May 2016 that the relatively low number of permits issued in the east results from the small number of applications submitted to it, and that it works to encourage permits and completion certificates.

About 20% of approved housing units were in the east

The State Comptroller recorded that about 20% of the housing units approved city-wide across 2010 to 2014 were approved in the east of the city, a different measure from the 14% share of permits, because permits and housing units are counted separately. The audit set that share against a population share, and the Central Bureau of Statistics publishes its own count of the city's residents.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
About 20%	Housing units approved city-wide that were approved in the east	State Comptroller of Israel	2010 to 2014
Close to 40%	Share of Jerusalem's population living in the Arab neighbourhoods	State Comptroller of Israel	2016 audit
39.5%	Arab share of Jerusalem residents	Central Bureau of Statistics	End of 2023
60.5%	Jews and Others share of Jerusalem residents	Central Bureau of Statistics	End of 2023

The Comptroller set the approval shares beside the population share to conclude that there are large gaps between the Arab and the Jewish neighbourhoods. The population share is a count of residents and is not a permit entitlement.

The audit publishes no permit refusal count and none after 2014

The State Comptroller's tables run 2010 to 2014 and record applications submitted and permits granted only. Nothing in the

published audit is a count of the following, so the 644 difference between the eastern application and permit totals may not be read as refusals.

- Applications refused.
- Applications withdrawn.
- Applications still pending at the close of the period.
- Any Israeli permit series for the years after 2014.

A document formulated in early 2016 by the municipal prosecution, which the audit relays, records about 10,000 illegal structures in East Jerusalem not being dealt with, given resource constraints and the extensive scope. That is the prosecution's own count of cases it is not handling, and it is not a count of structures found unlawful by a tribunal or a count of [demolitions](#).

Which figures here may not be added together?

The east of the city, in these audits, means the roughly 70 square kilometres over which Israel applied its law, jurisdiction and administration in June 1967 and annexed to the Jerusalem municipal boundary, as the State Comptroller defines it in its report on social services for the Arab population of East Jerusalem.

Applications, permits granted and housing units approved are three different universes with three different shares, about 15%, about 14% and about 20%, and none may be restated as another. The Comptroller's permit and application data are the Jerusalem

Municipality's own records, audited by the state auditor. The population shares are counts of [residents](#) and belong to a different measurement again.

Questions readers ask

How many building permits did East Jerusalem get?

The State Comptroller recorded 965 permits granted in the Arab neighbourhoods of the east across 2010 to 2014, against 6,003 in the west, 6,968 in all.

What share of Jerusalem permits went to the east?

About 14%, on the State Comptroller's 2016 audit, covering permits granted between 2010 and 2014.

How many applications came from East Jerusalem?

The State Comptroller published 1,609 applications from the east across 2010 to 2014, against 9,143 from the west, 10,752 in all.

Does the audit say how many applications were refused?

No. The State Comptroller reports applications submitted and permits granted, and publishes no count of applications refused, withdrawn or pending.

What reasons does the Comptroller give for the low number of applications?

The State Comptroller named a shortage of outline plans, a shortage of municipal infrastructure including water and sewage, and the absence of land settlement, which produces uncertainty of title.

What did the Jerusalem Municipality say?

The Jerusalem Municipality stated in May 2016 that the relatively low number of permits issued in the east results from the small number of applications submitted to it, and that it works to encourage permits.

What did the district planning body say?

The Jerusalem District Planner stated in May 2016 that the District Committee had acted to ease planning in the east, including a very lenient procedure for proving connection to the land.

Is the 20% figure the same as the 14%?

No. The State Comptroller recorded about 20% as the share of housing units approved city-wide in the east, and about 14% as the share of permits granted there. They count different things.

How many people live in the Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem?

The State Comptroller put the figure at close to 40% of the city's population, and the Central Bureau of Statistics counted 39.5% of Jerusalem residents as Arabs at the end of 2023.

Does Israel publish permit figures for years after 2014?

Not in this audit. The State Comptroller's tables stop at 2014, and no later Israeli permit series for East Jerusalem is carried here.

What is the figure of about 10,000 structures?

A document formulated in early 2016 by the municipal prosecution, relayed by the State Comptroller, records about 10,000 illegal structures in East Jerusalem not being dealt with, on the prosecution's own count.

Does the audit address land expropriation?

No. The State Comptroller examined the local planning and building committee and its licensing, and the audit publishes nothing on expropriation.

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RECORD EXPLAINER August 26, 2026

Does Israel Demolish Palestinian Homes, and What Do Israeli Bodies Publish?



KEY FIGURES August 28, 2026

How Many People Live in Jerusalem?



KEY FIGURES August 31, 2026

Does East Jerusalem Get the Same Rubbish Collection?

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KEY FIGURES September 9, 2026

Are Israeli Police Wiretap Permits Properly Documented?

130 of 359 administrative communications-data permits examined lacked complete documentation, on the State Comptroller's January 2026 audit.

LAW AND COURTS Israel Police State Comptroller Wiretapping Communications Data Oversight



130 of 359 administrative permits for obtaining communications data lacked complete and proper

documentation meeting the procedure's requirements, in controls the Israel Police Cyber Division ran between December 2020 and August 2021, published by the State Comptroller of Israel in January 2026. The report writes the share as about 36%. The 359 are the permits those controls examined, not a count of permits the police issued, and the audit publishes a deficiency count rather than a count of permits certified as properly documented.

Figure	What it counts	Period
359	Administrative communications-data permits examined in the Cyber Division's controls, in cases where field units received the data and analysed it	December 2020 to August 2021
130	Of those 359, the permits lacking complete and proper documentation meeting the procedure's requirements	December 2020 to August 2021
about 36%	The share of the 359 examined permits lacking that documentation, as the report writes it	December 2020 to August 2021
about 30	Controls run by the Cyber Division, most examining one week of a field unit's execution of permits and some up to a month	December 2020 to August 2021
7 of 7	Matters checked in the control of wiretapping at one field unit in which recurring defects were found	2020
1	Defects recorded as corrected, the method of identifying speakers	2020

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2026, Use of Technological Tools for Enforcement Purposes, chapter 4.

130 of 359 permits examined lacked complete, proper documentation

The State Comptroller recorded the 130 twice in the same chapter, once as the finding of the Israel Police Cyber Division's own

controls of its field units and once as the audit's own finding. The test applied is the one set by the police procedure, whether the documentation was complete and proper as that procedure requires, so the count is a function of that standard. The 130 and the 359 are the two counts the audit prints.

- Whose count: the Cyber Division's own, run over the field units it supervises, and confirmed by the State Comptroller.
- What the permits are: administrative permits for obtaining communications data, examined where field units had received the data and analysed it.
- What the figure is not: a count of permits found unlawful, and not a share of all permits the police issued.

The 359 are communications-data permits, not wiretap orders

Communications data and wiretapping are treated as two separate matters in the chapter, and the 359 belong to the first. The State Comptroller reported on wiretapping through the controls run at a field unit rather than through a permit population, so no permit share exists for wiretap orders. The wider supervision counts below are counts of the police's own internal control activity, taken from that activity's own records.

What the audit counted	Figure	Period
Administrative communications-data permits examined	359, of which 130 lacked complete documentation	December 2020 to August 2021

What the audit counted	Figure	Period
Professional-guidance controls performed	259, of which 256 covered only field-deployed units	2019 to 2021
Controls of the operational response department	None	2021

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, 2026, chapter 4.

A 2020 control found defects in every wiretap order examined

The 2020 control of wiretapping at one field unit found recurring defects in every order examined, across all seven matters checked, and the State Comptroller recorded the method of identifying speakers as the only defect corrected. The control was run by the Israel Police over its own unit, and it covers the orders examined at that unit rather than any national total. The audit prints no count of wiretap orders in force.

- 7 of 7 matters checked carried recurring defects, on the police's own 2020 control at one field unit.
- 6 of 7 deficiency areas remained uncorrected at the 2020 follow-up, on the Comptroller's examination.
- No annual control by the head of the cyber division is recorded across 2018 to 2022, other than one in 2020.

About 30 controls examined mostly one week of unit activity

About 30 controls were run by the Israel Police Cyber Division between December 2020 and August 2021, and the State Comptroller recorded that most examined one week in which field units executed administrative permits, with some covering up to a month. The 359 permits sit inside those sampled windows. The word “about” is the report’s own, and the count of controls is the Division’s own record of work it did on itself.

- About 30 controls, December 2020 to August 2021.
- Most covered one week of a field unit’s activity; some covered up to a month.
- The 359 permits, and the 130 within them, are drawn from those windows.

No Israeli body publishes a total of wiretap permits issued

Neither the State Comptroller’s 2026 audit nor any other Israeli official publication in the record used here carries an annual count of wiretap orders issued or communications-data permits granted, a court approval or rejection count, or a documentation rate across the whole Israel Police. What the audit publishes is what its controls examined and what those controls found.

- No annual total of communications-data permits granted by the Israel Police.
- No annual total of wiretap orders sought, granted or refused.
- No force-wide documentation rate, and no compliance count derived from the 359.

Which figures here may not be divided into one another?

The 359 permits and the 259 professional-guidance controls count different things over different periods and are not a ratio. The 130 is a deficiency count within the 359, so the remaining 229 are permits the audit did not report as deficient rather than permits it certified as properly documented. The 7 of 7 matters at one field unit in 2020 belong to wiretapping and cannot be added to the communications-data permits. All figures are the Israel Police Cyber Division's own records of its own controls, published by the State Comptroller in January 2026.

Questions readers ask

How many of the permits examined were properly documented?

The State Comptroller published a deficiency count rather than a compliance count: 130 of 359 examined administrative permits lacked complete and proper documentation, and no figure is published for the rest.

Which permits do the 359 refer to?

The State Comptroller recorded them as administrative permits for obtaining communications data, examined in cases where police field units had received the data and analysed it.

Who ran the controls that produced the 130?

The Israel Police Cyber Division ran them over its own field units, and the State Comptroller reported the finding both as the Division's and as the audit's own.

Does the 36% cover the whole Israel Police?

The State Comptroller recorded it as a share of the 359 permits the controls examined, which came from about 30 controls between December 2020 and August 2021, so it is not a force-wide rate.

How long a period did each control cover?

The State Comptroller recorded that most of the roughly 30 controls examined one week of a field unit's execution of permits, and some covered up to a month.

What did the audit find on wiretap orders themselves?

The State Comptroller recorded that the 2020 control at one field unit found recurring defects in every order examined, across all seven matters checked.

How many earlier deficiency areas had been corrected?

The State Comptroller found 6 of 7 deficiency areas still uncorrected at the 2020 follow-up, with the method of identifying speakers recorded as corrected.

How often did the head of the cyber division run an annual control?

The State Comptroller recorded no annual control by the head of the cyber division across 2018 to 2022, other than one in 2020.

Who published these figures, and when?

The State Comptroller of Israel published them in January 2026, in chapter 4 of a special report on the use of technological tools for enforcement purposes.

Does any Israeli body publish how many wiretaps the police carry out?

No annual count of wiretap orders or communications-data permits appears in the audit, which measured supervision and documentation rather than volume.

Does the State Comptroller publish counts of complaints against police officers?

The State Comptroller reported 11,776 complaints opened at [the Police Investigations Department](#) between 2019 and 2021, and of 5,356 final decisions taken in 2021, 68, being 1.2%, ended in a criminal indictment.

Has the Comptroller examined police record-keeping elsewhere?

The State Comptroller reported that about 55,000 suspects' files were closed for lack of evidence in 2020, about 60% of the files closed that year, and that the Israel Police hold no data in their computerised systems on files closed for lack of guilt.

Sources

- State Comptroller of Israel, 2026. Use of Technological Tools for Enforcement Purposes: Wiretapping and Communications Data, chapter 4, Police Supervision and Control over the Use of Communications Data and the Conduct of Wiretaps. Special report, Shevat 5786, pp. 174 to 183. library.mevaker.gov.il. Official or primary record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2023. The Handling by the Police Investigations Department and the Police of Offences by Police Officers. Systemic Issues, chapter 105, May 2023. library.mevaker.gov.il. Official or primary record.
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Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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