



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Military Objectives Distinction Proportionality Israel Defense Forces
NAZA



A building can be a military objective on any of 4 grounds under the rule Israel applies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its Key Legal Aspects paper of 2 November 2023: an object qualifies where, “by their nature, location, purpose or use,” it makes “an effective contribution to military action” and its destruction “offers a definite military advantage.” The Ministry states that under this rule “many ostensibly civilian objects may become legitimate targets.” The IDF’s own presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact, applies the same wording and shows a redacted target card whose objective is a residential building.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
4	Grounds on which an object can qualify as a military objective: nature, location, purpose or use	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Stated 2 November 2023
3	Kinds of site beyond hospitals to which the IDF applies “further restrictive measures”: schools, places of worship and UN facilities	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Stated 2 November 2023
2	Limbs of the military-target definition in the IDF’s presentation: objects, and persons	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
8	Boxes in the IDF’s decision flow for a target, including “Proximity to Sensitive Sites?” and “Civilians in Target?”	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
1977	Year of the Additional Protocols, to which Israel is not a party; it states it abides by the customary rules they embody	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Stated 2 November 2023

Israel applies Article 52's 4 grounds as customary law, the Ministry states

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets out Israel's rule for objects on page 8 of its Key Legal Aspects paper, as its own statement of Israel's legal position: "In accordance with the principle of distinction, the IDF only targets persons who are members of organized armed groups or civilians directly participating in the hostilities, and objects that qualify as military objectives. In terms of objects, Israel applies the customary definition of "military objectives" as reflected in Article 52 of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions."

The paper's footnote gives the definition in full: "those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

- Israel is not a party to Additional Protocol I, and the Ministry states on page 7 that it "abides by all applicable rules of customary international law, including those embodied in conventions to which it is not a party (such as the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions)"
- The Ministry applies Article 52 as customary law, not as a treaty Israel has joined

The Ministry says civilian buildings "may become legitimate targets" by their

use

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states on page 2 of the same paper that “many ostensibly civilian objects may become legitimate targets,” and that “it cannot be concluded from the mere fact that seeming “civilians” or “civilian objects” have been targeted, that an attack was unlawful.”

The Ministry gives its own account of why, on page 9: “ Hamas’s military infrastructure, command, militants, communications, and weapons are deliberately located within residential, commercial, and other civilian buildings, including specially protected sites, for the most part in the densest parts of Gaza.” That is the Ministry’s statement about Hamas’s conduct, published by a party to the war.


The Ministry names on page 9 the sites it treats differently: “The special protection afforded under international law to objects such as hospitals is reflected in IDF procedures, and the IDF implements further restrictive measures for additional sites such as schools, places of worship, and UN facilities.”

The IDF’s presentation defines a military target in 2 limbs

The IDF’s presentation, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, defines a military target on its slide 8 in 2 limbs, the IDF’s own account of its rule:

Limb	The presentation's wording
Objects	An object that by its nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military action and whose destruction offers a definite military advantage
Persons	A member of an enemy armed force, "a member of an organize [sic] armed group", or a civilian directly participating in hostilities "for such time that he does so"

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 8, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF.



Slide 8.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 8, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

A redacted IDF target card names a residential building as its objective

The IDF's presentation shows a target card, redacted as supplied, recording its objective as "Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building". Its legal review is marked "Conditional", the condition is "the provision of an effective

advance warning”, and the recommendation is “Real-time visual surveillance”, the IDF’s own record of one review.

- Top Secret -

Target ID: [REDACTED]

Intell Type of Target: Arms cache i military commander. Function: The target is an a Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Kh commander. The house is bc operational planning site for f operatives for the coordination Location: Abasan Al-Kabir, c Affiliation: Palestinian Islamic Presence at target: The milita and Palestinian Islamic Jihad Description: The target is pa 23*23m in size. The target structure measuring 13*13m i the roof of the structure is k concrete structure measuring tanks, 2 solar panels, and ti shack. Weaponry located at the target the manufacture of projectiles Sensitive sites: There are no 100m radius of the target. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Intelligence by [REDACTED] Aerial footage [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	ives jet - store at whilst l te, ice cking”). Not Approved	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]
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Planning n 2 Option 3	Conditions ☒ Real-time visual surv. ☒ Nighttime ☒ Indiv. warning to civilians in target ☐ Indiv. warning to civil. in surrounding structures ☒ Legal conditions ☐ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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Slide 15, redacted as supplied.


Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The card’s conditions checklist is ticked for real-time visual surveillance, nighttime, an individual warning to civilians in the target and legal conditions. It is not ticked for an individual warning to civilians in surrounding structures.

The IDF’s decision flow asks “Civilians in Target?” in 1 of 8 boxes

The IDF’s presentation lays out a decision flow for an intelligence-based target on its slide 18, read in two rows, the IDF’s own account of its procedure:

- Define exact location
- “Area Evacuated? Yes | No”
- “Proximity to Sensitive Sites? Yes | No”
- “Civilians in Target? Yes | No”
- “Warning Considerations”
- “Choose The Right Munition”
- “Target Coherent RoE? Yes | No”
- “Permission to Strike”



Slide 18. “ROE” and “RoE” on the slide are rules of engagement.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 18, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The IDF states each strike gets its own proportionality assessment

The IDF states on its data-technology page of 18 June 2024, as its own account of its procedures, that “In each attack, IDF procedures require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects,” and that the procedures “do not permit carrying out strikes on a category basis, without conducting individual assessments per strike.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states what counts on each side of that assessment:

- Military advantage “may include a variety of operational considerations such as disrupting enemy activities, weakening the enemy’s military forces, gaining ground, and protecting the security of one’s own forces and civilians” (Key Legal Aspects, page 10)
- Civilian casualties or damage, “while tragic, do not of themselves allow for a conclusion in regard to proportionality without an informed assessment of both the expected civilian harm and the military advantage anticipated at the time of the attack” (page 3)
- “Excessiveness, however, is not measured using absolute numbers” (May 2015 report, paragraph 330)

No Israeli publication read here lists homes struck as military objectives

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IDF publish the rule and not its application. Absent from the Israeli publications read here:

- A count of residential buildings struck as military objectives since 7 October 2023
- Which of the 4 grounds applied to any identified home that was struck
- The outcome of the legal review for any strike on a home, beyond the single redacted card in the IDF's presentation

Where these figures come from

Each rule here is a party's own statement: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Israel's legal position, the IDF on its procedures. They state the test, not whether any strike met it. The 4 grounds and the 2 limbs follow the wording of Article 52 of Additional Protocol I, which Israel applies as customary law without being a party. The target card is one redacted example, not a count, and the presentation was supplied to IsraelFact, not published by the IDF. The May 2015 report describes the 2014 conflict.

Questions readers ask

When does Israel say a building becomes a military objective?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that an object qualifies where "by their nature, location, purpose or use" it makes "an effective contribution to military action" and its destruction offers "a definite military advantage."

Can a home be a military target under Israel's rule?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “many ostensibly civilian objects may become legitimate targets,” and the IDF's presentation shows a target card for a residential building.

Is Israel bound by Additional Protocol I?

Israel is not a party to it; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states Israel applies Article 52's definition as customary international law.

Which buildings does the IDF say it treats with extra restrictions?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs names schools, places of worship and UN facilities, beyond the special protection given to hospitals.

Does the IDF check for civilians before striking a building?

The IDF's decision flow, in its presentation supplied to IsraelFact, includes the box “Civilians in Target? Yes | No” before “Permission to Strike.”

Does a civilian death mean a strike was unlawful?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that civilian casualties “do not of themselves allow for a conclusion in regard to proportionality” without assessing expected harm and anticipated advantage.

Does the IDF approve whole categories of targets?

The IDF states its procedures “do not permit carrying out strikes on a category basis, without conducting individual assessments per strike.”

What counts as military advantage?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists “disrupting enemy activities, weakening the enemy’s military forces, gaining ground, and protecting the security of one’s own forces and civilians.”

Can a person in a home be a target?

The IDF’s presentation defines a target to include a member of an organized armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities “for such time that he does so.”

Was the residential target on the card struck?

The IDF’s presentation does not say; the card records a conditional legal review, and its dates and target ID are redacted.

How many homes has Israel struck as military targets?

No Israeli publication read here gives a count of residential buildings struck as military objectives.

Sources

- Israel Defense Forces, 2024, updated 2026. The IDF’s Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Dated 18 June

2024, last updated 14 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record, a party's own account of its own procedures.

- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. "Process of target attack", a presentation on targeting and civilians, slides 8, 15 and 18. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF's own account of its procedure.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015. The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI: IDF Conduct of Operations During the 2014 Gaza Conflict. Dated May 2015, released 14 June 2015. gov.il. Official or primary record, a party's own account of its own conduct.
- Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023. Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects. Updated to 2 November 2023. gov.il. Official or primary record, a party's own statement of its legal position.

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Can an IDF Legal Adviser Stop a Strike?



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Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?



CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

The IDF stated on 14 September 2026 that no Gaza strike it planned or approved anticipated 500 civilian deaths, and that people, not AI, approve strikes.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY NAZA Israel Defense Forces IDF Spokesperson Gaza
Artificial Intelligence



The Israel Defense Forces stated on 14 September 2026 that it “has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed,” its own answer to a figure in the promotional clip for the documentary NAZA, as The Times of Israel reported. The IDF Spokesperson’s first response, on 11 September, “categorically rejects these allegations” and states that strikes are selected and approved “by human personnel only.” On 14 September the Chief of the General Staff instructed the Military Advocate General to examine possible legal action over the film, and told troops he had not watched it.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
500	Civilians the IDF states no Gaza strike it planned, approved or carried out was anticipated to kill, its own statement answering a figure in the film’s promotional clip	Israel Defense Forces, as quoted by The Times of Israel	Stated 14 September 2026
11 September 2026	Date of the IDF Spokesperson’s first published response, which answers the film “according to the publications”	IDF Spokesperson	Friday 11 September, one day after the Venice premiere
3	Instructions the Chief of the General Staff issued: a Planning Directorate team, a legal examination by the Military Advocate General, and a leak inquiry	IDF Chief of the General Staff, as reported by The Times of Israel	14 September 2026
2021	Year the IDF states its Habsora tool was first used operationally, on the page its response links to	Israel Defense Forces	Page of 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
9	Questions in the FAQ the IDF added to that page, the first “Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?”	Israel Defense Forces	Added 14 September 2026
9	Steps in the IDF’s targeting process, with legal review at step 7 and commanders’ approval at step 8, the IDF’s own account	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
18	Clips of the IDF’s own strike footage in which a strike is called off, held or diverted	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026

The IDF Spokesperson rejected the allegations on 11 September 2026

The IDF Spokesperson published the army’s first response on 11 September 2026, the day after the film’s premiere at the Venice Film Festival, and stated that it responds to the film “according to the publications.” The statement is the IDF’s own account, and it carries no figure. Its points, in order:

- “The IDF categorically rejects these allegations.”
- The film “relies on anonymous testimonies from individuals whose identity cannot be verified, including whether they served in the IDF, in what capacity, or whether they were involved in the matters about which the allegations are being made.”
- The excerpts include “claims regarding national and military strategy that are clearly beyond the knowledge of junior-level

soldiers,” and situations in which Intelligence Directorate soldiers “by definition would not have been involved.”

- The IDF “strikes military targets and makes unprecedented efforts to minimize harm to civilians.”
- “A soldier who witnesses a violation of the law is required under military orders to report it,” and “This also applies to individuals who were interviewed for the film.”
- “Decisions regarding the selection and approval of strikes in the IDF are made by human personnel only, in accordance with IDF guidelines, and not by artificial intelligence.”

The IDF denied a 500-civilian strike on 14 September 2026

The IDF stated on 14 September 2026 that no strike it planned, approved or carried out in Gaza anticipated killing 500 civilians “or anything near that number,” its own statement, posted on its X account and quoted by The Times of Israel. The 500 is a figure for anticipated harm in the claim and in the denial alike, not a count of people killed. The statement has two halves, and a third sentence about the film’s makers.

What the statement covers

The IDF’s words, as quoted

Planning, approval and execution

“The IDF has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed.”

The outcome of any strike

“Nor was any credible claim raised throughout the war suggesting that an IDF strike had caused anything near that number of fatalities.”

What the statement covers**The IDF's words, as quoted**

The film's makers

They "couldn't possibly verify this claim, there is no real supporting evidence, and yet they published it anyway."

Source: Israel Defense Forces, post of 14 September 2026, as quoted by The Times of Israel the same day.

The Chief of the General Staff issued 3 instructions on 14 September

The Chief of the General Staff issued three instructions on 14 September 2026 after meeting senior officers on the film, as The Times of Israel reported, and stated that "according to the reports that have emerged so far" the film "is based on blood libels, deliberate distortion of reality, and false and serious accusations against IDF soldiers and commanders." The instructions are the army's own, and an instruction to examine legal action is not a legal action taken.

- A "multi-organizational and multidisciplinary team" headed by the Planning Directorate, to "formulate courses of action and tools for addressing false claims against the IDF and its soldiers."
- The Military Advocate General to "examine and advance possible legal actions regarding the film and those involved in it."
- The top brass to examine "information security aspects and possible individuals involved in the leaking of classified materials that were used in producing the film."

The same day the IDF Spokesperson, in a Hebrew-language post quoted in translation, invited the film's makers "to allow IDF representatives to view the full film, so that we can address each of the claims raised in it in a substantive manner."

The IDF updated its targeting page with 9 answers on AI

The IDF updated its page on data technologies in intelligence processing on 14 September 2026, first published 18 June 2024, and added nine questions and answers; its 11 September response links to that page, and the page links back to the response. The answers are the IDF's own account of its own procedures. Four of them:

Question on the IDF's page	The IDF's answer
Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?	"No."
Who makes the final decision to approve an attack?	"The decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander."
Does Lavender automatically mark Palestinians for assassination?	"No."
Is the IDF's targeting process fully automated?	"No."

The page states that Habsora "was first utilized in an operational setting in 2021," and that Lavender "is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack." It publishes no count of targets either tool suggested.

The IDF states it has not viewed the full film


The Chief of the General Staff wrote to troops on 14 September 2026, as The Times of Israel reported: “I have not watched the film, I do not know whom they interviewed in it or who or what is behind it. The claims and events were not presented to the IDF, and therefore it is difficult to respond to the matter seriously and professionally.” The Times of Israel reported the same day that the military had reacted only to clips posted online. The same missive states: “We constantly work to investigate, correct and improve, and we will continue to accept any substantive criticism and examine ourselves.” No IDF response to the full film appears in the material read here.

The IDF’s presentation sets legal review before commanders’ approval

The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, sets out a targeting process in 9 steps, with legal review at step 7 and commanders’ approval at step 8. The presentation is the IDF’s own account of its procedure, and the approving commander, on its slide 16, is “an officer who has been professionally and operationally qualified for this role and possesses the authority to authorize strikes against designated targets.” The steps, in the slide’s order:

1. Intelligence collection
2. Analysis

3. Identifying military objectives
4. Link to mission
5. Validation
6. Planning
7. Legal review
8. Commanders' approval
9. Execution, battle damage assessment and lessons learned



Slide 6. "BDA" on the slide is battle damage assessment.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 6, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

18 clips of IDF footage show strikes called off, held or diverted

The IDF's own strike footage, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, shows a strike called off in 7 clips, held in 1

and diverted in 10, dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. The English subtitles are burned into the footage as supplied. The clips are a set, not a sample, and carry no count of strikes carried out.

Outcome in the clip	Clips	On-screen dates
Called off, not carried out	7	4 April 2024 to 25 September 2025
Held pending confirmation	1	14 August 2024
Munition diverted from the target	10	17 November 2024 to 12 July 2026

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact, read from the subtitles in each clip.



ON SCREEN: 22 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:11

1. There are people there
2. I recommend to abort, there is a group of five people now,
3. even more, possibly children and more. A lot
4. A lot, it's an appropriate time to abort

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

Where these figures come from

The 11 September statement and the data-technology page are published on idf.il. The 14 September statements were posted on X or issued to the press, and are quoted here as The Times of Israel reported them, in its English translation where the original was Hebrew. Each is the IDF's own statement about allegations against it. The 500 is an anticipated-harm figure, not a death toll, and the three instructions of 14 September are instructions, not outcomes. The presentation and the 18 clips are the IDF's own material, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF; the presentation carries no date on its face.

Questions readers ask

When did the IDF first respond to NAZA?

The IDF Spokesperson published the army's first response on 11 September 2026, one day after the film premiered at the Venice Film Festival, as The Times of Israel reported.

What did the IDF say about the 500 figure?

The IDF stated on 14 September 2026, in its own statement, that it "has never planned, approved, or carried out a strike in Gaza in which 500 civilians or anything near that number were anticipated to be killed."

Does the IDF say AI chooses its strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson stated on 11 September 2026 that decisions on selecting and approving strikes “are made by human personnel only” and “not by artificial intelligence.”

Has the IDF seen the whole film?

The Chief of the General Staff wrote to troops on 14 September 2026, “I have not watched the film,” as The Times of Israel reported.

Is the IDF taking legal action against the filmmakers?

The Chief of the General Staff instructed the Military Advocate General on 14 September 2026 to “examine and advance possible legal actions,” as The Times of Israel reported. No decision appears in the material read here.

Did the IDF ask to see the film?

The IDF Spokesperson invited the film’s makers on 14 September 2026 to let IDF representatives view the full film, in a Hebrew-language post The Times of Israel quoted in translation.

What does the IDF say interviewed soldiers should do?

The IDF Spokesperson stated on 11 September 2026 that a soldier who witnesses a violation of the law is required under military orders to report it, and that this applies to those interviewed for the film.

What is Habsora?

The IDF states that Habsora is a tool first used operationally in 2021 that suggests objects for an analyst to research, and that its suggestion cannot alone identify a target.

What is Lavender?

The IDF states that Lavender is “a general-purpose database” that cross-references intelligence sources, and that “this is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack.”

Who approves an IDF strike?

The IDF states on its page updated 14 September 2026 that “the decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander.”

What else did the Chief of the General Staff order?

The Chief of the General Staff ordered a Planning Directorate team on responses to claims and an inquiry into leaked classified material, on 14 September 2026, as The Times of Israel reported.

What steps does the IDF’s targeting process have?

The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact, sets out 9 steps, from intelligence collection to execution, with legal review at step 7 and commanders’ approval at step 8.

What does the IDF’s own strike footage show?

The IDF's footage supplied to IsraelFact shows a strike called off in 7 clips, held in 1 and diverted in 10, dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026.

Where can the IDF's statements be read?

The IDF published its 11 September 2026 response and its data-technology page on idf.il; its 14 September statements were quoted by The Times of Israel.


Sources

- Israel Defense Forces, 2024. The IDF's Use of Data Technologies in Intelligence Processing. Published 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Footage of strikes called off, held or diverted, eighteen clips, on-screen dates 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF's own footage.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. "Process of target attack", a presentation on targeting and civilians, slides 6 and 16. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF's own account of its procedure.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2026. Statement on the NAZA "500" claim, posted on the IDF's X account, 14 September 2026, as quoted by The Times of Israel. Official statement by a party, relayed by Israeli press.

- IDF Spokesperson, Israel Defense Forces, 2026. The IDF Spokesperson's Response Following the Publication of the Movie "NAZA". 11 September 2026. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF chief floats legal action against 'NAZA' film, orders probe of leaked material. 14 September 2026. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press, relaying IDF statements.
- The Times of Israel, 2026. Zamir tells troops IDF hasn't seen 'NAZA' yet, will accept 'substantive criticism,' not 'unfounded vilification'. 14 September 2026. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press, relaying an IDF statement.

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Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



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Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?



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Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?



KEY FIGURES September 23, 2026

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

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KEY FIGURES August 26, 2026 Updated September 23, 2026

Does Israel Adhere to Humanitarian Protocols?

What Israel's own bodies publish: the IDF ethical code, stated precautions, 74 investigations opened, and COGAT's recorded aid tonnages.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Military Advocate General COGAT Gaza IDF Doctrine
Humanitarian Aid



74 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct in Gaza had been opened as at 3 August 2024, on the published count of the IDF Military Advocate General's Corps, which applies a stated reasonable-suspicion standard and counts its own processes. The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, COGAT's own count, resting on tonnages self-declared by suppliers rather than weighed at the crossings. The Israel Defense Forces publishes its ethical code, the Spirit of the IDF, which sets out six values and names purity of arms among them. No Israeli body publishes a finding on whether its own forces complied with humanitarian law.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
6 values	Values set out in the Spirit of the IDF, the army's own ethical code, purity of arms among them	Israel Defense Forces	Undated doctrine, as published
74	Criminal investigations opened into alleged misconduct in Gaza, the Corps' own count of its own processes, under a reasonable-suspicion standard	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
Over 1,000	Incidents identified as requiring factual assessment and referred to the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, the Corps' own count, a floor	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
1,778,363 metric tons	Food recorded entering Gaza, COGAT's own count, on tonnages self-declared by suppliers and private providers	Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories	10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
More than 1.9 million tons	Aid the army states it delivered, its own count, published as a floor	Israel Defense Forces	Start of the Swords of Iron war to 19 August 2025
Over 70,000 tons	Aid entering Gaza, the Ministry's own count, published as a floor	Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 16 December 2023
More than 106,000	Aid trucks entering Gaza, Israel's own stated total	Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Permanent Mission in France	7 October 2023 to 14 September 2025

The Spirit of the IDF names purity of arms among its values

The Spirit of the IDF is the army's own published ethical code, its statement of the standard it says binds its personnel, and it is not an account of conduct or a count of anything. On purity of arms the code states: "An IDF soldier will only exercise their power or use their weapon in order to fulfill their mission and only when necessary," and that the soldier "will not use their weapon or power to harm uninvolved civilians and prisoners and will do everything in their power to prevent harm to their lives, bodies, dignity and property." On human life it states that the soldier "will recognize the critical importance of human life," and on discipline that the soldier will "ensure they are only giving out legal orders, and do not follow illegal orders."

The six values the code sets out:

- Purity of Arms
- Human Life
- Discipline
- Professionalism
- Camaraderie
- Sense of Mission

What does the IDF state it does before a strike?

The Israel Defense Forces states, in its own account of its own procedures, that it warns civilians before strikes and aborts strikes in certain circumstances. Israel's own count of warnings, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, runs to over 15 million text messages, over 12 million pre-recorded calls and over 4.5 million leaflets by 8 December 2023; no Israeli publication read here counts roof knocks performed or strikes aborted in the current war. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs published its own position statement on 17 September 2025, giving figures stated as of 14 September 2025 and referring readers to COGAT for humanitarian aid detail.

- Warnings by telephone calls, text messages and leaflets, and a numbered evacuation-area map published in December 2023 so residents could follow instructions by area, on the army's own account.
- Roof knocking, a loud non-lethal munition, before striking a building, on the army's own account.


- Strikes aborted when civilians are present, on the army's own account.
- The army's stated position that Hamas sites military infrastructure, headquarters, launchers and weapons storage in residential buildings, hospitals, mosques and schools, and that Hamas broadcast messages telling residents to ignore evacuation warnings.
- At a briefing on 29 February 2024 the IDF Spokesperson stated over 13,000 people the army describes as terrorists eliminated in Gaza and about 3,400 apprehended in Judea and Samaria jointly with the ISA, both the army's own counts and its own characterisation, published as a floor and an approximation.

The Corps applies a reasonable-suspicion standard to alleged misconduct

The Military Advocate General's Corps opened 74 criminal investigations as at 3 August 2024, its own count of its own processes, and states that in armed conflict "death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct." The 74 are investigations opened, not findings, indictments or convictions. The [count and the machinery behind it](#) are set out separately.

Criminal investigations opened, by subject

74 INVESTIGATIONS OPENED, AS AT 3 AUGUST 2024



■ Death of detainees held by the IDF ■ Alleged pillaging or stealing ■ Alleged detainee mistreatment
■ Alleged illegal use of force ■ Destruction of civilian property

Source: IDF Military Advocate General's Corps, Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza, updated 3 August 2024. The Corps' own count of investigations opened, under a reasonable-suspicion standard.

COGAT records 1,778,363 tons of food entering Gaza on its own count

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, COGAT's own count, resting on tonnages self-declared by humanitarian organizations and private sector providers rather than weighed at the crossings. Two other Israeli bodies publish tonnage totals of their own, over different periods and covering different categories of goods, and the three may not be summed or compared as one series. [What each body counts entering Gaza](#) differs by publication.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
1,778,363 metric tons	Food only, COGAT's own count on self-declared tonnages	Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories	10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026
More than 1.9 million tons	All aid, the army's own count, a floor	Israel Defense Forces	Start of the Swords of Iron war to 19 August 2025
Over 70,000 tons	All aid, the Ministry's own count, a floor, of which over 6,500 tons medical supplies	Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 16 December 2023
18,000 tons	Medical supplies and medicines, COGAT's own count	Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories	Since 10 October 2025, as at July 2026

No Israeli body publishes a finding on its forces' compliance

The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes the number of criminal investigations it has opened and the number of incidents referred to the General Staff Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, its own counts of its own processes, and publishes no findings, indictment or conviction count in that publication. The Corps states that the Military Advocate General "is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence," and that its decisions can be challenged before the Attorney General and the Supreme Court. No State Comptroller audit chapter drawn on here reports on conduct of hostilities.

Which figures may not be added together?

Every figure on this page is a body's own count of its own activity or its own processes, published by that body and carrying its own period. The 74 investigations count investigations opened under a stated reasonable-suspicion standard, so the count moves with the threshold and is not a count of findings. Tonnages published by COGAT, the Israel Defense Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover different goods over different windows and are not one series. Floors stay floors: "more than 1.9 million tons" is not 1,900,000, and "over 70,000 tons" is not 70,000. The Corps' "over 1,000 incidents" is likewise a floor.

Questions readers ask

How many criminal investigations has the Military Advocate General's Corps opened over Gaza?

The Military Advocate General's Corps opened 74 criminal investigations as at 3 August 2024, on its own count of its own processes.

What threshold produces that count?

The Military Advocate General's Corps states that it applies a reasonable suspicion standard, and that civilian death or injury in armed conflict in most cases does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.

Are the 74 findings, indictments or convictions?

No. The Military Advocate General's Corps published them as investigations opened, and no findings, indictment or conviction count appears in that publication.

What is the Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism?

The Military Advocate General's Corps states it is a permanent General Staff body conducting factual assessments, created during the 2014 Gaza conflict on a recommendation of the Turkel Commission, and that over 1,000 incidents had been referred to it.

Who publishes the food tonnage entering Gaza?

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories recorded 1,778,363 metric tons of food between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026, its own count on tonnages self-declared by suppliers.

Can the tonnage totals be added together?

No. The Israel Defense Forces published more than 1.9 million tons of all aid to 19 August 2025, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published over 70,000 tons to 16 December 2023; the counts cover different goods over different windows.

Which values does the Spirit of the IDF set out?

The Israel Defense Forces publishes six values: Purity of Arms, Human Life, Discipline, Professionalism, Camaraderie and Sense of Mission.

Does the IDF publish how many warnings it issued?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes Israel's own count: over 15 million text messages, over 12 million pre-recorded calls, over 4.5 million leaflets and over 45,000 individual calls to 8 December 2023. No Israeli publication read here counts roof knocks performed or strikes aborted.

How many aid trucks does Israel state entered Gaza?

The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated more than 106,000 aid trucks carrying over two million tons as at 14 September 2025, and more than 12,000 trucks since May 2025, 80% of them carrying food.

How much water does COGAT state is entering Gaza?

The Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories reported more than 70,000 cubic meters per day facilitated through external water lines and desalination facilities, excluding local wells, as at its July 2026 report, a floor on its own count.

Does any Israeli body publish a compliance finding?

No such finding was published by the bodies drawn on here. The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes counts of referrals and investigations opened, and nothing on compliance as an outcome.

Sources

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SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

How Many Criminal Investigations Has the IDF Opened Over Gaza?



KEY FIGURES August 20, 2026

How Much Aid Has Entered Gaza, and Who Counted It?



KEY FIGURES August 26, 2026

Does Israel Limit the Amount of Aid Entering Gaza?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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MORE FROM THE RECORD

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026 Updated September 23, 2026

Is Israel Striking Gaza During the Ceasefire?

What Israeli bodies published about strikes inside Gaza after the ceasefire of 10 October 2025, and the count they do not give.

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS [Gaza Ceasefire](#) [IDF War Diary](#) [Yellow Line](#) [COGAT](#) [Israeli Official Record](#)
[Diverted Strikes](#)



21 soldiers' deaths are the only count the IDF Spokesperson's Unit attached to the strikes it published on 13 April 2026, in a dispatch stating that Israeli forces had struck armed operatives who approached the yellow line inside the Gaza Strip during that week. The dispatch calls them precise strikes and says the forces are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement, both the Israeli military's own account and characterisation of its own operations. The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, on the same unit's earlier dispatch. Neither dispatch gives a number of strikes.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
10 October 2025, 12:00	Time the ceasefire took effect, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	War diary dispatch of 4 November 2025
21	IDF soldiers whose deaths the dispatch attributes to one of the operatives struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack, the army's own count of its own losses	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	Published 13 April 2026, strike dated only to that week
Hundreds of metres	Length of an underground route the IDF states its forces located and destroyed in the Jabalia area, on its own account	IDF Spokesperson's Unit	Since the ceasefire entered force, published 4 November 2025
10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026	Period COGAT treats as the ceasefire in its own humanitarian reporting	COGAT	Report of July 2026
6 September 2026	Date of a strike in Gaza that IDF footage shows diverted in flight after civilians gathered near the target	Israel Defense Forces, reported by Israel Hayom	Released 7 September 2026

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2	Clips of the IDF's own strike footage dated after the ceasefire took effect, each showing a munition diverted as people approached; neither names its place	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	29 May 2026 and 12 July 2026

The IDF records precise strikes near the yellow line in April 2026

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published at 18:15 on 13 April 2026 that Israeli forces had struck during that week a number of armed operatives who approached the yellow line and who it says planned attacks in the immediate term against its forces operating in the centre of the Gaza Strip. The dispatch's own wording is that they were "attacked in precise strikes", and it is the Israeli military's own account of its own operations.

What the dispatch carries, and what it does not:

- The theatre: the centre of the Gaza Strip, on the IDF's own description.
- The timing: "during the week", with no date given for any strike.
- The quantity: "a number of" operatives, with no figure attached.
- The outcome: no casualty count for those struck.

Southern Command directed the strikes on operatives approaching the yellow line

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported on 13 April 2026 that the strikes were directed by Southern Command and the Israel Security Agency, which is the Israeli military naming which of its own bodies ordered its own operations. The same dispatch states that IDF forces under Southern Command "are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement and will continue to act to remove any immediate threat", Israel's own characterisation of its own conduct rather than a finding by any other body.

The [yellow line](#) is a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, on the IDF's own description published in its war diary on 4 November 2025. Activity described as east of the yellow line is activity within the Strip.


The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on 4 November 2025 that the ceasefire entered force on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages, and that battle-team forces of the Yiftach and 188 brigades under Division 252 were then operating east of the yellow line in the northern Strip in accordance with the ceasefire agreement and the directives of the political echelon. That framing is the army's own account of its own deployment. COGAT records the same ceasefire period as 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026 in its own humanitarian reporting,

which is that unit's own count of its own coordination activity and covers supply rather than fire.

Dated Israeli records on the ceasefire

PUBLICATION, FOOTAGE AND PERIOD DATES, NOT A COUNT OF EVENTS



Source: IDF Spokesperson's Unit war diary dispatches; COGAT, Humanitarian Situation Report During the Ceasefire; IDF footage supplied to IsraelFact; Israel Hayom, 7 September 2026.

21 soldiers' deaths are attributed to one of those struck

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported on 13 April 2026 that the deaths of 21 IDF soldiers were attributable to the activity of one of the operatives struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack on buildings where its forces were operating and on a tank crew securing them. The 21 is the army's own count of its own personnel, and it belongs to that earlier attack rather than to the April 2026 strikes.

- Whose count: the Israeli military's, of its own soldiers.
- What it counts: deaths in an anti-tank attack preceding the strikes reported.

- What it does not count: anyone killed or injured in the strikes themselves, for which the dispatch gives no figure.

IDF footage shows strikes diverted from people during the ceasefire

The IDF released footage on 7 September 2026 of a strike in Gaza the day before, Sunday 6 September, Israel Hayom reported. In the outlet's account of the IDF release, the IDF intended to strike a member of Hamas's military wing, a gathering of civilians was identified near him during the strike, and because the munition could not be cancelled once released, it was diverted from its course in real time to prevent harm to the civilians. That is the IDF's own account of its own strike.

Two clips of the IDF's own strike footage, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, carry on-screen dates after the ceasefire took effect. In both the munition is diverted as people approach, in the words of the English subtitles burned into the footage. Each clip shows a date and no place, so neither establishes where its strike took place.



ON SCREEN: 29 MAY 2026 • DIVERTED • 0:05

1. Watch out, a child is coming, we are going to divert
2. He is coming, we are going to divert

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 12 JULY 2026 • DIVERTED • 0:07

1. Four people approaching, ten seconds

2. Four minors, currently not very close
3. Divert [ammunition]. Divert [ammunition] [sic]

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The IDF publishes no count of strikes during the ceasefire

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published no strike tally in either dispatch: the 13 April 2026 entry gives no number and no date beyond that week, and the 4 November 2025 entry reports a located compound of launchers, rockets and launch positions in the Shuja'iyya neighbourhood and a destroyed underground route in the Jabalia area, again without a count of strikes. Both are individual dated dispatches from a continuing war diary, and no cumulative figure for the ceasefire period appears in either.

The same army does publish running operational totals for another theatre and period, which is where a reader will find figures of that kind:

- The Israel Defense Forces reported approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran and more than 4,700 operational sorties during Operation Roaring Lion, to 13 March 2026, on its own count. Those are Iran figures for a separate operation, and they are not Gaza figures.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The Gaza figures and the Iran figures come from different operations, theatres and periods, and neither set may be summed with or compared against the other. The 21 is a count of Israeli soldiers killed in an anti-tank attack that preceded the strikes reported on 13 April 2026, so it is not a casualty figure for those strikes and not a Palestinian casualty figure of any kind. Each dispatch is one day's publication and supports a statement about what the IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on that date, never a count of operations across the ceasefire. The footage records single strikes: the 6 September 2026 release reached this record through Israel Hayom, and the two clips were supplied to IsraelFact, show a date but no place, and support no rate of strikes diverted. COGAT's ceasefire reporting covers food, water and medical supply on that unit's own records and carries no strike or casualty data. No Israeli body cited here publishes a count of strikes, shelling or resulting casualties in Gaza during the ceasefire.

Questions readers ask

Which ceasefire do these figures cover?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published that the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, and COGAT records the ceasefire period as 10 October 2025 to 7 June 2026.

Who published the April 2026 strike dispatch?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published it in its war diary, timestamped 18:15 on 13 April 2026.

How many strikes has Israel carried out in Gaza since the ceasefire began?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit publishes no such figure. Its 13 April 2026 dispatch reports strikes on "a number of" armed operatives, with no total and no date beyond that week.

Does the IDF say the strikes were consistent with the agreement?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit stated that its forces under Southern Command are deployed in the area in accordance with the agreement, which is the army's own characterisation of its own conduct.

Where is the yellow line?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit describes it as a forward line inside the Gaza Strip, in its war diary dispatch of 4 November 2025.

Which Israeli bodies directed the strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit reported that Southern Command and the Israel Security Agency directed them, on the military's own account.

How many people were killed in the April 2026 strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published no casualty figure for those struck, and no Israeli body cited here publishes a Palestinian casualty count for the ceasefire period.

What is the figure of 21 a count of?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit attributes the deaths of 21 IDF soldiers to the activity of one operative struck, in an earlier anti-tank attack. It is the army's own count of its own personnel.

What did the IDF report locating in Shuja'iyya?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit published on 4 November 2025 that Brigade 11 forces located a compound containing launchers, rockets and launch positions there, on the army's own account.

Which units did the IDF say were operating east of the yellow line?

The IDF Spokesperson's Unit named battle-team forces of the Yiftach and 188 brigades under Division 252, with Yahalom engineers, in its dispatch of 4 November 2025.

Does COGAT report on strikes?

COGAT recorded food, water and medical supply entering Gaza between 10 October 2025 and 7 June 2026 on its own records, and reports no strike or fire data.

Does IDF footage show strikes diverted during the ceasefire?

The IDF released footage on 7 September 2026 of a strike in Gaza diverted in flight the day before, Israel Hayom reported. Two clips supplied to IsraelFact, dated 29 May and 12 July 2026, show munitions diverted and name no place.

Does the IDF publish operational totals anywhere?

The Israel Defense Forces reported approximately 7,600 strikes across Iran and more than 4,700 operational sorties to 13 March 2026, on its own count, in a separate theatre and period.

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HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

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CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

Has the IDF Published Its Own Footage of Aborted Strikes?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the Ceasefire?



KEY FIGURES August 20, 2026

How Much Aid Has Entered Gaza, and Who Counted It?



RECORD EXPLAINER Updated September 23, 2026

Does Israel Publish a Proportionality Assessment for Gaza Strikes?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

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A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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KEY FIGURES September 23, 2026

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

Over 15 million texts, over 12 million pre-recorded calls and over 4.5 million leaflets to 8 December 2023, on the Foreign Ministry's count of Israel's own.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Evacuation Warnings Roof Knocking Israel Defense Forces
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gaza



The Israel Defense Forces had sent over 15 million text messages, made over 12 million pre-recorded phone calls and airdropped over 4.5 million leaflets urging civilians in Gaza to leave areas of hostilities by 8 December 2023, on counts the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published as Israel's own. The same Ministry paper counts over 45,000 individual phone calls to people in areas of hostilities and at individual targets. For the 2014 conflict, the Ministry's report dated May 2015 states that the IDF gave specific warnings before more than a thousand attacks on individual targets, its own count.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
Over 15 million	Text messages urging civilians to leave areas of hostilities and individual targets, Israel's own count, a floor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 8 December 2023
Over 12 million	Pre-recorded phone calls, Israel's own count, a floor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 8 December 2023
Over 4.5 million	Leaflets airdropped, Israel's own count, a floor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 8 December 2023
Over 45,000	Individual phone calls urging people to leave areas of hostilities and individual targets, Israel's own count, a floor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Cumulative to 8 December 2023
12 October 2023	Date from which the IDF urged civilians to leave northern Gaza temporarily	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	From 12 October 2023
More than a thousand	Attacks on individual targets preceded by a specific warning, typically by phone, the IDF's own count	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	7 July to 26 August 2014

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
630	Sectors in the IDF's layered map of Gaza, each with a continuous assessment of the population present, the IDF's own account	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
7	Numbered blocks addressed by an IDF evacuation warning the presentation reproduces, directed to a shelter in Deir al-Balah	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation


The IDF warned through texts, calls, leaflets and broadcasts

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023 that the IDF encouraged civilians “to temporarily evacuate from areas of intensive hostilities and from individual targets,” and that its messages “often include detailed information as to when to evacuate (including from specific areas and individual targets), the safe routes to be used, and where aid may be obtained.” The channels it lists, Israel’s own account:

- Text messages, over 15 million
- Pre-recorded phone calls, over 12 million
- Leaflets airdropped, over 4.5 million
- Individual phone calls, over 45,000
- Messages on social media, radio and TV in Gaza
- Communication with international organizations on the ground in Gaza

Warnings by channel, to 8 December 2023

MILLIONS. EACH FIGURE IS A FLOOR, PUBLISHED AS “OVER”, AND ONE PERSON CAN RECEIVE SEVERAL.



Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Frequently Asked Questions, updated to 8 December 2023. Israel's own count.

A numbered map divided Gaza by neighbourhood

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the IDF uses “a detailed map of Gaza, with designated numbers for specific neighborhoods,” shared “with the public in Gaza and with international organizations on the ground in order to create a ‘common language’ directly with the civilian population.” The Ministry’s FAQ describes the mechanism behind it, on its own account:

Element	What the Ministry states
The unit	The “Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit”, of “senior IDF commanders, intelligence officers, Arabic speaking soldiers, legal advisors and other professionals”
Monitoring	It “constantly monitors in real time the implementation of these evacuation recommendations,” including through open-source tools and intelligence
Distribution	Through radio and TV in Gaza, airdropped leaflets, international organizations, social media and text messages, because “communications in Gaza is intermittent”
Use	The IDF “provides information to Gazans where to evacuate, on what routes and where shelters may be accessed, in advance of intensified operations”

The Ministry's paper does not state how many numbered areas the map carries. The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, describes a layered map that divides Gaza into 630 sectors, and calls it a "common language" tool as well.

The IDF's presentation divides Gaza into 630 sectors

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, states that Southern Command built "a layered map which divides Gaza into 630 sectors" and made continuous assessments "of the population presence that is there" in each. The presentation is the IDF's own account of its procedure. Its slide 10 states:

- The team was "led by a Brigadier General, and made up of intelligence experts, Arabists, legal advisers, OSINT specialists and more", to "assess the overall presence of civilians throughout the Gaza Strip"
- The team maintained "contact with key communal leaders in those sectors"
- Internally, the map made forces "aware of civilian presence in each sector", and of "critical civilian sites such as shelters"
- Externally, it served as "a 'common language' tool" to convey "precisely where the IDF intends to operate and where are the safer regions"
- Its features reached Gaza's population through "the millions of leaflets, phone calls, and text messages which have been

disseminated by the IDF since the start of the war”

Mapping Civilian Evacuation



Slide 11, “Mapping Civilian Evacuation”. The slide carries no legend for its colours.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 11, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

An IDF leaflet directs 7 numbered blocks to a shelter in Deir al-Balah

An IDF evacuation warning reproduced in the same presentation, in Arabic with an English translation beside it, addresses 7 numbered blocks in 5 Gaza neighbourhoods and directs those present to “the known shelter in Deir al-Balah”. The leaflet is the IDF’s own, and it carries a map of the blocks and a QR code. Its translation, as printed on slide 13:

Line on the leaflet	The translation's words
Heading	"Urgent warning"
Addressees	Blocks 2348, 2325, 2347, 662, 2322, 2324 and 2326 in the Al-Shuhadaa, Ain Jaulut and Al-Farouq, Al-Salam, Yarmouk and Bisan neighbourhoods
The danger	"The area you are in is considered a dangerous combat zone!"
The instruction	"For your safety, the IDF appeals to you immediately evacuate from this area and go to the known shelter in Deir al-Balah"
The close	"He who was warned was exused [sic]!"

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 13, supplied to IsraelFact. The leaflet carries no date.

Translation:

Urgent warning

To those present in:

Block 2348 in the Al-Shuhadaa neighborhood, Blocks 2325 and 2347 in the Ain Jaulut and Al-Farouq neighborhood.

Block 662 in the Al-Salam neighborhood

Block 2322 in the Yarmouk neighborhood

Block 2324 in the Bisan neighborhood

Block 2326 in the Shuhada neighborhood

The area you are in is considered a dangerous combat zone!

The IDF is operating in the area with force!

For your safety, the IDF appeals to you immediately evacuate from this area and go to the known shelter in Deir al-Balah

He who was warned was exused!

Slide 13.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 13, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

A redacted IDF target card makes approval conditional on a warning

A target card in the IDF's presentation, marked "Top Secret" and redacted as supplied to IsraelFact, records a legal review marked "Conditional" on "the provision of an effective advance warning". The card is one example, not a count, and its warning boxes read as follows:

Warning box on the card	As shown
Individual warning to civilians in the target	Ticked
Individual warning to civilians in surrounding structures	Not ticked

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact with names, dates and the target ID blacked out. The presentation's decision flow on slide 18 also carries a box headed "Warning Considerations".

- Top Secret -

Target ID: [REDACTED]

Intell Type of Target: Arms cache i military commander. Function: The target is an a Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Kh commander. The house is bc operational planning site for i operatives for the coordination Location: Abasan Al-Kabir, c Affiliation: Palestinian Islamic Presence at target: The milita and Palestinian Islamic Jihad Description: The target is pa 23*23m in size. The target structure measuring 13*13m i the roof of the structure is k concrete structure measuring tanks, 2 solar panels, and tl shack. Weaponry located at the target: [REDACTED] the manufacture of projectiles Sensitive sites: There are no 100m radius of the target. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Intelligence by [REDACTED] Aerial footage [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	Warning Option 2 Option 3	Conditions ☒ Real-time visual surv. ☒ Nighttime ☒ Indiv. warning to civilians in target ☐ Indiv. warning to civil. in surrounding structures ☒ Legal conditions [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
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Slide 15, redacted as supplied.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The 2014 report describes 3 kinds of warning

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' report on the 2014 conflict, dated May 2015, states that the IDF issued "general warnings" to stay away from sites of combat activity, "regional warnings in areas where it expected to undertake attacks or significant operations," and "highly specific warnings to particular buildings, households and persons." The counts below are the IDF's own, from that report.

Warning in 2014	What the Ministry states
Beit Lahiya, 13 July 2014	10,000 leaflets at 07:00, pre-recorded mass calls between 6:15 and 9:15, and another 10,000 leaflets in the early afternoon
Shuja'iyyeh, before the ground operation	Phone calls, radio and television broadcasts, and over 150,000 leaflets
Shuja'iyyeh, the manoeuvre	Delayed "for more than 24 hours in order to facilitate further evacuations"
Individual targets	Specific warnings before "more than a thousand attacks"

What is roof knocking?

Roof knocking is the firing of "a low-explosive projectile at the target's roof" to "give civilians in or near the target a last opportunity to seek safety before an attack," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report. The report states the IDF used it "in certain instances where warnings were unheeded or unfeasible," and calls it "a progressive precaution that went beyond the requirements of international law." The report gives no

count of roof knocks, and none appears in the Ministry's 2023 papers read here.

When does the IDF not give a warning?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its Key Legal Aspects paper, updated to 2 November 2023, that where circumstances do not permit a warning, “such as when the strike is aimed at a militant who may exploit the warning to escape, or when there is insufficient time to provide a warning,” there is “no legal requirement to do so.” The situations the Ministry names, and what follows a warning, on Israel's own account:

- A target who “would escape if warned”, or a warning that “would compromise the safety of attacking forces” (2014 report, paragraph 308)
- Too little time, for example “when an enemy attack is imminent” (November 2023 paper)
- After a warning, “the IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given” (November 2023 paper)

Where these figures come from

The 2023 counts are Israel's own, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the IDF, cumulative to 8 December 2023, and each is a floor. They count four channels and may not be added into a number of warnings or of people warned. The 2014 figures describe the 2014 conflict only. No later cumulative count appears

in the IDF and Ministry publications read here. The presentation is the IDF's own account, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, and neither it nor the leaflet it reproduces carries a date; the 630 counts map sectors, not people.

Questions readers ask

How many text messages has the IDF sent to Gaza?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF had sent over 15 million text messages urging civilians to leave areas of hostilities by 8 December 2023, Israel's own count.

How many leaflets has the IDF dropped?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF had airdropped over 4.5 million leaflets by 8 December 2023, Israel's own count and a floor.

Does the IDF phone people before a strike?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs counts over 12 million pre-recorded calls and over 45,000 individual calls by 8 December 2023, Israel's own count.

When did the IDF tell civilians to leave northern Gaza?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF has urged civilians to evacuate northern Gaza temporarily since 12 October 2023.

What is the Civilian Harm Mitigation Unit?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes it as a unit of senior IDF commanders, intelligence officers, Arabic speakers and legal advisers that maintains the evacuation map and monitors it in real time.

What does a warning message say?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that IDF messages often give when to evacuate, the safe routes and where aid may be obtained.

Does the IDF always warn before a strike?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that no warning is legally required when a target might escape or when there is insufficient time, in its November 2023 paper.

If people stay after a warning, does the IDF treat the building as empty?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “the IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given.”

How many roof knocks has the IDF carried out?

No count of roof knocks appears in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ May 2015 report or its 2023 papers read [here](#).

How many specific warnings did the IDF give in 2014?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF gave specific warnings before more than a thousand attacks on individual targets in 2014, the IDF's own count.

How many sectors does the IDF's map of Gaza have?

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, states that its layered map divides Gaza into 630 sectors, each with a continuous assessment of the population present.

What does an IDF evacuation leaflet say?

A leaflet reproduced in the IDF's presentation tells those in 7 numbered blocks that "The area you are in is considered a dangerous combat zone!" and to go "to the known shelter in Deir al-Balah".

Are these counts current?

The counts run to 8 December 2023, and the IDF republished the Ministry's paper on its own site on 15 December 2023.

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
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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026



CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST —

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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COUNTING COMPARISON September 23, 2026

How Many Hamas Fighters Does Israel Say It Has Killed?

The IDF stated on 29 February 2024 it had eliminated over 13,000 people it calls terrorists in Gaza; later counts cover separate periods.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY [Israel Defense Forces](#) [Gaza](#) [Combatant Counts](#) [Hamas](#)



The IDF stated on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the war

began, its own count and the last whole-war figure in the IDF publications read for this record. Later IDF publications count separate periods and operations instead: about 14,000 killed or arrested in the first 9 months of the ground manoeuvre, about 2,000 from 18 March to 20 August 2025, and about 2,750 in the operation the IDF calls Gideon's Chariots B. The windows differ, one count includes arrests, and none of them may be added to another.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
Over 13,000	People the IDF describes as terrorists that it says it eliminated in Gaza, its own count	Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson	Start of the war to 29 February 2024
About 14,000	People the IDF describes as terrorists that it says its forces killed and arrested, the two not separated	Israel Defense Forces	First 9 months of the ground manoeuvre, stated 16 July 2024
About 2,000	Eliminated since operations resumed, in the English release; the Hebrew release of the same date says more than 2,100	Israel Defense Forces	18 March to 20 August 2025
About 2,750	Eliminated in Gaza City during Gideon's Chariots B; the page gives the operation no dates	Israel Defense Forces	Stated 27 October 2025
More than 100	Targeted eliminations in the first month after operations resumed, beside "hundreds" neutralized	Israel Defense Forces	18 March to 16 April 2025

The IDF counted over 13,000 eliminated to 29 February 2024

The IDF Spokesperson stated at a briefing on 29 February 2024, the 146th day of the war, that the IDF had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the war began. The count is the IDF's own, published by a party to the war, and the classification of those counted as terrorists is the IDF's own. "Over 13,000" is a floor.

The count is not limited to Hamas. Like every IDF figure on this page, it counts people the IDF calls terrorists, without naming the organisation each belonged to.

About 14,000 were killed or arrested in 9 months, the IDF stated

The IDF stated on 16 July 2024, day 263 of the fighting in Gaza, that "הכוחות חיסלו ועצרו כ-14,000 מחבלים": its forces killed and arrested about 14,000 people it calls terrorists. The IDF's own count joins the killed and the arrested in one figure and does not separate them, and its headline gives the same figure as "נפגעו", hit.

The same IDF page lists, among those eliminated, its own count by rank:

Level	Eliminated, on the IDF's count
Brigade commander	6
Battalion commander	Over 20
Company commander	About 150

Source: Israel Defense Forces, 9 months of the ground manoeuvre, 16 July 2024.

The page's headline states that half the leadership of Hamas's military wing had been eliminated. It also records about 37,000 targets struck from the air, which is a count of targets, not of people.

The Prison Service held 1,477 Gaza residents on security grounds in December 2025

The Israel Prison Service counts separately the people from Gaza it holds, its own count of its own facilities at each month's end. It is a count of people held on a date, not of arrests, and it is not a breakdown of the IDF's 14,000.

Month end	Gaza residents held on security grounds	Of them, held as unlawful combatants
October 2025	1,415	1,130
November 2025	1,458	1,167
December 2025	1,477	1,189

Source: Israel Prison Service, inmates report, fourth quarter 2025, published 17 March 2026. Prison Service facilities only.

The IDF counts each period after March 2025 separately

The IDF published three counts after operations in Gaza resumed on 18 March 2025, each its own count for its own window:

Window	The IDF's count	Published
18 March to 16 April 2025	More than 100 targeted eliminations; "hundreds of terrorists and military commanders" neutralized	16 April 2025
18 March to 20 August 2025	About 2,000 eliminated [English]; more than 2,100 [Hebrew]	20 August 2025
Gideon's Chariots B, in Gaza City	About 2,750 eliminated	27 October 2025

Source: Israel Defense Forces, releases of 16 April 2025, 20 August 2025 and 27 October 2025.

The April 2025 window sits inside the August 2025 window, so the first two rows overlap. The IDF gives Gideon's Chariots B no dates on the page that counts it, so where it falls against the August window cannot be read from the record.

The IDF's English and Hebrew releases of 20 August 2025 give 2 figures

The IDF's English release of 20 August 2025 is headed "Senior Officials and About 2,000 Terrorists were Eliminated". Its Hebrew release of the same date, covering the same five months from 18 March 2025, is headed "חיסול יותר מ-2,100 מחבלים", more than 2,100 eliminated. Both are the IDF's own count; neither version corrects the other.

The IDF's 5 counts overlap and may not be added

Adding the IDF's figures, each its own count, produces a number the IDF never published. The reasons are in the records

themselves:

- The 13,000 window, from the start of the war, and the 14,000 window, from the start of the ground manoeuvre, overlap
- The 14,000 includes people arrested, and the other figures count people eliminated
- The April and August 2025 windows overlap
- No IDF count read here covers 16 July 2024 to 18 March 2025
- The Gideon's Chariots B count carries no dates

No IDF page read here gives a whole-war total after February 2024

The IDF's retrospective of 27 October 2025, marking 752 days of war, counts operations and gives no cumulative figure for Gaza. Absent from the IDF publications read here:

- A whole-war count of people the IDF says it eliminated in Gaza, after 29 February 2024
- A count of those killed separated from those arrested, for the 14,000
- A breakdown of any count by organisation

Where these figures come from

Every IDF figure here is the IDF's own count of its own operations, published by a party to the war, and each counts people the IDF describes as terrorists, its own classification. The Prison Service

figures are its own count of people held on a date. “Over”, “about” and “more than” are the IDF’s own words and each figure is a floor or an approximation. The 14,000 joins killed and arrested. The windows overlap or are undated, so no two figures may be summed, and a later figure is not an update of an earlier one.

Questions readers ask

How many Hamas fighters does Israel say it has killed?

The IDF stated on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the war began, its own count.

Is there a newer total from the IDF?

No IDF page read here gives a whole-war total after February 2024; later IDF releases count separate periods and operations.

Does the IDF’s count include only Hamas?

No IDF figure read here is limited to Hamas; each counts people the IDF calls terrorists, without naming their organisation.

What does the IDF’s 14,000 figure count?

The IDF stated on 16 July 2024 that its forces killed and arrested about 14,000, in one figure for both.

How many senior commanders does the IDF say it killed by July 2024?

The IDF's count of 16 July 2024 lists 6 at brigade-commander level, over 20 at battalion-commander level and about 150 at company-commander level.

How many does the IDF say it killed after the March 2025 resumption?

The IDF stated about 2,000 in English and more than 2,100 in Hebrew, for 18 March to 20 August 2025.

Why do the English and Hebrew figures differ?

The IDF published both on 20 August 2025 and explains neither; both are its own count.

How many does the IDF say it killed in Gaza City in 2025?

The IDF stated on 27 October 2025 that its forces eliminated about 2,750 in Gideon's Chariots B, in Gaza City.

Can the IDF's figures be added into a total?

No; the windows overlap or are undated, and one figure includes arrests.

Does the IDF say how it classifies someone as a terrorist?

The IDF publications read here apply the term without setting out the classification behind each count.

How many people from Gaza does Israel hold?

The Israel Prison Service counted 1,477 Gaza residents held on security grounds at the end of December 2025, 1,189 of them as unlawful combatants, in its facilities only.

Whose count are these figures?

Each is the IDF's own count of its own operations, published by a party to the war.

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What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Can an IDF Legal Adviser Stop a Strike?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

Has the IDF Published Its Own Footage of Aborted Strikes?

IDF pages have carried aborted-strike video since 11 March 2012; the IDF released Gaza footage on 18 December 2023 and 7 September 2026.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

[Aborted Strikes](#)

[Israel Defense Forces](#)

[Civilian Harm](#)

[NAZA](#)

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The IDF has published footage of air strikes called off over civilians on its own website since at least 11 March 2012, and it

released footage of “recent aborted airstrikes” in Gaza on 18 December 2023, The Times of Israel reported the same day. On 7 September 2026 the IDF released footage of a munition diverted in flight in Gaza the day before, after civilians gathered near the target, Israel Hayom reported. The 18 clips of IDF strike footage supplied to IsraelFact are not among the IDF releases found, and no Israeli publication read here counts strikes aborted since October 2023.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2012	Earliest year of an IDF web page read here that embeds a video of a strike aborted over civilians	Israel Defense Forces	11 March 2012
4	IDF web pages from 2012 and 2014 read here that describe strikes aborted over civilians, 3 of them with video	Israel Defense Forces	11 March 2012 to 18 August 2014
18 December 2023	Date the IDF released footage of aborted strikes in Gaza in the current war, with its Spokesperson's statement	Israel Defense Forces, reported by The Times of Israel	18 December 2023
6 September 2026	Date of a strike in Gaza that IDF footage shows diverted in flight after civilians gathered	Israel Defense Forces, reported by Israel Hayom	Released 7 September 2026
18	Clips of IDF strike footage supplied to IsraelFact, none of them found among the IDF's own releases	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026

The IDF's website carried aborted-strike videos in 2012 and 2014

The IDF published 4 pages on its own website between 2012 and 2014 describing strikes aborted over civilians, 3 of them embedding a video. What each page says its video shows is the IDF's own description; the videos were not retrieved for this record.

Date	IDF page	What the IDF says
11 March 2012	Israeli Air Force: Bombing Gaza or Pinpoint Strikes	"Many times strikes have been aborted at the last minute due to last-minute interference, such as civilians coming too close," then "View an IAF strike aborted at the last minute"
15 November 2012	How Does the IDF Minimize Harm to Palestinian Civilians?	During Operation Cast Lead in 2008 and 2009 "the IDF aborted many missions seconds before they were to be carried out"; the video is "an example of an IAF airstrike that was called off as the missile was on its way to the target"
16 July 2014	How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?	"The following video shows how IAF airstrikes were called off when civilians were identified in the area"
18 August 2014	How the IDF Gets Real-Time Intel to Abort Strikes	A squadron commander: "If the situation is unclear, the attack will be aborted"

Source: Israel Defense Forces, idf.il, pages of 11 March 2012, 15 November 2012, 16 July 2014 and 18 August 2014.

The IDF marks the 16 July 2014 page "This article is outdated". The same page records that on 9 July 2014 people gathered on the roof of a target after a warning shot and "The IAF called off the strike to avoid civilian casualties."

The IDF released footage of aborted strikes on 18 December 2023

The IDF released footage on 18 December 2023 "showing recent aborted airstrikes in the Gaza Strip due to the presence of

civilians,” The Times of Israel reported, with an English-language video statement by the IDF Spokesperson. The Spokesperson stated, as the outlet quoted him: “We abort attacks when we see unexpected civilian presence. We choose the right munition for each target, so it doesn’t cause unnecessary damage.” He said the IDF warns civilians before attacks “whenever possible.”

The report does not state how many strikes the footage showed or when each took place, and neither is given here.

IDF footage shows a munition diverted in flight on 6 September 2026

The IDF released footage on 7 September 2026 of a strike in Gaza on the previous day, Sunday 6 September, Israel Hayom reported. In the outlet’s account of the IDF release, the IDF intended to strike a member of Hamas’s military wing, a gathering of civilians was identified near him during the strike, and because the munition could not be cancelled once released, “הוסט החימוש ממסלולו”, “בזמן אמת על מנת למנוע את הפגיעה באזרחים”: the munition was diverted from its course in real time to prevent harm to the civilians.

The strike fell nearly eleven months into the ceasefire that took effect on 10 October 2025. The IDF’s own post of the footage was not located on idf.il, and the release reached this record through Israel Hayom.

The 18 clips supplied to IsraelFact are not among the releases found

The IDF's own strike footage supplied to IsraelFact runs to 18 clips dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026, showing strikes called off in 7, held in 1 and diverted in 10. None of the 18 was found among the IDF releases read for this record, and each is published on IsraelFact as supplied, not as an IDF release.



ON SCREEN: 22 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:11

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF


The IDF's presentation shows 3 strikes cancelled in the Air Force's footage

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, shows 3 Air Force strikes "cancelled due to the presence of civilians close to the targets," under the heading "Many strikes were cancelled due to

unexpected presence of civilians.” Only the first of the 3 panels carries a date on screen, 14 July 2014.

The IDF routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians. Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians

Examples of IAF strikes that were cancelled due to the presence of civilians close to the targets:



"we identified civilian on the roof..."
"copy that, let's move to the next target"



"Yes.. There is civilian walking in the yard..."
"copy that, we will not strike this target now..."



"there are probably children here.. We are stopping everything"

Slide 17. Only the first panel carries a date on screen, 14 July 2014.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 17, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its May 2015 report on the 2014 conflict, as its own account of the IDF's conduct, that "individual pilots exercised their discretion to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians."

No Israeli publication read here counts strikes aborted since 2023

The IDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describe aborted strikes and publish examples, not totals. Absent from the Israeli publications read here:

- A count of strikes aborted, suspended or diverted since 7 October 2023
- A list of the IDF's releases of aborted-strike footage, with the number of clips in each
- An IDF release of any of the 18 clips supplied to IsraelFact

Where these figures come from

The 2012 and 2014 pages are the IDF's own, on idf.il, and describe earlier conflicts; the 16 July 2014 page is marked outdated by the IDF. The 2023 and 2026 releases are the IDF's, reported by The Times of Israel and Israel Hayom; the footage itself was not retrieved, so what it shows is taken from those reports. The 18 clips and the presentation are the IDF's own material, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF. A release shows examples chosen by the IDF and supports no rate of strikes aborted.

Questions readers ask

Has the IDF ever released videos of cancelled strikes?

Yes; IDF pages on idf.il embed videos of strikes aborted over civilians from at least 11 March 2012, and the IDF released such footage from Gaza on 18 December 2023.

When did the IDF first publish aborted-strike footage?

The earliest IDF page read here is dated 11 March 2012 and embeds a video the IDF describes as “an IAF strike aborted at the last minute.”

Did the IDF release aborted-strike footage during the current war?

Yes; the IDF released footage of “recent aborted airstrikes” in Gaza on 18 December 2023, The Times of Israel reported.

Has the IDF shown a munition diverted after launch?

Yes; the IDF released footage on 7 September 2026 of a munition diverted in flight in Gaza the day before, Israel Hayom reported.

Did the diversion on 6 September 2026 happen during the ceasefire?

Yes; the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025, nearly eleven months earlier.

What did the IDF Spokesperson say in December 2023?

He said, as The Times of Israel quoted him: “We abort attacks when we see unexpected civilian presence.”

Were the 18 clips on IsraelFact published by the IDF?

No; they are the IDF’s own footage, supplied to IsraelFact, and none was found among the IDF’s releases.

Why is the IDF's 2014 page marked outdated?

The IDF marks it "This article is outdated" and does not give a reason on the page.

How many strikes has the IDF aborted in Gaza since 2023?

No Israeli publication read here gives a count; the IDF releases examples.

Did Israeli pilots cancel strikes in 2014?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that in 2014 "individual pilots exercised their discretion to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians."

Where can the IDF's own footage be seen?

IDF pages on idf.il from 2012 and 2014 embed videos, and the 2023 and 2026 releases were carried by The Times of Israel and Israel Hayom.

Sources


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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Can an IDF Legal Adviser Stop a Strike?



CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



RECORD EXPLAINER Updated September 23, 2026

Is Israel Striking Gaza During the Ceasefire?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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MORE FROM THE RECORD

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

How Many Hamas Fighters Does Israel Say It Has Killed?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?

The IDF answers no: it says Habsora and Lavender assist analysts, a human identifies each target, and operational commanders approve strikes.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY Artificial Intelligence Habsora Lavender Israel Defense Forces Targeting



The Israel Defense Forces answers “No” to the question “Does the IDF use AI to select targets in Gaza?” on its page about data technologies, published 18 June 2024 and updated 14 September 2026, its own account of its own procedures. It states that Habsora, a tool first used operationally in 2021, and Lavender, which it calls a general-purpose database, do not select targets. It states that a human analyst identifies each target, an authorised intelligence officer approves it, and an operational commander decides whether to strike, and it publishes no count of targets either tool suggested.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2021	Year the IDF states Habsora was first used in an operational setting, in an earlier operation in Gaza	Israel Defense Forces	Stated 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026
3	Decisions open to a senior commander on a pre-planned attack: approve, suspend or abort	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2014 Gaza conflict, report dated May 2015
5	Blocks on the Target Card the Ministry reproduces, one of them a binding legal review	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	A 2014 target, report dated May 2015
Dozens	Law-of-armed-conflict experts added to the Military Advocate General's International Law Department in active hostilities, the Ministry's own description	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Since 2007, stated May 2015
9	Steps in the IDF's targeting process, from intelligence collection to execution, with legal review at step 7, the IDF's own account	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2	Limbs of the military-target definition in the same presentation: objects, and persons	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation

The IDF says Habsora and Lavender do not select targets

The Israel Defense Forces states that both tools “help intelligence analysts review and analyze existing information,” and that “they do not autonomously select targets for attack.” The descriptions are the IDF’s own account of its own tools.

Tool	What the IDF says it is	What the IDF says it does not do
Habsora	A tool that “fuses large amounts of data from across disparate datasets” and suggests “certain physical objects” for an analyst to research, first used operationally in 2021	Its suggestion “cannot be solely relied upon to identify a target without being thoroughly explored by the intelligence analyst”
Lavender	“A general-purpose database that organizes and cross-references layers of several existing intelligence sources”	“This is not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack”
Both	Tools that “focus the analyst on information that is likely to be relevant”	“They do not generate orders for strikes”

Responding to a New York Times investigation in December 2024, the IDF said that “officers always verified the information provided” by AI systems, and that AI tools were no more than a “starting point” of target selection, as The Times of Israel reported on 26 December 2024.

A human analyst identifies each target, the IDF states

The Israel Defense Forces states that under the Intelligence Directorate's standard operating procedure "this identification process must always be done by a human intelligence analyst, who is trained and authorized to carry out such work," its own account of its own rules. The steps it describes:

- The analyst identifies a target, applying the SOP's definitions of "military objectives", which follow international law.
- The target "is subject to approval by an authorized intelligence officer."
- "The IDF's intelligence regulations in force do not permit for any technologies to make target identification determinations in place of humans."
- "Intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets."

The IDF's presentation defines a military target in 2 limbs

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, defines a military target in 2 limbs, one for objects and one for persons. The definition is the IDF's own wording, on its slide 8:

- Objects "which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or

partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”

- “A Member of an enemy armed force, a member of an organize [sic] armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities (for such time that he does so)”

Military target:

1. Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
2. A Member of an enemy armed force, a member of an organize armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities (for such time that he does so)

Slide 8.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 8, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF


The IDF’s presentation sets out 9 steps from intelligence to strike

The same presentation sets out the IDF’s targeting process in 9 steps, its own account of its procedure, on slide 6. Analysis and the identification of military objectives come at steps 2 and 3, legal

review at step 7 and commanders' approval at step 8, and the slide names no tool or system at any step.

Step	On the slide
1 to 3	Intelligence collection; analysis; identifying military objectives
4 to 6	Link to mission; validation; planning
7 and 8	Legal review; commanders' approval
9	Execution, battle damage assessment and lessons learned

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 6, supplied to IsraelFact.



Slide 6. "BDA" on the slide is battle damage assessment.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 6, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

Who decides whether to strike?

An operational commander decides, the Israel Defense Forces states: “The decision whether to strike is made by the commander after considering this information and input, as well as operational, policy, humanitarian, and legal considerations.” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ report on the 2014 conflict, dated May 2015, describes the same step as “a highly-regulated, multi-tiered process for approving pre-planned attacks,” its own account of the IDF’s process.

Decision on a pre-planned attack	The Ministry’s wording
Approve	“approve the attack [where appropriate, subject to certain conditions]”
Suspend	“suspend the attack [for instance, because more information about potential collateral damage is necessary]”
Abort	“abort the attack altogether”

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, paragraph 245.

The IDF’s presentation, supplied to IsraelFact, describes the approving commander on its slide 16 as “an officer who has been professionally and operationally qualified for this role and possesses the authority to authorize strikes against designated targets.”

What role do legal advisers play in approving a strike?

A legal adviser gives “a binding opinion regarding the legality of an attack, plus any stipulations for its execution” for pre-planned attacks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report, which reproduces a translated Target Card from 2014. The

Ministry states that the Military Advocate General “is appointed by the Minister of Defence (a civilian authority), not by the IDF Chief of General Staff,” and its November 2023 paper states that IDF legal advisers “are not subject to the IDF chain of command on professional matters.”

Block on the Target Card	What it holds, on the Ministry’s account
Intelligence	The target and its surroundings
Operational Directives	The objectives commanders set, and any conditions they add
Operational Planning	The means and methods, and the precautions possible
Legal Review	The legal adviser’s binding opinion
Conditions	All conditions gathered in one place, with legal conditions marked

In the 2014 example the legal advisers “conditioned their approval on the provision of an effective advance warning” and recommended “real-time visual surveillance,” and the commander added “that the attack be conducted at night.”

The Ministry states fact-specific legal advice is not always available in real time

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that “the exigencies of combat do not always allow for a targeting process involving this level of deliberate pre-planning and pre-approval,” and that “certain input, such as fact-specific legal advice, will not be available in real time.” It gives the example of a platoon commander “required to take immediate action in response to coming under fire.” In such cases, on the Ministry’s

account, commanders “rely on the training they have received, as well as directives that specify the checks and authorisations required prior to carrying out attacks.”

The IDF publishes no count of targets the tools suggested

The Israel Defense Forces’ page of 18 June 2024, updated 14 September 2026, carries one figure, the year 2021, and no count of the tools’ output. Absent from it:

- Objects Habsora suggested to analysts, for any period
- People listed in the Lavender database
- Targets identified, approved or struck, for any period

Where these figures come from

The IDF page describes current procedures and is the IDF’s own account. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs report describes the targeting process in the 2014 conflict, and its Target Card is a 2014 example; neither stands for the other period. “Dozens” is the Ministry’s own word and not a count. The December 2024 remarks reach this page through The Times of Israel. The presentation is the IDF’s own account, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, and it carries no date on its face.

Questions readers ask

What is Habsora?

The Israel Defense Forces states, in its own account, that Habsora is a tool, first used operationally in 2021, that suggests physical objects for an analyst to research, and that its suggestion cannot alone identify a target.

What is Lavender?

The Israel Defense Forces states that Lavender is “a general-purpose database” cross-referencing intelligence sources, and “not a list of confirmed military operatives eligible to attack.”

Does AI approve IDF strikes?

The IDF Spokesperson stated on 11 September 2026 that strikes are selected and approved “by human personnel only” and “not by artificial intelligence.”

Is the IDF’s targeting process automated?

The Israel Defense Forces answers “No” on its page updated 14 September 2026, and states that identification, review and approval involve human personnel.

Who approves a strike?

The Israel Defense Forces states that “the decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander,” on its page updated 14 September 2026.

Can the analyst who picks a target also order the strike?

The Israel Defense Forces states that “intelligence officers who identify targets are not the ones who also decide to strike those targets.”

Are the IDF’s legal advisers under its commanders?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that IDF legal advisers are not subject to the chain of command on professional matters and report to the Military Advocate General, in its November 2023 paper.

Is a legal adviser’s opinion binding?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that the MAG Corps’ legal opinions “are binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks.”

What happens when there is no time for legal review?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that commanders then rely on their training and on directives specifying the checks required, in its May 2015 report.

Did the IDF comment on AI in December 2024?

The IDF said that “officers always verified the information provided” by AI systems, as The Times of Israel reported on 26 December 2024.

What are the steps in the IDF's targeting process?

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, sets out 9 steps, from intelligence collection to execution, with legal review at step 7 and commanders' approval at step 8.

How does the IDF define a military target?

The IDF's presentation defines a military target as an object making "an effective contribution to military action" whose destruction "offers a definite military advantage", or a member of an enemy armed force or organised armed group, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities.

When did the IDF first publish its account of these tools?

The Israel Defense Forces published its page on data technologies on 18 June 2024 and last updated it on 14 September 2026.


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SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?

CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



KEY FIGURES September 23, 2026

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

How Many Criminal Investigations Has the IDF

Opened Over Gaza?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?

No Israeli publication read here sets a number. The Foreign Ministry says excessive harm is not measured in absolute numbers, and the IDF assesses each strike.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Proportionality

Collateral Damage

Israel Defense Forces

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NAZA



No Israeli publication read here sets a number of civilians a strike may kill: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report on the 2014 Gaza conflict that excessive civilian harm “is not measured using absolute numbers” and is assessed case by case against the military advantage a commander anticipates. The Israel Defense Forces states, in its own account on a page updated 14 September 2026, that every attack requires “an individual assessment” of expected civilian harm, made “in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically.” Responding to a press investigation in December 2024, the IDF confirmed that its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out, as The Times of Israel reported; no Israeli body has published those rules in the material read here.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
Over 6,000	Aerial strikes against military objectives the IDF conducted in the 2014 conflict, its own count, published by the Ministry	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	7 July to 26 August 2014
8	Civilians the Ministry states were killed when people returned to a warned building after a bomb was released, an incident it calls exceptional	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	8 July 2014
3	Limbs of the proportionality test Israel's Supreme Court applies to a military measure	Israeli Supreme Court, HCI 2056/04	Judgment of 30 June 2004
14 September 2026	Latest update of the IDF page requiring “an individual assessment” for each strike	Israel Defense Forces	Page first published 18 June 2024

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
26 December 2024	Date the IDF confirmed its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out	Israel Defense Forces, as reported by The Times of Israel	The war from 7 October 2023
8	Boxes in the IDF's decision flow for an intelligence-based target, one asking "Civilians in Target?" before "Permission to Strike"	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
15	Clips of the IDF's own strike footage in which people near the target are the reason a strike is called off, held or diverted	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026

Excessiveness “is not measured using absolute numbers,” the Ministry states

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its report on the 2014 conflict, dated May 2015, that commanders “must analyse the proportionality of each and every attack,” and that excessiveness “is assessed on a case-by-case basis, in light of the specific military advantage anticipated by the commander based on the information reasonably available to him at the time of the attack.” The report is the Ministry’s own account of the IDF’s conduct in 2014.

Element of the assessment	What the Ministry’s report states
What is weighed	Expected incidental harm to civilians and civilian objects, against the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated

Element of the assessment	What the Ministry's report states
Whose judgment	The commander's, on "the information reasonably available to him at the time of the attack"
The threshold	"As long as there is no significant imbalance between the expected collateral damage and the anticipated military advantage, no excessiveness exists"
Who assists	"engineers and damage-assessment specialists," and "remotely piloted aircraft" monitoring civilian presence in real time

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, paragraphs 325 and 330.

The IDF states each strike gets an individual assessment

The Israel Defense Forces states on its page on data technologies, published 18 June 2024 and updated 14 September 2026, that "IDF procedures require conducting an individual assessment of the anticipated military advantage and the incidental damage expected to civilians and civilian objects." The page is the IDF's own account of its own procedures.

- The assessments "are to be made in relation to each specific strike, and not categorically."
- The IDF's targeting procedures "do not permit carrying out strikes on a category basis, without conducting individual assessments per strike."
- Collateral damage is assessed "in view of all reasonably available information, in order to achieve the most accurate assessment possible."

- The steps before a strike “include the obligations to apply feasible precautionary measures and conduct a proportionality assessment.”

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made the same point in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023: proportionality “is to be applied to each and every attack independently, and it does not relate to the overall use of military force,” and “one attack causing 500 casualties should logically, and legally, be seen differently than 500 attacks against military objectives resulting overall in the same number of casualties.”

Does a warning remove civilians from the estimate?

No: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that after a warning “the IDF did not assume that a relevant site or area had been evacuated,” and that “the provision of a warning never, on its own, affected a proportionality assessment.” The statements are the Ministry’s own account of the IDF’s practice.

Statement	Publication	Date
Adherence to “prior general or specific warnings provided by the IDF was not presumed”	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014 conflict report, executive summary	May 2015
Civilians who stayed despite warnings were not discounted “for purposes of its proportionality analyses”	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014 conflict report, Chapter VI	May 2015


Statement	Publication	Date
"The IDF does not assume that there are no civilians in areas or sites where advance warnings had been given"	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Key Legal Aspects	Updated to 2 November 2023

The IDF's decision flow asks "Civilians in Target?" before a strike

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, sets out a decision flow for an intelligence-based target in 8 boxes, one of them "Civilians in Target? Yes | No". The presentation is the IDF's own account of its procedure, and it states that the IDF "routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians." The boxes, in the slide's order:

Box	What the slide asks or states
Intel based targets	"Define Exact Location"
Evacuation	"Area Evacuated? Yes No"
Sensitive sites	"Proximity to Sensitive Sites? Yes No"
Civilians	"Civilians in Target? Yes No"
Warning	"Warning Considerations"
Weaponry	"Choose The Right Munition"
ROE	"Target Coherent RoE? Yes No"
Approval	"Permission to Strike"

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slides 17 and 18, supplied to IsraelFact. No box states a number of civilians.



Slide 18. “ROE” and “RoE” on the slide are rules of engagement.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, “Process of target attack”, slide 18, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

A redacted IDF target card records a conditional legal review

A target card in the IDF’s presentation, marked “Top Secret” and redacted as supplied to IsraelFact, records a legal review with the status “Conditional”. The military objective reads “Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building”, the condition reads “the provision of an effective advance warning”, and the recommendation reads “Real-time visual surveillance”; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ May 2015 report gives the same condition and recommendation for the 2014 Target Card it reproduced. The card’s conditions box, as shown:

Condition on the card	Box
Real-time visual surveillance	Ticked
Nighttime	Ticked
Individual warning to civilians in the target	Ticked
Individual warning to civilians in surrounding structures	Not ticked
Legal conditions	Ticked

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact with names, dates and the target ID blacked out. One example, not a count.

- Top Secret -

Target ID: [REDACTED]

Intel Type of Target: Arms cache i military commander. Function: The target is an a Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Kh commander. The house is bc operational planning site for i operatives for the coordination Location: Abasan Al-Kabir, c Affiliation: Palestinian Islamic Presence at target: The milita and Palestinian Islamic Jihad Description: The target is pa 23*23m in size. The target structure measuring 13*13m i the roof of the structure is k concrete structure measuring tanks, 2 solar panels, and tl shack. Weaponry located at the target [REDACTED] the manufacture of projectiles Sensitive sites: There are no 100m radius of the target. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Intelligence by [REDACTED] Aerial footage [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	ives jet - store at whilst l ce, ice cking"). lot Approved	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	Planning <table border="1"> <tr> <th>Option 2</th> <th>Option 3</th> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </table>	Option 2	Option 3															Conditions ☒ Real-time visual surv. ☒ Nighttime ☒ Indiv. warning to civilians in target ☐ Indiv. warning to civil. in surrounding structures ☒ Legal conditions ☐ [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
Option 2	Option 3																				

Slide 15, redacted as supplied.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF


The Ministry judges a strike by what a commander expected at the time

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its Key Legal Aspects paper, updated to 2 November 2023, that “compliance is conduct-oriented, not result-oriented,” and that an attack causing more collateral damage than expected “does not necessarily indicate a violation.” Its May 2015 report calls the analysis “forward-looking, based on what a reasonable military commander could anticipate under the same or similar circumstances.”

The same report gives an example it calls exceptional, the Ministry’s own account. On 8 July 2014 in Khan Yunis, civilians warned out of a building were “identified as approaching or returning to the premises after the bomb had been dropped but before it hit its target,” there was “no technical possibility of diverting the bomb or aborting the attack,” and “eight civilians lost their lives.”

IDF footage shows strikes stopped as people came near the target

The IDF’s own strike footage, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, shows people near the target given as the reason a strike is called off, held or diverted in 15 of 18 clips, dated on screen from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. The clips are a set, not a sample, and give no count of strikes carried out. Two are below.



ON SCREEN: 17 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:13

1. There is a person walking south, on the eastern route
2. He will probably pass close to the target during execution [of the attack], about fifty meters
3. Copy that, aborted

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 14 AUGUST 2024 • HELD • 0:06

1. We suspect that there is a woman in the car with him
2. Stand by while we confirm
3. Copy, we are standing by

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The IDF confirmed its rules of engagement changed when the war began

The Israel Defense Forces, responding to a New York Times investigation published 26 December 2024, confirmed that its rules of engagement had changed when the war broke out and maintained that all practices remained consistent with international law, as The Times of Israel reported the same day. That is the IDF's own response, paraphrased by the outlet.

- The IDF has published no text of its rules of engagement in the material read here.
- It has published no per-strike threshold for civilian harm, for any period, in the material read here.

Where these figures come from

The 2014 figures and the Khan Yunis example are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' own account of the IDF's conduct in 2014, and describe that conflict, not the current war. The 14 September 2026 page is the IDF's own account of its current procedures. The rules-of-engagement confirmation reaches this page through The Times of Israel's paraphrase, and carries no figure. "Over 6,000" is a floor. The presentation and the 18 clips are the IDF's own material,

supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF; the presentation carries no date on its face.

Questions readers ask

Is there a fixed number of civilians the IDF allows per strike?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that excessiveness “is not measured using absolute numbers” and is assessed case by case.

Who decides whether expected civilian harm is excessive?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the commander decides, on the information reasonably available at the time of the attack, and the IDF states that an operational commander approves each strike.

Does the IDF assess civilian harm for every strike?

The Israel Defense Forces states on its page updated 14 September 2026 that its procedures require “an individual assessment” for each strike, “not categorically.”

Did the IDF change its rules of engagement after 7 October 2023?

The IDF confirmed in December 2024 that its rules of engagement changed when the war broke out, as The Times of Israel reported,

and stated its practices remained consistent with international law.

Has the IDF published its rules of engagement?

No text of the IDF's rules of engagement appears in the Israeli publications read here, and the IDF's stated standard is the individual assessment on its 14 September 2026 page.

Does a later civilian death toll make a strike unlawful?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its November 2023 paper that "compliance is conduct-oriented, not result-oriented," judged on what the commander expected at the time.

Are civilians who ignore a warning counted in the estimate?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report that the IDF did not discount civilians who stayed after a warning in its proportionality analyses.

How many strikes did the IDF carry out in 2014?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states the IDF conducted over 6,000 aerial strikes against military objectives between 7 July and 26 August 2014, the IDF's own count.

What proportionality test do Israel's courts apply?

The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 in HCJ 2056/04 that a military measure needs a rational connection to its aim, the

least injurious means, and injury in proper proportion to the gain.

What does the Ministry say about one strike against many?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023 that one attack causing 500 casualties is to be seen differently from 500 attacks causing the same total.

Does the IDF check for civilians just before a strike?

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, states that the IDF "routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures" and asks "Civilians in Target?" before "Permission to Strike".

What does an IDF target card record?

A redacted card in the IDF's presentation records a legal review marked "Conditional", on "the provision of an effective advance warning", with real-time visual surveillance recommended.

What does the title NAZA mean?

The Times of Israel reported on 14 September 2026 that the title is a Hebrew acronym meaning collateral damage; no Israeli publication read here defines it.

Sources

- Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Footage of strikes called off, held or diverted, eighteen clips, on-screen dates 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF's own footage.
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- The Times of Israel, 2024. "IDF loosened rules of engagement after Oct. 7, allowing more civilian deaths – NY Times." 26

December 2024. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press, carrying the IDF's response.

- The Times of Israel, 2026. IDF chief floats legal action against 'NAZA' film, orders probe of leaked material. 14 September 2026. timesofisrael.com. Israeli press.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?



KEY FIGURES September 23, 2026

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?



RECORD EXPLAINER Updated September 23, 2026

Does Israel Publish a Proportionality Assessment for Gaza Strikes?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

Continue →

MORE FROM THE RECORD

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

How Many Hamas Fighters Does Israel Say It Has Killed?

Has the IDF Published Its Own Footage of Aborted Strikes?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?

IDF footage supplied to IsraelFact shows 7 strikes called off, 1 held and 10 diverted in 18 clips dated 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY


[Aborted Strikes](#)

[Civilian Harm](#)

[Israel Defense Forces](#)

[NAZA](#)

[Gaza](#)



Israel Defense Forces footage supplied to IsraelFact shows strikes called off, held or diverted in 18 clips dated on screen

from 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026, the IDF's own footage with the command exchange subtitled in English. The strike is called off in 7 clips, held in 1 and diverted in 10, and people near the target are the reason given in 15, children, minors or kids in 8 of them. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote on 8 December 2023 that "countless attacks have been aborted or avoided completely in order to prevent harm to civilians," and no Israeli publication read here gives a count.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
18	Clips of the IDF's own strike footage, each with its own on-screen date; a set, not a sample	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026
7	Clips in which the strike is called off and not carried out	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 25 September 2025
10	Clips in which the munition is diverted away from the target	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	17 November 2024 to 12 July 2026
15	Clips in which people near the target are the reason given	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026
8	Clips in which children, minors or kids are named	Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact	22 May 2024 to 12 July 2026
3	Air Force strikes the IDF's targeting presentation shows cancelled for civilians, one dated on screen	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	One dated 14 July 2014

7 clips show a strike called off before it was carried out

The IDF's own footage shows the strike called off in 7 of the clips, as subtitled. People near the target are the reason in 6; in the seventh, on 25 September 2025, the reason given is "This is an active area." Each clip is an excerpt of 3 to 21 seconds, not the whole engagement.


On-screen date	The reason, in the subtitles' words	The call
4 April 2024	"A group of people approaching"	"So abort"
17 May 2024	A person who "will probably pass close to the target during execution [of the attack], about fifty meters"	"Copy that, aborted"
22 May 2024	"a group of five people now, even more, possibly children"	"It's an appropriate time to abort"
24 May 2024	"uninvolved [civilians]"	"We cancelled the [attack on the] target"
5 July 2024	"Two people are on the route, they could be kids"	"Abort, abort. Abort"
8 August 2024	A cyclist, then "two kids in the south"	"Copy that, we are aborting"
25 September 2025	"This is an active area"	"We will not attack"

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact, with the English subtitles as they appear on screen.



ON SCREEN: 4 APRIL 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:04

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF




ON SCREEN: 17 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:13

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 22 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:11

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 24 MAY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:05

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 5 JULY 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:20

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 8 AUGUST 2024 • CALLED OFF • 0:12

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 25 SEPTEMBER 2025 · CALLED OFF · 0:03

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

10 clips show the munition diverted from the target

The IDF's own footage shows the call to divert in 10 of the clips, which steers a munition away from its target rather than calling the strike off beforehand. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' May 2015 report names diverting as an option for a bomb already dropped, in recording a 2014 case in which there was "no technical possibility of diverting the bomb or aborting the attack." The footage does not show where a diverted munition landed.

On-screen date	The reason, in the subtitles' words	The call
17 November 2024	"Stay away from the truck"	"Divert, don't harm the trucks"

On-screen date	The reason, in the subtitles' words	The call
10 December 2024	"Isn't that a child near him?"	"Divert, divert, divert. I diverted"
25 December 2024	"We detect a lot of people"	"Abort, abort. Abort, divert [ammunition]"
13 March 2025	"People approaching, people approaching"	"We are diverting. Divert [ammunition]"
27 June 2025	"There are two children"	"Copy that, divert [ammunition]"
7 July 2025	"There is a child here"	"Make sure we divert? Divert"
11 July 2025	"We detected many people there"	"we are diverting"
28 September 2025	None in the subtitles	"Cancel [the attack]", then "Divert"
29 May 2026	"Watch out, a child is coming"	"we are going to divert"
12 July 2026	"Four people approaching", then "Four minors"	"Divert [ammunition]"

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact, with the English subtitles as they appear on screen.



ON SCREEN: 17 NOVEMBER 2024 • DIVERTED • 0:05


Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 10 DECEMBER 2024 • DIVERTED • 0:03

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF





ON SCREEN: 27 JUNE 2025 • DIVERTED • 0:06

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 7 JULY 2025 • DIVERTED • 0:06

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 11 JULY 2025 • DIVERTED • 0:04

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 28 SEPTEMBER 2025 • DIVERTED • 0:04

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 29 MAY 2026 • DIVERTED • 0:05

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF



ON SCREEN: 12 JULY 2026 • DIVERTED • 0:07

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

1 clip shows a strike held while a passenger is confirmed

The IDF's own footage shows the strike held in 1 clip, dated 14 August 2024, while those on the call confirm who is in a vehicle. The clip ends before any decision.

- The concern: "We suspect that there is a woman in the car with him"
- The instruction: "Stand by while we confirm"
- The reply: "Copy, we are standing by"
- Not shown: whether the strike later went ahead, was called off or was diverted



ON SCREEN: 14 AUGUST 2024 · HELD · 0:06

Source: Israel Defense Forces footage, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF


The IDF presentation shows 3 strikes cancelled for civilians

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, shows 3 Air Force strikes "cancelled due to the presence of civilians close to the targets," one dated on screen 14 July 2014. Its heading, in the IDF's own words: the IDF "routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians. Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians."

- "we identified civilian on the roof..." and "copy that, let's move to the next target", dated 14 July 2014
- "Yes.. There is civilian walking in the yard.." and "copy that, we will not strike this target now..."
- "there are probably children here.. We are stopping everything"

The IDF routinely reviews targets after the target-clearing procedures, and wherever feasible uses visual and intelligence means to ensure that the area is clear of civilians. Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians

Examples of IAF strikes that were cancelled due to the presence of civilians close to the targets:



"we identified civilian on the roof..."
"copy that, let's move to the next target"



"Yes.. There is civilian walking in the yard..."
"copy that, we will not strike this target now..."



"there are probably children here.. We are stopping everything"

Slide 17. Only the first panel carries a date on screen, 14 July 2014.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 17, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

Pilots cancelled strikes over civilians in 2014, the Ministry states

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in its May 2015 report on the 2014 conflict that "individual pilots exercised their discretion to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians," its own account of the IDF's conduct. The same chapter sets out when attacks were cancelled or suspended, and one case in which that could not be done.

When, on the Ministry's account	The Ministry's words	Paragraph
The target was not a military objective, was specially protected, or expected civilian damage was excessive	The IDF "cancelled or suspended an attack whenever it became apparent"	315

When, on the Ministry's account	The Ministry's words	Paragraph
For reasons of policy	"although they were expected to be within the parameters of the rule of proportionality"	316
At the pilot's own discretion	"to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians"	316
After release, on 8 July 2014	"no technical possibility of diverting the bomb or aborting the attack"; "eight civilians lost their lives"	328

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, dated May 2015.

No Israeli publication read here counts strikes called off since 2023

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote in its FAQ updated to 8 December 2023 that "countless attacks have been aborted or avoided completely in order to prevent harm to civilians," and that "Israeli strikes that do not meet this threshold have been, and will continue to be, aborted." "Countless" is the Ministry's word, not a count. Absent from the IDF and Ministry publications read here:

- A count of strikes called off or suspended since 7 October 2023
- A count of munitions diverted after release
- A release by the IDF of the 18 clips on this page

Where these figures come from

The 18 clips are the IDF's own footage, supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, and the quotations reproduce the

English subtitles burned into them, with their bracketed insertions. The clips are a set, not a sample, and no rate of strikes called off against strikes carried out may be drawn from them. A called-off strike is not carried out; a diverted munition is steered away, and where it landed is not shown. No clip names or describes its target, and none shows or names its location. The 2014 examples describe that conflict, not the current war.

Questions readers ask

Does the IDF abort strikes when civilians are near the target?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on 8 December 2023 that attacks are aborted “when the expected civilian harm might be greater than initially expected,” and the IDF’s own footage, supplied to IsraelFact, shows 7 strikes called off.

What does it mean when the IDF diverts a munition?

The munition is steered away from its target; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ May 2015 report records a 2014 case in which a bomb could not be diverted once it had been dropped.

How many strikes has the IDF called off in this war?

No count appears in the Israeli publications read here; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote on 8 December 2023 that “countless attacks have been aborted or avoided completely.”

Did the IDF publish these clips?

The 18 clips are the IDF's own footage, supplied to IsraelFact, and none appears in an IDF release read [here](#).

Who wrote the English subtitles?

The subtitles are burned into the footage as supplied to IsraelFact, and no translator is credited on screen.

Are children mentioned in the footage?

Children, minors or kids are named in 8 of the 18 clips, the first dated 22 May 2024 and the last 12 July 2026.

Do any clips date from after the ceasefire?

Two clips carry on-screen dates after the ceasefire that took effect on 10 October 2025, as the IDF recorded it: 29 May 2026 and 12 July 2026, both showing a munition diverted.

What was the target in each clip?

No clip names or describes its target; the subtitles give only what was seen near it.

Why was a strike held on 14 August 2024?

The subtitles read "We suspect that there is a woman in the car with him" and "Stand by while we confirm," and the clip ends before any decision.

Did pilots cancel strikes on their own judgment?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that in 2014 “individual pilots exercised their discretion to cancel or delay planned strikes due to the presence of civilians.”

Were strikes cancelled even when they were proportionate?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that in 2014 some “attacks were cancelled or suspended for reasons of policy, although they were expected to be within the parameters of the rule of proportionality.”

What does the IDF’s presentation say about cancelled strikes?

The IDF’s presentation “Process of target attack”, supplied to IsraelFact, states that “Many strikes were cancelled due to unexpected presence of civilians” and shows 3 examples, one dated 14 July 2014.

Sources

- IDF Spokesperson, Israel Defense Forces, 2025. Division 252 activity in the yellow line area, war diary. 4 November 2025. idf.il. Official or primary record.
- Israel Defense Forces, 2024 to 2026. Footage of strikes called off, held or diverted, eighteen clips, on-screen dates 4 April 2024 to 12 July 2026. Supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF. The IDF’s own footage.

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CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?



KEY FIGURES September 23, 2026

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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MORE FROM THE RECORD

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Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026 Updated September 23, 2026

Does Israel Publish a Proportionality Assessment for Gaza Strikes?

Israel's bodies publish investigation counts, thresholds and a judicial proportionality test. No Israeli body publishes a strike-level assessment.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY [Gaza](#) [Proportionality](#) [Military Advocate General](#)
[Israeli Supreme Court](#) [State Comptroller](#)



74 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct in Gaza had been opened by the Military Advocate General's Corps as at 3 August 2024, the Corps' own count of its own processes, produced under a stated reasonable-suspicion standard. No Israeli body publishes a proportionality determination on any individual strike in Gaza. What Israel's bodies do publish is a judicial proportionality test stated in 2004, an operational tally the Israel Defense Forces attributes to itself, referral and investigation counts with the threshold that produced them, and a State Comptroller audit of the machinery that examines conduct in combat.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
74	Criminal investigations opened into alleged misconduct in Gaza, the Corps' own count, under a reasonable-suspicion standard	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
Over 1,000	Incidents referred for factual assessment to the General Staff's Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism, the Corps' own count, a floor	IDF Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024
Over 13,000	People the IDF describes as terrorists it says it has eliminated in Gaza, the IDF's own count on its own classification, a floor	Israel Defense Forces	Since the start of the war, stated 29 February 2024
3	Limbs of the proportionality test applied to a military measure	Israeli Supreme Court, HCI 2056/04	Judgment of 30 June 2004
3 years and 5 months	Interval from the second Turkel report to government approval of the recommendations implementing it	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2013 to 3 July 2016
2,125	Palestinians killed in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge, on	State Comptroller of Israel, relaying the	2014

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
	figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a party's own count	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	

Turkel reported in 2013, the government approved implementation in July 2016

The State Comptroller records that the Turkel Commission delivered the first part of its report in January 2011 and the second, on Israel's examination and investigation mechanisms, in February 2013. The Ciechanover team delivered its implementing recommendations to the Prime Minister on 20 September 2015, about a year after the October 2014 date set for them, and the government approved them on 3 July 2016 in decision B/125 of the Ministerial Committee for National Security Affairs, about three years and five months after Turkel reported. The same audit records that a 2012 to 2013 audit of the civilian component in combat was completed in draft, circulated 12 February 2014 and updated in May 2014, and was not published because Operation Protective Edge intervened. These are the findings of Israel's state audit institution, reporting to the Knesset on Israeli bodies, and the audit sits alongside the same report's findings on [training in the laws of war](#).

From the Turkel report to government approval

DATES AS RECORDED IN THE MARCH 2018 AUDIT.

Turkel report, part one

Turkel report, part two

Ciechanover recommendations

Government approval

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Source: State Comptroller of Israel, Operation Protective Edge, March 2018.

Beit Sourik applied a three-part proportionality test to military measures

HCJ 2056/04 concerns the route of the West Bank separation barrier, not operations in Gaza, and it states the test Israel's own court applies to a military measure rather than applying that test to Gaza. The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 that the military commander had authority to build the obstacle for security reasons, rejected the claim that the route served a political rather than a security purpose, and voided several seizure orders because the route was disproportionate. The figures below are the Court's own statements in the judgment, and the [ruling on the barrier route](#) carries them in full.

Figure	What the Court stated it counts
3 limbs	Rational connection, least injurious means, and injury in proper proportion to the gain
About 40 kilometres	Length of the segment covered by the challenged seizure orders
35,000	Local inhabitants whose lives the Court found the route injures
4,000 dunams	Local inhabitants' land taken up by the route of the fence itself

Figure**What the Court stated it counts**

1,500 dunams

Cultivated land left on the far side of the fence

Source: Israeli Supreme Court, HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Village Council v. Government of Israel, judgment of 30 June 2004.

The IDF counts over 13,000 it describes as terrorists killed

The Israel Defense Forces stated at a press briefing on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists in Gaza since the beginning of the war. That is the IDF's own count, on the IDF's own classification of who is counted, stated at a single date, and "over 13,000" is a floor rather than an exact total. The briefing gives a separate count for a separate territory, which counts a different action.

Figure**What the IDF states it counts****Period**Over
13,000

People it describes as terrorists eliminated in Gaza

Since the start of the war,
stated 29 February 2024About
3,400People it describes as terrorists apprehended by IDF
forces together with the ISA in Judea and SamariaDuring the war, stated 29
February 2024

1,500

Of those apprehended, people it describes as Hamas
terroristsDuring the war, stated 29
February 2024

Source: Israel Defense Forces, press briefing by the IDF Spokesperson, 29 February 2024. Each figure is the IDF's own reported count.

The IDF publishes no civilian casualty count of its own

The Israel Defense Forces publishes no count of civilians killed in Gaza in the material used here. The 2,125 Palestinians killed during Operation Protective Edge appears in the State Comptroller's March 2018 report, which attributes it to figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the wounded and housing figures in the same report are attributed by the report to Palestinian bodies and international organisations. The IDF also states measures it says it takes before a strike. Israel's own count of warnings is published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and no Israeli publication read here counts roof knocks performed or strikes aborted in the current war:

- Warnings to civilians by telephone call, text message and leaflet: over 15 million text messages, over 12 million pre-recorded calls, over 4.5 million leaflets and over 45,000 individual calls to 8 December 2023, Israel's own count
- Roof knocking, a loud non-lethal munition, before striking a building
- Strikes aborted when civilians are present
- A numbered evacuation-area map published so residents could follow instructions by area

Source: Israel Defense Forces, stated precautions in Gaza and the human-shields position, the IDF's own account of its own conduct; the warning counts are Israel's own, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' FAQ updated to 8 December 2023, and each is a floor.

No Israeli body publishes a proportionality assessment of any strike

The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes counts of what its own machinery has done, and no assessment of whether any

particular attack was proportionate. The Corps states that in armed conflict, death or injury to a civilian or harm to civilian objects, while tragic and regrettable, in most cases do not by themselves indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, as they can be explained as reasonable aftermath of lawful operational activity, and its counts are a function of that threshold. The breakdown of the 74 by category sits in the record on [how the Corps examines misconduct](#).

Item	What the Corps publishes
Criminal investigations opened	74, as at 3 August 2024, its own count
Incidents referred for factual assessment	Over 1,000, with hundreds still under assessment at the time of writing
Threshold applied	A reasonable-suspicion standard, stated in the publication
Findings, indictments and convictions	No count in that publication
Proportionality determination on an individual attack	None in that publication

Source: IDF Military Advocate General's Corps, Addressing Alleged Misconduct in the Context of the War in Gaza, published 24 February 2024, updated 3 August 2024. The counts are the party's own counts of its own processes.

Which figures here may not be added together?

The 74 investigations and the over 1,000 referrals count stages of one process and are not two populations to be summed. The over 13,000 is a count of people the IDF describes as terrorists, on the IDF's own classification, and no total of any kind may be derived by subtracting it from a figure published by another body. The

2,125 belongs to Operation Protective Edge in 2014 and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not to the current war and not to the State Comptroller. Both the 13,000 and the over 1,000 are floors and are never restated as exact numbers.

Questions readers ask

Does Israel publish a proportionality assessment of any strike in Gaza?

The Military Advocate General's Corps publishes investigation and referral counts, and its publication carries no proportionality determination on an individual attack.

How many criminal investigations has the Corps opened?

The Military Advocate General's Corps opened 74 criminal investigations into alleged misconduct in Gaza as at 3 August 2024, on its own count.

What threshold produces that count?

The Corps states that civilian death or injury in armed conflict does not by itself indicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, and the 74 rests on that standard.

Are the 74 findings or convictions?

The Corps counts investigations opened, and its publication records no findings, indictment or conviction count.

What proportionality test do Israel's courts apply?

The Israeli Supreme Court held on 30 June 2004 that a military measure must show a rational connection to its objective, use the least injurious means, and stand in proper proportion between injury and gain.

Did that judgment concern Gaza?

HCJ 2056/04 concerns the route of the West Bank separation barrier, and the Israeli Supreme Court decided it on 30 June 2004.

How many people does the IDF say it has killed in Gaza?

The Israel Defense Forces stated on 29 February 2024 that it had eliminated over 13,000 people it describes as terrorists, its own count and a floor.

Does the IDF publish a civilian casualty count for Gaza?

The Israel Defense Forces publishes no civilian casualty count in the material used here, and its 29 February 2024 briefing counts only those it describes as terrorists.

Where does the 2,125 figure come from?

The State Comptroller reported 2,125 Palestinians killed during Operation Protective Edge in 2014, on figures published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Does the IDF publish how many warnings it issued?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs publishes Israel's own count: over 15 million text messages, over 12 million pre-recorded calls, over 4.5 million leaflets and over 45,000 individual calls to 8 December 2023. No Israeli publication read here counts roof knocks performed.

How long did the examination machinery take to stand up?

The State Comptroller recorded about three years and five months between the second Turkel report of February 2013 and the government's approval of the implementing recommendations on 3 July 2016.

Was any earlier audit of conduct in combat published?

The State Comptroller records that a 2012 to 2013 audit of the civilian component in combat was completed in draft in 2014 and was not published because Operation Protective Edge intervened.

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SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER August 20, 2026

How Many Criminal Investigations Has the IDF Opened Over Gaza?

RECORD EXPLAINER August 27, 2026

What Did Israel's Supreme Court Rule on the Barrier Route?



RECORD EXPLAINER August 31, 2026

Were Israeli Soldiers Trained in the Laws of War?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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MORE FROM THE RECORD

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

How Does the IDF Warn Civilians Before Strikes in Gaza?

How Many Hamas Fighters Does Israel Say It Has Killed?

Has the IDF Published Its Own Footage of Aborted Strikes?

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Can an IDF Legal Adviser Stop a Strike?

Israel's Foreign Ministry states IDF legal opinions are binding on individual attacks; a senior commander then approves, suspends or aborts.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Military Advocate General

Legal Review

Israel Defense Forces

Targeting

NAZA



Legal opinions of the Military Advocate General's Corps "are binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in its May 2015 report on the 2014 Gaza conflict. In the process that report describes, a legal adviser gives a binding opinion on a planned attack, and a senior commander then approves it, suspends it or aborts it. The IDF states that the decision to strike rests with an authorized operational commander, and the IDF's own presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact, puts legal review at step 7 of 9, before commanders' approval.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
3	Options open to a senior commander once the binding legal opinion is in: approve, suspend or abort, the Ministry's account of the IDF's process	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	2014 conflict, report dated May 2015
2007	Year since which the IDF's International Law Department has been expanded in hostilities by "dozens" of law of armed conflict experts	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Since 2007, as stated in May 2015
9	Steps in the IDF's targeting process, with legal review at step 7 and commanders' approval at step 8, the IDF's own account	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
5	Conditions on a redacted IDF target card whose legal review is marked "Conditional"; 4 are ticked	Israel Defense Forces presentation, supplied to IsraelFact	Undated presentation
2	Bodies before which a Military Advocate General decision can be challenged: the Attorney General and the Supreme Court	Military Advocate General's Corps	As at 3 August 2024

The Ministry states a legal adviser's opinion is binding on the IDF

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sets out the position of the IDF's lawyers in paragraph 238 of its May 2015 report, as its own account of the IDF's structure:

- Military lawyers “are not subordinate to the commanders they advise”
- The Military Advocate General “is appointed by the Minister of Defence (a civilian authority), not by the IDF Chief of General Staff”
- High Command Orders state the Military Advocate General is “subject to no authority but the law”
- “Legal opinions of the MAG Corps are binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks”

The Ministry's Key Legal Aspects paper of 2 November 2023 restates the reporting line for the current war: “IDF legal advisers are not subject to the IDF chain of command on professional matters, but report directly to the Military Advocate General, whose conduct is subject to scrutiny by the Israeli Attorney General.”

A senior commander has 3 options after the legal opinion

The Ministry's May 2015 report describes pre-planned attacks as passing through “a highly-regulated, multi-tiered process,” and

names the legal adviser's part in it: "a legal adviser's binding opinion regarding the legality of an attack, plus any stipulations for its execution." Then, in the Ministry's words, "a senior commander may (i) approve the attack (where appropriate, subject to certain conditions), (ii) suspend the attack (for instance, because more information about potential collateral damage is necessary), or (iii) abort the attack altogether."


Stage	What the Ministry says happens	Paragraph
Intelligence	Information on the target and its surroundings is collected	245
Objectives	Commanders set the objectives of the attack	245
Planning	Operational planners assess means and methods	245
Legal review	A legal adviser gives a "binding opinion regarding the legality of an attack"	245
Decision	A senior commander approves, suspends or aborts	245

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 2014 Gaza Conflict: Factual and Legal Aspects, Chapter VI, dated May 2015.

The IDF states the same division for the current war, as its own account, on its data-technology page of 18 June 2024: "The decision whether to strike is made by the commander after considering this information and input, as well as operational, policy, humanitarian, and legal considerations." A question the IDF added to that page on 14 September 2026 gives its answer in one line: "The decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander."

The IDF's presentation puts legal review at step 7 of 9

The IDF's presentation "Process of target attack", supplied to IsraelFact and not published by the IDF, lays out its targeting process in 9 steps, from intelligence collection to execution. Legal review is step 7 and commanders' approval is step 8, the IDF's own account of its procedure.



Slide 6. "BDA" on the slide is battle damage assessment.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 6, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The IDF's presentation describes the approving commander, on its slide 16, as "an officer who has been professionally and operationally qualified for this role and possesses the authority to authorize strikes against designated targets."

A redacted IDF target card marks its legal review "Conditional"

The IDF's presentation shows a target card, redacted as supplied, whose legal review carries the status "Conditional". The objective is recorded as "Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building", the condition is "the provision of an effective advance warning", and the recommendation is "Real-time visual surveillance". Its checklist carries 5 conditions:

Condition on the card	Ticked
Real-time visual surveillance	Yes
Nighttime	Yes
Individual warning to civilians in the target	Yes
Legal conditions	Yes
Individual warning to civilians in surrounding structures	No

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF.

- Top Secret -

Target ID: [REDACTED]

Intell Type of Target: Arms cache i military commander. Function: The target is an a Palestinian Islamic Jihad's Kh commander. The house is bc operational planning site for f operatives for the coordination Location: Abasan Al-Kabir, c Affiliation: Palestinian Islamic Presence at target: The milita and Palestinian Islamic Jihad Description: The target is pa 23*23m in size. The target structure measuring 13*13m i the roof of the structure is k concrete structure measuring tanks, 2 solar panels, and ti shack. Weaponry located at the target: the manufacture of projectiles Sensitive sites: There are no 100m radius of the target. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Intelligence by [REDACTED] Aerial footage [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED]	Legal Review Status: Conditional Military Objective: Arms cache and operational meeting place in a residential building Conditions: the provision of an effective advance warning. Recommendations: Real-time visual surveillance Reviewed by [REDACTED] on [REDACTED] Conditions ☒ Real-time visual surv. ☒ Nighttime ☒ Indiv. warning to civilians in target ☐ Indiv. warning to civil. in surrounding structures ☒ Legal conditions ☐ [REDACTED]
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Slide 15, redacted as supplied.

Source: Israel Defense Forces, "Process of target attack", slide 15, supplied to IsraelFact; not published by the IDF

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reproduces a Target Card from the 2014 conflict in its May 2015 report and records the same shape: "the legal advisers conditioned their approval on the provision of an effective advance warning," recommended "real-time visual surveillance," and the commander required "that the attack be conducted at night."

The Ministry says fact-specific legal advice is not always available in real time

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states in paragraph 247 of its May 2015 report that "the exigencies of combat do not always allow for a targeting process involving this level of deliberate pre-planning and pre-approval," and that "certain input, such as fact-specific legal advice, will not be available in real time." For those targets, in the Ministry's words, commanders "rely on the training they have received, as well as directives that specify the checks and authorisations required prior to carrying out attacks."

The Military Advocate General answers to the law, the Corps states

The Military Advocate General's Corps describes its own position on its page updated 3 August 2024:

- "The MAG is subject only to the law on professional matters and operates with full independence"

- Its decisions are “subject to civilian oversight and can be challenged on appeal in front of Israel’s Attorney General, as well as before the Israeli Supreme Court”

The Ministry’s May 2015 report adds, in paragraph 240, that “since 2007, in times of active hostilities the International Law Department has been expanded by dozens of additional Law of Armed Conflict experts,” deployed to the Regional Command and Divisional levels as the Operational Law Apparatus.

No Israeli publication read here counts strikes stopped on legal advice

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the IDF describe the legal adviser’s role and publish no figures for how it is used. Absent from the Israeli publications read here:

- A count of attacks a legal adviser found unlawful, since 2014 or since October 2023
- A count of attacks approved on conditions, suspended or aborted after legal review
- A count of time-sensitive attacks carried out without fact-specific legal advice

Where these figures come from

Every statement here is a party’s own account of its own procedure: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the IDF’s conduct in 2014, the IDF and its Military Advocate General’s Corps on the

current war. They record the stated process, not how any strike was decided. The May 2015 report describes 2014, not the current war. The presentation is the IDF's own and was supplied to IsraelFact, not published by the IDF, and its target card is one redacted example, not a count. The 2007 in the table is a year, not a number of lawyers.

Questions readers ask

Is an IDF legal adviser's opinion binding?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that legal opinions of the Military Advocate General's Corps "are binding upon the IDF, including with regard to the legality of individual attacks."

Who decides whether a strike goes ahead?

The IDF states that "the decision to approve an attack rests with an authorized operational commander," after operational, policy, humanitarian and legal considerations.

What can a commander do after the legal review?

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' account of 2014, a senior commander may approve the attack, suspend it or abort it altogether.

Where does legal review sit in the IDF's targeting process?

The IDF's presentation, supplied to IsraelFact, puts legal review at step 7 of 9, before commanders' approval at step 8.

Do IDF legal advisers answer to the commanders they advise?

No, on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' account: military lawyers "are not subordinate to the commanders they advise" and report to the Military Advocate General.

Who appoints the Military Advocate General?

The Minister of Defence, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "not by the IDF Chief of General Staff."

Can a legal adviser attach conditions to a strike?

Yes, on both Israeli accounts read here: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes "stipulations for its execution," and the IDF's presentation shows a legal review marked "Conditional" on an advance warning.

Is there always a lawyer before a strike?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that for time-sensitive targets "certain input, such as fact-specific legal advice, will not be available in real time," and commanders rely on training and directives.

How many lawyers does the IDF deploy in wartime?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that since 2007 “dozens of additional” law of armed conflict experts join the International Law Department in hostilities; it gives no exact number.

Can a Military Advocate General decision be challenged?

The Military Advocate General’s Corps states its decisions can be challenged before Israel’s Attorney General and the Supreme Court.

How often have lawyers stopped a strike?

No Israeli publication read here gives a count of strikes found unlawful, conditioned, suspended or aborted after legal review.


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SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Call Off Strikes When Civilians Appear?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Use AI to Choose Targets in Gaza?



RECORD EXPLAINER September 23, 2026

Does the IDF Set a Limit on How Many Civilians a Strike May Kill?



CHRONOLOGY September 23, 2026

What Did the IDF Say About the NAZA Documentary?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

LATEST

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A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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KEY FIGURES September 16, 2026

How Many Palestinians From Gaza Does Israel Hold? 1,477 in December 2025

The Israel Prison Service counted 1,477 Gaza residents held on security grounds at the end of December 2025, of them 1,189 as unlawful combatants.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

[Gaza Detainees](#)

[Israel Prison Service](#)

[Unlawful Combatants](#)

[Ceasefire](#)

[State Comptroller](#)



1,477 residents of the Gaza Strip were held on security grounds in Israel Prison Service facilities at the end of December 2025, on the Prison Service's own count of its own facilities, published in its fourth-quarter inmates report on 17 March 2026. The ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, on the IDF Spokesperson's published account, so all three months covered by that report fall inside it. The Prison Service counted 1,415 at the end of October and 1,458 at the end of November. Each of the three is a count of people held on the last day of a month, not a count of arrests.


Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
1,477	Gaza Strip residents held on security grounds in Prison Service facilities	Israel Prison Service	End of December 2025
1,189	Of that total, those held as unlawful combatants	Israel Prison Service	End of December 2025
245	Of that total, those held in the category the Service records as held "for days"	Israel Prison Service	End of December 2025
38	Of that total, sentenced security prisoners	Israel Prison Service	End of December 2025
2,366	Security prisoners held in IDF facilities, not by residence, whom the Prison Service could not absorb	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2025
1,722	Gaza detainees approved for release, 1,411 held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF	Government of Israel, Decision 3396	9 October 2025

The Prison Service counted 1,477 Gaza detainees in December 2025

The Israel Prison Service published 1,415 for October, 1,458 for November and 1,477 for December 2025, its own count of people held in its own facilities, classified by the residency class it uses for Gaza Strip residents. Each figure is a stock at a month end, so the movement between two months is the net of people admitted and people released and is not a count of arrests. The October figure spans the ceasefire start of 10 October 2025, and November and December are the first two full months inside it.

Gaza residents held on security grounds

PRISON SERVICE FACILITIES, END-OF-MONTH STOCK, OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 2025



Source: Israel Prison Service, inmates report for the fourth quarter of 2025, the Service's own count. Month-end stocks, not arrests.

1,189 of the December total were held as unlawful combatants

The Israel Prison Service counted 1,189 Gaza residents held as unlawful combatants at the end of December 2025, a category created by the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002. That count is a subset of the same Service's Gaza security total for the month and not an addition to it. The Service reported the subset for each of the three months in its own quarterly workbook.

Month end	Held as unlawful combatants	Gaza residents on security grounds
October 2025	1,130	1,415
November 2025	1,167	1,458
December 2025	1,189	1,477

Source: [Israel] Prison Service, inmates report for the fourth quarter of 2025, the Service's own count of its own facilities.

The December total splits into 4 Prison Service categories

The Israel Prison Service records each Gaza detainee under one of eleven holding categories, and for December 2025 it published four of them as carrying the population. The Service counted 38 sentenced security prisoners among the 1,477, with the rest held under categories that carry no sentence. The Service also published security administrative-detention durations for December 2025 across adults generally, 923 held up to 12 months,

681 up to 18 months and 477 up to 24 months, and did not break those durations out by Gaza residence.

Category, December 2025	Count
Unlawful combatants	1,189
Held "for days"	245
Sentenced security prisoners	38
Remaining categories, each	Fewer than 10

Source: Israel Prison Service, inmates report for the fourth quarter of 2025, the Service's own count.

The count covers Prison Service facilities, not IDF facilities

The Israel Prison Service counts people held in its own facilities and in no others. The State Comptroller of Israel reported 10,147 security prisoners in Prison Service facilities as at February 2025, a further 2,366 security prisoners held in IDF facilities whom the Prison Service could not absorb, and a shortfall of 3,502 incarceration places, in an audit of the state's own incarceration bodies published on 9 June 2026. Those figures are dated February 2025, before the ceasefire, are not broken out by residence, and belong to a different counting authority than the monthly Gaza figures above.

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
10,147	Security prisoners in Prison Service facilities	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2025

Figure	What it counts	Who published it	Period
2,366	Security prisoners in IDF facilities	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2025
3,502	Shortfall of incarceration places for security prisoners	State Comptroller of Israel	February 2025

The Prison Service publishes no count of arrests since the ceasefire

The Israel Prison Service publishes month-end stocks by category and by district of residence, and publishes no figure for arrests, new admissions or detention orders issued after 10 October 2025. Its coarser residence cut counted 4,052 adults from the territories in October 2025, 4,238 in November and 4,105 in December, a grouping that does not separate Gaza. The Government of Israel, in [Decision 3396 of 9 October 2025](#), approved the release of 1,700 Gaza detainees it describes as not having been involved in the events of 7 October 2023 together with 22 minors in the same category, 1,411 of them held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF, and published no subsequent detention figure.

Which of these figures may not be added together?

The monthly Gaza figures are the Israel Prison Service's own count of people held in its own facilities at a month end, so a difference between two months is a net change and not an arrest count. The 1,189 unlawful combatants sit inside the 1,477 and are not

additional to it. The State Comptroller's 10,147 and 2,366 are dated February 2025, are not broken out by residence, and may not be added to the Prison Service's monthly Gaza figures. The 1,722 in Decision 3396 is a release approval by the Government of Israel and a separate category from the 250 prisoners and detainees the same decision approved for release.

Questions readers ask

Has Israel published a figure for Gaza detainees during the ceasefire?

Yes. The Israel Prison Service published 1,415, 1,458 and 1,477 Gaza residents held on security grounds at the ends of October, November and December 2025, its own count of its own facilities.

Is the figure rising or falling?

The Israel Prison Service counted a rise of 62 across the quarter, from 1,415 at the end of October 2025 to 1,477 at the end of December 2025.

Does that mean 62 people were arrested?

No. The Israel Prison Service publishes a stock at each month end, which is the net of admissions and releases, and it publishes no arrest or new-admission count for the period.

How many are held without a sentence?

The Israel Prison Service counted 38 sentenced security prisoners among the 1,477 held at the end of December 2025; the remainder are recorded under categories that carry no sentence.

What is an unlawful combatant in this count?

It is a statutory holding category under the Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Law, 5762-2002, and the Israel Prison Service counted 1,189 Gaza residents under it at the end of December 2025.

Are administrative detainees counted separately?

Yes. The Israel Prison Service records administrative detention as its own category and published detention durations for December 2025 of 923 up to 12 months, 681 up to 18 months and 477 up to 24 months, across adults and not separated by Gaza residence.

Does the Prison Service figure cover everyone Israel holds?

No. The State Comptroller of Israel reported 2,366 security prisoners held in IDF facilities as at February 2025, outside the Prison Service count.

Does the residency class say where a person was taken?

No. The Israel Prison Service classifies detainees by where they reside on its own record, not by place of capture.

What did the cabinet decide about Gaza detainees?

The Government of Israel, in Decision 3396 of 9 October 2025, approved the release of 1,700 Gaza detainees and 22 minors in the same category, 1,411 held by the Prison Service and 311 by the IDF.

When did the ceasefire begin?

The IDF Spokesperson published that the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025 at 12:00, with 72 hours designated for the return of hostages.

Does any Israeli body publish a count of detention orders issued since then?

Not in these publications. The Israel Prison Service publishes month-end stocks and categories, and no Israeli body cited here has published an arrest or detention-order count for the period after 10 October 2025.

Where can the monthly figures be checked?

The Israel Prison Service publishes them as a quarterly freedom-of-information workbook, and the Gaza residency figures sit on its residency-by-prisoner-type sheet.

Sources

- Government of Israel, 2025. Decision 3396, Framework for the release of all Israeli hostages. Government Secretariat, Prime Minister's Office, 9 October 2025. Official record.

- Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson, 2025. Division 252 activity in the yellow line area. War diary, 4 November 2025. A party's own published account of its own operations.
- Israel Prison Service, 2026. Inmates report, fourth quarter 2025. Freedom-of-information quarterly, published 17 March 2026. Official record.
- State Comptroller of Israel, 2026. Incarceration, Release and Prosecution of Security Prisoners Following the Iron Swords War. Annual-report series, published 9 June 2026. Official record.

SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

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RECORD EXPLAINER September 9, 2026

Has Israel Entered Gaza Neighbourhoods During the Ceasefire?



PRIMARY DOCUMENT September 9, 2026

What Did Israel's Cabinet Decide About the Gaza Ceasefire?

Every figure on this page names the body that published it and the period it covers. Where a figure is a party's own count of its own activity, the page says so and states the standard that produced it. See Sources and method.

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When Does Israel Say a Home Can Be a Military Target?

A building can be a military objective by its nature, location, purpose or use, Israel's Foreign Ministry stated on 2 November 2023.

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